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Irrigation Management in Nepal’s Dhaulagiri Zone: Institutional 
Responses to Social, Economic and Political Change 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1  The Focus, the Purpose and the Problem of the Thesis 
The focus of this thesis is irrigation and its institutional settings in the hills and mountains of 
Nepal’s Dhaulagiri Zone. Community-level water irrigation management institutions constitute the 
prime level. These institutions will be examined in terms of the implications of social, economic 
and political change in relation to irrigation as common property regimes1. This involves analysis 
along the following lines: firstly, the historical, social and economic contexts of irrigation systems 
and rural development; secondly, the performance of irrigation systems; and, thirdly, relationships 
between the economic and political context, access to livelihood opportunities, and irrigation 
system performance. The analysis is primarily conducted in the temporal context of the 1990s and 
2000s, and involves repeat survey methodology. 
One aim of this thesis is to explore, empirically, if and how irrigation systems and their institutions 
are affected by what appears to be a changing role of agriculture in rural economies and livelihoods. 
Another, closely related aim is, through this empirical exploration, to identify factors that affect the 
roles and the performance of irrigation institutions, and the challenges that changing external 
conditions represent to theory and policy formulation. It is believed that better understanding of the 
challenges and processes involved in rapid socio-economic change in relation to collectively 
managed irrigation is required for the formulation of needs-responsive policies. Irrigation is a key 
resource—the management of, and the access to, being important in livelihood and poverty 
contexts. It is also believed that in the current contexts of rapid and heterogeneous change 
commonly associated with economic globalization, dominant thinking on irrigation institutions as 
effective ways of organizing agricultural production—as reflected in both theory and policy—fails 
to fully capture changing ground-level reality. Therefore, it is proposed that the central role 
provided to community-based natural resource management institutions in rural development policy 
and planning frameworks requires re-thinking. It is the ambition of this thesis to contribute to such 
re-thinking. 
In the context of irrigation in Nepal the problematic may be summed up as follows: livelihood 
diversification, related changing forms of agriculture and growth in non-farm income, along with 
demographic issues, appear to have become major elements in socio-economic change in rural 
Nepal. If agriculture is no longer the major source of livelihoods, incentives for investing time and 
labour in collective operation and maintenance of irrigation systems are likely to be affected, and 
may therefore have implications for the capacity of local water management institutions to operate 
and maintain irrigation systems effectively and in a sustainable manner. So would the introduction 
of crops that require irrigation schedules different from those of conventional crops. However, the 
relationships between social, economic and political change and institutional change in irrigation 
systems are not well understood, partly because of the rapid nature of change and partly because of 
a theoretical dearth within this area of research. As a consequence, contemporary rural development 
                                                 
1 A common property regime is a set of institutions, regulations and management practices subject to collective 
decision-making. See section 2.5.1. 
 1
frameworks tend to inadequately address the increasing complexity of local irrigation management. 
In sum, it is considered relevant, both empirically, theoretically and in a policy sense, to analyse 
institutional responses to change in terms of their broader context. 
1.2 Points of Departure 
1.2.1  “Nepal is a Landlocked Country……” 
A great many reports, academic or otherwise, on Nepal’s development begin by stating that “Nepal 
is a landlocked country”. This is usually to somehow explain Nepal’s relative geographical 
disadvantage and thus limited achievements in terms of social and economic development2. Being 
sandwiched between China (Tibet) and India has indeed created a high degree of economic 
dependence, particularly on India, which controls Nepal’s access to the sea, and through trade and 
transit agreements is able to set conditions for trade. The topography of the 147,000 km2 country, 
commonly divided into three ecological zones (mountains, hills and terai) with the majority of the 
population of some 28 million people concentrated in the smallest of these zones, the terai (or 
plains) bordering India, is another often-cited constraint to development.  
There is little doubt that these physical attributes have played a part in shaping the predominantly 
agrarian-based economic development of the country. The geographical focus in this study is on the 
mountains and the hills, where limited access has meant that local economies, many based on 
irrigated agriculture, were relatively isolated for centuries. It may be argued, as do Bray (1991) and 
Schendel (1991), that the isolated and scattered nature of irrigation, such as found in the hills and 
mountains of Nepal, has not contributed to the patterns of change or ‘laws of motion’, such as those 
that, for example, Geerts (1963) and Wittfogel (1957) with their concepts of agricultural involution 
and hydraulic society, respectively, claimed had taken place in parts of East and Southeast Asia. 
Indeed, the social and economic ramifications of Nepal’s thousands of irrigation systems have, 
generally speaking, not involved the generation of food surpluses and thus the release of labour for, 
for example, cultural activities and specialization, as is claimed to have been the case in so-called 
hydraulic societies. Difficult topography aside, the historical ‘neglect and rule’ nature of the state in 
Nepal has also played a role in constraining economic achievements. The Kathmandu Valley was 
the closest that Nepal came to anything that may resemble a hydraulic society. With its intricate 
triple cropping irrigation systems, some of which were state-sponsored, this valley “represented an 
island of high agricultural productivity against a general background of inefficient and extensive 
farming practices” (Regmi 1978:14), also with a great deal of specialization and some of the 
impressive cultural artefacts associated with a strong state. State-sponsored irrigation canals (so-
called raj khulo) were also in place in the districts of Nuwakot, Kaski, Palpa and Syangja from the 
19th century, but the areas irrigated were not large3.  
 
                                                 
2 In 2007, Nepal was ranked 142 of 177 nations in the composite Human Development Index and 148 in terms of GDP 
per capita (United Nations Development Programme 2007). 
3 These state-operated systems were apparently developed when Nepal was divided into principalities. These became 
slowly incorporated into the unified state of Nepal under King Prithivi Narayan Shah (see Agergaard 1998. See 
Benjamin and Shivakoti 2002 for the origins of the Palpa Raj Khulo). 
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Rana4 rule in particular, characterized as it was by a combined philosophy of feudal greed and 
mediocrity, appears to have played a major role in suppressing economic potential. As Mahesh 
Chandra Regmi, Nepal’s eminent historian and prime source of evidence on irrigation in the 
country5 points out throughout his scholarship, the purpose of government to the Ranas was the 
extraction of revenue through taxation on agricultural lands and the maintenance of controls to 
ensure that the small elite in Kathmandu secured these revenues. As noted in chapter 5, one such 
control measure was to restrict internal movement and social upliftment by not investing in 
infrastructure, social and physical, preferring to collect whatever meagre revenues could be 
obtained from subsistence farmers. Other measures included intricate systems of land tenure aimed 
at ensuring tax collection and control. This involved the granting of so-called birta lands 
(ownership of which was permanent and, in addition to the collection of taxes for the state, involved 
the imposition fines that accrued as personal income) as well as jagir lands (with fewer privileges 
and on a temporary basis) to loyal subjects (see Benjamin and Shivakoti 2002). 
Unlike their Shah (or Gorkhali) predecessors who attached importance to land reclamation and 
resettlement, the Ranas had limited ambitions beyond securing personal wealth and the status quo. 
The period of their rule was therefore characterized by lack of agricultural innovation, and 
Agergaard argues that the foundation for what she calls the “undeveloped agrarian economy of 
Nepal” (1998:30) was laid in the 19th century. In this regard, she quotes the concluding paragraph of 
Regmi (1978): 
“Under the agrarian system that existed in Nepal during the 19th century, resources were 
extracted from the peasants without any compensation, and neither the state nor the elite 
groups who absorbed these resources took serious interest in the lowly occupation of tilling 
the land and raising crops… low productivity due to inadequate capital investment in 
agriculture, the mainstay of Nepal’s economy, was consequently the key link in the chain of 
historical causation that explains why Nepal remained a poor country during the 19th 
century” (Regmi 1978:158 in Agergaard 1998:31). 
While irrigation had been introduced with the migration of Hindu caste groups into the hills from as 
early as the first millennium (see section 5.8.1), it was most probably based on the production of 
only one annual crop (monsoon rice) for centuries (Regmi 1978). As Benjamin and Shivakoti 
(2002) argue, some agricultural innovation and intensification, such as that associated with the 
introduction of new crops and irrigation, may have developed through the spread of birta and jagir 
forms of land tenure and the associated coercion of the state such as that involving jhara, a form of 
forced labour. However, relative rapid population increase (a tripling since 1850, see Agergaard 
1998) probably also played a role. The fact that most of the irrigation systems investigated in this 
study (in the hills) were developed during the 20th century would tend to support this, along the 
lines of Boserup’s (1965) theory that agricultural intensification occurs in response to population 
growth. It is also quite clear, from the histories provided by farmers in this study, that it was farmers 
themselves that built most of the systems without state involvement. As Benjamin and Shivakoti put 
it, “in an environment of central neglect… farmers had to provide irrigation facilities by the own 
efforts” (2002:58). 
                                                 
4 The Ranas, a section of the nobility that managed to hang on to power from 1846 to 1951, are generally blamed in the 
literature for keeping Nepal isolated, underdeveloped and feudal. 
5 As Benjamin and Shivakoti (2002) point out, most of the information on irrigation in Nepal derives, indirectly, from 
Regmi’s work on land tenure and taxation. 
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The period from 1950, following more than 100 years of Rana rule, is often referred to as the era of 
bikash, or development, or planned development because of the establishment of a series of national 
five-year plans that since 1956 have specified goals and objectives for the various sectors of the 
economy. The era has been characterized by massive flows of foreign aid to Nepal, but there is a 
general consensus in the literature that more than 50 years of development aid has produced 
relatively meagre results. Explanations for this vary, ranging from emphasis on the caste system and 
‘fatalism’ (Bista 1991) to lack of commitment on the part of the political elite (Mihaly 1965); 
however, most commentators, regardless of emphasis, implicitly or explicitly, acknowledge that the 
historical political economy, particularly the legacy of the Ranas and the Shah rulers before them, is 
a major factor in a political economy of aid which, with the rent-seeking nature of its bureaucracy, 
political mismanagement and a centralist culture combining to make development relatively 
unsuccessful in Nepal. 
In the context of irrigation, it is quite obvious that the rent-seeking and centralist culture was 
sustained by foreign aid when the Department of Irrigation came into existence in 1951. Large-scale 
irrigation projects supported by foreign donors, although implemented far from the capital, were 
generally controlled by the centre (see Dixit and Gyawali 1999, also section 4.2). The country’s 
tendering regulations that involved a hierarchy of contractors, ensured, at least until the early 1990s 
when the legislation was partly changed, that controlling the projects was a lucrative affair. Fuelled 
by a ‘productivist’ (Wilson and Rigg 2003) quest to increase national food production and informed 
by water-control thinking, much attention was focused on large-scale irrigation development in the 
terai, which had seen considerable immigration from the hills. How many hectares of what became 
known as agency-managed irrigations systems (as opposed to farmer-managed irrigation systems) 
were developed is uncertain6. What is quite clear though, is that irrigation management in Nepal, in 
the period from the early 1950s to the early 1990s, became increasingly ‘governmentalized’ (see 
Pradhan and Yoder 1990, International Labour Organisation 1995). It is also quite clear that the 
merits of these agency-managed systems in terms of sustainability are poor, and that the 
contribution of ‘indigenous’ systems to agricultural production has been largely ignored (Pradhan P, 
1988). In the 1980s, the focus changed to irrigation development and rehabilitation in the hills and 
mountains; in addition to food production, the objective was now one of food security and halting 
emigration from the hills to the terai, by then considered to have reached food production and 
‘carrying’ capacity.  
With the introduction of democracy in Nepal in 1990, and the subsequent dawn of policies 
supporting steps towards more autonomous management of natural resources at the community 
level, the ‘governmentalization of irrigation’ trend was slowed and eventually reversed. A series of 
events led to local resource management institutions occupying a significant role in the 
development strategies and legal framework of Nepal including its Agricultural Perspective Plan of 
1995 (National Planning Commission 1995). First of all, community-focused policies were— and 
continue to be—endorsed by development agencies for which local natural resource management 
organizations were considered particularly appropriate institutional forms. Secondly, along with 
accompanying strategies emphasizing ‘good governance’, popular participation and 
decentralization, the 1990s saw a series of studies that rediscovered the historical role of indigenous 
irrigation (see e.g. Pradhan P 1989, Pradhan and Yoder 1990, Rana 1992, KC and Pradhan 1993, 
Yoder 1994, ILO 1995, Pradhan P 2003). There was a focus, in much of this work, on how 
                                                 
6 By one count, community institutions manage, or partly manage, at least 16,700 irrigation systems, or 67 per cent of 
Nepal’s irrigable area, the remaining being agency- (government-) managed (Pradhan P 1989), but the distinction 
between agency- and farmer-managed systems is often somewhat blurred (Gyawali and Dixit 1999). 
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penetration of government authority with its legislative and regulatory framework, imposed on 
‘traditional’ institutions, might lead to the erosion of capacity for cooperation in irrigation through 
loss of indigenous management and technological skills. Thirdly, case studies from Nepal in 
influential collective action literature (see, for example, Ostrom et al. 1992) demonstrated that 
farmer-managed systems performed better than agency-managed systems, and pilot projects such as 
the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project (see section 1.2.3) demonstrated that participatory 
resource management worked in practice.  
In sum, numerous studies found that farmer-managed irrigation systems (or what is more commonly 
referred to in the literature as community-based irrigation systems) in Nepal display a variety of 
specific socio-economic and institutional contexts, and a similarly vast variety of water 
management practices. These typically include the pooling of resources for the construction and 
maintenance of canals and tanks as well as the regulation of water distribution and allocation. They 
usually also include the monitoring of violation of rules, and arbitration and negotiation in the case 
of conflict. Local irrigation management institutions also play roles in safeguarding the resource, 
including the protection of watersheds. Similarly, a wide range of water management institutional 
and organizational patterns are found. Committees may be selected or elected, written constitutions 
may or may not exist, some organizations are very hierarchical, others have flatter structures, etc. 
(see Pradhan P 1989). These characteristics may influence the mobilization of resources, water 
allocation rules, conflict resolution, etc., and are believed to influence overall performance of 
systems. Regardless of the variations, coordination—at least in cropping regimes based on cereal 
crops—is necessary because of the complexity and interrelationship between the many tasks that 
must be performed to ensure the flow of resources necessary to accomplish irrigation delivery 
(Yoder 1994). In other words, many of the qualities that are perceived as central to sustainability, 
and which appear to be lacking in agency-managed systems, appear to be present in community-
based irrigation. 
Documentation of the qualities of community-based irrigation in Nepal in past decades have 
brought these systems into the league of more celebrated and well-documented community systems 
in mountains or hills in Asia, such as the muang fai systems of northern Thailand (see, for example, 
Elstner and Neef 2004, Tan-Kim-Yong et al. 2005) and the subaks of Bali (see, for example, Geertz 
1980, Lansing 1980).  
1.2.2 Irrigation Systems and Agrarian Change 
As research such as that referred to above suggests, community-based irrigation systems appear to 
possess certain qualities that render them viable and sustainable modes for organizing agricultural 
production. However, the problematic of this thesis is focused not so much on irrigation systems 
themselves, but rather on how these systems and their institutions are shaped by changing wider 
economic and political contexts. It follows that irrigation and its institutions are seen to be closely 
linked with agrarian change. The problematic of section 1.1 has been arrived at on the basis of 
growing evidence of the declining and changing role of agriculture in the rural economies of Nepal, 
as in many other parts of the world, as a result of global and regional economic forces. Barker and 
Molle note that: 
“Although traditional communal irrigation schemes are often praised for their endogenous 
mix of local wisdom and social cohesion, and sometimes romanticized, these systems are 
now exposed to new threats, as communities have opened to the world, agriculture moved 
from subsistence to commercialization, and villagers diversified their economic activities” 
(2002:4). 
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The scenario suggested by Barker and Molle obviously draws attention to external forces other than 
those associated with government authority, which was, as noted in section 1.1, the preoccupation 
of earlier research. Also, as Rigg emphasizes, there are strong empirical indications that rural areas, 
their economies and agriculture are changing:  
“the distinctions between rural and urban are becoming blurred as households increasingly 
occupy, or have representation in, both the rural and urban worlds and, more to the point, 
earn a living in both agricultural and non-farming activities… this requires a re-thinking of 
the rural economy and rural life, a reappraisal of policy initiatives and planning strategies, 
and a re-formulation of theories of agricultural and rural development” (Rigg 2001 in Barker 
and Molle 2002: 22). 
Indeed, rapid social and economic change in rural areas leads to increasingly complex rural 
development trajectories, as captured in the notion that “trends and discontinuities in the character 
of rural areas generate a rural development problematic sharply different from that of the past” 
(Ashley and Maxwell 2001:397) and, it should be added, from that prescribed by conventional 
theoretical approaches to rural development such as, for example, the pervasive growth–linkages 
thinking. Livelihoods diversification in particular creates increased complexity. Both of the above 
quotes allude to a theoretical (and a policy) dearth with respect to understanding changes in the 
relative importance of agriculture. In both the policy and academic ‘camps’, there appears to be 
considerable confusion with respect to responding conceptually and practically to the 
‘discontinuities’ referred to above; a problem that is no doubt compounded by the speed with which 
many rural areas are changing. 
Rigg (2006) points out that to the following trends seem to be occurring in the developing world. 
● Occupations and livelihoods in the countryside are diversifying. 
● Occupational multiplicity is becoming more common. 
● The balance of household income is shifting from farm to non-farm. 
● Livelihoods and poverty are becoming de-linked from land (and from farming). 
● Lives are becoming more mobile and livelihoods correspondingly delocalized. 
● Remittances are playing a growing role in household economies. 
● The average age of farmers is rising. 
● Cultural and social changes are being implicated in livelihood modifications and in new ways. 
In Nepal, rural livelihoods and local economies have, particularly in the past decade, become more 
strongly associated with employment opportunities in India and, increasingly, labour markets 
further a field. Agriculture as a source of livelihood remains important, but not as important as it 
used to be, even if increased commercialization of agriculture is occurring, particularly in areas 
within reach of roads (Blaikie and Coppard 1998). Livelihood diversification at the household level 
appears to be the main reason for agriculture’s declining role. Comparison of data on non-farm 
incomes from the mid-1970s with data from the mid-1990s reveals that non-agricultural income has 
increased significantly over the past decades for all categories of rural households (Blaikie et al. 
2002). Recent census data suggest that one-third of the economically active population is solely 
involved in non-agricultural activities (International Center for Integrated Mountain Development et 
al. 2003), while in the 1980s only 14 per cent of the population worked in non-agricultural activities 
(World Bank 1991).  
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It should also be noted that the rural development trajectory of Nepal in past decades has moved in 
conflicting directions. On the one hand, it appears that democratic policies meant greater ability to 
pursue livelihood interests on the part of certain groups of farmers. These groups were also helped 
by increasing levels of connectivity to gain access to markets and information. On the other hand, 
the Maoist armed movement, which was launched in 1996, in many ways stifled institutional and 
economic life. In many rural areas of the country, the conflict led to economic crisis, displacement 
and exodus on a large scale. 
These trends compel a questioning of the key assumption behind the placing of community-based 
irrigation institutions at the forefront of rural development frameworks. In particular, the contingent 
assumption within collective action theory7—the main body of thought that has informed scholars 
and planners—of the centrality of agriculture to people’s livelihoods has to be questioned. A 
corollary problem in this context is the tendency to perceive communities as stable entities in which 
people are seen to depend on natural resources for survival (Moench 2002, Sadeque 1999). In the 
face of the growing evidence of changing ground-level realities, it appears increasingly problematic 
to consider communities and their institutions as stable entities in which people have incentives to 
manage key resources such as irrigation water collectively. 
These changing realities have not gone entirely unnoticed in Nepal. Indirect information points to a 
number of implications: Gyawali and Dixit (1999) note with reference to irrigation systems in the 
Tinau Basin that the changing nature of labour relationships and increased mobility induce farmers 
to default on long-standing norms by working elsewhere instead of contributing to cleaning canals 
and erecting diversions. On the same note, Pradhan P (2003) expresses concern that the migration 
of young men will lead to labour shortages for operation and maintenance tasks in the Chattis 
Mauja system in the terai. A recent study (DANIDA 2002) on hill communities with micro-
hydropower in the hills indicates vast income differentials as a result of remittances; something that 
prominent studies suggest is harmful to cooperation (Tang 1991, Bardhan 1995). Finally, Blaikie et 
al. (2002) note that demographic restructuring of villages in the hills may lead to disintegration of 
the “moral economy” of the village. 
1.2.3 The Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 
Another point of departure for this study is my involvement in the Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project, a technical cooperation project between the Department of Irrigation and the 
International Labour Organization8 funded by DANIDA and implemented in Parbat, Baglung, 
Myagdi and Mustang Districts in Nepal’s Dhaulagiri Zone (see map 1, section 5.1). The core 
methodological approach in this study involves comparison between socio-economic and 
institutional circumstances in the early 1990s and the early 2000s in communities affected by 
project interventions. The ‘historical’ data in this repeat survey consists of so-called key-effects 
                                                 
7 While, admittedly, too general a notion and an oversimplification, collective action theory refers to the academic 
discourse that started out in reaction to Hardin’s (1968) pessimistic views on the viability of common ownership of 
natural resources. The theories and concepts for solving collective action problems in rural development in this 
discourse are applied in relation to management and governance of the commons, which refers to a “diversity of 
resources or facilities as well as to property institutions that involve some aspect of joint ownership or access” (Dietz et 
al. 2002:18). See chapter 2. 
8 The involvement of the International Labour Organization in an agricultural project was based on the philosophy of its 
Special Public Works Programme, which sought to alleviate poverty through labour-, and community-based methods 
for infrastructure development. It is also quite probable that the Basic Needs Strategy that informed development in 
Nepal in the 1980s, formulated by the International Labour Organization, with food security as an element, led to the its 
involvement in irrigation.  
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monitoring studies (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) that were 
carried out when I worked as Socio-economic Monitoring and Evaluation Officer for the project 
from 1992 to1995. While this is not an impact study of the project, its activities and philosophy 
should be considered important ‘case’ context. 
As explained in previous sections, pre-1950s irrigation in Nepal mainly entailed the production of 
monsoon rice and, until the 1980s, project interventions focused mainly on development of large-
scale systems in the terai. The Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project along with a number of 
other projects9 focused on irrigation rehabilitation in the hills and mountains, with the broad 
objective of seeking to halt migration to the terai10 through improved living standards and better 
food security in the hills and mountains. These improved conditions were to come about as a result 
of increased agricultural production through more reliable supply and more efficient use of water. It 
involved two major interventions: firstly, replacing or improving temporary earth and stone 
structures at the points in feeder streams where water is diverted into irrigation canal systems (the 
intake) with cement and sometimes iron structures. Temporary structures, often made of earth and 
stone, tend to be washed away by floods and require considerable labour inputs. Secondly, lining 
earthen canals with cement so as to minimize conveyance losses (i.e., water loss in the canals) from 
seepage and leakage. Cement lining of canals often has the added advantage of increasing the flow 
of water as friction is reduced. The aim of bringing not only increased, but also more reliable, 
supplies of water was to enable the irrigation of crops other than monsoon rice, such as wheat and 
maize, all year round. It was also to reduce the labour inputs required for maintenance activities, 
thus freeing labour for managing additional crops.  
The Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, started in 1989 and completed in 1996, coincided 
with the dawn of a policy environment that was, as described in section 1.2.1, characterized by a 
focus on decentralized and participatory resource management. The project acted as a field 
laboratory for policy frameworks that promoted the implementation, operation and management of 
irrigation by farmers through legally recognized irrigation associations. This institutional 
engineering was by and large carried out in accordance with conventional wisdom at the time, based 
strongly on the assumption that agriculture was central to people’s livelihoods and that, therefore, 
people would continue to cooperate in its management. It also involved the testing, implementation 
and documentation of community-based, labour-intensive and thus local-employment-generating 
construction methods (the so-called piecework system11). Additionally, the project involved a 
number of ‘irrigation-related’ activities, including income-generation and savings groups for 
women, environmental protection measures, and improved access (mainly mule trails). 
By the end of the project period, 67 irrigation systems had been assisted, the vast majority (59) as 
rehabilitation projects, and a minority (eight) as new projects. The project’s final evaluation report 
(Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 1996) estimates that close to 6000 households (or some 
34,000 individuals) had gained improved or new irrigation facilities; that up to 200 construction 
groups and irrigation organizations had been formed or strengthened; that some 3000 individuals 
had received training; and that 1500 women in the so-called beneficiary communities had become 
members of women’s saving groups. The selection of projects for assistance was not based on any 
                                                 
9 Including the World Bank’s Irrigation Line of Credit and the Asian Development Bank’s Irrigation Sector Project. 
10 Following decades of government-encouraged migration, the terai was considered to have reached its ‘carrying 
capacity’. 
11 This approach, which was (at least in the context of Nepal) pioneered by the project, allowed the contracting of minor 
works to community-based construction groups and unlicensed contractors. 
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form of master planning prioritization at district level. Any community, provided it could muster 75 
signatories, could apply for rehabilitation assistance and was, in principle, entitled to a pre-
feasibility survey involving the application of both technical and social selection criteria, and 
provided criteria were met, project assistance. In practice, however, the majority of projects that 
ended up receiving assistance were not necessarily the most needy. Rather, a combination of ‘first 
come first served’ and the local political economy meant that they tended to be located in central 
areas or be otherwise relatively well endowed.  
The empirical setting of this study and its meaning are introduced in more detail in chapter 5. 
Suffice it to say at this point, that the basic approach, pioneered in the context of Nepal by the 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, was replicated in subsequent irrigation projects12 on a 
larger scale. There has not, neither in the design of these projects nor in the literature, been much 
questioning of the wisdom of the dominant rehabilitation approach13 to improving food security and 
living standards in the hills and mountains of Nepal. Additionally much as in the days of the 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, Nepal’s rural development frameworks continue to 
assign central places to institutions for the cooperative management of irrigation. This is seemingly 
based on the persistent assumption that not only is agriculture central to people’s livelihood, but that 
the type of agriculture that is central is based on community-managed irrigation. 
 
12 The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank’s Irrigation Sector Project in the hills. 
13 One contribution, however, breaks rank and questions the wisdom of promoting water control technologies that only 
aim at strengthening existing rice–maize–wheat irrigation regimes. These technologies, it is pointed out, not only 
require substantial cooperation in operation and management, but are also by design geared towards relatively large 
flows of water and coordinated irrigation. Perhaps, it is asked, it would be wiser to promote technologies that focus on 
micro-sources of irrigation and that are geared to the more individualized irrigation requirements of high-value crops 
(mainly horticultural) for which the hills and mountains are seen to have a competitive advantage? (Parajuli et al. 2001). 
 
Chapter 2: Towards Re-thinking of Irrigation and Rural Development 
2.1 Introduction 
It is the intention in this chapter to present the theoretical background for analysis of irrigation 
systems and their institutions in the context of livelihood change. Because of the rural change 
perspective of this thesis, it includes elements of the meta-level theory formation associated with 
rural development and agrarian change. However, its frameworks for analysing performance in 
irrigation systems and for analysing institutional change in a social and economic perspective are in 
the main related to middle-level theory construction. That level of theory construction is associated 
with, in the words of Martinussen, “phenomena between structures and individual actors”, which, as 
he noted in the latter half of the 1990s, represent a “break with the previously predominant tendency 
to focus on societal formations in their entirety as the central units of analysis” (1997:353). 
I accept that a great deal of the problematic of this thesis, particularly the elements that relate to the 
changing role of labour in irrigation, might quite plausibly be explained by drawing on the literature 
on agrarian change and structural transformation. Not least the more recent works on changes in 
rural economies that situate rural livelihood diversification and related themes within the dynamics 
of globalization, de-agrarianization and de-peasantization (see, for example, Bryceson 2001, Rigg 
2006, Wilson and Rigg 2003, Start and Johnson 2004 and the various articles in Development 
Policy Review 19(4) 2001). However, as Ashley and Maxwell suggest, diversification can be 
understood as being “by households or of economies” (2001:408). I will, in this endeavour, focus on 
both, i.e., on how the micro-world (de Haan and Zoomers 2005) of households, institutions, 
communities, etc. responds to external conditions, without losing sight of the fact that many of 
these conditions are indeed structural in nature. 
As suggested above, two broad bodies of theory with which I will mainly engage may both be said 
to belong within middle-level theory construction. The first is primarily associated with natural 
resource management, and may be referred to as what I define later in the chapter to be collective 
action theory. Its literature has grown immensely over the past couple of decades, not least in the 
context of irrigation, and has become important in terms of both actual contributions1 and influence 
on policy. The main objective of most contributions within this body of literature has been to 
demonstrate that so-called collective action problems can be solved, i.e., that cooperation in 
managing irrigation and other natural resource and agriculture endeavours is feasible. This has 
typically been demonstrated through explanation of the internal level circumstances of the workings 
of these endeavours. In the course of demonstrating this, certain theories have been advanced that 
may explain how some cooperative endeavours work, or may be made to work, under certain 
circumstances, but any theory with “general explanatory power”, as Martinussen (1997) notes, on 
the so-called commons and their workings has not been generated as a result.  
Within the main competing body of literature, which I choose to categorize under a broad ‘property, 
access and entitlements’ heading, the objectives and focuses of contributions have been more 
diffuse than that of the collective action literature. In general though, these contributions have 
                                                 
1 One indicator in this respect is articles catalogued in the ‘Common-Pool Resource Biography’ at Indiana University, 
which show that the number of articles on the commons had grown from 275 in 1990 to more than 1000 new articles in 
2000. Likewise, the number of scholars (whose papers often coincide with those in the above-mentioned biography) 
attending the biannual conferences held by the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) 
grew from 150 to more than 600 over the same period (Dietz et al. 2002). Please note that not all contributions to the 
IASCP may be said to belong to collective action scholarship. 
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tended to focus on the dynamics of natural resource management under various property 
arrangements, and the external social, economic, political, cultural and historical contexts that 
influence institutional arrangements. They are also characterized by a tendency to subsume such 
dynamics in wider processes of agrarian change. Even so, this body of literature has, as its already 
mentioned diffuse nature would suggest, also not generated a theory with general explanatory 
powers on the dynamics of rural change and its wider contexts. I do not actually believe that a 
general theory of rural change or natural resource management, its trajectories or dynamics in 
relation to surrounding social and economic environments is possible, nor particularly useful. Not 
only because analytical perspectives are diverse, as the demarcation of theoretical perspectives 
roughly outlined above would suggest, but also because local natural resource management 
represents empirical contexts that are far too diverse and dynamic to warrant comprehensive 
theories. To do justice to certain empirical contexts, as the empirical sections of this thesis will 
demonstrate, seemingly divergent conceptual and analytical frameworks may have to be employed.  
So why talk about comprehensive theories at all? Because, as Agergaard (1998) notes2, certain 
thought dominates research, despite analytical disjunctions. That dominant thought, which 
obviously changes over time, I propose is, within the area of local natural resource management and 
rural change (as within other areas), to a large extent the results of a striving towards some degree 
of generalization. What is perceived, in certain periods of time, within major discourses generated 
in particular political and economic environments3, as the most plausible, widely applicable, widely 
disseminated and valid forms of explanation becomes dominant thought. Any theoretical 
presentation obviously needs to relate to such dominant thought before any attempts can be made to 
re-think the issues. 
Hence, the main objectives of this chapter are: firstly, to present and discuss the most dominant 
approaches to local natural resource management and its explanatory value in the context of what I 
perceived, in the first chapter, as a rapidly changing rural livelihood context. Secondly, I will 
attempt to identify some of the ingredients required for re-thinking of approaches. It may be noted 
at this point that somewhat detailed theoretical elements will also appear in chapters 8 and 9 in 
connection with the conceptual and analytical frameworks applied to empirical contexts. Therefore, 
the presentation in this chapter seeks to take a ‘step back’ in relation to the analytical frameworks 
and focus on the theoretical trajectories and foundations that underlie these frameworks. 
2.2 Defining and Understanding Institutions: The Main Positions 
I find it appropriate to start out by defining institutions, as this many-faceted concept is repeated 
throughout this thesis. In the following, I will not so much discuss the methodological tensions and 
cleavages regarding the concept—that discussion surfaces in later sections—but merely introduce 
the definitions and some of the minor tensions surrounding the concept. I will, however, also 
                                                 
2 Agergaard notes this in the context of migration processes (but not in the context of migration as a manifestation of 
diversification)—an area of research that also expresses itself at “diverse analytical levels and from different analytical 
perspectives” (1998:37).  
3 Johnson (2004:429) quotes Campbell and Pedersen on what could be called the ‘political economy of dominant 
thought’: “There is ample evidence showing that those paradigmatic views that came to dominate the intellectual 
landscape at different moments in history did so in part because they were backed by substantial material resources and 
intellectual elites who were able to gain footholds in important institutional arenas where they could articulate their 
ideas, train protégés, and establish influential and professional networks for the propagation of their views” (2001:274). 
I would add to this that certain ‘paradigms’ are accommodated in political environments (see section 2.3.1). 
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position myself in relation to these definitions so that the reader has an idea about the direction of 
my argumentation. 
Institutions occupy a central, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, place in the social sciences 
and development research. They are most commonly defined as “the rules of the game in society or, 
more formally … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990:3), 
and it is these “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour that structure 
human interaction” (North 1989:1321). These institutions, or social structures, are also commonly 
understood to be composed of “cultured-cognitive, normative and relative elements” (Scott 
2001:48) that operate at multiple levels from localized interpersonal relationships to world systems. 
Emphasizing the constraining role of institutions on the individual, North’s definition is quite 
central to neoclassical economic perceptions of institutions as phenomena that somehow regulate 
utility-maximizing behaviour in a market economy. These perspectives on institutions are 
characteristic of the dominant body of literature mentioned in the introduction, i.e., that associated 
with collective action. They also “emerge from some kind of behaviouralism”, as Martinussen 
(1990:8) has pointed out, and stand in some contrast to what he calls more functional definitions.  
I take these functional definitions to denote perspectives with emphasis on the functions that 
institutions perform rather than on the cultured-cognitive and normative aspects. In the specific 
context of natural resource management institutions I refer, as mentioned in the previous section, to 
these perspectives in the context of ‘property, access and entitlements,’. In the more general context 
of institutions, I opt to categorize these functional definitions under the broad rubric of political 
economy of institutions4 approaches, thus emphasizing concern with the who-gets-what-and-where 
functions of institutions. Within this line of thinking, Bromley (2006:31) suggests that “institutions 
are the means whereby the collective control of individual action is given effect”. Institutions are 
seen as arenas where various interests are pursued, and they define fields of action for both 
individuals and groups. They are constituted chiefly by social and economic relations in 
combination (Bromley 2006), specifically by broadly defined social relations of cooperation, 
negotiation, competition and power (Lund 1994). Institutions are also very dynamic, as Berry 
(1989, 1993) has demonstrated, and must be understood in wide contexts, including both their 
contemporary and their political-economic historical foundations. They are also generally seen to 
facilitate access to livelihood opportunities and, therefore, play important livelihoods roles; people 
craft and play out livelihoods “within the context of various and varying set of matrices of 
institutions”, as Bingen (2000:9) states.  
As the last statement in particular indicates, the broad political economy of institutions approaches, 
which suggest that institutions may act as both as constraints and opportunities, stand in contrast to 
the neoclassical emphasis on institutions as something that mainly constrains individual behaviour. 
As will be more clearly spelt out later in this chapter, the differences between the 
neoclassical/behavioural and the political economy of institution definitions of institutions 
obviously lead to diverging analytical trajectories. There is, however, some degree of consensus on 
the centrality of institutions to those processes of change that we usually refer to as development. It 
seems safe to suggest that common ground could be reached by referring, as Bingen does, to 
                                                 
4 I here use the somewhat contested term ‘political economy’ in what I perceive as its sociological sense, i.e., to denote 
emphasis on economic and political power in the context of individuals in relation to groups and other ‘forces’ in 
society. In the words of Collinson, political economy analysis “focuses on the distribution of power and wealth between 
different groups of individuals, and on the processes that create, sustain, and transform these relationships over time” 
(2003:10). A more normative definition is provided by Cousins who defines political economy as “questions of 
structured inequality and relations of power” (1990:14). 
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institutions as “both formal and informal norms, rules, procedures and processes that define the way 
in which individuals should inter-relate and act” (2000:3).  
The terms institutions and organizations are often used interchangeably, both colloquially and in 
research. The cooperative arrangements in irrigation, which I refer to as irrigation institutions in this 
study, typically have some degree of organizational manifestations: they display structures of 
“recognized and accepted roles or positions that are ordered in some relationship to each other in 
order to achieve specified goals” (Bingen 2000:2) through committees, designations, etc. However, 
these institutions are much more than their recognizable structures. They are constituted by rules, 
formal and informal, as well as already mentioned social relations that are rooted in historical 
political-economic conditions of access to resources. Hence, the term institutions when applied in 
this thesis, in the context of organizational manifestations, refers to their ‘deeper’ substance.  
In this study, I employ a pragmatic approach to the debate on the nature of institutions. I hold that 
institutions are indeed the rules of the game but also much more, to the extent that the political 
economy of institutions approaches have considerable explanatory value with respect to rural 
change. I therefore place the main conceptual and analytical emphasis on institutions as conduits of 
access to resources and opportunities, as well as on the social and economical dynamics of the 
contexts in which access may occur, rather than on constraining functions and internal level 
analysis. However, as suggested in the previous section, I do not find the approaches to institutions 
mutually exclusive, but posit that the more neoclassical-economics-inspired approaches serve useful 
analytical purposes. This pragmatism stems from two factors: firstly, both lines of thinking offer 
frameworks that can meaningfully inform analyses. Secondly, my attempts at pursuing a grounded 
methodology imply that it is the empirical context, i.e., the nature of the data and its purpose, that 
guides the choice of explanatory frameworks.  
2.3  Theoretical Trajectory of ‘The Local Resource Management Institution’ in Rural 
Development 
The dynamics of irrigated agriculture and its institutions are, as pointed out in chapter 1, considered 
in a broad ‘re-thinking rural development’ perspective in this study. I will therefore briefly outline a 
theoretical and conceptual trajectory of the role of institutions and its corollary concepts in rural 
development thinking. When referring to rural development, I do not refer to a body of thought but 
to a sector characterized by competing ideas and policies. The objective is to arrive at an 
understanding of the place that the ‘local natural resource management institution’ (i.e. the kind of 
institution through which much irrigation is managed) occupies in current rural development 
thinking.  
Neat characterization of certain periods as being dominated by specific thinking is tempting, but 
obviously problematic as “paradigms and theoretical frameworks tend to accumulate in a competing 
environment rather than replace each other” (Martinussen 1990:3, see also Ellis and Biggs 2001). 
However, certain trends in the treatment of natural resource management institutions within rural 
development may be discerned. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) discuss the relationship between 
village institution and the nebulous concept of community, and point out that ‘community’ and 
village life (rather than their specific institutions) were popular subjects of analysis among 
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars attempting to understand the transformations of 
their time. Some of these scholars, they argue, represent romantic notions of kin networks, harmony 
and joint property seen to be under threat from the external, eroding forces of ‘progress’. These 
notions may still explain some of the attraction that ‘community’ holds today, particularly among 
conservationists. In contrast, the early roots of modernization theory, represented by Marx and 
Engels, Weber and (early) Durkheim, highlighted the disappearance of community, and saw market 
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penetration and urbanization as positive community-eroding factors paving the way for progress. 
These evolutionary views carried on to later modernization theorists whose perceptions were, as 
Agrawal and Gibson further argue, characterized by negative views of community and village life, 
connoting it with being underdeveloped, static and fatalistic; factors that were seen as obstacles on 
the path from traditional to modern. 
The evolutionary perspective heritage became particularly evident in post World War II 
modernization-inspired theories of rural development. While these were less explicitly negative 
about community as such than earlier scholars, village life continued to be considered traditional 
and backward, at least in less developed regions, as in Rostow (1960). Institutions, other than the 
market, were generally not recognized as tools for managing resources or structuring other forms of 
economic and social relations. In these neoclassical economics-inspired theories, markets were seen 
as the principal institutions to integrate and facilitate the activities of producers, savers and 
investors in the process of specialization. The central role assigned to the market, without much 
consideration for facilitating or constraining mechanisms, may be further illustrated by the 
emphasis on essential linkages (backward, forward and consumption) as in the pervasive ‘regional 
growth linkages’ school (see Start 2001). 
North (1990), while obviously dealing with rural development at a much later stage when principles 
associated with new-institutional economics (see below) were gaining ground, is an exception 
within neoclassical economic perspectives on rural development. While aligning himself closely 
with evolutionary perspectives on economic growth, not least rural growth linkages models, he 
adds—with a focus on transaction costs—considerable institutional nuances to these models. In 
North’s primordial village, trade is limited, as are subsequent transaction costs; whatever exchange 
exists is facilitated by a dense social network of ‘informal constraints’. However, as markets grow 
and cover larger distances, transaction costs increase as trust and kinship networks can no longer be 
relied upon. In the face of increased complexity, institutions in the shape of standards, legislation 
and, eventually, capital markets emerge.  
As highlighted by Ellis and Biggs (2001), the above neoclassical models of rural growth linkages 
were (and continue to be) at odds with parallel thinking on the ‘political economy of agrarian 
change’. This was (and is) because of the former’s neglect of issues such as rural property relations 
in agrarian change processes, inequality, class and power as well the general forces of development 
under capitalism that are seen to influence these dynamics. In the ‘political economy of agrarian 
change thinking’ institutions are predominantly embedded in these larger dynamics, some of which 
may be seen as institutions in themselves, or at least as constitutive elements of institutions. Explicit 
mention of institutions was therefore limited, something. This also owes, as Long (2001) mentions, 
to the fact that much of the debate during the 1970s and 1980s within this theoretical framework 
centred on grand theory with a particular focus on ‘the agrarian question’, i.e., on proletarianization 
versus peasantization of the countryside.  
It should be noted that collective action within this framework connoted collective resistance to 
those institutions seen to serve as mechanisms of socio-political control in the sociological sense of 
the notion (Berg 1991). Increased alienation of the rural poor from the resource bases on which 
livelihoods depend was seen as an important stimulant to such collective action (Korten 1980). This 
is obviously quite different from the meaning of collective action in the neoclassical economics 
sense where, as explained later, the notion connotes the abilities of communities to cooperate in 
managing resources.  
Neoclassical modernization theories, along with equally-structurally-founded Marxist-inspired 
macro-perspectives on development, underdevelopment and agrarian change, dominated rural 
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development debates well into the 1980s. This may well explain why the social and economic 
implications of the elaborate systems regulating cooperation in the commons and semi-commons 
that prevailed throughout the later Middle Ages in Europe and elsewhere received, as Wade wrote 
less than two decades ago, “strangely little attention from students of present-day peasant societies” 
(1988:11). Ostrom’s review and analysis of “long-enduring, self-organized and self-governed 
common pool resources” (1990:58) in Switzerland, Japan, the Philippines and Spain is an exception 
that also seeks (particularly in the case of Spain) to understand these institutions in a wider 
historical governance context. So are Wade’s references to traditional grazing and cropping 
regulations in England (Wade 1988). It may be added that North (1990) in his previously mentioned 
analysis also acknowledges what he refers to as the English heritage of institutions and ideas, from 
town meetings to self-government. Overall though, in relation to the more influential strands in 
rural development thinking, it seems appropriate to characterize institutions as a minority discourse 
of rural development, at least until the 1980s and 1990s. 
The one event that began to draw attention to non-market institutions such as those associated with 
common pool and common property resources was the publication of Hardin’s article on the 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ in 1968. With its pessimistic arguments, firmly rooted in the dogma of 
‘utility maximization of the individual’ of neoclassical economic thinking, environmental 
degradation was considered inherently related to common ownership. Any attempt at restraining 
individual use of a common resource was considered likely to fail because of ‘human nature’ 
(Hardin 1968), the crux of the argument being: one person may limit his use of a resource but if 
others do not (and why should they?) then the resource will degrade anyway, so why restrain 
oneself? 
2.3.1  Emergence of a Dominant Discourse: Enter the ‘Local Resource Management 
Institution’  
Reactions to Hardin’s paper—said to be one of the most-often cited scientific papers of the second 
half of the twentieth century—formed a theoretical context that initially challenged and nuanced 
Hardin’s assertions (Martinussen 1997), and at a later stage5 mapped and systematized conditions 
for community-based resource management. The quest for resolving the ‘tragedy’ of the commons 
fed into the phenomenal rise, in mainstream economic thinking, of attention to institutions in the 
1980s and 1990s that is commonly referred to as new-institutional economics. That this ‘new’ 
perspective on economics was in fact not altogether new was noted by Berry who found that, in 
what she calls new-institutional neoclassical economics, appreciating “the role of interlinked, often 
personalized transactions between economic agents, the economic literature has only caught up with 
the relevant literature in economic anthropology” (1993:12).  
The theoretical context6 that challenged Hardin was based on the strand (another being that of 
transaction costs) in new-institutional economics that deals with collective action in relation to 
public or collective goods (Nabli and Nugent 1989) and resources associated with common property 
arrangements. The mainstream economic concepts of ‘excludability’ (the degree to which someone 
can be excluded from benefiting from a good) and ‘subtractability’ (the degree to which someone’s 
                                                 
5 The 1985 Annapolis, Maryland, United States conference organized by the National Research Council Panel on 
Common Property Resource Management is considered a major point of departure in commons research. See chapter 8 
for more details. 
6 However, the ability or inability of (rational, self interested) individuals to cooperate in the pursuits of joint welfare 
was originally theorized by Mancur Olson (1965). 
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use of a good means less of that good for others to use) within categories of goods7 were central to 
the theoretical context. Common pool resources, to which irrigation systems are seen to belong, are 
understood to have low excludability; it is difficult to exclude someone who, by virtue of, for 
example, land ownership, is entitled to irrigation water. At the same time subtractability is high; 
“the withdrawal of an acre-foot of water from an irrigation canal means that there is one acre-foot 
of water less for anyone else to use”, as Ostrom et al. (1993:89) put it. These characteristics may 
lead to a situation, analogous to Hardin’s ‘tragedy’, where:  
“Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each 
person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of 
others. If all participants choose to free-ride, the collective benefit will not be produced” 
(Ostrom 1990:6). 
In the context of community-managed irrigation systems, ‘contribution to the joint effort’ is mainly 
associated with labour and other forms of contribution to maintenance. This is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8. The bottom line here is that, within a rational choice framework that stresses the 
micro-foundations of institutions (Scott 2001), Ostrom (1990, 1992, see also Ostrom et al.1993), in 
particular, argued that the presence of specific rules and incentives might overcome the ‘collective 
action problem’ of free-riding and subsequent ‘tragedy’. As a result, natural resource management 
institutions—based on individual economic rationales as determinants for investment in what was 
referred to as collective action—were increasingly seen as efficient ways of organizing economic 
activity within the realm of natural resource management. The idea that “social outcomes can be 
explained in terms of the calculation that individuals make about the perceived costs and benefits of 
future actions” is, as Johnson (2004:411) points out, strongly embedded in methodological 
individualism. Although the constraining role of institutions on human behaviour is toned down 
compared with non-new-institutional neoclassical approaches, the emphasis is still on rules (i.e., 
institutions) that constrain human behaviour (in this case the propensity to free-ride). I refer 
throughout this study to this approach as the collective action school (or thinking, approaches and 
thought) and to its literature as collective action research. 
The readily observable existence of cooperatively managed resource systems in many parts of the 
world, not least irrigation systems, fuelled the resolve to refute Hardin’s tragedy metaphor, even if 
he was in fact confusing free-for-all open-access grazing situations with common property 
situations where users have rights, duties and ensuing benefits. Identification of predominantly 
internal enabling factors for collective action, diagnosed as social homogeneity and supportive 
traditions, and the rules, rights, duties and sanctions that in ‘best practice’ cases regulate 
cooperation over the commons, led to the elaboration of design principles (Ostrom 1990, 1992, see 
also Vermillion 2001). This again led to the persuasive notion that appropriate local institutions 
might be engineered as part of government-cum-donor policies, i.e., that enabling institutional 
factors could be created through external intervention. Numerous case studies demonstrated that 
various collective action problems had in fact been solved (see Ostrom 1990, the collection of cases 
in Bromley et al. 1992, Baland and Platteau 1996). As an example of the substantial production of 
evidence in favour of community-level management, it was convincingly demonstrated in the case 
of Nepal that community-managed irrigation systems actually perform better than government-
managed systems (see Ostrom et al. 1992, Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002, and chapter 1 in this study).  
                                                 
7 Usually public goods, private goods, common pool, and toll goods. 
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The impact of providing central places to community-based management in development policy 
goes beyond the management of natural resources, to encompass various kinds of cooperative 
arrangements (in public works, cooperatives, etc.). In the case of irrigation, it involved taking away 
power from line agencies and allowing ‘participation’ by farmers, mainly in the construction and 
operation of irrigation schemes but also in a formal legal sense. Social mobilization, applying the 
‘get the institutions right’ social engineering ideas of Ostrom, became key elements in irrigation 
development, and eventually formal legal ownership of irrigation systems (and other resources from 
forests to drinking water) came to rest with communities who became responsible for operation and 
maintenance.  
While the initial focus in the collective action discourse was predominantly on the management of 
resources characterized by some degree of common ownership, focus on the ‘local’, the 
‘community’ and its institutions has increasingly been accommodated within the broad and 
somewhat fuzzy sphere of decentralization8. Within that sphere, the discourse throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s has become increasingly resource-specific (Saleth et al. 2003)9. A vast proportion of 
developing countries are affected by decentralization reforms10, and collective action thinking has 
contributed to the trend. In sum, perceptions of the ‘local natural resource management institution’ 
as an efficient, participative and perhaps even egalitarian medium for organizing rural development 
activities at the micro-level found a particularly central place in the rural development frameworks 
of most countries from the 1990s onwards, as a nearly hegemonic discourse (see van Meijl and von 
Benda-Beckmann, F 1999).  
Returning to the theoretical trajectory angle of these last two sections, notions of the importance of 
rural institutions other than the market obviously no longer belonged to a minority discourse. 
Rather, they had found resonance in the post-structural turn that Blaikie and Coppard claim the 
“social sciences have taken over the past decade or so, to focus on the competing knowledge claims 
of science, the state and formal institutions on the one hand, and the farmers on the other” (1998: 
28). In a specific rural development context, this paradigm shift stands in contrast to the macro-
perspectives on rural development outlined earlier, by envisaging “rural development as a 
participatory process that empowers rural dwellers to take control of their own priorities for 
change” (Ellis and Biggs 2001:443). Central to this shift, was a focus on actor-oriented perspectives 
with rural people seen as capable of understanding of the processes of change in which they are 
involved.  
Much of the academic debate in the last couple of decades has indeed focused on the structure 
versus actor, agency and practice controversy. There have been notable critiques of the analytical 
                                                 
8 Decentralization means many things to many people and is an increasingly contested notion. I prefer Ribot’s definition 
of decentralization: it is “any act by which a central government formally cedes power to actors and institutions at lower 
levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” (Ribot 2004:9). However, decentralization is often used to 
denote what we may associate with both ‘democratic decentralization’ (as in Ribot’s definition) and ‘privatization 
decentralization’ such as the ceding of power to user groups.  
9 The key statement from the Bonn Freshwater Conference in 2001 is a good example of this. “Decentralization is key. 
The local level is where national policy meets community needs. Local authorities—if delegated power and the means, 
and if supported to build their capacities—can provide for increased responsiveness and transparency in water 
management, and increase the participation of women and men, farmer and fisher, young and old, town and country 
dweller… [as well as encourage] cooperation within river basins and make existing agreement more vital and valid” 
(Bonn Keys, in Hall 2005:118). 
10 Agrawal (2001) estimates that at least 60 countries claim to be in the process of decentralizing aspects of natural 
resource management. 
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value of alleged ‘post-modernist’, ‘neo-populist’ and ‘social-constructionist’ views and notions that 
tend to see the ‘institutions as the facts’ (see for example, Blaikie and Coppard 1998, Harriss and de 
Renzio 1997). I will return to some of these aspects in later sections. Suffice it to say at this point 
that the location of collective action theories on the management of resources in the commons, in a 
theoretical tradition that focuses on behaviour and choice at the individual and group levels, not 
only explains a strong degree of ‘agency’ orientation in natural resource management thought, it has 
also ensured accommodation within the larger ‘growth linkage’ rural development discourse 
mentioned earlier.  
Further, it may be argued that the paradigm shift towards actor-oriented perspectives found fertile 
ground among donors, disillusioned as they were with the inefficiency of development aid, 
particularly the top-down approaches spawned by modernization-inspired strategies (Ellis and 
Biggs 2001). Among the rural development themes of the 1980s onwards (including NGOs, 
farming systems research, indigenous knowledge, participation), notions of the efficiency of ‘the 
local natural resource management institution’, with theoretical emphasis on incentives and choice, 
were particularly attuned to the liberal environment promoted by international donors (see Start 
2001). That liberal environment—which also led some observers to talk of a ‘Washington 
Consensus on Food, Agriculture and Rural Development’11 (see Maxwell and Heber-Percy 2001)—
gained ground in a number of countries that from the 1980s had not only embarked on 
decentralization reforms, but had also adopted structural adjustment policies and associated policies 
of economic liberalization. 
2.4  The Limitations of Collective Action Approaches  
As the previous section establishes, the theoretical and related political trajectories of institutions in 
rural development and natural resource management have, at least since the 1980s, been dominated 
by collective action research, with a principal focus on how individual incentives in combination 
with social institutions affect social outcomes (Johnson 2004). It would appear though, that the 
ambitions of this thesis to capture institutional change in relation to livelihoods change in a rural 
development context can only be partly fulfilled through the relatively restrictive, efficiency-
oriented conceptual frameworks of collective action. The frameworks may help us understand how 
common property regimes work or do not work under certain circumstances; but how these 
circumstances come about is less certain. This is linked to the tendency within collective action 
thinking to explain the workings of, for example, irrigation institutions at internal management 
levels. This, it would appear, limits the ability to capture change (Moench 2002), be it social, 
political or economic.  
Further limitations, as suggested by the internal level approach, include the tendency to perceive 
communities and associated resource management institutions as stable entities, as if the enabling 
factors for successful commons, such as interest in a natural resource and its management, social 
homogeneity, ‘supportive traditions’, etc. were constants. Of particular relevance to the ‘new rural 
development problematic’ that frames this investigation, collective action assumes that people have 
incentives to collectively manage key resources such as irrigated agriculture. That assumption is 
                                                 
11 Maxwell and Heber-Percy (2001:57) identified the Washington Consensus on Food, Agriculture and Rural 
Development as follows: “An accommodation has been found between the pre-eminence of a poverty reduction 
objective and the legacy of a neo-liberal, market-oriented model. Growth is regarded as essential, the private sector will 
be the main engine of development, government will provide strategic policy and investment support for infrastructure, 
service delivery and marketing, participation will be encouraged (perhaps more in some models than others) and safety 
nets will be provided.” 
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increasingly problematic (Sadeque 1999, Moench 2002) if agriculture is no longer as central to rural 
economies and to people’s livelihoods as it used to be. There are, in other words, limitations to what 
collective action research can explain in increasingly complex empirical contexts.  
It appears that the limitations are associated with the mode of explanation in collective action. Berry 
states that:  
“Methodological individualism—a somewhat misleading term since it refers not to a method 
of research but to a mode of explanation—has been rightly criticized for treating social 
processes as multiples or weighted sums of autonomous individual acts” (1994:27). 
Methods of research that presume the possibility of studying individuals or groups in isolation, she 
argues, preclude observation of the social relations and interactions that we try to understand. She 
recommends that in order to go beyond understandings that reflect the “theoretical presuppositions 
rather than any demonstrable social realities” (1994:34) associated with the ‘abstract’ language of 
neoclassical economics a host of methodologies should be employed. These include what she calls 
studying people rather than surveying individuals, through lifetime histories, re-studies and analysis 
of how people gain access to resources, and the role that fluid and dynamic institutions play in the 
process. Given that a re-study forms part of the empirical premises on which this study is based, I 
obviously find Berry’s recommendations appealing. I will return to these issues in section 2.5.2 and 
in the methodology chapter.  
Theories that, as their point of departure, assume informed rational individual behaviour and 
individual incentives, and emphasize the importance of rules at internal levels may indeed be 
narrow in the sense that they fail to adequately capture the wider dynamics of power and political 
economy contexts. This, however, does not mean that what they do capture is captured wrongly. 
Bardhan and Ray, in a discussion of the methodological dichotomies in mainstream economics and 
politico-economic anthropological12 methods in commons research, argue that 
“… methodological individualism, utility maximization and exogenous preferences together 
create what might be called a thin theory of human action, but it is this thinness that gives 
micro-economic models their precision, parsimony and predictive power” (2006:661).  
The documentation, in the collective action school, of the variety of ways that obstacles to 
cooperation in the commons have been overcome, and the models used to explain this, have proven 
useful tools for measuring success of failure in the ‘management’ of resources sense. Therefore, as 
frameworks for measuring performance and efficiency in the commons, collective action 
approaches such as that associated with the ‘Oakerson Framework for Analysing the Commons’ 
(Oakerson 1992) appear well suited for just that. It is, as also Cousins has noted, “extremely useful 
as a starting point for analysis” (1993:4). I demonstrate and elaborate further on this in chapter 8 of 
this study. 
2.5 Competing Perspectives 
In the following I will present and discuss competing perspectives to collective action on the 
commons. These are closely aligned with what I referred to as ‘political economy approaches’ in 
section 2.2. They are also to a large extent, in a rural development perspective, related to what I 
referred to as ‘the political economy of agrarian change’ in section 2.3. It has to be kept in mind 
                                                 
12 This is not to suggest that the overall approach towards explanation in this thesis is one of social and cultural 
anthropology; the dichotomy could just as well be between neoclassical approaches and the ‘holistic critical’ social 
science approaches of this thesis. 
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though, that drawing neat lines between perspectives is nearly as problematic as neatly 
characterizing certain periods as being dominated by specific thinking (see section 3). This has 
particularly been the case following the ‘post-structural turn’ with its ‘complexity’ claims and 
attention to agency and other specifics across disciplines. Competing perspectives on the commons 
are not necessarily dichotomous or mutually exclusive. They do, however, as I will argue, reflect 
different epistemologies that are worth taking note of because of their methodological ramifications 
and subsequent explanatory value.  
Therefore, examining the cleavages can be a useful academic exercise. Defining where ideas ‘are 
coming from’ helps in understanding methodological tensions as well as the political economic 
policy environments in which theories are accommodated. It also exposes both strengths and 
weaknesses in respect to the extent to which various explanations are likely to be accommodated in 
political economic contexts. Those strengths and weaknesses are obviously related to prevailing 
ideologies and the dominant discourses that these generate, but they are also related to more 
practical issues such as the extent to which theories adequately and readily explain phenomena13. 
Therefore, I find that characterization of theoretical propositions in respect to ambition, i.e., their 
level and purpose rather than where they diverge—as representing different layers of explanation—
is a constructive approach. This pragmatism is reflected in the frameworks identified for empirical 
analysis in this study. 
Methodological criticism and critical reviews of achievements are not new in collective action 
scholarship on the commons (see, for example, Agrawal 2001, 2002). Nor is criticism of the 
collective action approaches or elements thereof by non-collective action scholars (see, for example, 
Berry 1993, Bromley 2006, and contributions in the next sections). However, comprehensive 
analysis on where the literature crystallizes in terms of epistemology and disciplinary approaches 
seems a relatively new phenomenon, with the contributions by Bardhan and Ray (2006), Mosse 
(2006) and particularly Johnson (2004) being the most prominent to my knowledge. Put somewhat 
sweepingly, the crystallized positions on the commons may be described as follows. At one end of 
the continuum we have, as the previous sections have shown, mainstream neo-institutional 
neoclassical economists making prescriptions. At the other end, we have anthropologists having 
‘conversations’ (see Bardhan and Ray 2006, Mosse 2006) on property relations. In between the 
extremes we find (political) economists who may be prescriptive, but who also borrow concepts 
from ‘conversations’. I will start out with an example of the latter type. 
2.5.1  Common Property Resources or Common Property Regimes?  
First of all we need to return to definitions in order to obtain more precision and to re-focus. In the 
process of providing evidence that the tragedy of the commons need not to occur, it appears that the 
concepts associated with the commons became increasingly blurred in much of the collective action 
literature. Bromley14, in particular, (see 1991, 1992a, 1992b) has been at pains to advocate the use 
of the concept of common property regimes, arguing that there are no common property resources, 
only common property (and other forms of tenure) regimes. He points out that “the literature is full 
of casual references to common property resources as if this were a universal and immutable 
classification—almost as if the prevailing institutional form were somehow inherent in a natural 
                                                 
13 And may, therefore, influence the relative ease with which they may be converted into policy. 
14 Bromley is sometimes associated with the collective action literature (see, for example, Johnson 2004). I will argue 
that he differs on account of his rejection of , for example, methodological individualism, emphasis on the role of 
historical and other context in the analysis of the commons, as well as his views on property and other institutions as 
social relations. 
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resource” (1992a:65). He adds that “there is no such thing as a common property resource—there 
are only resources controlled and managed as common property, as state property or as private 
property” (1992a:66). 
Bromley’s point is that the institutional form is not inherent in the resource. Trees, fish, water and 
other natural resources are controlled and managed in the various forms mentioned above, or they 
may not be controlled or managed at all and come in the shape of open access resources. Fuys et al. 
put it concisely when they state that: 
“Common property refers to some form of shared resource tenure—usually involving a 
group that is defined that uses and manages the resource. A common property regime 
represents a set of institutions, regulations and management practices subject to collective 
decision-making. The term refers to the kind of tenure that exists, not the resource itself” 
(2006:3, my italics). 
But is it really the case that the resource does not matter in relation to the institutional arrangement? 
As Berthelsen (1997) points out, water, in the case of irrigation, constitutes a specific condition of 
production15. That specific condition of production, as I elaborate on in more detail in chapter 7, 
renders cooperation (in water conveyance, control and distribution) the most effective way of 
producing wet rice (but not necessarily the production of non-cereal crops, see chapter 9). In this 
narrow, ‘internal’ sense, characteristic of the collective action school’s use of the notion of common 
property resources, the resource may indeed be said to influence the institutional form of its 
management. However, as Berthelsen also points out, with reference to Marxist economic 
perspectives, the specific conditions of production are subsumed in common conditions of 
production (which I take to mean irrigated agriculture).  
These common conditions are subject to external conditions imposed by the “societal production 
process” (Berthelsen 1997:49), a somewhat hazy term that I take to include, for example, irrigation 
infrastructure promotion under agricultural policies that emphasize wet rice production. In this 
broader sense, the role of the resource as a determinant of the institutional form is diminished, and it 
makes more sense to focus on the form of tenure, i.e. the common property regime that serves a 
specific (production) purpose. In more concrete terms, we may say that it is the water in relation to 
human artefacts (the intake, the canals, the distribution mechanisms) and in relation to certain 
cropping patterns under certain ecological, economic and political conditions that makes 
management of the resource as common property, under a common property regime, effective. 
Also in concrete terms, it may be argued that property is a key concept, which, while most 
commonly treated as property rights in the collective action literature (see Ostrom 1990), tends not 
receive sufficient attention as an institution with economic and social dynamics. While most people 
will think of property as something very tangible (typically land), Bromley (1991) explains that 
property is not an object; it is a social relation “that defines the property holder with something of 
value against all others” (1991:2). That value is a benefit stream and a property right is a claim to a 
benefit stream, protected by an authority, usually the state in the legal sense, and the ‘local’ 
management system in the practical sense. Property should be seen as a social instrument, an 
institution that protects valuable ‘things’ with rights, and “particular property regimes are chosen 
for particular purposes” (Bromley 1991:3). Just as the state has a duty to protect individual rights 
                                                 
15 Which, in line with Wittfogel 1957 (and what insfluenced him, i.e. Marx’s ideas on a pre-capitalist mode of 
production in which irrigated agriculture is important) obviously affects institutional arrangements in society at what we 
could call a structural level. 
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holders’ claims to property, rights holders have duties; in the case of common property regimes 
those duties, on the part of the individual rights holder, relate to the protection and upkeep of 
something in which a social unit has common interests. Bromley points out that: 
“Irrigation systems represent the essence of a common property regime. There is a well-
defined group whose membership is restricted; an asset to be managed (the physical 
distribution system); an annual stream of benefits (the water that constitutes a valuable 
agricultural input); and a need for group management of both the capital stock and the 
annual flow (necessary maintenance of the system and a process for allocating the water 
among members of the group of irrigators), to make sure that the system continues to yield 
benefits to the group” (1992b:13). 
Going beyond conventional perceptions of the determining role of the resource in shaping 
institutional arrangements appears an important step towards a broader understanding of common 
property regimes. So does a deeper understanding of the dynamics of property as a social relation, 
not least if what is ‘valuable’ is no longer solely associated with agricultural production under a 
common property regime. Although not directly related to the problematic of this study, except 
perhaps in respect to notions of stability in collective action, we are also reminded that the fact that 
membership is restricted in irrigation systems, based as it is on individual ownership of land, means 
that common property regimes have something in common with individual property regimes: non-
owners are excluded from what is in fact a corporate group common property regime.  
So while excludability is low in the internal sense, as held in collective action thought (see previous 
section), it is high in relation to outsiders. Bromley pointed this out in the early 1990s (see Bromley 
1992a) and it obviously challenges perceptions (also mentioned in the previous section) of the ‘local 
natural resource management institution’ and community as an egalitarian, somewhat neutral 
medium for organizing rural development at the micro-level. Interestingly, debates that question the 
status of natural resource management decentralization as practically a panacea in this regard, as 
well as in relation to poverty reduction and democracy, have only seemed to gain vigour in the 
2000s (see, for example, Meynen and Doornbus 2004, Ribot 2004, Manor 2004, Beck and Fajber 
2006, Vandergeest 2006). 
2.5.2  ‘Property, Access and Entitlement’ Approaches 
Both the issue of equity and that of property lead towards perspectives that may be said to belong 
towards the other end of the continuum from collective action thinking, in terms of both 
epistemological and normative foundations. Johnson (2004) pins what he calls ‘the entitlement 
school’ against the collective action school by noting that:  
“Two bodies of thought compete for a voice in this literature [on the commons]. One, 
responding to Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, is primarily concerned with the problem of 
achieving collective action to conserve natural resources which are both depletable and 
unregulated. A second, motivated by notions of moral economy… and entitlement… deals 
with problems of creating and sustaining resource access for poor and vulnerable groups in 
society” (2004: 408). 
He notes, as the above quote suggests, two types of tension between these two bodies of thought: 
The first is a normative tension expressed in concern, within the collective action school, with the 
efficiency and ‘health’ of the commons (whether in a conservation or production context) on the 
one hand, and the ‘entitlement’ scholars’ concern with problems of inequality (and the implicit 
normative assertion that socio-economic equality is desirable) on the other: 
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“Whereas ‘collective action scholars’ analyse the rules and sanctions that encourage 
individuals to conserve the commons, ‘entitlement scholars’ emphasize the historical 
struggles that determine resource access and entitlement, and the ways in which formal and 
informal rules create and reinforce unequal access to the commons” (2004:409). 
The second is a methodological tension. Johnson points out that entitlement scholars tend to favour 
a sociological–historical method with emphasis on explaining property rights regimes in their 
historical context. This stands in contrast to the collective action school’s deductive models and 
methodological individualism-based approaches that are embedded in a wider trend of positivism in 
(particularly United States) social science. Within this trend, he argues, historical ‘facts’ are, at best, 
‘selected’ and interpreted so as to make theories and predictions, and in line with Popper’s (1957) 
‘poverty of history’ thinking, history generally plays a limited role. Entitlement scholars, therefore, 
“… have criticized the collective action literature for its instrumental and historically de-
contextualized understanding of common property relations, calling for a more historical 
understanding of the ecological and socio-economic factors that affect the myriad relations 
on which property, common property and other forms of resource entitlements are based” 
(Johnson 2004: 409). 
By pointing out the embeddedness of the collective action school in positivism’s tendency to 
neglect the value of contextualized analysis, historical and socio-economic, Johnson touches upon 
the concerns in the problematic that substantiate this study: that dominant approaches, in policy and 
research, to irrigation and rural development, based on assumptions about stability, the continued 
centrality of agriculture, and on farmers having incentives to invest in collective action, fail to keep 
up with ‘reality’ in a rapidly changing world. By also pointing out that collective action scholarship 
tends to be “firmly grounded in the art of deduction” (2004:424) (as opposed to more inductive and 
grounded methods) by virtue of its accommodation in a positivist social science, he touches upon 
some of the epistemological reasons for the apparent tendency, within collective action, to 
inadequately capture change in common property regimes. 
It is also worth repeating, in the context of how Johnson’s entitlement approach may be defined 
epistemologically vis-à-vis collective action, that both approaches are actor-oriented. However, 
actor orientation in the entitlements approach differs from the already mentioned assumption in 
collective action that commons endeavours are “simply the aggregated outcome of the effective 
agencies and interests of individuals” (Long 2001:57). In this context, Berry points out that: 
“In moving beyond individual and analytical individualism, however, it is important not to 
lose sight of agency. People are, after all, our principal informants: their statements and 
actions not only provide researchers with much evidence about social practices, but they 
also play an active role in shaping our understanding of their circumstances” (1994:27). 
2.6 Towards Re-thinking 
Notwithstanding epistemological differences, the focus in what Johnson (2004) calls ‘entitlement’ 
scholarship on natural resources restricts, much as the narrow focus in collective action theory on 
agriculture as the central source of livelihoods does, the ability to capture changes in irrigated 
agriculture that may not necessarily be related to natural resources. In that sense, in relation to the 
problematic of this thesis, the scholarship represents conventional wisdom that does not appear to 
constitute sufficiently useful ingredients in a re-think of approaches. In another sense though, unlike 
collective action, the approach is characterized by what does appear as a major ingredient in a re-
think, i.e., the focus on the broader factors that determine resource access and livelihood 
construction. For that reason, I will build on the approach and add ‘property’ and ‘access’ as two 
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major, related themes to Johnson’s ‘entitlements’. Admittedly, this results in a very broad ‘heading’ 
that resembles a set of complementing approaches rather than a comprehensive body of thought. 
However, these added ingredients, I will argue, appear to hold the potential for approaching a re-
thinking of common property regimes in irrigation. I will begin with property. 
2.6.1  Property as a Dynamic of Rural Change 
It may be recalled how Bromley, in section 2.5.1, in the context of common property regimes, 
explained that property is a social relation that, in the case of irrigation, may yield a benefit stream. 
From a macro-level perspective, property may not only be seen as a very central social relation, but 
also—most commonly in relation to land—as an institution that influences agrarian change. 
Property is a central dynamic of rural change because of processes of turning access into property 
claims and eventually property rights. Those processes involve struggles, negotiations, power, 
influence and eventually sanctioning by socially legitimate institutions such as the state, as Lund 
(1994) suggests. Lund also points out—with reference to agency orientation—that agrarian 
change—or rather the wide range of social, economic and political processes that cause such 
change—is multi-level and involves, but is also a lot more than, change in individual strategies.  
This notion of property is obviously related to the Marxist-inspired ‘political economy of agrarian 
change’ school. It is, however, also clear that the recognition of people’s agency is not entirely 
congruent with the largely structural analyses in the ‘political economy of agrarian change’ of the 
past16. The dynamics of turning access into property rights as a force in agrarian change is, as 
suggested above, most clearly illustrated in the context of property relations in relation to land. 
Lund and Sikor (2006), for example, demonstrate how villagers in Vietnam, owing to a 
combination of land scarcity and market forces, through individual and community level 
negotiation and claims, achieve formal (private property regime) land rights in land re-allocation 
processes. Natural resource devolution in the forestry sector in many parts of the world also 
involves related processes that result in ‘handing over’ of, if not land rights, then tenure rights to 
communities under common property regimes. In irrigation in the hills of Nepal, the process of 
turning access into property claims and rights entailed historical ethnic geography dimensions as 
well as ongoing water allocation dimensions, as explained in chapters 5 and 6. 
Thus the notion of property relations as a dynamic of rural change is useful in understanding the 
historical process of creating common property regimes. But because of the focus on processes 
involved in turning access into property claims and rights and the benefits that they create in 
relation to natural resources such as land and water, this dimension cannot stand alone in addressing 
the ‘transforming rural economies’ and ‘if agriculture is no longer as central to people’s livelihoods 
as it has been, what may then happen in common property regimes’ problematic of this thesis, with 
it implicit assumptions of reconfiguring benefit streams. Property is, however, a good entry point 
for understanding determinants of access to opportunities in general. Property, such as land and 
water and the benefits that these generate, relate to relative economic status and, as Start and 
Johnson point out, one should not “underplay the importance of economic status whether in assets 
                                                 
16 This change rests, compared with earlier approaches, as I have already touched upon, with the ‘post-structural turn’. 
Put somewhat bluntly, I propose that whereas the spoils of that turn, in relation to mainstream/neo-institutional 
economics, led to increased emphasis on methodological individualism, it led, in ‘the political economy of agrarian 
change’, to greater recognition of the empirical context and the value of specifics, of ethnographic methods and of the 
‘scientific’ value of qualitative methods in combination with structural analysis as a contextual backdrop. This is not to 
say, though, that neo-institutional scholarship does not contain any of these qualities. 
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or net entitlements flows, in influencing the qualitatively different patterns of access that arise in 
rural areas. Power over markets is determined by relative bargaining position” (2004:36).  
That, in turn, is determined by initial resource position (or endowments). Simply put, from a 
political economy perspective, differential access to opportunities, many of which are offered in 
various types of markets, tends to depend on how ‘well placed’ a person is in terms of capital, 
influence (power), sources of information, and so on. Additionally, in rural areas connectivity 
through roads, infrastructure endowments in the shape of irrigation, and proximity to central places 
in general constitute a structural context to being ‘well-placed’ and overcome barriers to access that 
less well-placed persons may experience. Being well-placed to access opportunities, including those 
that are not directly related to agriculture but may, for instance, be offered in global labour markets, 
will often depend on rights to property in the shape of natural resources and the values that they 
generate. These values may enable a household to pay upfront costs associated with access to 
particularly lucrative labour markets in the absence of networks that may otherwise facilitate labour 
migration.  
Likewise when related to agriculture, opportunities may come in the shape of new technology, and 
households with better-than-average endowments can afford to be less risk-averse in terms of 
adopting new crops (Start and Johnson 2004), not least in areas with better-than-average initial road 
and irrigation conditions resulting from public investment, as is also seen in the context of the green 
revolution in India (see, for example, Harriss 2000 for a comparison of agricultural performance 
across states). Being well-placed often gains a particular spatial connotation in the micro-context of 
irrigation systems where access to water is often associated with location in relation to the water 
conduit. Farmers in the head-ends of irrigation systems are often in better positions, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, to access water than are farmers located in tail-ends, a predicament 
known as the ‘tail-end problem’ in irrigation literature (see chapters 7, 8, and 9). 
Moreover, poverty may be understood as failure to access opportunities. From a political economy 
perspective that failure should, as de Haan and Zoomers point out, be seen as social exclusion, “a 
process in which groups try to monopolize specific opportunities to their own advantage” 
(2005:33), through, for instance, property relations. So while the problematic of this thesis, with its 
speculations on changing rural economies and reduced importance of agriculture (and thus land) 
requires that we go beyond a narrow association of property with land and other natural resources, 
we still need to keep in mind the role of property, in the shape of natural resources, in determining 
access to opportunities. This is after all a rural context.  
2.6.2  Access as a Dynamic of Social and Economic Change 
Keeping these political economy aspects in mind, we can embark on separating both the concepts of 
property and access from a narrow association with socially acknowledged rights to physical 
resources and the benefits that they may create. Von Benda-Beckmann F and Von Benda-
Beckmann K’s scope-widening proposal that “the function of property concerns the ways in which 
the relations between society’s members with respect to valuables are given form and significance” 
(1999:21) is useful in this respect. So are Ribot and Peluso’s 2003 ideas on property and access as 
expressed in their ‘theory of access’, which—while claiming to focus on access to natural resources 
(and appearing as more of a set of ideas than a coherent theory)—stands out as a major contribution 
that not only places property in a wide context of access but also places access in a wide ‘access to 
opportunities’ context (see also de Haan and Zoomers 2005, Start and Johnson 2004 for this 
perspective). Ribot and Peluso do not dispute the theorizing of property in the context of property 
rights and benefit streams, but propose closer attention to the origins of those socially 
acknowledged claims or rights that underlie property. Therefore, they take a ‘step back’ in the chain 
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of logic and define property as social relations in respect to ‘things’ (of value) and define access as 
the “ability to benefit from things—including material objects, persons, institutions and symbols” 
(2003:153).  
As I also propose in the previous section, Ribot and Peluso argue that ability to gain access stems, 
to a large extent, from power. They see it as inherent in social relations, as something that emerges 
“from or flows through both intended and unintended consequences of social relationships” 
(2003:156). The things that people may have ability, or power, to benefit from through access, 
Ribot and Peluso argue, include not only tangible ‘things’ or resources, such as land, capital and 
labour even if these factors remain important, but also more fluid, immaterial ‘things’ including 
persons, institutions, and political and socio-economic processes. This perspective widens the scope 
of both access and property, and enables some degree of differentiation between the two dynamics. 
In ‘property relations as a social dynamic’ thinking, at least in the context of agrarian change, the 
transformation of physical resources through struggles, negotiations, power, etc. into something 
(property) to which people have rights and therefore benefits tends, as already mentioned, to be at 
the forefront as a dynamic of change. In taking a step back in the chain of logic, the focus in access 
as a social dynamic thinking is on the investment in access to economic opportunities (which may 
include physical resources but also markets, persons, etc.) through various access mechanisms that 
also involve struggles, negotiations, the exercise of power, and so on. It is the transformation of 
these processes into benefits, some of which may derive from property rights, which constitutes a 
social dynamic. 
Access to opportunities may be secured, for instance as Berry (1989, 1993) argues, by investing in 
institutions, ranging from networks to kinship, and as I will argue in this thesis, by investing in 
‘operational’ institutions such as user groups and cooperatives. Ribot and Peluso argue that, if 
examined over time and understood within political-economic moments, mechanisms of access may 
be understood as ‘access pattern processes’ (see also Lund 1994), and explain social change 
because: 
“People and institutions are positioned differently in relation to resources at various 
historical moments and geographical scales. The strands [of access] thus shift and change 
over time, changing the nature of power and forms of access to resources” (2003:154). 
Again, I understand the resources referred to as anything that may eventually yield benefits. 
Understanding access pattern processes at particular moments in time and as processes is 
particularly important in the context of the over-time methodology employed in this thesis (see 
chapter 3). The strands mentioned are both structural and relational. At the relational level, access 
depends, as already mentioned, on participation in a variety of institutions, access to which again 
depends on power, much of which may stem—as also mentioned above—from property rights and 
economic status. The importance and nature of these institutions change as the benefits that 
investment in institutions may generate also change, in tune with the opportunities offered to 
particular segments of the population in particular politico-economic moments. The institutions that 
constitute relational access mechanisms to various opportunities or benefits are thus fluid and 
dynamic (Berry 1993, 1994, Ribot and Peluso 2003).  
2.6.3  Entitlement and Livelihood Approaches 
Through elaboration of the various mechanisms involved in the process of rural change, livelihood 
(or ‘sustainable livelihoods’ as it became known in the 1990s’ ‘future positive’ discourses of, for 
example, the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom) analysis emerged 
as a central ‘post-modern’ attempt at combining structure and agency in the 1990s. In its simplest 
terms, it comprises the notion that a portfolio of assets such as natural capital, social capital, human 
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capital, physical capital, and financial capital defines livelihoods. Sometimes political capital is 
added to the list (see Nicol 2000). Livelihoods are constructed in terms of people’s ability to put 
these assets into productive use and raise themselves out of poverty. The various elements involved 
are elaborated on in chapter 9. While the livelihoods approach is not a theory as such, it is obviously 
based on a set of concepts, the most central being that of entitlement: 
I will bring the concept to the forefront for two reasons, even if access, by focusing on ability to 
benefit from ‘things’, in many ways subsumes the concept of entitlement. First of all, entitlement 
connotes normative concerns associated with problems of creating access for the poor to resources 
(Johnson 2004) and opportunities in general. As should be clear by now, such normative concerns 
influence the choice of topic for this thesis and its approach to explanation. In this vein, the main 
idea behind using the notion in combination with the more encompassing notion of access, with its 
emphasis on processes and dynamics, is to bring to the agenda the distribution of benefits, or rather 
abilities to gain access to benefits. Secondly, combined with property and access, the notion of 
entitlement is central to qualifying the usefulness of livelihoods analysis as a framework for 
analysing rural change. Entitlement is best understood together with Sen’s complementing concepts 
of endowments and capabilities. 
Coined by Sen (1981), entitlement refers to the range of livelihood possibilities that people can 
have (see also de Haan and Zoomers 2005, Ellis 2000). The related notion of capabilities, also 
coined by Sen, refers to what people can do or be with their entitlements in terms of changing their 
livelihoods conditions (Leach et al. 1997). Most of what people can have or do depends on 
endowments, i.e., the property rights and resources (usually referred to as assets in livelihood 
analysis) both at the level of the household and at the more structural ‘initial infrastructure’ 
condition level that influence their power and relative position to access opportunities and change 
livelihoods, as discussed in section 2.6.1. Entitlement remains the most intriguing of these concepts 
in the context of property and access because it refers to the political economy and social relations 
related processes of gaining opportunities, much in the same way as access denotes processes 
associated with benefiting from ‘things’ such as property. As de Haan and Zoomers point out, 
“endowment is the right in principle and entitlement is what one actually gets” (2005:35) through 
negotiation, competition, cooperation, etc.  
These central concepts have been somewhat abused in their journey from Sen’s original ideas of 
explaining causes of and abilities to cope with famine to elements in livelihood approaches. Citing 
Longhurst (1994), Ellis points out that: 
“It is unfortunate that a lot of writing about livelihoods in developing countries mixes terms 
and concepts borrowed from alternative structures of ideas, without appreciating that the 
piecemeal deployment of such concepts often serves neither to clarify nor to remain true to 
their intent in the body of thought from which they were extracted” (2000:16,17). 
Ellis provides as an example the influential definition of livelihoods by Chambers and Conway that 
a “livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities 
required for a means of living” (1992:7 in Ellis 2000:7). The problem with respect to using the 
concept of capabilities in a definition of livelihood, Ellis remarks, is that because it originally refers 
to what a person can achieve given social and economic characteristics and endowments, it overlaps 
with assets and activities and thereby confuses process and outcomes. I propose, along the lines of 
de Haan and Zoomers (2005), that it was capability as self-help, rather than in its original deeper 
meaning, that ensured the accommodation of livelihood approaches in development policies in the 
late 1990s—most prominently in the United Kingdom where the ‘New Labour’ government 
embraced the positive image of the livelihoods approach. The neo-liberal appeal of the approach is 
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evident; people are seen to possess options and strategies for coping as (rational) decision-takers in 
a world of opportunities. It is mainly with respect to this aspect, embodied in the notion that the 
household may be treated as a black box for which “some combined utility function is assumed” 
(Bagchi et al. 1998: 457), that criticism has been raised.  
Greater attention to notions of access in relation to entitlement serves to downplay the rational 
choice elements of the livelihoods approach and its relatively thin theory of human action. First of 
all, notions of access, by emphasizing the role of mediating social relations and other institutions, 
add substance to processes associated with acquiring the capitals that constitute important elements 
in enabling people to shape their livelihoods (see Ellis 2000)—what they can have—other than that 
of the ‘black box of opportunities’ in much livelihoods analysis. Secondly, as de Haan and Zoomers 
point out, as “access is not only an issue affecting the use or acquisition of capitals… [but] also an 
issue associated with the beneficial exploitation of livelihood opportunities” (2005:34), it draws 
attention to dynamics of entitlement where the performance of social relations matters a great deal. 
While indeed important, it is not only the possession or ownership of capitals that matter; so do 
various processes at institutional level in various socio-political arenas and moments. De Haan and 
Zoomers (2005) provide the example of vegetable marketing where success depends—in addition to 
access to physical and financial capital—on, for example, marketing channels, transparent prices, 
and farmers trust in traders.  
Marx has famously, albeit somewhat insipidly17, observed that “people make their own history, 
albeit not under conditions of their own choosing” (Marx 1852, paraphrased from Baggchi et al. 
1998: 457). By putting livelihood ‘in its place’ through the paying of closer attention to access in 
relation to endowments and entitlements in shaping capabilities, the emphasis may be seen to shift 
to the conditions under which people make history, i.e., the structural rather than the agency 
element. 
As Seddon and Adhikari propose: 
“To discuss the structure of livelihoods is to recognize explicitly that the livelihoods of 
individuals and households are structured by the wider political economy, and that the 
livelihoods of the poor and less powerful differ significantly and substantially from the 
livelihoods of the rich and influential, not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively” 
(2003:49). 
Given such attention, I find that the livelihoods approach, to quite an extent, pulls together the 
somewhat ‘fuzzy’ concepts (Sikor and Lund 2006) involved into a meaningful and flexible 
conceptual and analytical framework where institutional mechanisms, as a means of gaining access, 
stand out as central elements. We may also choose to see the livelihood approach as an attempt at 
making sense of the realization, emerging over the past decades, that rural change entails more than 
merely agricultural development. In that sense, as an analytical framework that considers a 
multitude of factors as shaping livelihoods and rural change, the livelihoods approach in many ways 
                                                 
17 As Bardhan and Ray ask, in relation to Marx’s statement, “Who could disagree?” (2006:660). Interestingly, Marx’s 
exact wording is unclear and seems to be presented as paraphrases. Franks, for instance, refers to Marx as having said 
that “people make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing” (Franks 2004, quoting Layder 
1994:207–208). Bardhan and Ray (2006) quote Marx from ‘the Eighteenth Brumaire of Bonaparte’ (1852) as having 
said that “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves”, and like most others use the quote in order to illustrate that the idea that 
individuals may be understood as autonomous agents within the constraints of social structures, as opposed to being 
mere “products of the structures that bound their agency” (Bardhan and Ray 2006:660).  
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represent the most comprehensive and holistic approach on offer. Accordingly, livelihoods analysis 
and elements of livelihoods trajectory methodology, have, in this study, been singled out as a 
particularly useful approach to the capturing of rural change at the level of individuals, institutions 
and society (see chapter 9). I propose, however, that a couple more concerns, related to the macro- 
and structural context of rural change, be considered part of the re-thinking of changes in irrigation 
systems managed as common property regimes. 
2.6.4  Livelihoods, Diversification and Common Property Regimes 
As an approach that has come about in response to the complexity of patterns of rural change, 
livelihood thinking is common in the context of rural economic diversification. As already 
suggested in section 1.2.2, any re-thinking of the trajectory of rural change will have to consider 
such diversification as a major theme. It is typically thought of as being about livelihood 
diversification, with rural people straddling both rural and non-rural (foreign as well as local) 
domains, depending on a combination of rural and non-rural incomes, markets and institutions. It 
must be emphasized though, that diversification may also take place within agriculture such as 
when farmers diversify their cropping portfolio to include, for instance, not only cereal crops but 
also vegetable crops. It may also denote the rise of non-farming activities in the rural economy in 
general, and/or at the level of livelihood units such as the household or the individual.  
Diversification thus takes place at different levels, such as that of the rural economy and that of the 
household or the individual. There are usually links between types of diversification and the levels 
at which they occur, but as Start and Johnson (2004) point out, these are not always particularly 
direct. Links may, for instance, include the stimulation of agricultural diversification in response to 
increased demand for vegetables in expanding rural town centres. However, as is often the case in 
Nepal, such demand may be fuelled by remittances that are invested in rural towns rather than 
village areas, and which thereby may become part of urbanization dynamics. Both direct and 
indirect links may also be associated with increased demand for labour, such as when remittances 
stimulate construction activities in rural towns, or when more hands are needed to produce 
vegetables for growing markets. Local labour shortages, exacerbated by migration and remittance-
fuelled economic activities, would typically be part of the picture. 
Diversification is a relatively new concept in the context of the historical structural transformation 
from agricultural to industrial societies, understood as the proportional decline in the agricultural 
sector in its contribution to national output and employment, and the rise of the manufacturing 
sector (see Kuznets 1966). These processes that have characterized most industrialized nations are 
typically seen to be closely associated with the idea that economic development emanates from 
(primary sector) agriculture though growth linkages (backward, forward and consumption), thus 
implying gradual transfers of resources from the agricultural to the (secondary) manufacturing and 
other (tertiary) sectors. In the words of Mellor, “the faster agriculture grows, the faster its relative 
size declines” (1976). Thus, the (regional) growth-linkages school tends to view the processes 
through the lens of rural non-farm economic activities18 associated with backward, forward and 
consumption linkages to agriculture (see, for example, Davies 2004, Start and Johnson 2004, 
                                                 
18 This is probably too much of a generalization, as some (see, for example, Davies 2004, Start and Johnson 2004) 
actually tend to also group outside-agriculture-related economic activities such as migration as falling within the rural 
non-farm activities sector. The focus remains, however, on activities with linkages to agriculture and on agriculture as 
the vehicle of economic growth.  
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Ashley and Maxwell 2001) and the specialization19 that is seen as a corollary of most economic 
development (see, for example, Johnston and Kilby 1975). There is a tendency to view non-farm 
activities as add-ons to the main business of farming, even if, as Rigg—bringing matters to a 
head—notes “an increasing number of rural households have no commitment to farming 
whatsoever” (2006:181). 
However, as Ashley and Maxwell (2001) point out, the rural non-farm economy is about 
diversification. As Ellis argues, so are many other rural development concerns. Indeed, livelihood 
diversification—the “process by which rural households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio 
of activities” (2000:15)—cuts across a number of self-bounded arenas of discussion in rural 
development from household coping and risk strategies to rural–urban migration and, I add to Ellis’ 
arenas, situations of a complete divorce between rural household economies and farming, as noted 
by Rigg above. I also add changing common property regimes in irrigation as another arena that 
diversification cuts across. Comprehensive livelihood diversification frameworks, based 
conceptually on the relations and processes that determine access opportunities, as outlined in the 
preceding sections, while serving quite clearly to illustrate the causes of ‘within’ and ‘without’ 
agriculture diversification, may also serve to some extent to explain the effects that people’s 
strategic livelihood choices may have on common property regime irrigation. 
However, the putative relationship between increasingly diversified livelihoods and changes in 
irrigated agriculture, from its organization to changing cropping patterns to maintenance levels and 
to productivity, is under-explored. This is symptomatic of the general problem noted by Rigg 
(2006) of tracing the effects of current transformations that do not conform with conventional 
growth-linkages structural transformation. I have already discussed the epistemological limitations 
of the collective action approach; with respect to actual research on the commons, Agrawal (2002) 
notes that understanding such relationships is an area where commons research falls short of 
explanation despite the multiplicity of causal variables generated from the numerous case studies 
that have characterized the post-Hardin era. To the extent that collective action frameworks do 
address the problematic, notions of shifts in costs and benefits (Ostrom 1992) and economic 
heterogeneity (where inequity is seen to undermine mechanisms of reciprocity; see chapter 8) are 
applied. The focus, however, remains largely on internal institutional characteristics and 
arrangements.  
When, within this literature, reference is made to the wider economy, alternatives to cooperating on 
the commons are seen as exit options, as in a 2002 volume edited by Ostrom et al. that seeks to 
assess 15 years of collective action research. There, it is noted that “integration of resource users 
into world economies tends to make them less dependent on particular resources, thus increasing 
their exit options with respect to local resources and management rules” but that the “net effect of 
these changes is unknown and has barely been theorized or investigated” (Stern et al. 2002:475, see 
also Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002 in that volume). The hypothetical state of these 
speculations is presented as follows. 
                                                 
19 Which, as Ellis (2000) points out, is incompatible with diversification at the level of the individual but not at the level 
of the household. 
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Figure 1 
Hypothesized Effects of Wealth or Wealth Inequality on Common Pool Resources 
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Source: Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002. 
This model describes three causal paths of hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality, 
resulting from non-agricultural incomes on common pool resource maintenance. The minus signs 
indicate negative effects on the variable to the right of the arrow. Path A describes a situation where 
resource users have “enough at stake, and enough wealth to maintain the resources on their own” 
(Stern et al. 2002:448). Paths B and C hypothesize the effects when this is not the case; in B, it is 
wealth and exit options that cause institutional arrangements to deteriorate, while in C, deterioration 
is caused by a heterogeneity of wealth. The latter two scenarios are considered the most common in 
irrigation systems. To my mind, models like these, are illustrative of the paths that changes in 
external condition may lead to, as well as of the little that we actually know about the general 
effects of such change. They are therefore also symptomatic of rather ‘thin’ approaches to 
understanding and explaining processes of change in common property regimes. 
As suggested in chapter 1, the rapid nature of rural change and the ensuing empirical diversity 
renders cause and effect relationships difficult to establish, and theorization problematic. The 
‘access, entitlement and property’ approaches, collated in livelihood analysis frameworks, though 
not offering any clear causality and general ‘answers’ as such, nevertheless provides a ‘thicker’ 
framework for attempting to understand the effects of diversification on common property regimes. 
To sum up some of my earlier propositions in this regard, a ‘thicker’ framework implies emphasis 
on the notion that people, positioned differently in relation to access to opportunities at various 
historical moments and places, invest in institutions for reasons of livelihood construction. The 
institutions that people invest in are also positioned differently at various moments and places, and 
livelihoods are therefore played out within the context of a varying set of institutions. As Berry has 
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observed, this implies that people invest in the institutions “which prove more effective in giving 
people access to livelihoods or the means of production” (1989:51), i.e., the institutions to which 
they are able to gain access to and which, at any given time for any given group of people, make th
most sense. This strongly suggest—as indeed also suggested in figure 1—that the relative 
importance of certain institutions changes in tune with external political economic conditio
that what were once strong institutions may see a weakening of key functions as a result of a shift in
institutional investment at the household-livelihood-unit level during processes of diversification. 
As Mosse notes in this regard: 
“… if farmers are rational o
e 
ns, and 
 
ptimizers (and there is no suggestion that they are irrational), 
The tioned under-researched nature of the putative effects of farmers optimizing across 
hools of thought on the commons—from 
seen 
r 
e action 
ntion to access implies, by downplaying the capability and 
re 
of 
 
lectricity, etc.), public 
 
ated in arid or semi-arid zones or in steep hill-slope areas that 
are ecologically vulnerable. There the poor are isolated in every sense. They have meagre 
they have to optimize across all of the multiple social fields that constitute their lives…” 
(2006:702). 
 already men
social fields—whether it happens at all, the extent to which it may happen, how it may manifest 
itself, and possible effects on irrigation systems—illustrates the relevance of empirical 
investigations into this element of rural diversification. 
Rounding off this section, it is worth noting that both sc
their respective methodological individualism and “socio-historical” (Mosse 2006:695) points of 
departure—tend to converge in the sense that mechanisms of change in the commons and its 
institutions are seen as largely interest-based (Berry 1993, Johnson 2004). Thus, incentives—
as either rational, individual, utility-maximizing, decision-making investment in collective action o
as strategic decisions that stem from conflict, bargaining, entitlement, claims and access—to invest 
or not invest in common property regimes and to include them or not include them in livelihood 
strategies are indeed central to both perspectives. It is, however, the latter perspective that—by 
emphasizing social relations and dynamics rather than individual rational objectives and static, 
internal levels—appears to constitute the most relevant conceptual tool for understanding 
diversification in relation to common property regime irrigation systems. Because collectiv
models fail to encompass changed rural contexts, their ability to explain the changing roles of local 
institutions in the management of irrigated agriculture is also limited. 
2.6.5  The Role of Geography 
As suggested in section 2.6.3 atte
opportunity elements, if not less attention to how people make history, then in many ways mo
attention to the conditions under which they make it. In section 2.6.1, I discussed the importance 
being well placed socio-economically and in terms of initial infrastructure conditions with respect 
to terms of access. In the following, I will briefly follow up on this discussion by touching upon the
spatial dimensions of these initial condition aspects of access. There is obviously nothing new in 
pointing to the role of geography. However, the point I wish to make is that the role of spatial 
factors as determinants of access to assets, terms of production and exchange and, ultimately, 
patterns of diversification opportunities and the way irrigation is organized is particularly 
pronounced in hills and mountains and therefore requires special attention. 
Relatively low levels of connectedness (such as roads, telecommunication, e
services and investment are general characteristics of rural areas compared to urban areas. In hills 
and mountains, this is particularly pronounced to the extent that such areas may be characterized as
low-potential. As Conway notes: 
“The worst poverty is often loc
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holdings or access to land, little or no capital, and few opportunities for off-farm 
employment. Labour demand is often seasonal and insecure. Extension services are few an
far between, and research aimed specifically at their needs is sparse” (1997:134–1
in Ashley and Maxwell 2001:397). 
s is obviously a rather sweeping observation, and as this thesis will show, irrigated farmers ten
e relatively better endowed than uph
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abilities to access resources and opportunities. Despite a great deal of heterogeneity in this respect, 
they nevertheless face obstacles to livelihood change that differ from those of farmers in more 
central areas. As Zoomers (1999) observes in the Andes—a setting that is relatively comparable to 
the Himalayas—geographical settings such as agro-ecological zones and distance to markets 
significantly influence livelihood opportunities and outcomes. In Zoomers’ case, it was found that 
opportunities and outcomes were related more closely to location-related factors than ‘strategi
actions’ on the parts of farmers. While the current research will not establish if this is also the case 
in the hills and mountains of Nepal, it draws attention to location as an important structural 
backdrop to the construction of livelihoods in a diversifying economy.  
Location-related factors affect both ‘within’ and ‘without’ agriculture levels of diversificatio
may be understood with the assistance of growth-linkages concepts. At t
of diversification, relatively small farm sizes make it difficult for hill and mountain farmers to 
compete with lowland and more centrally located farmers with respect to the expansion of cereal 
crops20. The expansion of road connections also typically means that with reduced transport cos
the cost of ‘imported’ cereals also decreases. In the hills, such constraints on expansion of 
production are pronounced in relation to ‘traditional crops’, i.e., rice, (the production of which is 
closely related to the way irrigation is organized) wheat and maize. In the mountains, the in
expand livelihoods through cereal crop production relates to the production of mainly buckwheat 
and naked barley. However, agricultural growth and increased farm income may be created through 
linkages to the urban (and indeed the world) economy through products, which in certain places, 
have competitive advantage (Wiggins and Proctor 2001), such as horticultural crops.  
Both hills and mountains represent conducive growing areas for what are generally referred to as 
winter vegetables such as high-value cauliflower and cabbages (hills) as well as apples
for which there is considerable demand, both in growing ‘rural towns’ and in urban centres further
away. Many farmers, not least those located close to transport arteries, have diversified their 
cropping portfolios accordingly and, as a consequence, situations of ‘legal pluralism’ with respect 
to access to and use of irrigation water exist in many systems; the implications of this on irrig
organization are discussed in chapter 9. However, successful utilization of the competitive 
advantage of hills and mountains depends on both the already mentioned improved connectedness 
through roads as well as on growth in urban economies; the demand represented by rural tow
particularly essential. The notion that rural development in hills and mountains depends on location
specific competitive advantage is quite central to the Agricultural Perspective Plan for Nepal, a 
strongly growth-linkages informed document (see chapter 4).  
With respect to ‘without’ agriculture diversification Wiggins and Proctor (1999) argue that rural
areas have competitive advantage in certain sectors only, such a
 
20 There are, however, exceptions to this. As shown in chapter 5, rice is typically both a ‘subsistence’ and a ‘cash’ crop 
in the hills, owing to demand for local high-grade rice—the sale of which by many households is compensated for by 
the purchase of cheaper, ‘imported’ rice. 
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urban areas. Whether other forms of ‘without’ agriculture diversification such as migration may b
meaningfully understood in the context of competitive advantage is doubtful
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21. There is, ho
little doubt that location-related factors influence patterns of migration. This is particularly evident 
when it comes to gaining access to specific labour markets, where people’s initial conditions—how 
‘well placed’ people are—are associated with location and tend to play determining roles with 
respect to access to lucrative labour markets. I discuss the possible impacts of migration on 
irrigation systems in chapter 9.  
I will round off this section by arguing that the notion of access gains special meanings in hill a
mountain areas that cannot be captured through the concepts of growth-linkages related theo
alone. These meanings have deve
physical isolation, and the historical concentration of wealth and power in central areas with relativ
easy access outside the hills and mountains. Access in the hills and the mountains therefore 
connotes more than mere physical access, it also connotes more metaphorical meanings assoc
with exclusion vs. inclusion, drudgery vs. ‘easy life’, modernity vs. backwardness, being ‘someone’ 
vs. being ‘nobody’, having ‘connections’ vs. being ‘isolated’, ‘progress’ vs. ‘retreat’, and so 
2.7 Collective Action, Property, Access and Entitlements as Ingredients in a Re-thinking of 
Approaches 
Early in this chapter I proposed that comprehensive theories on the dynamics of natural resource 
management and changing institutions were unattainable. I then proceeded to account for dominant 
that collective action approaches, while inadequate in many ways, nevertheless offer important 
tools, useful, in particular, in the diagnosis of problems and performance in common property 
regimes. I then focused my attention on alternative approaches that, to a greater extent than 
collective action, capture political economy contexts and dynamics and therefore change, startin
out by redefining ‘common property resources’. Having thus introduced property as a central 
dynamic concept, I moved towards the approaches that I propose contain central ingredients 
thinking: property, access and entitlements, brought together in a livelihoods analysis framework, a
ideas that offer scope for capturing change in dynamic common property regime contexts. The
usefulness of these ingredients, however, I argued, requires that we go beyond certain restrictions 
associated with a tendency to focus on access to natural resources rather than access to resources as 
opportunities. The ingredients proposed represent an attempt at developing a set of ideas in relat
to the on-the-ground situation and the way that it has been problematized in this thesis. In the 
following I will briefly expand on where I place emphasis with respect to this set of ideas. 
2.7.1  Collective Action Frameworks as Tools for Measuring Performance 
While collective action frameworks have serious limitations in respect to capturing change 
role of the wider context, what such frameworks do capture is captured well. The
empirical data used in this study as well as their intention to measure change (bef
wider causes and effects) involves the use of a collective action analytical framework that is 
particularly useful for measuring performance, namely that of Oakerson’s (1992) framework for
analysing the commons. 
 
21 Except perhaps in relation to the martial qualities that the British associated with certain hill groups and therefore 
recruited for the Gurkha regiments. These perceived qualities have effectively branded hill people, and seem to persist 
in ‘noble savage’ type notions of ‘bahadur’ (warriors) on the part of employers of hill people as watchmen in India (see, 
for example, Himal South Asian, Jan–Feb 1997). 
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2.7.2  Changing Common Property Regimes as Subsumed in Rural Change 
Collective action has emerged as a near-hegemonic discourse in rural development over the past 
decades. Investigating mainly internal level workings of common property systems, it has 
stances of 
, 
exts, 
stitute an important contextual 
onomic and topographical 
 
ises to capture some of the complex reality posed by rural institutional 
rivate property and irrigation water as common property may be seen to 
d 
h a 
 defined temporal contexts add analytical 
may 
contributed to understanding of how common property regimes work under circum
stability, with agriculture as a central livelihood concern. However, changing rural areas, 
characterized by livelihood diversification, make these assumptions increasingly problematic. I 
therefore suggest that the de-contextualized methodological individualism of collective action
while useful in the diagnosis of performance in common property regimes, needs to be 
complemented by more contextualized, political economy approaches to capturing the role of 
changing common property regimes in rural development. 
2.7.3  Understanding Irrigation in Regional Historical Perspectives 
It follows from my bringing to the forefront approaches that emphasize political economy cont
that regional historical perspectives on irrigation should con
backdrop to the case studies of irrigation system. Given Nepal’s social, ec
heterogeneity, which offers very few ‘typical’ situations, I suggest that contexts such as historical 
patterns of accumulation, ethnic geography, and the spatial distribution of access to opportunities 
are particularly important. 
2.7.4  Strands of Access 
Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) proposal that people gain access through a combination of structural and
relational mechanisms prom
change. Access to land as p
constitute important structural strands of access. So would the possession of irrigation technology, 
settlement at locations advantageous for irrigation, infrastructure, and distance to markets. Access 
to authority and education (partly as a result of caste) and to benefits associated with donor projects, 
foreign labour markets, new crops, credit, etc. through networks and institutions constitute, to a 
greater extent, relational strands of access to opportunity. Both strands of access position certain 
groups to, through various institutions, access opportunities offered at particular points in time.  
2.7.5  Access and the Political-economic Moment 
Therefore I propose, also in line with Ribot and Peluso, that certain phenomena are best understoo
in temporal contexts. If, as Ribot and Peluso suggest, “access is about all possible means by whic
person is able to benefit from things” (2003:156), then
precision. Just as different political and economic circumstances change the terms of access to what 
people can and wish to gain access to, social relations and social change emerge from cooperation 
and conflict over benefits within particular political-economic moments. It follows that social 
relations in certain political-economic moments are manifest in, for instance, cooperation over 
specific property regimes and in processes of gaining and maintaining property rights if the main 
livelihood option on offer is irrigated agriculture. Other political-economic moments may offer 
conditions conducive to the pursuit of alternative livelihoods options, and other social relations 
become manifest in activities related to the pursuit of these alternative options. It may also follow 
that when benefits associated with, for instance, cooperation in irrigation lose ground to other 
available benefits, then the social relations manifest in cooperative arrangements, as well as in 
maintaining and gaining property rights in irrigation, will also change.  
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2.7.6  Livelihoods Analysis as an Integrating Framework 
While collective action approaches may be seen as restrictive and possibly even ‘reductionist’, the 
‘theory of access’ may be seen as the opposite: a political economy theory of everything, 
symptomatic of post-modernist claims of complex empirical realities. Certain notions in the theory 
of access are somewhat fuzzy, including the notion of social relations, and the origin and actual role 
of power in social relations22. I will not analyse power relations in much detail in this study. This is 
because the nature of the re-study data restricts such analysis, and because I find that studies of 
changes in livelihoods and the institutions through which livelihoods are played out—while 
implicitly acknowledging the role of power—gain more practical relevance if analysed in concrete 
social, political and economic contexts. The livelihoods framework constitutes a comprehensive 
attempt at analysing such relationships. This is not to suggest a theoretical integration along the 
lines of a comprehensive theory, merely an analytical one, with room for those relatively discrete 
theoretical elements that do not adequately capture complexity on their own. 
 
 
22 While I recognize that power is played out at all levels, I feel that a hierarchy of power, control and ability to access 
benefits could be more clearly spelled out in this body of thought. Some forms of power would indeed be more 
important than other forms. Not least the historically strong relationship between the possession of capital, and the 
ability to access more resources—being ‘well placed’—and to benefit more from them than those with lesser, initial 
endowments. Linked to this, it would also appear that a greater emphasis on control over access to production and 
exchange should perhaps be at the top of a hierarchical ‘what kind of access matters the most in an access to 
opportunities’ order. 
Chapter 3: Methodological Approach 
3.1  Introduction 
Based on repeat-study1 methodology, this study combines quantitative and qualitative approaches 
in a comparison of livelihood and institutional change in irrigated communities in Nepal’s 
Dhaulagiri Zone in the early to mid-1990s and the early 2000s. In addition to this core 
methodological approach, the analytical strategy is based on principles associated with what m
termed a grounded approach (although not ‘grounded theory’; see below and footnote 3). This 
implies an approach that is predominantly inductive rather than deductive
ay be 
 
h (Dey 
ative study. 
                                                
2. It may be argued that 
the fact that many of the data are derived from a largely quantitative (cross-sectional) study would 
render invalid any talk of a grounded approach. Not only is a grounded approach strongly 
associated with qualitative inquiry, it also came about (as indeed did other qualitative methods) in
reaction to the logical-deductive forms of theorizing that are central to quantitative researc
1999). Additionally, when qualitative and quantitative inquiries are combined, the qualitative 
inquiry usually comes first, often with the objective of generating hypotheses for subsequent 
quantit
However, this thesis’ methodological ‘self-understanding’ of being grounded must be understood in 
relation to—as elaborated on in the previous chapters—notions of rural reality changing rapidly and 
moving in diffuse directions. This means, as also postulated earlier, that conventional theories on 
agrarian change, rural livelihoods and rural institutions are increasingly unable to explain reality 
adequately. Therefore, it serves the topic best to let ‘ground-level reality’ determine not only what 
has to be explained but also what best explains it. In other words, the main purpose of being 
‘grounded’ is based on a perceived need to re-think rural development, as necessitated by its taking 
a path that has been hitherto unpredicted and difficult to explain. However, it must be emphasized 
that the ambition is not to develop theory as in Glaser and Strauss’ classical ‘grounded theory’3 (see 
Kvale 2004); rather, it is to re-think existing contributions and hopefully add facet to theory by 
seeking to explain snapshots of rapidly changing reality through longitudinal comparison. 
In contrast to the theoretically adaptive, ‘avoid preconceived ideas’ (see Dey 1999:3) textbook 
versions of grounded theory, the study design is obviously, as the first chapter reveals, theoretically 
informed, in the sense that cautious criticism of existing thinking feeds into the problematic. Hence 
it would be wrong to claim that the thesis is without any sort of hypotheses, but rather that—in line 
with most qualitative research—these are somewhat broad and preliminary, and that their ‘testing’ 
 
1 I use the terms repeat-study and repeat-survey interchangeably to describe a method of ‘comparative static’, i.e., the 
comparison of snapshots over time as a “starting point for imputing processes of aggregate social change” (Blaikie et al. 
2002).  
2 I find Mikkelsen’s definitions of inductive and deductive approaches useful: “The inductive approach… begins with 
concrete empirical details and then works towards abstract ideas or general principles. There is often a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective—seen from the point of view of the subjects—to the empirical analysis. The deductive approach… begins 
with abstract ideas (e.g., hypothesis) and then collects concrete, empirical details to test the ideas. One’s point of 
departure in theory or hypothesis is made explicit” (2005:168). 
3 A discussion of the merits of grounded theory is beyond the scope of this thesis; suffice it to say that the idea of 
developing ‘theory’ from empirical observation may be directly useful in a micro-sociological context (see eg Dey 
1999); it is more problematic to directly relate the empirical to new middle and macro levels of theory construction in 
the somewhat abstract and complex theoretical frameworks of e.g. agrarian change. While grounded theory holds 
considerable value as a historical reaction to the dominance of quantitative research, what I advocate is the grounded 
principle, as applied in a ‘let the data speak’ or being ‘empirically based’ approach. 
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against the research is a flexible process that may—should the data so suggest—entail 
reformulation or questioning of the original ideas and assumptions, and/or the formulation of new 
ideas and assumptions.   
The level of pre-understanding is largely determined by (and therefore related to the author’s 
epistemological and ontological positions) existing data (in this case, from early 1990s studies) 
combined with observations (while working as an adviser in Nepal in the early 1990s and then 
again in late 1990s and early 2000s) in the subsequent period of rapid local and global change and, 
of course, the thinking that informed the ideas of the research proposal. All these factors constitute 
indications for what to study, where and how to study it, and may be seen to constitute the first 
hermeneutics in Giddens’ (1984) concept of the double hermeneutic as a characteristic of the social 
sciences, which as Agergaard suggests, 
“refers to the double process of translation or interpretation which is involved in social 
research. The first element of interpretation concerns the fact that researchers are socialized 
into a certain universe of concepts, theories, self-representation, etc. Such scientific 
traditions exist within all scientific disciplines… however, to social science (and human 
science) the second part of the double hermeneutics appears: the researched objects are 
subjects which act and interpret their own actions” (1998:66). 
The role of the second part of the hermeneutics, i.e., the value of the subject’s interpretations is 
obviously central to the continued debate about the scientific value of qualitative and quantitative 
research in social science. That debate, which is related to what I call the post-structural turn in 
section 2.3.1 and the structure–agency debate, has been invigorated in recent years. Not least as a 
result of Flyvbjerg’s (2001) call for a social science that does not seek to emulate the natural 
sciences, but rather emphasizes Gidden’s first hermeneutics in the sense that social science inquiry 
is not ‘value free’, and the second hermeneutics in that causality may refer to the “reasons why an 
actor carries out an action” (Caterino and Schram 2006:5) without ruling out that structural 
variables, perhaps unknown to the actor, may also explain causality. Provided that the wider context 
is understood, these actors and their actions are, according to Flyvbjerg, best understood in the 
context of case studies because these constitute concrete examples. 
The present study may be seen as a multiple case study carried out in a regional ‘case’ context, but 
obviously not as a purely qualitative study, as it combines quantitative and qualitative methods in 
what Mikkelsen (2005) calls methodological pluralism. In addition to seeing people as subjects 
rather than objects, such pluralism is characterized by “room for combinations of quantitative and 
qualitative methods from different disciplines… flexibility and improvisations in choice of practical 
methods, i.e., iteration between data and partial results” (2005:144). I agree with Mikkelsen’s 
position that methodological pluralism has a number of benefits, particularly with respect to 
obtaining more multifaceted pictures through triangulation. In this study, qualitative surveys are 
used to qualify the cross-sectional surveys, and to add meaning to these. I also agree with her 
observation that the use of methodological pluralism requires consideration of key concepts and the 
epistemologies of different methods if the outcome is to be enhanced as a result of integration. This 
problematic is particularly evident, I will argue, when methodological pluralism also involves 
longitudinal comparison, as the conception and design of ‘historical’ surveys tend to have been 
informed by different perspectives to, and serve different purposes from, subsequent repeat surveys. 
This matter is discussed in the next section. 
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3.2  Perspectives on Repeat-Study Methodology 
Before explaining the background of the present study and its design and data collection 
methodology, I wish to place the repeat-study methodology that is at the heart of this thesis in a 
wider methodological perspective. Murray (2002) in a paper that examines various methodological 
practices in livelihoods research identifies three main approaches—the circumspective, the 
prospective and the retrospective:  
“The circumspective (‘looking around’) approach concentrates on the empirical 
investigation of combinations of modes of livelihoods at one moment in time, with the 
‘present’ being typically construed as embracing six months or one year prior to the 
investigation” (2002:490). 
While, according to Murray, the objective of the circumspective practice is to “open up questions 
about the relationships between different socio-economic activities” (2002:490), seemingly for the 
sake of academic curiosity, the prospective approach is seen as largely prescriptive. Aiming to 
influence policy, it seeks to innovate and develop new concepts for planners and policy-makers, 
through the “placing of much emphasis on project monitoring and evaluation, on analysing the 
success or failure of past policies… and on specific practical interventions” (2002:491). While I 
find the distinction between the circumspective and the retrospective approach useful, particularly 
because of the obvious differences with respect to the horizon for investigating and understanding 
change, I find the prospective approach distinction unnecessary. Regardless of the timeframe, most 
livelihoods research is based on ambitions, or has at least the potential, to influence policy, and is, 
for this reason, also prospective. The retrospective (‘looking back’) approach entails, in the words 
of Murray, 
 “pushing to the limits of their potential, various methods of understanding the changes that 
have taken place over a much longer timescale. Central to its effective implementation is the 
serious pursuit of longitudinal comparison. In principle, the most effective methods of 
achieving this, in the strict sense, are panel studies of the ‘same’ population over time” 
(2002:490). 
The key objective, Murray points out, of the retrospective approach in livelihoods research is the 
analysis of household trajectories of accumulation (or impoverishment) over time, and of matrices 
of vulnerability. It may be argued, along the lines of Rigg (2006), that the most illuminating 
examples of livelihoods research and rural change are based on longitudinal comparison, for the 
simple reason that such longitudinal comparison enables understanding of trajectories of change. 
One such illuminating example is the project on Long Term Change and Livelihoods of the 
Overseas Development Group at the University of East Anglia, UK, the results of which are 
referred to as ‘yardstick’ data in section 9.4. That project involved fieldwork in 15 villages in 
western Nepal, immediately south of the Dhaulagiri Zone in 1996–1997 (see Blaikie et al. 2002, 
Bagchi et al. 1998). The main comparative base was a cross-sectional survey carried out in the same 
area in 1974–19754.  
While certainly not without methodological constraints, many of which revolved around the 
tensions surrounding integration of quantitative and qualitative approaches (as also discussed in 
3.1), the Long Term Change and Livelihoods Project stands out as an important contribution. This 
                                                 
4 That influential historical work (see in particular Blaikie et al. 1980, 2005), along with the ensuing scholarships of 
Piers Blaikie, John Cameron and David Seddon on Nepal, which often draw on this early base, is referred to throughout 
this study, particularly in chapter 5.  
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is not least because of its sound findings (see section 9.4), its uniqueness (many researchers find the 
repeat-study method attractive but refrain from revisiting earlier data for a number of reasons 
including ‘institutional memory loss’ and the methodological difficulties involved), and 
methodological plurality (it applied a battery of techniques from village mapping to wealth ranking, 
life histories and sample household surveys), but also because of its discussion of methodological 
constraints. These included the difficulties associated with sampling. On the one hand, it was seen 
as desirable to investigate long-term change through revisits to some of the households in the 
original sample, along the lines of a cohort approach; however, not being a strict longitudinal 
cohort, the sample had to also be as representative as the original sample survey5, while at the same 
time redefinitions of administrative units, and demographic and social changes made the use of 
stratification criteria identical to those applied earlier problematic. This resulted in some interesting 
manoeuvres, summed up in the recommendation that repeat sampling surveys (i.e., cross sectionals) 
should not aim to mimic previous sampling procedures, but employ considerations of ‘reasonable 
accuracy’ (see Bagchi et al. 1998). 
Other considerations include the quality, coverage and objectives of data when researchers revisit 
secondary data, as well as the acceptable time period over which to map livelihood trajectories. 
Here the team felt that a 20-year time span was sufficient to track “slow-acting processes such as 
population growth, technical changes and environmental change” (Bagchi et al. 1998:464) and that 
a longer timeframe would have made it difficult to re-interview respondents because of deaths. 
These, and related dilemmas, are described in terms of re-studies being prisoners of the past 
(Blaikie et al. 2002). On the one hand, re-studies need, as discussed above, to follow largely similar 
methodologies and ask largely similar questions in the present as in the past in order to generate 
comparisons. On the other hand, changed theoretical perspectives and new paradigms confront 
contemporary researchers. In view of the 1974–1975 study being informed by a neo-Marxist 
dependency perspective and the 1996–1997 study being informed by a broad ‘post-structuralist’ 
agenda as reflected in the methodologies applied, it is noted that re-studies tend to be “imprisoned 
in the theories, epistemologies… of the original study” (Blaikie et al. 2002:1257), and it is therefore 
asked, somewhat rhetorically “if the re-study is freed from its intellectual and methodological 
genealogy, is it a re-study?” (Blaikie et al. 2002:1257).  
3.3  The Comparative Base 
Repeat-study methodology was chosen for this study because of the availability of a comparative 
base (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995; Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project 1996). That base stems from my employment from 1992 to 1995 on the 
International Labour Organization’s Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project (as described in 
section 1.2.3). As Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, I was in charge of socio-economic 
monitoring and evaluation activities including so-called key-effects monitoring surveys. The basic 
objective of these surveys was, through annual cross-sectional surveys, to build up a database of 
socio-economic and agricultural data relevant to the objectives of the project. It was believed that 
through the creation of a time series of data it would be possible not only to measure changes 
related to the expected direct impacts of irrigation interventions (particularly improved agricultural 
performance), but also to isolate the variables, other than those directly related to irrigation, that 
might contribute to possible changes. In addition to these impact study objectives, the intention was 
                                                 
5 As Blaikie et al. point out, the revisited household “would not receive the same probability of being sampled as the 
rest of the contemporary population” (2002:1257). 
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also for the surveys to serve as process monitoring tools in the sense of ensuring, through annual 
surveys, that the project was on track in relation to its objectives. Being a central element in the 
project’s monitoring and evaluation system, the key-effects monitoring survey methodology is 
documented6 in a procedural manual on monitoring and evaluation of irrigation systems (Berg 
1995a). 
While a consulting company associated with the Department of Geography of Prithivi Narayan 
Campus in Pokhara7 was subcontracted to conduct the surveys and analyse the data, my 
responsibilities included planning and design, quality control of data collection and analysis, as well 
as writing executive summaries of survey results. During the period 1992–1995, I was involved 
with the four surveys that constitute the comparative base, and took part in three annual tours8 to 
most of the 15 irrigation schemes that had been selected for surveys in the four project districts 
(Parbat, Baglung, Myagdi and Mustang). The surveys continued for another two years following my 
departure from Nepal, but upon scrutiny of the survey reports I decided not to include the 1996 and 
1997 surveys as comparisons for the re-study, as their quality and validity could not been 
confirmed. 
Reflecting the dominant perspectives in Nepal at the time on being ‘scientific’, the overall study 
design and the data collection methodology of the 1992 survey was characterized by what was then 
referred to as a ‘formal’ (i.e., largely quantitative) approach that aimed to establish complex 
statistical relationships, and preferred physical measurements to farmers’ statements (see section 8.3 
for a discussion). Subsequent surveys, reflecting the emerging preference for more ‘informal’ (i.e., 
qualitative) approaches, emphasized the use of so-called participatory rural appraisal techniques, 
more open-ended questions, reflections on sources of bias along the lines of Chambers (1983) and, 
above all, listening to farmers. Trained in an ‘exact’ science tradition such a more humble ‘reversal 
of roles’ approach to data collection involved considerable re-orientation of the consultants in 
charge of data collection and initial analysis. 
The end-result was a series of surveys that from 1993 to 1995, based on the thinking that it is ‘better 
to be partly right than completely wrong’, sought to combine both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. These changes, along with some rephrasing of questions, the inclusion of new indicators 
and the omission of others over the years, resulted in questionnaires that were not entirely 
homogenous over the years, except with respect to key agricultural performance indicators. This 
has, as is evident from chapters 8 and 9, led to the exclusion of certain data in some years because 
these do not constitute a clear comparative base, neither ‘intra’ 1992–1995 nor in relation to the 
repeat-study. A sample questionnaire from the surveys of the 1990s is provided in annex 1. 
3.4  The 2004 (Cross-Sectional) Repeat-Survey 
The methodological ‘imprisonment in the past’ pitfalls alluded to above, and the actions taken in 
that regard, are accounted for throughout the data analysis. However, the conflicts and dilemmas 
that arose in this respect had more to do with the differing objectives of the comparative base 
                                                 
6 As noted in the Final Project Evaluation, the “Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project is a very well-documented 
project” (DIDP 1996:12). 
7 The Himalayan Research Centre, a consulting firm associated with the Department of Geography at the Prithivi 
Narayan Campus in Pokhara. 
8 I arrived in Nepal in September 1992. One of my first tasks was to summarize the findings of the first survey, 
conducted in May–June of that year. 
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(process and impact monitoring) and the repeat-study, with its broader contextual perspective and 
focus on livelihoods and institutions, respectively, than on inconsistent surveys in the 1990s. In 
order to overcome the narrowness of the comparative base, I designed a number of qualitative 
surveys, with the aim to not only ‘qualify’ the repeat-survey, but also add wider dimensions, as 
discussed in further detail in section 3.5 below. 
The repeat-survey, which was conducted in 2004, included largely similar thematic areas as the 
socio-economic studies that were conducted in 1992–1995. Thus, the 2004 ‘snapshot’ (see annex 2) 
contains basic data related to population, landholding size, and parameters of livelihood 
diversification such as income and source of income, employment, migration, and expenditure on 
food as well as data on yields, cropping patterns and cropping intensities. Institutional aspects 
include investigations into parameters of cooperation and performance such as organizational 
structure, operation and management practices, including labour inputs and the basis for labour 
contribution, as well as water supply, distribution and allocation. Other methodological features of 
the survey include the following. 
● Coverage and duration: The 1992–1995 surveys covered 15 communities that had been 
purposively selected with a view to obtaining as broad a picture as possible. While, in a repeat-
survey such as this one I obviously had to select the same communities as in the comparative 
base, its ‘maximum variation sampling approach’ was also considered desirable in the repeat-
survey, as it was seen to enable identification of factors that have meaning across communities. 
If, for instance, despite variation between systems—either in the same ecological setting (e.g., 
the hills or the mountains) or between settings such as hills and mountains—common factors do 
play in, then generalization is possible. Additionally, looking broadly at both hills and 
mountains may arguably enable applicability of findings to other settings. In this sense, both 
commonalities and differences are important. 
● However, the deteriorating security situation in the Dhaulagiri Zone in the spring of 2004 meant 
that only nine of the original 15 communities could be included in the survey (see section 3.8 
for a discussion of the effects of the security situation on methodology). Thus, while the 1995 
study population consisted of 1361 households, the repeat-survey involved 931 households. 
This affected the principle of maximum variation sampling to some extent, as the omitted 
communities, deemed out of bounds to outsiders9, were typically the more remote Maoist-
affected communities (i.e., Hugdisir in Baglung District, Ranabang, Seraphant and Pakhu in 
Myagdi District, and Setophant in Parbat District). The survey was conducted over a period of 
40 days during the months of April and May 2004.  
● Household sample design: As in the 1990s, 20 per cent of heads of households (male or female, 
as decided by the household) in the individual schemes were interviewed; however, with a 
minimum of 10 and a maximum of 30 households in each sub-project. This was deemed 
necessary owing to resource constraints in the 1990s. That meant an almost full survey in the 
smallest community (Tiri, 11 households), and a 13 per cent sample in the largest community 
                                                 
9 It was not actually impossible to travel to these places, particularly not for foreigners—probably because (1) the 
Maoists saw themselves as ‘internationalist’ and wished to have a positive image abroad; (2) the army had no interest in 
harming foreigners and causing a diplomatic incident; and (3) neither side saw foreigners as ‘stakeholders’ in the 
conflict. The Nepalese, however, were in danger of abduction by the Maoists, and severe intimidation, torture and even 
disappearance at the hands of the army. Non-government Organisation workers in particular were at risk, as the 
Maoists, on the one hand, were keen to co-opt them, and the army, on the other hand, suspected that their mere presence 
in Maoist-dominated areas was proof of Maoist affiliation. 
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(Kurgha, 234 households). Obviously this meant that, particularly in the smaller communities, 
many households were re-visited. See tables 5 and 6 in chapter 6 for basic data on communities. 
Not being a cohort study, the repeat-survey involved new sample households. In the case of 
Mustang District, this was done on the basis of the most recent official lists of landholdings as 
in the 1990s. In the hill districts, where the security situation had led to relative administrative 
collapse, lists of households were updated together with heads of irrigation institutions or other 
key informants before samples were drawn. 
● As with the surveys of the 1990s, only households with land in the command area of the 
irrigations schemes (the vast majority; see section 6.2) were sampled. Also in line with previous 
methodologies, the samples were stratified according to location in the irrigation systems (the 
main branch canals, i.e., head, middle and tail). 
● Data collection techniques: As in the 1990s, a semi-structured questionnaire covering similar 
themes but abbreviated to fit the current scope was used (see annex 2). Assistants were trained 
(see below) to be observant, iterative, prodding and explorative, and judging from the nature of 
data collected, also in interview situations where I was not present, these principles were applied 
throughout. I was actively present during data collection in six communities; the remaining 
three (Pipalbot, Amalachaur, Arjewa) were considered out of bounds, owing to the security 
situation. All interviews, including the qualitative ones (see section 3.5), were recorded on tape 
and later transcribed. 
● Survey organization: As already mentioned, a consulting company associated with the 
Department of Geography of Prithivi Narayan Campus in Pokhara conducted the 1992–1995 
surveys. In view of the knowledge possessed by this group, and with a view to ensure a 
homogenous approach with respect to data collection approaches, the idea was to have this 
company assist with data collection for the entire repeat-survey. Unfortunately, the security 
situation in the Dhaulagiri Zone deteriorated considerable during the first half of 2004 with a 
Maoist attack on Beni, the headquarters of Myagdi District in March, with according to local 
people perhaps 100 dead. This meant that only one area—Mustang District in the mountains, 
which remained unaffected by the conflict—was considered a safe place to work for local 
academics. Subsequently, in order to collect data in the hills it was decided to recruit assistants 
from the Dhaulagiri Community Development Centre, a local Non-government Organisation 
with some institutional knowledge of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project10. Most 
importantly, the Non-government Organisation possessed an extensive network of skilled 
fieldworkers and enjoyed a ‘working relationship’ with both the armed forces and the Maoists. 
Two senior staff members from the organisation received theoretical and practical training and 
conducted the hill part of the survey under my supervision11. 
● Data analysis: At the initial data analysis stage, immediately following the fieldwork in the 
summer of 2004, assistance was secured from a Kathmandu-based consultant who, together 
with the fieldworkers who had conducted the interviews and myself, initially went through all 
(n=188) questionnaires in order to clarify ambiguities. The raw data were then categorized 
according to different levels of aggregation (community and district levels), and organized into 
15 base tables and sub-tables showing means and percentages, with a view to enable integration 
                                                 
10 The Non-Government Organisation (the Dhaulagiri Community Resource Development Centre) had been conducting 
social mobilization activities in DIDP schemes in Baglung and Myagdi districts from 1992–1997. 
11 Supervision and feedback was provided from the Non-government Organisation’s office in Baglung.  
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with the comparative base. The next step involved ‘digging’ into the comparative base data, 
both as it appeared in the summaries of the key-effects monitoring surveys, and in the actual 
1992–1995 survey reports, assessing what could be compared and what could not. The 
agricultural performance data were the most readily comparable across the years, while the data 
on income, operation and management practices, water supply, distribution and allocation 
required considerably more digging in order to generate comparisons. 
3.5  The Qualitative Surveys 
The concepts of ‘trajectory’—defined as “a path through time” (Bagchi et al. 1998:457)—and 
‘livelihood trajectory’ in particular, which “refers to the consequences of the changing ways in 
which individuals construct a livelihood over time” (Bagchi et al. 1998:457), are central to the Long 
Term Change and Livelihoods Project of the Overseas Development Group at the University of East 
Anglia, project. In this vein, the “life history (an individual’s own ‘story’ of the changing 
livelihoods—constructed by herself albeit not under conditions of her own choosing) becomes a 
central concept and component of the research methodology” (Bagchi et al. 1998:457). I found the 
potentially change-capturing dimensions of these concepts inspiring, and the qualitative surveys that 
followed the cross-sectional survey thus aimed to explore livelihood trajectories. Ideally, such 
exploration implies the following up of the same individuals over time. However, even though a 
number of people who had also been interviewed in the 1990s were re-selected for interviews, the 
relatively quantitative nature of the past surveys meant that the existing data could not be said to 
constitute a comparative base of individual life histories. I therefore broadened the concept 
somewhat, and aimed for more general and collective (community) livelihood trajectories. 
Additionally, the qualitative surveys aimed to not only explore how people construct livelihoods 
within a longer-term context, but also to examine the role of institutions in those processes. I 
therefore added the concept (see Berg 2003) of ‘institutional trajectory’, with a view to, in addition 
to the life histories of households, also capturing the ‘life histories’ of water management 
institutions. This was obviously based on the tenet that livelihoods are crafted and played out in the 
context of institutions, with this, as explained in chapter 2, influencing the focus of the 
investigation.  
The qualitative surveys, which were designed after preliminary analysis of the findings from 
quantitative survey, involved the following. 
● A key informants checklist (see annex 3) that aimed to qualify issues from the cross-sectional 
survey. The purposively selected respondents (n=14), most of whom were people active in 
irrigation institutions, had been identified during the cross-sectional survey and were 
interviewed about a combination of institutional and socio-economic issues. The perspective 
was both circumspective and retrospective. 
● A checklist (see annex 4) that aimed to investigate livelihood trajectories by focusing on 
livelihood strategies, the meanings of irrigation institutions and other institutions as well as 
changes in socio-economic status over the years. Respondents (n=18) were purposively selected 
among people who had been interviewed in the 1990s and whose life situation I knew 
something about, and based on maximum variation principles. The perspective was 
predominantly retrospective. 
● A checklist (see annex 5) that went beyond the focus on livelihoods and irrigation institutions, 
and aimed to map the institutional landscape surrounding the communities and assess the 
relative importance of various institutions. The purposively selected respondents (n=16) 
consisted of a combination of people who were active in irrigation institutions and who—during 
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the previous interviews—had been identified as people who were active in mothers groups and 
credit groups, etc. The perspective was predominantly circumspective. 
In the hills, these qualitative surveys were conducted in the autumn of 2004 and involved two 
months of fieldwork as well as a month of preliminary analysis and transcription. As was the case 
with the cross-sectional survey, the data were collected with the assistance of Non-government 
Orgnisation staff from Baglung, from where I also carried out the preliminary analysis. While I was 
actively present during most of the interviews, three of the six hill communities remained, as 
already mentioned, out of bounds to outsiders during the period. In the mountains, the surveys were 
conducted over a month in the early months of 2006, and entailed in addition to the surveys, a trek 
from Mustang via Beni to Baglung. Having walked the same route in 1993, the visual impressions 
and informal talks with people during this ‘repeat’ trek served as inspiration for the descriptions of 
the area and its history that appears in chapter 5. The small market survey that appears in section 
9.5.2 was also carried out during this period. 
3.6 Notes on Other Sources of Data 
The thesis obviously relies on sources of data other than the primary data, derived from sources of 
information other than farmers. During the planning of the cross-sectional survey in the early 
months of 2004, I was based at the International Labour Organization’s Kathmandu office, and 
spent considerable time tracing data related to the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, much 
of which, it turned out, had perished or gone missing during office relocations. Fortunately, the 
most essential documentation was already in my possession. The affiliation with the International 
Labour Organization, as well as my formal affiliation with the Department of Geography at 
Tribhuvan University, proved to be a useful platform for gaining access to resource persons in the 
donor and Non-Government Organisation community, as well as in government, and thus to the 
relevant documents that serve as contextual and yardstick (i.e., comparative) data. Likewise, my 
former colleagues in DANIDA’S Energy Sector Assistance Programme in Kathmandu (where I had 
been employed from 1999–2002) proved to be an indispensable source of information on current 
socio-political developments in the country. Similarly, the Dhaulagiri Community Resource 
Development Centre (DCRDC) in Baglung was an essential source of information on local 
conditions. 
3.7  Notes on the Timeframe 
What is an acceptable timeframe for conducting repeat studies? Bagchi et al. (1998) and Blaikie et 
al. (2002) find that the span of a generation is appropriate. I will argue that the time span required to 
meaningfully use repeat-study methodology depends on the scope of the investigation. In this case, 
the scope involves the examination of livelihood trajectories in the context of institutional, political 
and economic change. Based on Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) suggestion that particular political-
economic circumstances offer access mechanisms that shape livelihood trajectories, I use their 
concept of the ‘political economic moment’ to denote the period from the early 1990s to 2006 
within which the investigation is framed (see section 4.1). Particularly the political events of this 
period, both in a national and regional context, qualify for an ‘analytical moment’, not least when 
understood in the wider historical ‘moments’ accounted for in chapters 1, 4 and 5. 
3.8  Data Collection during War Time 
The year 2004 was particularly tumultuous for Nepal, as what had until then been characterized by 
most observers as an insurgency gradually assumed the characteristic of civil war. The war itself, 
and its by-products in the shape of prolonged general strikes, roadblocks and curfews, proved not 
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only to be a logistical challenge, but also affected, as the previous mentioning of out-of bounds 
areas suggest, the methodological approach. As mentioned earlier, the gradual west-to-east 
penetration of the Maoists culminated in an attack on Beni, the headquarters of Myagdi District, in 
April 2004 that left a large number of people dead on both sides and stifled institutional life in the 
area. This militarization was extremely serious; for instance the Maoist attack on Beni led to several 
air attacks by the army on villagers and in the succeeding months the few Non-government 
Organisations that were still active in the areas advocated that no village meetings were to be held 
in the open. Landmines and roadside bombs were a potential threat along the highway that led into 
the area. 
As mentioned in section 3.4, the Beni incident and its subsequent militarization of the hills in the 
Dhaulagiri Zone meant that I had to replace the academically trained professionals with two Non-
government Organisation staff for data collection in the hills. This led to worries about the quality 
of the data to be collected, and the need to orientate and train this staff delayed the data collection 
process. However, my worries about quality were without foundation. Both professionals were 
originally farmers from Baglung and Myagdi districts, but had for a number of years worked as 
fieldworkers in agricultural income-generation projects, and what they lacked in academic skills 
was made up for in terms of local knowledge, enthusiasm and empathy. This resulted in relatively 
high quality and faithfully recorded interviews with limited recording bias. Hence, while the need to 
follow up and clarify recording ambiguities made the initial data collection quite an intensive 
process, the recruitment of the Non-government Organisation staff turned out to be a boon. 
On a broader methodological note, the hills of the Dhaulagiri Zone in 2004 represented a vastly 
different fieldwork climate compared to the 1990s. During data collection for the 1992–1995 
surveys, it was the norm rather than the exception to spend nights in the villages. That practice, 
which despite the hardship associated with sleeping on earthen floors, insects and heat usually 
rewards the research with better quality data (as a result of greater ‘immersion’, informal interaction 
and scope for observation) than short ‘quick and dirty’ visits, was unheard of in 2004. Farmers were 
generally worried about outsiders being caught in nightly crossfire between the army and the 
Maoists, as well as about the prolonged presence of outsiders causing unwanted attention from both 
sides of the conflict. Having to spend nights in the relative safety of district headquarters, often 
located several hours of walking from the communities, was also time-consuming. 
Linked to this, it was considerably more difficult, in 2004 compared to the 1990s, to conduct 
prolonged, qualitative interviews. The presence of the two Non-government Organisation staff who 
were known and trusted by many farmers was a great help in this respect. However, a climate of 
fear nevertheless meant that ambitions with respect to obtaining the detailed life histories associated 
with the livelihood trajectory approach had to be toned down. Relatively ‘hurried’ interviews 
meant, for instance, that it was difficult to build up to the point during conversations with farmers 
when the ‘grand picture’, associated with changes in livelihood conditions over the years (such as, 
for example, the changing nature and role of agriculture), was reflected upon. This problem was, in 
a couple of cases, compensated for by the conducting of interviews in district headquarters.  
These district headquarters were, however, also becoming increasingly militarized. Baglung, which 
I used as a base, had long been abandoned by most Non-government Organisations and outsiders, 
amid constant rumours that the town—located some 12 km from Beni—would be attacked by the 
Maoists any day. These rumours, along with the ever-growing military presence, an influx of 
displaced people from the western hinterlands, and the eight o’clock curfews, served to create quite 
a tense atmosphere. This unnerving situation was, however, outweighed to a great extent by the 
indomitable spirit of the staff and leader of my host institution, the Dhaulagiri Community Resource 
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Development Centre (from where the data collection staff was also recruited), practically the only 
Non-government Organisation that continued its activities in the region during this turbulent period. 
 
Chapter 4: 1990–2005 as ‘the Political-Economic Moment’ 
4.1 Introduction  
“We obeyed the Ranas and during the Panchayat we did what we were told. Democracy 
came and we followed. Tomorrow there may be another system and we will have to listen to 
them too. We can never say we won’t obey.” (Inhabitant of the Far Western District of 
Jumla in the early 2000s in Whelpton 2005:206). 
The above sentiment neatly sums up the fatalistic position from which many, particularly rural, 
people view the vagaries of politics in Nepal. However, even if different powers do come and go, I 
will argue in line with Ribot and Peluso (2003) that because different political-economic 
circumstances may change the terms of access for specific individuals and groups, then the terms of 
access are best understood within particular political-economic moments. Not just terms of access 
to the natural resources (the ‘resources’ in Ribot and Peluso’s optics) associated with irrigation but 
(as proposed in chapter 2) also resources understood more broadly as opportunities. Thus, particular 
political-economic circumstances offer access mechanisms that include the institutional landscapes 
that surround people, the politics, the laws, the technology, the infrastructure etc. used by certain 
people to gain access to desired opportunities. The political-economic moment in the context of this 
study coincides with the temporal context of the re-study, i.e. the period from 1990 to 20051. 
That period, which I will, in addition to the political-economic moment, refer to as the democratic 
era, commenced when the late King Birendra gave in to popular street protests known as the Jana 
Andolan (or ‘people’s movement’) in 1990. It came to an end when the present King Gyanendra on 
1 February 2005 dismissed the government, assumed absolute power, and reinforced emergency 
measures curbing civil liberties. Prior to 2005, institutional life and civil liberties had been affected 
by a number of democratic regressions imposed by both the Maoists and the state apparatus, but I 
consider 1 February 2005 as the date on which the last vestiges of democracy were removed.  
It may be argued that specific periods cannot be neatly isolated, and that terms of access for certain 
groups have evolved over long periods of time. Indeed, the brief 1990–2005 democratic era must be 
understood in the context of the democratic seeds sown in the first democratic period from 1951–
1960 and the royal concessions to democracy in later decades. Likewise, the democratic regression 
of the 2000s has historical precedents, and both the shortcomings of democracy and the insurgency 
must be understood in the context of centuries of what may best be described broadly as feudalism. 
Moreover, the terms of access for the particular group in question—irrigated farmers—during the 
democratic era are rooted in regionally specific historical circumstances, as I will show in the next 
chapter. I nevertheless find it important to point to a number of themes, which are characteristic of 
the democratic period, which I consider particularly important as access determinants in a rural 
livelihood context. These include institutional plurality, reduced information asymmetries, rural 
development policies, ‘globalization’, and the democratic regression associated with the civil war. 
Linked to the understanding of access in specific temporal contexts, I posit that the broad concept of 
political space for poverty reduction (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 2002) is useful in the context 
of understanding terms of access. It is understood as “the types and range of possibilities present for 
pursuing poverty reduction by the poor or on behalf of the poor” (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 
                                                 
1 The first comparative survey actually investigates events in 1991, and the last survey in the re-study was actually 
conducted in the spring of 2006, However, the democratic era is a useful cut-off period, hence the ‘rounding’. 
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2002:8), and implies that ‘the poor’ straddle private/public spheres and navigate within the 
institutional landscape regardless of private/public categories. Political space for poverty reduction 
is constituted by three main components: institutional channels for accessing policy formulation and 
implementation; political discourses of poverty and poverty reduction; and, social and political 
practices that may influence policy agendas and actual implementation (Webster and Engberg-
Pedersen 2002). Political space and the dynamics that it entails is “more likely when there has been 
a transition towards some form of democracy” (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 2002:11), as was 
the case in Nepal in the political-economic moment under examination. 
4.2  The Role of Democratic Policies 
As Whelpton proposes, it was the virtual closure of the border between India and Nepal in 1989, as 
a result of a trade and transit dispute, that “sealed the fate of the Panchayat regime” (2005:153) in 
place since 1960. However, as the same author explains, deeper tensions, including expansion of 
education coupled with limited ability in society to meet subsequent aspirations, inspiration from 
the collapse of Eastern European autocracies, and I would add, democratic reform in the region (e.g. 
the Philippines) led to popular uprisings in 1990 and the restoration (see 4.1) of multi-party 
democracy in 1991. The “monolithic patronage” (SAPPROS 2001) of the Panchayat system 
basically involved vertical control of institutional life, from village to parliament. It resembled the 
various forms of ‘guided democracy’ seen in other parts of Asia at the time, and while including a 
token element of popular representation, it enabled the king to rule “unhindered by the pressures of 
parliamentary democracy” (Whelpton 2005:101). 
The return of democracy to Nepal after 1990 coincided with a shared donor agenda emphasizing 
political decentralization and private sector participation in development, not least in the 
management of natural resources. Linked to this, the notion that local resource management 
institutions represent particularly appropriate institutional forms gained serious foothold in policies 
and legal frameworks towards the mid-1990s2. Not least in irrigation, where putting ‘the local 
resource management institution’ back on to the agenda, to the extent that it came to occupy a 
significant role in the rural development strategies and policy frameworks of Nepal, was helped 
along by a series of influential studies that rediscovered the historical role of indigenous irrigation 
(see ILO 1995, KC and Pradhan 1993, Pradhan 1989, Pradhan 2003, Pradhan and Yoder 1990, 
Rana 1992, Yoder 1994). As also mentioned in chapter 1, evidence of community-managed 
irrigation systems performing better than government-managed systems constituted another 
determinant with respect to assigning priority to community-based irrigation (Ostrom et al. 1992, 
Ostrom et al 2002).  
Private sector participation led therefore, first and foremost to the proliferation of what Ribot (2004) 
terms ‘privatization’ decentralization, i.e., donor-promoted Non-Government Organisations 
working with single-purpose3 user groups, committees, etc., particularly within forestry and 
irrigation. This tendency was helped along by a new Non-Government Organisation act that eased 
                                                 
2 See for example, the Agricultural Perspective Plan (National Planning Commission 1995) or, for more pioneering 
material, the Water Resources Irrigation Policy 2049 (1992) (Ministry of Water Resources, 1992). 
3 I borrow this term from Manor (2004) who contrasts single-purpose institutions such as user groups that often have 
selected leadership and a narrow portfolio, with multi-purpose institutions such as elected local government with wide 
portfolios (Manor 2004). It is basically an issue of private vs. public as also discussed in the context of collective action 
theory in chapter 2. 
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what had previously been a sector under strict central control4 (Berg 1995). Increased channelling 
of donor funds through Non-Government Organisations followed this ‘deregulation’. By the late 
1990s, some 40 per cent of all donor funds were administered by Non-Government Organisations 
(Whelpton 2005), whose number had reached some 30,000 (Bhattachan 2001, Whelpton 2005). 
Prior to the appearance of the ‘NGO’ acronym in donors’ project documents, private, self-help 
organizations had primarily been either centred around religious activities (so-called guthi5), 
community-based natural resource management institutions, or been in the shape of tea-party-type 
organizations controlled by the Kathmandu elite. The massive mushrooming of Non-Government 
Organisations that followed the money was indeed problematic. I categorized these organisations as 
follows in a paper6 drafted in 1995. 
• ‘Phoney offices’ consisting mainly of signboards and labels, set up to obtain pieces of the 
development cake.  
• Consultancy firms in disguise, set up by professional groups, including government 
officials.  
• Well-meaning and idealistic development organizations, many working in partnership with 
international NGOs and sometimes government organizations. 
• Networks or umbrella organizations with objectives and scope that include attempts at 
constructing economic development alternatives, capacity and awareness building, 
promoting human and gender rights, etc., and increasing people’s participation at both local 
and advocacy levels. The higher tiers may work at advocacy levels. 
• Professional associations such as micro-hydro owners, farmers (community-based groups, 
user groups), women’s and occupational groups, etc., often federated at district levels. 
These are obviously not exclusive categories. Many would argue that the first category remains the 
most dominant; I would, however, as someone who worked with Nepalese Non-Government 
Organisations both in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s, argue that the sector has matured 
considerably over the years. By the early 2000s, the wheat had been sifted from the chaff to the 
extent that the latter three types of organisation characterized the sector, not only because donors 
themselves had learned from past mistakes, but also because the Maoist presence meant that there 
were limits to what you could get away with (see section 4.8). The category at the bottom of the 
list—what might be referred to as grassroots initiatives (and not actually Non-Government 
Organisations in the modern sense of the term)—that may be seen to have influenced history in 
many parts of the world, appeared to dominate in the latter part of the political-economic moment. 
As one commentator noted in 2002: 
“What is both surprising and promising is that despite the generally bleak climate, Nepal has 
witnessed a remarkable resurgence in small-scale grassroots mobilizations on issues of 
community and livelihood. Some of these examples include the creative initiatives of 
                                                 
4 The Social Service National Coordination Council, which until the early 1990s controlled the activities of foreign 
NGOs, had the late Queen Aishwarya on its board, something which may be taken to illustrate vested elite interests 
(prestige, funds, ‘stepping stone’ jobs, etc.) in the sector. 
5 Guthi may be described as mutual help associations, particularly among Newars, often centred on the operation of 
temples. 
6 Representing a donor (the International Labour Organisation) that promoted the use of Non-Government 
Organisations, I had been intensively involved in screening, selection and hiring of such organisations. 
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‘untouchable’ castes for dignity and equality; struggles by agricultural labourers for justice; 
and the voices of the rural people against domestic violence, gambling, alcoholism, and for 
women’s rights.” (Shah, 2002: no page numbers) 
While ‘privatization’ decentralization was a relatively fast process after 1990, political 
decentralization took place at a much slower pace. Policies after 1990 involved gradual transfers of 
power from central bureaucracies to new Village Development Committees and District 
Development Committees (i.e., elected local bodies), but mostly this amounted to mere territorial 
decentralization in name only, without much change in terms of the operative norms that had 
characterized the Panchayat period, let alone delegation or devolution. However, annual grants from 
the central level, particularly after 19947 meant that Village Development Committees became 
increasingly important. Also, legal reforms succeeded, albeit in a small way, to remove power from 
traditional line agencies and allowed ‘participation’ by farmers, mainly in the construction of 
irrigation schemes and other infrastructure, and in terms of representation at the district level in 
emerging local government structures. In donor-supported infrastructure projects, social 
mobilization activities became key elements in irrigation development; farmers would typically 
carry out major works themselves, and eventually ownership of irrigation structures came to rest 
with the communities, whose irrigation institutions became responsible for operation and 
maintenance8. 
Despite these decentralization efforts, dichotomies between central government and local 
government in terms of gaining control of resources were an issue throughout the 1990s, as it had 
been ever since donors starting financing development projects in the early 1950s. In the case of 
lucrative large-scale irrigation projects, Dixit and Gyawali (1999), for instance, noted the central 
government’s pre-occupation with large-scale donor-funded water projects, with the role of local 
government being reduced to adjusting to and mitigating unintended consequences. The importance 
of the decentralization process for rural livelihoods needs to be understood in this context of 
planning and governance, where, over the years, a core tension has been the power of central line 
agencies and their district-level extensions vis-à-vis ‘local’ people.  
With the introduction of the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act (see Danida 2002), the 
decentralization process gained momentum in qualitative terms to increasingly include the 
devolution of decision-making powers and the build-up of capacity for planning and 
implementation at local levels. Local bodies became increasingly interesting to donors, as 
alternatives to top-heavy, central line agencies, not least because the Local Self-Governance Act 
endorsed the transfer of portfolios from line agencies, including those dealing with drinking water 
and irrigation, to District Development Committees (Danida 2002). Even if it may be argued that 
                                                 
7 The United Marxist-Leninist (UML) government introduced what they called a ‘Build Your Village Yourself’ 
programme whereby all Village Development Committees received NRs 500,000 for local development projects. Most 
funds were used for infrastructure projects. 
8 This marked a departure from previous centralized project implementation practice that involved only line agencies 
and a hierarchy of contractors. The changes were made possible as a result of amendments to the government’s 
Financial Rules that assigned “priority to users’ committees formed by local users for the construction of projects to be 
implemented in rural areas up to a cost ceiling of Nepali Rupees 10 lakh” (one million) (Ch. 42, no. 46, Nepal Gazette, 
part 3, 01 March 1993:9). These amendments followed wording in the Eighth Plan (1992–1997) emphasizing that “rural 
communities will be encouraged to organize user groups for building community infrastructure and to organize 
beneficiary groups in order to strengthen receiving mechanisms at the grassroots level. All projects within the technical 
and managerial competence of the local people will be implemented by local user groups with assistance from local and 
district committees” (National Planning Commission 1992:41). 
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dichotomies also existed between local government institutions at the community level, and that 
local-level power relations continued to play important roles, such devolutionary steps were 
important in the context of local livelihoods. Not least because local technical departments, staffed 
by professionals appointed by locally elected bodies, created scope for community-based resource 
management institutions to become actual counterparts to the more formal, local institutional 
setups.  
Democratic policies and the creation of political space for poverty reduction (Webster and Engberg-
Pedersen 2002) were thus related in the political-economic moment. In Nepal both privatization 
decentralization and political decentralization, as an outcome of democratic policies, enabled the 
articulation of a vast plurality of interests for groups that either had the ability to gain access to 
them directly or for whom external resources could access them on their behalf. Particularly in 
those parts of rural Nepal that gained road access, farmers’ irrigation associations and other 
prominent single-purpose user groups such as farmers’ cooperatives and forestry user groups 
became connected to a surrounding institutional landscape where decentralization policies enabled 
their legal recognition as user groups and thus (at least in principle) eligibility for funding through 
local administrative bodies.  
Some of this plurality of interests ended up as development initiatives that, by virtue of being less 
top-down and involving far more actors than before (including donors, central and local 
government, local organizations, politicians and communities) in relatively diverse institutional 
landscapes, improved in qualitative terms9 compared to the past. The relative success of 
community-managed forestry, irrigation and energy activities and of thousands of associated 
income-generating groups is evidence of the importance of the restructuring of institutional 
landscapes. While the effect of these activities on those without access to single-purpose user 
groups may be questioned (see for example, Beck and Fajber 2006), the fact that ‘soft’ issues (such 
as social mobilization activities and the associated organization of women, marginalized groups, 
etc.) were increasingly a part of development activities should be considered important. 
4.3  Access to Information 
Democratic policies in the political-economic moment, helped along by technology, led to reduced 
information asymmetries between Nepal and the outside world and between urban centres and rural 
areas within the country. Around the turn of the millennium, Nepal probably had the freest and most 
flourishing media in South Asia. Literacy rates, which increased from 39 per cent in 1990 to about 
58 per cent by 2000 according to one estimate (Whelpton 2005) 10, obviously played a major role. 
Alongside the printed press, telecommunications also increasingly found their way into rural areas 
where many Village Development Committees gained access to telephones. Satellite television, 
widely favoured as a source of information and entertainment over national terrestrial television, 
found its way into many district headquarters. Cyberspace remained a predominantly urban 
phenomenon but, as in other developing countries, the indirect role of the internet in reducing 
information asymmetries should not be underestimated. NGOs and development agencies linked to 
                                                 
9 Examples include the United Nations Development Programmes’s Rural Energy Development Programme, the  
International Labour Organisations´s Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project and the Forestry Programmes 
undertaken by His (then) Majesty’s Government with Danida and Australian Aid. In terms of developing pioneering 
approaches that were adopted by other development initiatives, the impact of these projects and programmes should be 
considered to be considerable. 
10 Asian Development Bank (2004) puts the figure much lower, at 43 per cent. 
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information networks over the internet played important roles in this respect, by facilitating 
information flows to local government and community levels via fieldworkers and other facilitators. 
The livelihood effects of improved access to information are somewhat intangible but should not, in 
my opinion, be underestimated. It should be recalled that a great deal of innovation—probably most 
of it—takes place without direct intervention from government and donors. Indeed, many farmers 
and rural entrepreneurs, it appears, would rather have access to technical know-how than to other 
forms of intervention11. Manuals and plans in hand improve people’s position with respect to 
approaching urban manufacturers of, for example, small hydropower plants and agricultural 
implements, or government agencies and Non Government Organisations for assistance. Increasing 
rates of domestic and overseas migration throughout the 1990s (see section 4.5) are also thought to 
have increasingly contributed to information flows through social remittances, i.e., ideas and 
practices that are transmitted by migrants (Levitt 1996). Social remittances, of course, associated 
with Gurkha soldiers and their communities have been a feature in rural Nepal for close to two 
centuries. The vast increase in migration over the past couple of decades, however, it may be 
argued, has led to the spread of social remittances to a much broader populace, and appears—in 
combination with educational advancements—to have raised expectations with respect not only to 
employment and material goods but also to political and economic systems. 
4.4  The Economic Environment and its Rural Development Planning Framework 
While a democratic policy environment and reduced information asymmetries in the political-
economic moment may be seen as conducive to gaining access to resources, broadly understood, the 
role of economic policies aimed at the rural sector is more ambivalent. Nepal, like most other 
countries in the region, had embraced agricultural policies associated with structural adjustment and 
deregulation. This primarily involved removing subsidies for fertilizers, water-lifting irrigation 
technology as well as organizational reform of both agricultural input and marketing corporations. 
The effect that this had on rural livelihoods is probably limited, as discussed in chapter 5. 
Otherwise, programmes for the agricultural sector were for most of the period guided by the 1995–
2015 Agricultural Perspective Plan, designed by the well-known economist John Mellor, and in line 
with the overall economic liberalization policies pursued in Nepal. The Agricultural Perspective 
Plan is characterized by a focus on priority inputs such as irrigation, fertilizer, agricultural roads and 
power, and research and extension, with the objective of achieving a ‘green revolution’ and poverty 
reduction. These priority inputs are to be applied in proper sequence so that they reinforce each 
other. For the hills, the strategy involves a focus on high-value crops including citrus, off-season 
vegetables and vegetable seeds, while for the mountains, apples, vegetables and potato seed are 
envisaged as key crops (National Planning Commission 1995). The Agricultural Perspective Plan is 
based on a growth-linkages approach that not only sees agriculture as a central source of livelihood 
but also as the central dynamic in Nepal’s economic development. Moreover, it is characterized by 
recognition of regional comparative advantages, confidence in the dynamics of the role of the 
private sector, particularly community-based organizations, and market forces.  
This Plan has been criticized for ignoring first of all that the rural economy lacks the foundations in 
terms of human and physical capitals and institutional capacity for adoption of, for instance, new 
agricultural technologies, and secondly the ‘imperfect’ nature of rural markets. In this situation, a 
growth strategy that sought, among other things, to enhance these capitals and focus on public 
                                                 
11 This is in my experience a common reply when interviewing farmers during feasibility surveys for technically 
oriented development programmes such as electrification and agricultural extension. 
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works to raise welfare and effective demand was considered a more suitable approach (Cameron 
1998). The Asian Development Bank, which was instrumental in preparing the plan, has recently 
reviewed it. It concludes that while the realization of the plan is hindered by structural constraints 
such as land fragmentation and small farm sizes, its general idea remains sound: 
“The Agricultural Perspective Plan is a valid strategy to inform the formulation of 
agricultural development policy and plans in Nepal. As a general strategy, it has a clear 
vision and a good appeal to the need of using technology and infrastructure to increase 
agricultural productivity and move farming from subsistence to commercialization. From 
the broad point of view of being an overall strategic vision of agricultural development, the 
Agricultural Perspective Plan is still an appropriate and useful document” (Asian 
Development Bank 2002:56). 
Unsurprisingly, the Asian Development Bank therefore recommends more of the same in its 
strategy for Nepal for the period 2005–2009 (Asian Development Bank 2004). Also unsurprisingly, 
it notes that the implementation of the plan has been slow, not because of the plan itself but because 
of the Government of Nepal’s slow implementation of programmes within priority areas. It also 
notes that implementation has been extremely uneven, and that regions that were already relatively 
well endowed in terms of infrastructure such as roads, trails, bridges and irrigation prior to the birth 
of the plan have also been those regions that have benefited the most from investments made during 
the first nine years of the Plan (Asian Development Bank 2004). The Dhaulagiri region, as I will 
show in chapter 5, may be said to belong to one such well-endowed area where a combination of 
investments in road infrastructure and irrigation has had significant livelihood effects for certain 
groups of people. 
4.5  Migration and Remittances 
However, it is somewhat surprising that the Asian Development Bank, while noting that rural 
sources of income have become more diverse, refers to migration as a seasonal phenomenon (Asian 
Development Bank 2004) that apparently does not warrant particular attention in the years ahead. In 
this sense, the Asian Development Bank policy echoes the World Bank’s view on migration and 
remittances during the early 1990s, which were seen “as an unfortunate and marginal by-product of 
a stagnant rural economy to be eliminated progressively by programmes for economic development 
within Nepal and within the agricultural sector” as Seddon et al. (1998:4) have noted. The World 
Bank also concluded towards the end of the 1990s that:  
“In the short to medium term, agriculture represents the highest potential for growth and 
poverty alleviation, as the vast majority of the people, and especially of the poor, live in 
rural areas and draw their livelihood from agriculture” (quoted in Seddon et al. 2001:8) 
While it is a fact that the majority of the population is involved in agriculture, the unwavering faith 
in the continued centrality of agriculture is striking. With more than 85 per cent of the population 
according to the 2001 census (Central Bureau of Statistics 2004) officially living in rural areas (and 
with some 60 per cent, according to Asian Development Bank 2004, involved in the sector) 
agriculture certainly remains important, but not as important as it used to be. The low growth in 
agricultural Gross Domestic Product (2.6 per cent a year on average over the past 20 years) and a 
contribution to Gross Domestic Product of 39 per cent in 2004 (Asian Development Bank 2004) 
compared to 65 per cent in the mid-1970s (World Bank 1991) are evidence of this. However, 
contrary to the intentions of the Agricultural Perspective Plan, Nepal has failed to experience the 
transformation that in other countries has led to, or indicated, the transition from agricultural to 
industrial economies (Seddon et al. 1998). Rather, in Nepal, resource transfers into non-agricultural 
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sectors increasingly have come about as a result of non-farm income and remittances from migrants 
who seek economic opportunities abroad. It would appear that while incomes from remittances may 
be ploughed back into rural communities in the short run, both domestic and international migration 
should probably be understood in the context of a trend towards some sort of structural change—we 
do not know exactly what kind yet—that is not restricted to Nepal, as suggested in chapter 1. In 
Nepal and other developing countries, urban populations are expected to surpass rural populations 
within a couple of decades (Pinstrup Andersen et al. 1999).  
Indeed, labour migration and remittances increasingly became part of the lives and livelihoods of 
rural families in the political-economic moment. However, migration is not new to rural Nepal. 
Male farmers seeking to escape the poverty of Far Western Nepal have for decades been both 
permanently and seasonally employed in India in vast numbers. Seasonal migration for trade has 
been an entrenched livelihood strategy for Himalayan farmers for centuries. Likewise, Gurkha 
soldiers from the western and eastern hills have traditionally been employed in the British and 
Indian Armies. In addition, women and girls from various places, but mainly concentrated in the 
central hills, have for some time worked in the commercial sex industry in India.  
However, labour migration overseas accelerated dramatically in the period leading up to and into 
the political-economic moment. From an official estimate of 400,000 people working abroad in 
1980, the figure for the early 2000s was, quoting a conservative estimate, one in 20 of the 
population, with a corresponding 25 per cent of households benefiting from remittances (Kollmair 
et al. 2006). The importance of migration to the economy should not be underestimated; 10 years 
ago another conservative estimate put the value of remittances at Nepali Rupees 35 billion (1997 
figures) close to the official figure of Nepali Rupees 38.3 billion for all foreign exchange earnings 
combined (exports, foreign aid, tourism, remittances, etc.) in the same year, while the most liberal 
estimate put the figure at Nepali Rupees 69 billion, or almost double the official figure for foreign 
exchange earnings (Seddon et al. 1998). Kollmair et al. (2006) reached somewhat a similar 
conclusion about the proportions involved in the early 2000s. 
A number of factors may be pointed at in attempts to explain the substantial increase in labour 
migration from Nepal during the political-economic moment. These include conventional socio-
economic push factors (including historically decreasing land-holding sizes) as well as pull factors 
such as global economic integration—or globalization, as it also called—and its demanding 
international labour markets as major structural causes. With reference to section 4.3, I would also 
point to social remittances, educational attainment, free media and enhanced information flows, as 
factors that contributed to accelerating migration. Not only did these factors appear to raise people’s 
aspirations for better livelihoods, but improved information flows may also be seen to have 
improved conditions for the networks on which migrants depend. I have elaborated on these issues 
in chapters 5 and 9. The civil war’s stifling of institutional and economic life is likely to have 
played a role as a push factor as well. 
Access to foreign employment is highly unequal and is gained through a variety of access 
mechanisms. Relatively accessible, India remained the most important destination for the poorest 
migrants in the 1990s and 2000s—as it had been for decades before—both in terms of numbers of 
people who went there (more than one million) and the total volume of remittances. With an open 
border, labour migration to India, while definitely relying on networks12, poses little red tape and 
                                                 
12 The connection between people from Bajhang in the Far West of Nepal and employment in the Indian city of 
Bangalore is a case in point. See the thematic issue of Himal South Asian Jan/Feb 1997 entitled ‘Lowly Labour in the 
Lowlands’. 
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requires no middleman. Moving up the social ladder, many of the growing number of young men 
(and increasingly women as well) who now work in the Gulf, the West and the Far East, appear to 
rely on ‘old boy’ networks (mostly the Army) to gain access. Others manage to gain access by 
paying the relatively high commissions charged by manpower agencies. These groups, who tend to 
be better off than the average, may possibly be said to driven by ‘opportunity’ rather than distress 
(see Seddon et al. 2001), although I find the distinction fairly notional. 
It needs to be mentioned that on top of foreign migration came the highly visible, but difficult to 
quantify, migration from villages to district headquarters in both the hills and the terai, and to 
Kathmandu. These urbanization dynamics were accelerated by the displacement and subsequent 
rural exodus resulting from the civil war13, but should also be understood, as I discuss in chapter 5, 
in a wider context of migration-fuelled urbanization. I will also, in later chapters examine the 
consequences of livelihood diversification with migration as a central element, particularly in the 
context of common property regimes and assumptions about stable communities, agriculture as a 
central livelihood, and incentives to invest in cooperation that are at the heart of collective action 
theory. I will, therefore, round off this section with a couple of corollary issues that increasingly 
affected people’s lives in the political-economic moment. 
4.6  The Feminization of Rural Life 
Although aggregate assessments are lacking, there is general agreement that the political-economic 
moment saw increased feminization of rural life. Social upheavals in the period included the 
separation of families as a result of migration. There was, as Cameron observed, a “tendency for 
joint families to dissolve in the face of material pressures, leaving the elderly very exposed to low 
quality of life with resentful children or isolated living. At both ends of the age range, there is a 
gender bias against people who happen to be female” (1998:13). Linked to this, Blaikie et al. have 
observed that “many rural households have become a sort of spatially disparate extended family. 
The results are increasing feminization of rural life” (2002:1268). As the economically active men 
migrate, the women are left with the children and elderly. The risks to those left behind are great “if 
monetary remittances… decrease as the moral economy of the village disintegrates” (Blaikie et al. 
2002:1268). The point here is that the absence of husbands may create vulnerability, particularly if 
the status of the household shifts towards that of a de facto female-headed household, when 
remittances cease or if husbands do not return for various reasons, including disease.  
In this respect, HIV/AIDS had been a serious issue for quite some time before the 1990s for 
migrants working in the commercial sex industry in India, and for the husbands and children of 
those who came back. Increasingly, however, as the epidemic gained pace and spread into the 
general population, the wives of male migrants to India in particular were also increasingly at risk. 
Nowhere was the risk higher than in the Far West of Nepal where the majority of men travel to 
India for permanent and seasonal work, and where the combination of poverty, gender inequality 
and ignorance lead to high rates of infection (see, for example, Himal South Asian, March 2003). 
In this context, it has been pointed out that women’s rights to property (private and common) are 
generally more loosely defined than men’s. This may mean that women are more likely to lose 
access to the water, forests and land upon which they depend for food security (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
1997), if circumstances change and the household becomes de facto female-headed, as a result of a 
migrant husband who does not return. This may well have had serious livelihood consequences for 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Nepali Times, no. 161 (5–11 September), 2003. 
 56
a growing number of women in the political-economic period, not least in the context of the 
potential disintegration of cooperative institutions and self-help groups that may have resulted from 
migration and other upheavals. Barriers for women to sustain systems range from social norms—
women in some communities are prohibited from working in irrigation systems because of 
perceptions surrounding ritual pollution (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997)—to time constraints associated 
with additional domestic responsibilities. However, while the risk of marginalization in the politico-
economic moment may have increased for women left behind as a result of migration, it may also 
be assumed that feminization of rural life held opportunities for some women to improve their 
relative position vis-à-vis those institutions and structures that are usually defined and dominated by 
men (Cameron 1998). 
4.7  An Episode: Coming Full Circle - The End of the Democratic Era 
Three days after Nepal and the world had learned about the bizarre tragedy in which King Birendra 
and seven other members of the royal family had been killed, allegedly by the gun crazy and 
heavily intoxicated Crown Prince Dipendra, I decided to defy the official mourning period and 
collect some things from my office. While at the office, a colleague phoned and told me that 
Dipendra, who had been in a coma since the event, had passed away, and that I had better hurry 
home as crowds were gathering in the streets and a curfew had been announced. I decided to drive 
along Kathmandu’s ring road rather than the crowded streets of the city. At Pashupatinath, where 
the royals had been hurriedly cremated after their murders, my car became stuck in the ever-
thickening, barricade-constructing crowd of men, with heads shaved in respect for their dead king. I 
sheepishly asked a man if he thought I would be allowed to pass. He shook his head, said I had 
better get the vehicle off the road, and pointed to a residence with a large gate. I managed to drive 
up to the house, knocked on the gate, and was given permission to leave the car in the compound. 
The walk towards my home, along the tracks and trails of the north-eastern part of Kathmandu, left 
a strong impression on me of the collective despair and grief that the people felt. Photographs of 
King Birendra and his close family were displayed on makeshift altars, surrounded by the usual 
paraphernalia used for puja14. Some people were crying openly, some stared vacantly into the air, 
many stood around in small groups, sombrely discussing the events of the past days and what might 
happen next. Away from the crowds, I came across a taxi and got in. I told the driver about the 
crowds and the barricades at Pashupatinath, and asked him what he thought would happen next. He 
was in a grim mood. “Somalia—we will be like Somalia. That’s what will happen now,” he replied. 
4.7.1  Democratic Regression 
Most people connect Nepal’s recent history with the carnage at the royal palace on the evening of 1 
June 2001. However, even though the tragedy was on an unprecedented scale as familicide and may 
appear anachronistic, Thapa (2005) reminds us that the history of the monarchy and, in particular 
that of the Rana regime that held power for more than 100 years, is replete with power struggles 
that led to murderous takeovers. And if it was not for the fact that the events at the royal palace may 
be seen to have, if not, heralded the beginning of the end, then certainly, sped up the demise of the 
democratic era, the violent events at the palace, in 2001 as in centuries before, would have had little 
effect on life in rural Nepal. Unlike King Birendra, King Gyanendra15, who became king after the 
                                                 
14Hindu worship 
15 Whom many people believe to have masterminded the massacre. 
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massacre, was not democratically inclined, and appeared particularly determined to tackle the 
escalating Maoist insurgency with force.  
The insurgency began in 1996 when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)—the Maoists, as they 
were to become better known—announced their ‘People’s War’ from their heartland of the 
impoverished mid-western hills (see chapter 5). Their agenda was unequivocal and included ‘class 
war’ through violent means, secularism, and a republican state. The rise of the Maoists may be 
understood in the context of a number of factors. These include the democratic policies that had 
created political space for poverty alleviation among certain groups, including groups that had not 
earlier been able to articulate their interests. These policies also created political space for 
mobilization of ultra-leftist factions that had gradually splintered from a leftist movement that, with 
some degree of unity, had confronted the Panchayat regime in 1990 (see Whelpton 2005). Factors 
also included skilful and tactical leadership that enabled the expansion of Maoist influence to most 
of the country, and the playing of indirect political games in Kathmandu without losing grip on the 
heartland. Most fundamentally, however, the Maoist success should be understood in the context of 
centuries of centralist rule of a feudal or semi-feudal character and, subsequently, a democratic era 
with a great deal of what we may metaphorically term ‘excess historical baggage’. This excess 
baggage may be seen to characterize the state machinery from central to local levels. Gyawali 
succinctly sums up the problem: 
“… the Nepali state since its inception has maintained a feudal character and the bureaucracy 
has been functioning within this context. Of interest here is the effect of this character on 
economics. A feudal society differs from a capitalist one in that the creation of scarcity and 
rent seeking is the goal rather than increased production and profit making” (2001:212). 
This pervasive ‘culture’ led, among other factors, to elastic distinctions between what is public 
property and what is private property on the part of managers of public utilities (Gyawali 1989 in 
Pandey 1996) and bureaucrats from central government to local line agencies and politicians. 
Thereby, it contributed to the failure of mainstream political parties to deliver changes in the lives 
and livelihoods of the increasingly-aware rural poor, particularly landless rural labourers, and 
subsequently to the rise of the Maoist movement in the politico-economic moment. The effect that 
the insurgency had on rural livelihoods and institutions is dealt with in chapter 9. Suffice it to say at 
this point that the violence and disturbances caused by the insurgency—along with the 2001 events 
at the royal palace—contributed, I will argue, to a mounting collective lack of faith in ‘project 
Nepal’, as exemplified by the taxi driver’s analogy to Somalia. Post June 2001, Nepal saw an 
escalation of the conflict, with a declaration of a state of emergency later in the year, and the 
deployment of the armed forces in what had until then been considered a matter for the police. 
Eventually, the conflict saw some 13,000 dead and many thousands of displaced families.  
Amid growing political turmoil, the political decentralization process came to a halt when District 
Development Committees and Village Development Committees were dissolved in July 2002 by 
the Government of Sher Bahadur Deuba on the pretext of securing (planned) fair elections. The fact 
that the opposition, including the Maoists, increasingly dominated local bodies is generally believed 
to be the real reason for this step. It meant that, at the district level, central government was 
represented by the Chief District Officer (the Magistrate), the Local Development Officer, the 
police and army, and district line agencies, all of which were appointed by and, as in pre-democracy 
days, only accountable to the central level. Somewhat ironically, King Gyanendra dismissed the 
Deuba Government in October of the same year, using the latter’s inability to hold planned 
elections as a pretext. A caretaker government then replaced the cabinet with a prime minister from 
the Panchayat era (see Nepali Times, vol. 103 and vol. 114, 2002). 
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The final straw in democratic regression was delivered on 1 February 2005 when King Gyanendra 
dismissed the his appointed government, and introduced further ‘emergency’ curbing of civil 
liberties, thus concentrating all power and resources with the monarchy and the army. Interestingly, 
the king had been given yet another pretext for concentrating power when, after 9/11, the United 
States had placed the official tag of ‘terrorist’ on Nepal’s Maoist insurgents. As the official 
proclamation reveals, the king was thus helped in redefining development as security in official 
discourse:  
“We would like to thank all the friendly nations who have generously supported us, 
appreciating our commitment to fight terrorism, as well as donors and international financial 
institutions that have rendered invaluable assistance in our development endeavours. Even 
the world’s democracies are presently faced with the threat of terrorism, which cannot be 
confined within geographical boundaries. The world community has in fact realized that the 
more secure, stable and prosperous the smaller nations become, the more secure, stable and 
prosperous will the region and the world as a whole be. Nepal is, therefore, committed to 
eliminating terrorism in her own interest as well as in the interest of democracies around the 
world” (Proclamation to the nation by King Gyanendra on 1 February 2005). 
The linking of development with the official security agenda meant increased allocation of 
resources to the security forces, whose involvement in the crisis increasingly appeared to have its 
own dynamics and vested economic interests.  
4.7.2  Donors and the Conflict 
Both the state and Maoist agendas left western donors in a rather awkward position. On the one 
hand, they were faced with the realization that the power structures, which they had worked within 
and sought to reform over decades, might have been part of the overall ‘structural violence’16 that 
had fuelled the conflict17. Working through government organizations, even at the practical level 
(such as road-building) now meant identifying with the state, and was met with Maoist resistance. 
On the other hand, efforts aimed at making amends through the addressing of root-cause socio-
economic issues, involving the targeting of development activities towards previously neglected 
regions and groups and applying transparent ‘best practice’ principles, became increasingly 
problematic and met with resistance from the army. Likewise, the same NGOs that had proved 
useful in the 1990s had now to thread a careful balance between the army and the insurgents, owing 
to a shared ambition among the two for controlling areas, their populations and their institutional 
life, and thus having activities carried out under their respective auspices. 
A key concern among donors was that the crisis had increased poverty and made already-insecure 
livelihoods even more insecure, as development assistance failed to reach intended recipients. 
Displacement and a general exodus to urban areas, with visibly deteriorating social conditions, 
nourished this concern. Along the lines of the king’s proclamation, state discourse echoed these 
concerns and used them to legitimize severe restrictions in civil liberties in order to go for a ‘final 
                                                 
16 A term coined by Johan Galtung to refer to the ways in which social, economic, and political systems can 
institutionalize harm (Galtung 1969). 
17 In this context Metz 1995:184 suggest that: “The poverty of Nepal’s people is due primarily to the forced extraction 
of the social surplus by the small number of people who historically came to rule Nepal, who were supported by British 
colonialism, and who continue in power due to the flow of ‘development’…the feudal power structure has subverted the 
development process via pervasive corruption, and has thereby maintained its hold, and prevented even growth” 
(Quoted in Agergaard 1998:24) 
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solution’ rather than any form of negotiated settlement with the Maoists. However, donor 
assessments of the poverty impact of the crisis stand in some contrast to what Seddon, a long-term 
observer of the crisis, has suggested: 
“The impact on poverty, however, has been negligible as the economic effects have been felt 
mainly in the commercialized sectors of the economy, and among the better off. General 
insecurity has accelerated rural emigration which will further increase reliance on non-farm 
income and remittances in rural areas; this may benefit the poor. The poor and women have 
generally benefited from the disruption to traditional social structures and practices. 
Development efforts by NGOs have become more focused on poverty alleviation” (2005:1). 
The logic of Seddon’s assessment—that a crisis which virtually halted all development efforts has 
not had a severe impact on poverty in the context of other forces at play—appears to be a damning 
verdict on four decades of ‘development’, including a full decade of democratic policies. However, 
notwithstanding the costs in terms of human deprivation and suffering associated with, for example, 
displacement, torture, and human casualties—and staying within strictly economic terms (as was 
seemingly intended by Seddon)—the observation probably has a great deal of merit, (even if donor 
interventions has had considerable effects on some people in some areas) as it echoes observations 
of the extreme regional unevenness of socio-economic development in Nepal (see, for example, 
Seddon and Adhikari 2003, and chapter 5 of this study). That unevenness is also reflected in the 
relationship between levels of socio-economic development and levels of insurgency: the origins 
and heartlands of the Maoist insurgency being the poorest districts of western and mid-western 
Nepal.  It needs to be emphasized that suggestions on the impact of the crisis in terms of livelihoods 
and most other aspects of human existence under conflict conditions remain somewhat speculative 
for want of reliable, aggregate assessments. However, any discussion of the impact of the crisis 
needs to consider who had stakes in the ‘development project’ and who did not. 
 
 
Chapter 5: The Study Area 
5.1  Introduction 
It is one of the main propositions of this thesis that irrigation systems are dynamic and changing, 
and that changes in these systems must be understood in the context of changes in the surrounding 
society. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce historical and contemporary 
dimensions of the wider region and context of the overall research area (see Map 1), and to situate 
the nine irrigation community cases within that context. In this chapter the meso-level, i.e., the four 
districts that comprise the Dhaulagiri Zone (understood mainly in administrative terms but also as 
the immediate economic and institutional environment with which the case communities interact), 
will constitute the units of analysis in what should be perceived as the second stage (the first stage 
being the macro-level contexts of the previous chapters) of a journey towards the community level, 
to be arrived at in the following chapter. The journey begins physically and mentally from the 
outside, narrated through the eyes of an outsider. The narrative is framed within two dominant rural 
development themes in Nepal over the past decades: the expansion of physical infrastructure and of 
institutional landscapes, illustrated by means of the penetration of a motorable road into the 
research area, and the increase in institutional and political life throughout the 1990s. Both themes 
are central to an understanding of how livelihoods in the irrigated communities have changed as a 
result of structural and relational access mechanisms (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
The narrative introduces the research area by travelling along the road, drawing attention to the 
highly visible, sometimes symbolic, ‘development’ associated with the road, and the more obscure 
‘development’ associated with institutional and political life. This focus on a transport artery 
suggests that the road has played a central role in opening economic and human potentials and 
dynamics in the political-economic moment; dynamics that are rooted in the historical importance 
of an ancient trade route that for centuries has played a role in defining and shaping the area 
economically, politically and administratively, thereby contributing to the formation of its 
institutional landscapes.  
Departing from the narrative, the journey towards community level continues along the lines of a 
regional analysis approach that aims to identify, as Long and Roberts put it, “patterns of activity 
that result from the spatial distribution of economic resources, settlements and social classes” 
(1984:4). The intention is not to be a comprehensive regional analysis but rather a partial one, so as 
to better understand the ‘space’—political, physical, socio-economic and institutional—where “over 
time, class interests, and social relationships have developed in a particular way because of a 
spatially specific pattern of economic change” (Long and Roberts 1984:3). Such an analysis is 
pertinent for two reasons: 
Firstly, meaningful engagement with the concepts of the household and the irrigated community as 
analytical units requires navigation through a regional context that is characterized by a great deal 
of heterogeneity in terms of access to resources (broadly understood) and economic and 
institutional characteristics and linkages. Hence, the navigation aims to eventually situate the 
irrigated communities in their regional context by identifying the characteristics that distinguish 
these from other categories. This is particularly important considering the previously argued need to 
consider both the notions of the village and ‘community’ as something dynamic and diverse, rather 
than something stable, homogenous and insular (Leach et al. 1997). Highlighting regional and 
integrative contexts also supports a key tenet of the theoretical framework of the thesis, i.e., that 
livelihoods and institutional change as experienced by the irrigated farmers must be understood in a 
wide perspective of rural transformation and agrarian change, involving, as Seddon puts it “the  
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Map 1 
Index Map of the Dhaulagiri Zone 
progressive subordination of small local communities to the dynamics of the wider economy and 
society” (2001:119).  
Secondly, as already hinted at in the above paragraph, elements of a regional analysis approach 
complements the maximum variation sampling approach of the field study, as it enables 
understanding of what differentiates and what connects within the region. This eventually leads to 
an understanding of not only the shared characteristics of irrigated communities that enable 
generalizations within that category within the region, but also of characteristics that may have 
meaning across categories.    
5.2  Before the Road 
“There are no roads west of Pokhara, which is the last outpost of the modern world: in one days 
walk, we are a century away” observed Peter Mathiessen in 1973 in his travelogue The Snow 
Leopard (1978) while part of an expedition that would eventually take him and his entourage of 
porters deep into the Himalayas. Following for the first part of the journey the main route between 
Pokhara and Tibet, Matthiessen’s first night out of Pokhara was spent at the village of Naudanda, 
scenically perched on a ridge at what was, at the time, about a days walk north-west of Pokhara. As 
a first or last stop, depending on the direction of travel, Naudanda was at the time a popular lodging 
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place for traders with their trains of mules, as well as for porters, farmers, Gurkha soldiers, students 
or foreign visitors, travelling along what was for centuries a major trade route for the exchange of 
Tibetan salt and Nepali food grains, linking the mountains and hills with the plains of Nepal and 
India. 
From Pokhara, an economically important middle-hill gateway to the mountainous hinterlands, 
travellers at that time, as described by Mathiessen, would walk northwest along the trade route 
through the first pass at Naudanda. They would reach Kusma (the headquarters of Parbat District) 
on the second day of the journey and the banks of the Kali Gandaki River near Baglung Bazaar 
(headquarters of Baglung District) on the third. Throughout this first portion of the trail, travellers 
would be surrounded, as is still the case today, by terraces, both irrigated (khet) and unirrigated 
(bari), and farm houses scattered on the steep hillsides of green valleys, predominantly inhabited by 
rice-growing Hindu farmers of the Brahmin and Chettri (high) castes. At times, settlements along 
the foot trail would take more a cohesive form, and become small bazaars, with shops selling tea, 
food, batteries, biscuits and the odd piece of clothing. 
Upon reaching the Kali Gandaki River, travellers would have the option of walking northwards up 
the trade route via Baglung Bazaar along an elevated trail on the western bank of the river, or 
carrying straight on north by a trail along the eastern bank of the river, for another half-day to Beni 
(the headquarters of Myagdi District). Here the trail, branching off northwest along the Myagdi 
River, one of the Kali Gandaki’s main tributaries, would take travellers around the Dhaulagiri 
Massif in a clockwise direction to remote Dolpo (this is where Matthiessen went) and eventually as 
far as Jumla in Western Nepal. The majority of travellers would, however, continue walking along 
the main trading route, northwards from Beni along the Kali Gandaki River to settlements along the 
river itself, or veer off along trails following the river’s numerous tributaries to settlements at higher 
elevations.  
Then as now, these valley settlements would, for another couple of days of walking, continue to be 
inhabited by Hindu farmers, mainly high caste Brahmins and Chettris. Terraced agriculture would 
still dominate the landscape, but the forests at higher altitudes and the snow-capped peaks would be 
getting closer. However, increasingly Hindu culture would give way to Buddhist culture, temples 
would give way to monasteries, prayer wheels, and prayer flags flying from rooftops. Emerging 
from the deep gorge between the Annapurna and Dhaulagiri ranges to the area of ecological 
transition from hills to mountains, known as Thak Khola1, rice paddy would have given way to 
highland crops. Upon reaching the arid region at Jomsom (headquarters of Mustang District at an 
altitude of 2700 m) in the southern part of Mustang District at least one week after their departure 
from Pokhara, travellers would be in a physical, cultural and political landscape entirely different 
from that just a few days walk to the south. A landscape inhabited by Tibeto-Burman peoples, 
known as Thakali and Bhotia, residing in scattered, nuclear settlements, surrounded by green, 
irrigated fields, appearing as bright oases in the desert. For those continuing north to Lo Manthang, 
the seat of the King of Mustang and the last significant outpost before the Nepal–Tibet border, 
another 4–5 days of walking would be waiting.  
                                                 
1The Thak Khola valley in Mustang District was the centre of this north–south trade in salt and food grains (see Vinding 
1984, 1992 and 1998). 
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5.3  An Episode: Opaque and Visible Change 
When, in 1992, as socio-economic adviser to the International Labour Organization’s Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project (DIDP), I travelled out of Pokhara en route to Baglung on a first 
project visit, Naudanda, where Matthiessen spent his first night, still had a couple of lodges catering 
to mule train ‘drivers’ and highlanders bringing flocks of sheep down from the mountains or 
consumer goods from the plains. However, rather than spending the night in this first stop after 
Pokhara, travellers were now more likely to stop briefly for a cup of tea and enjoy the magnificent 
view over Pokhara from where they would have left about an hour earlier by motor vehicle. With 
access to markets and technology featuring prominently in Nepal’s rural development framework, 
the fortunes of Naudanda had changed because of the arrival of the motor batu (road) and the 
subsequent shortening of travelling times.  
Although another prominent rural development theme at the time, ‘institutions in development’ 
(and the related notions of participation, indigenous knowledge and local agency) and the order that 
they connote was not what came immediately to mind while travelling along the new road in 1992. 
Where were these institutions anyway? Surely not on the steep slopes where small patches of fields 
and scattered houses seemed glued to the mountains at impossible angles? Yet the intensity of 
cultivation and the location of dwellings and fields in the extremely difficult terrain suggested 
something more than the mere physically tangible. In particular, the terraces and irrigation systems 
on the sides of valleys suggested dynamics associated with ancient agricultural and engineering 
skills and, above all, modes of organization. That visible enterprise stood in some contrast to a rural 
Nepal that a great deal of the development literature had characterized with frequent use of words 
such as resource degradation, scarcity, subsistence and stagnancy, in line with dominant Malthusian 
environmental disaster narratives (see Luintel 2001, Campbell 2001 for comments on these 
narratives). So did the level of economic activity associated with the penetration of the road from 
Pokhara into the hinterlands. 
Travelling on a motorcycle along the recently gravelled surface, I was not quite sure how far the 
road extended into the project area. Having negotiated a couple of rivers (as the bridges were yet to 
be erected) it turned out that the ‘roadhead’2 was at a place called Maldhunga, beside the Kali 
Gandaki River, close to Baglung Bazaar. Roadheads, unlike the relatively ‘hidden’ institutions 
associated with agricultural organizing practices, represent highly visible, dynamic change. The 
road, having disadvantaged a number of economically important locations along its course, 
culminated in a great deal of transit economic activity at the point of meeting the north-bound trail 
at Maldhunga. Trucks bringing consumer goods into the area had to be unloaded. Passengers waited 
for bus seats, porters loitered for fares, barbers trimmed hair, and everyone would eventually need 
something to eat and drink. Not entirely convinced about its safety, I parked the motorcycle in a 
teashop in the bustling makeshift bazaar, and completed the remainder of the journey to Baglung 
Bazaar by foot.  
Maldhunga remained the roadhead bazaar for quite some time. Then one fine day the motorcycle 
had to be parked someplace else. The road had been extended, and the action had shifted to new 
roadheads, first at Beni Bazaar and shorty after, at Baglung Bazaar, disadvantaging Maldhunga in 
the process. To Baglung in particular, this meant the consolidation of the town as a regional market 
centre, as evidenced by the emergence of bicycle and auto-repair shops, cinemas screening Hindi 
                                                 
2 I.e., the end or beginning of a motorable road. Degrees of access/remoteness in Nepal are often measured in terms of 
distance to the nearest roadhead. 
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movies, and the blaring of horns signifying the departure of buses and trucks to Pokhara and 
beyond. Through my work among bureaucrats, Non-Government Organisation people and farmers 
in the area, I realized that the road was both a metaphor for and a symbol of development to most 
people. To some, the meaning of the road was associated with the ability to swap the hardship of 
walking up steep hills with heavy loads on their backs for the comfort of sitting down in a bus while 
music plays. To others, roads meant prospects for improved livelihoods. At the level of both the 
individual and the cooperative, it connoted the ability to reach important markets in the district 
headquarters and beyond.  
To yet others, the ability of the outside world and the market to finally reach them was what was 
important, with electricity, television and video parlours relieving boredom and bringing about a 
sense of modernity. To all, the road meant significant reduction in the cost of travel, usually 
counted in the number of meals that one needed to consume en route to and from work places, army 
pension collection centres, markets, schools or family visits. As Shah (2002) suggests, the notion of 
development (‘bikas’) carries “senses of evolution, superiority, advancement, power and 
betterment” and roads are, as Pigg (1992) notes, central elements of this notion. In sum, the road 
brought hopes of access to benefits: projects, funds, pipes for water, electricity, movies, tourists and 
medicine might arrive. Projects, like the one I represented, the International Labour Organisation’s 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, were among the ‘benefits’ to which the road had 
provided access.  
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Map 2 
Motorable Road Penetration into the Dhaulagiri Zone 
 
 
Frequent visits to the area that involved taking part in village meetings, watching construction and 
maintenance work along irrigation canals, and gaining insights into agricultural cycles gradually 
made the relatively obscure institutions surrounding irrigation more tangible. It appeared that “the 
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hills are alive” (Benjamin and Shivakoti 2002), not so much with music, but with rational decision-
makers aiming to minimize risks through strategic thinking, by means of intricate systems for 
managing terrain, and pervasive institutions for governing and managing water. And the more 
frequent the visits, the more the fabric unfolded to reveal the institutional architecture and political 
dynamics. As what may be argued was a sign of, if not exactly deepening democratization, then 
certainly growing political space for livelihood advancement, manifestations of organizational and 
institutional life, subtle and obvious, increased significantly throughout the 1990s in the area along 
the trade route, as a direct result of Nepal’s democratization and improved access.  
These manifestations included group meetings (literacy, income-generating, water and sanitation, 
cooperatives) in courtyards, delegations of villagers (often irrigation, roads or forestry committees) 
on their way to the district headquarters, as well as trails and tracks, irrigation systems and other 
infrastructure created through cooperative efforts, often with the assistance of increasingly 
ubiquitous Non-Government Organisations whose choice of project area, like that of external 
donors and the government, appeared highly biased in favour of areas with vehicular access. The 
penetration of the main road network into the hinterlands of the Dhaulagiri Zone is illustrated on 
map 2, above. The road along the old trade route is planned to eventually reach Mustang and Tibet 
in 2007. By 2004, it had reached a few hours north of Beni. Construction work has, however, also 
been in progress from north to south for quite some years now. These developments have shortened 
travelling time along the trade route considerably: travelling south from Jomsom in 2004, the total 
overland journey to Pokhara was completed in three days compared to the minimum of eight days 
required before the road.  
5.4  Studies on the Area 
“Since the opening of Nepal to foreign research, the hills of Central and Western Nepal 
attracted the attention of anthropologists much less than the mountains, the Kathmandu 
Valley and Eastern Nepal” (Ramirez 2000a:iv). 
It would appear that a combination of heterogeneity—in terms of historical administrative 
configuration3, socio-economic structure, ethnic composition, topography, etc.—and, until a decade 
ago, difficult access have resulted in a dearth of comprehensive studies on the Dhaulagiri Zone. 
Hence, to the knowledge of this author, the area has not previously been constructed as a regional 
analytical unit; it has not been ‘mapped’ at aggregate levels in other than the physical and political 
administrative sense. At disaggregate levels, however, studies appear, although none that are 
comprehensive in the sense of representing an actual regional development analysis. The studies 
that do exist at this level include those of the socio-economic baseline variety that often has a 
district focus, thus reflecting a target-district or community orientation (corresponding with 
decentralization policies, broadly defined) combined with the sectoral (roads, water, irrigation, etc.) 
concerns of the donor that had commissioned the study (e.g., Energy Sector Assistance Programme 
2002, the various Dhaulagiri Irrigationa Development Project studies used in this thesis, and 
Department for International Development 2003). These studies have proved useful, both as micro-
cases, gap fillers and ‘checks’ in relation with official population census data available at the district 
                                                 
3 The administrative configurations of Nepal, particularly the delineation of areas into districts, only rarely reflect 
historical administrative borders, resources endowments or customary forms of government, i.e., features that may 
connote coherence and identity referents. The Rana Regime (1846–1950) operated with 33 districts, while the current 
75 districts, were drawn up in 1963 with, according to Gurung, “the objective of securing political mobilization for the 
Panchayat Regime” (2005:42). 
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level (International Center for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2001 and 2003), and for 
making comparisons with the national level.  
In line with the observations made in the opening quotation, academic studies conducted in the area 
have their focus on the northern, mountainous part of the Dhaulagiri Zone, typically the 
ethnographical contributions that construct and cover ‘cultural regions’ and specific ethnic groups. 
Works include Vinding’s (1984, 1992, 1998) comprehensive ethnography on the Thakali ethnic 
group in Mustang district and that of Fisher on the cultural identity of the Thakali in the southern 
districts of the zone (Fisher 2001, 2002). The focus on the northern part of the zone also includes 
Furer-Haimendorf (1975), whose work deals with, among other things, trade and social 
organization, and the works of Messerschmidt on political organization and institutions (see, for 
example, 1995). Lastly Bista (see 2000), Nepal’s most eminent anthropologist has, at an early stage, 
drawn attention to Mustang and its peoples. Even though the above contributions do make 
references to the southern hill districts of the region, not least with respect to north–south migration 
and the role of the trade route that transgresses the zone, socio-economic conditions, particular in 
the hill districts, remain comparatively under-analysed. 
In view of this dearth of data and analysis, the influential research carried out by researchers from 
the University of East Anglia on what was until the early 1970s known as the West–Central 
Planning Region4, informed by a neo-Marxist dependency perspective, and based on a mid-1970s 
rural household survey conducted as part of a road project in the districts immediately south of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, has proven useful5. The research resulted in four main books (Blaikie et al. 1979, 
Seddon, Blaikie et al. 1979, Blaikie et al. 1980, revised 2005, and Seddon 1987) and numerous 
articles as well as the mid-1990s re-study referred to in the methodology section of this thesis 
(Bagchi et al. 1998). As part of their pioneering role with respect to offering “insights into the 
structures and dynamics of the Nepalese economy and society through the prism of class analysis” 
(Bagchi et al. 1998:445), these works contain a great deal of analysis of determinants of urban 
growth, rural development and the general economic dynamics of the Dhaulagiri Zone in the 
Western Development Region. The revised version of Nepal in Crisis—Growth and Stagnation at 
the Periphery (Blaikie et al. 2005) has been particularly useful with respect to understanding the 
Dhaulagiri Zone in a wider context. As numerous references will make apparent to the reader, so 
has a more recent contribution—Pokhara—Biography of a Town (Adhikari and Seddon 2002)—that 
draws on a great deal of the insights to rural–urban development dynamics of the above mentioned 
works, but discusses these in the context of the role of Pokhara, the main town in the region, in 
relation to its hinterland, including the Dhaulagiri Zone.  
Other studies that contain agricultural and socio-economic analysis of adjacent areas have helped in 
the attempt at construction and delineation of the Dhaulagiri Zone as a region. These include 
Bishop’s (1990) detailed analysis of the Karnali region (constructed mainly as a socio-ecological 
region) to the west of the Dhaulagiri Zone, and MacFarlane’s (1976) related (in terms of their use of 
Malthusian disaster models) account of problems of overpopulation and limited land resources 
among the Gurung ethnic group near Pokhara. The multidisciplinary French research of the Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique and the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique that 
attempts to reconstruct the districts of Gulmi and Argakhanchi (see Ramirez 2000) (to the 
                                                 
4 Now the Western Development Region. 
5 As mentioned in Chaper 3, that survey forms the comparative base for the re-study that has inspired the methodology 
for this thesis. 
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immediate south of the Dhaulagiri Zone) as a social and political region, rich in detail, scope and 
analysis, has also served as a useful inspiration.  
As a final note in the context of the area as a (broadly understood) ‘mapped region’ and a more 
recognized regional entity, it needs to be mentioned that the Dhaulagiri Zone constitutes the 
northern part of one among four so-called growth axes (known officially as the Gandaki Growth 
Axis6 or corridor), a status that dates back to Nepal’s Fourth Development Plan 1970–1975. The 
regional development strategy of that plan was based on a perceived need to “integrate the national 
economy by reducing inter-regional disparity and at the same time make efficient use of resources 
by balancing projects at specific locations” (Gurung 1989:18), specifically by tying in the 
economies of the mountains, hills and terai. Within this planning framework, north–south roads 
would link growth centres, where “development efforts would be concentrated” (Gurung 1989:19). 
The north–south road, along which we will travel in the following two sections, has almost been 
completed; however—as will emerge from subsequent sections—while some inter-regional 
integration seems to have taken place, intra-regional integration (and expected disparity reduction) 
may not have been reduced, as resources have been concentrated in the central parts of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, adjacent to the main trading arteries.  
5.5  Characteristics of the Dhaulagiri Zone and the Western Development Region 
5.5.1  The Physical, Administrative and Ethnic Landscape 
While, as mentioned in section 5.4, the Dhaulagiri Zone has not been comprehensively constructed 
as a region in academic works, the motorable road and other physical features contribute 
significantly to concepts of locality and regional identity in the area. One such feature is that of the 
Dhaulagiri Mountain, the towering presence of which, at an altitude of 8196 meters7, is visible from 
numerous hills, ridges and valleys both north and south of its massif. Its defining presence is 
reflected in the naming of schools, development projects, Non-Government Organisations, sports 
clubs and local newspapers. Another defining feature is that of the Kali Gandaki River8 and the 
Trans-Himalayan Valley through which (parallel to the motorable road for most of the way) it flows 
from north to south in its meandering course from Tibet towards the Ganges River. 
Elevation in the region presents extreme variation, from a low in the hills of some 800 meters 
(Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Projects 1993) to the already mentioned high of 8196 meters. 
Parbat District, Baglung District and the southern part of Myagdi District, where six of the 
irrigation systems are located (Amalachaur, Arjewa, Kurgha, Pakuwa, Lampata and Pipalbot) are 
subtropical with monsoon rains. Mustang District, where three irrigation systems are located (Thini, 
Tiri and Khinga) is in the rain-shadow of the Himalayas with resulting arid conditions. The majority 
of the irrigated areas, and indeed the ones studied in this thesis, are located close to the Kali 
Gandaki, as are the major settlements and transport arteries. Thus, the focus of this study is on the 
‘central’ area of what is known in administrative and vernacular speak as the Dhaulagiri Zone, i.e., 
on a belt along the upper Kali Gandaki River, concentrated along a 75-km transect from Parbat 
                                                 
6 From Bhairawa in the terai, on the border with India, to Jomsom in the mountains. 
7 Visible from parts of northern India, Dhaulagiri was thought to be the highest mountain in the world for 30 years from 
1808 (www.en.wikipidia.org/wiki/dhaulagiri). 
8 The Gandaki Basin stretches from the Dhaulagiri Range to the Langtang Range. The Kali Gandaki River originates in 
northern Mustang on the Tibetan Plateau. It becomes know as the Narayani or the Gandak further downstream and joins 
the Ganges River in west Bihar (see Subba 2001). 
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District in the south, through Baglung and Myagdi Districts, northwards to Mustang District. 
Between Myagdi and Mustang Districts, the Annapurna and Dhaulagiri Massifs bisect the area, 
which changes from the hill ecological zone to that of the mountains ecological zone. These 
ecological zones will be referred to as the ‘hills’ and the ‘mountains’, respectively9.  
In administrative terms, the greater region is designated as the Western Development Region with a 
total population of 4,571,013, according to the 2001 population census (International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2001), and is divided into three zones. It administered from 
Pokhara, a town of around 170,000 people (Adhikari and Seddon 2001) located at roughly the 
centre of the region. The Lumbini Zone in the south includes both hills and plains. Bordering India, 
this is the most populous of the three zones, with some 2.5 million people. The Gandaki Zone, in 
the western part of the region, consists of mountains and hills, and is the second most populous 
zone with close to 1.5 million people. The Dhaulagiri Zone, with the highest relative proportion of 
mountain area, is the least populous of the three with close to 0.6 million people (International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2001) or just above two per cent of the 
country’s population. Of the region’s 17 districts10, four are located in the Dhaulagiri Zone. 
Covering an area of 3661 km2, Mustang is the largest of these four districts, followed by Myagdi 
with 2297 km2, Baglung with 1784 km2 and Parbat with 583 km2 (International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). Combined, the districts make up approximately six 
per cent of the land area of Nepal. Population densities vary from 4.19 persons per km2 in Mustang, 
to 50 persons per km2 in Myagdi, 151 persons per km2 in Baglung, and 319 persons per km2 in 
Parbat (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). Reference is made 
to table 1 for population data. 
                                                 
9 ‘Terai’ (lowlands), ‘hills’ and ‘mountains’ are the most common of classifications of ecological zones in Nepal but, 
given the geographical diversity of the country, they are very broad indeed. However, in the context of the scope of this 
work they may be justified. For more detailed classification in a climate/land-use context, see Lillesø et al. (2005). 
10 These 17 districts, along with the remaining 58 districts in Nepal, were drawn up in 1963 when the number of 
districts were expanded from 33 under a zonal hierarchy, with—as Gurung asserts—“the objective of wider political 
mobilization for the Panchayat regime” (2005:41,42). District boundaries often run along rivers, in valley bottoms, 
rather than along ridges that separate valleys. The fact that the delineation of districts does not reflect the physical or 
cultural resource base that would make them more ‘natural’ economic units, suitable for planning purposes, is seen by 
some as a hindrance to effective political decentralization, as the resource (and hence potential revenue) base renders 
economic room-for-manoeuvre problematic (see Gurung 2005, Whelpton 2005). 
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Table 1 
Population, Area and Ethnicity in the Dhaulagiri Zone 
District Population (2001)* Area (km2)** Main Ethnic Groups*** 
Parbat 157,826 583 Brahmin, Chettri, KDS 
Baglung 268,937 1,784 Magar, Brahmin,  
Chettri, KDS 
Myagdi 114,447 2,297 Magar, Brahmin  
Chettri, KDS 
Mustang 14,981 3,661 Thakali, Towa, Bhotia 
Sources: * International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2001; **Central Bureau of Statistics 1992; 
***Department For International Development 2003, Vinding 1998. 
Notes: KDS = Kami, Damai and Sarki, so-called occupational or Dalit (low) castes 
The main ethnic groups are listed in table 1. Linguistically Tibeto-Burman11 in origin, the Magar 
ethnic group constitutes the largest ethnic group in Baglung and Myagdi Districts (42 per cent in 
each); at the national level, this group constitutes some seven per cent of the population (Ministry of 
Population and Environment n.d.). The Magar are followed by high-caste Parbatiya12—
Brahmin/Chettri and Thakuri, who make up 33 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. In Parbat 
District, with 66 per cent, the high-caste Parbatiya constitute the majority of the population. 
Considering that national data suggest that some 30 per cent of the population of the hills belong to 
high-caste groups (Whelpton 2005), their proportion in the hill districts of the Dhaulagiri Zone is 
relatively high. Low-caste Parbatiya (Kami, Damai, and Sarki), also known as occupational castes, 
make up some 20 per cent in all three hill districts of the zone (Department For International 
Development 2003). Sprinklings of Gurung, Newar and Thakali constitute the remaining population 
in the hill districts of the zone. Parbatiya are largely absent from Mustang District, except as civil 
servants, soldiers and a small number of people belonging to occupational groups. In Mustang 
District, the ethnic groups include Thakali in the southern Thak Khola area, Towa (who tend to 
speak Thakali and even call themselves Thakali) in the northern Thak Khola area and, in the 
northern parts of the district, people who are “culturally Tibetan” (Vinding 1998) and known as 
Bhotia13.  
5.5.2  The East-West Divide 
Based on a wide range of indicators—from socio-economic conditions to services, access and 
infrastructure—official ranking places the four districts of the Dhaulagiri Zone within the ‘most 
developed’ third of Nepal’s 75 districts (ahead of districts within ‘intermediate’ and ‘least 
developed’ categories). Mustang at 19th place ranks highest, followed by Parbat at 20th, Baglung at 
                                                 
11 Tibeto-Burman refers to peoples whose languages are Tibeto-Burman in origin, thought to have arrived from the 
north and east. This, the largest linguistic grouping in the hills of Nepal (Whelpton 2005), is often referred to as 
‘Mongoloid’. 
12 Parbatiya (literally ‘people of the mountains’) is a term denoting hill-residing caste Hindus whose ancestors migrated 
into the subcontinent from the west, reaching what is now western Nepal during the first millennium AD (Whelpton 
2005). This grouping is often referred to as ‘Aryan’. 
13 From ‘Bhot’, the Nepali word for Tibet. Tibetans are commonly referred to as ‘Bhote’ in Nepali.  
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24th and Myagdi at 25th (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). 
However, this categorization fails to adequately account for significant intra-district variation, 
particularly with respect to Baglung and Myagdi Districts—a variation that serves to illustrate the 
historical problems associated with the current district structure (see footnote 10). The western 
hinterlands of these two districts have more in common with Rolpa, Rukum14 and Dolpa, their 
neighbouring districts15 immediately to the west, which rank 64th, 60th and 67th place, respectively, 
than they have with eastern Myagdi and Baglung Districts. Indeed, the already mentioned road 
infrastructure and access to services is concentrated in the eastern parts of Baglung and Myagdi 
Districts, which is also where we find concentrations of irrigated communities, i.e., the type of 
community that tends to be relatively prosperous and the subject of investigation in this thesis. The 
eastern part of the Dhaulagiri Zone has, in terms of ‘development’, more in common with the 
cluster of districts that surround Kathmandu in the Central Development Region and those that 
border India in the extreme east of the country, than it has with its western hinterlands. 
These intra-district differences reflect a national pattern, in which poverty tends to gradually 
increase in an east–west direction, the poorest regions being the Mid-Western and the Far-Western 
Development Regions. Arguably the fault line of the east–west divide is located a couple of days 
walking to the west of the Kali Gandaki River. This intra-regional imbalance has to be taken note of 
when understanding the spread of the Maoist insurgency. It erupted in 1996 in Rolpa and Rukum 
Districts, both of which, along with the western parts of Baglung and Myagdi, remain hotbeds of 
Maoist activity. By 2000, the Maoist presence was increasingly felt across the fault line of the east–
west divide, in and around the eastern parts of Baglung and Myagdi. In the following years, the 
eastern areas of the Dhaulagiri Zone witnessed increased Maoist activity both in the shape of 
sporadic incursions and in terms of actually taking control of institutional and economic life (see 
chapter 9). The west-to-east penetration of the insurgency culminated in an attack on Beni, the 
headquarters of Myagdi District, in April 2004 that left a large number of people dead on both sides 
of the conflict (and which coincided with the launch of fieldwork for this thesis, see chapter 3). 
Intra-regional unevenness is also a feature of Mustang District, where cultural and socio-economic 
distinctions are usually made between Lower (southern) and Upper (northern) Mustang, but 
differences between the two areas are not usually conceived of as a ‘divide’, even if wealth is 
concentrated in lower Mustang. Nor do north–south socio-economic differences reflect any levels 
of insurgency; as a sparsely populated border district with a heavy army presence, Mustang District 
remains virtually untouched by the conflict. 
5.5.3  Development Activities 
None of the integrated rural development projects that characterized development efforts in the 
1980s in Nepal reached the Dhaulagiri Zone and, until the 1990s, the area had received only 
sporadic attention from donors and the Nepalese Government. However, coinciding with the 
penetration of the road and the democratic reforms initiated in 1990, mushrooming of development 
projects (not least those that involved Non-Government Organisations) occurred from the early 
1990s. By 2000, Parbat and Baglung, the two most accessible districts in the Dhaulagiri Zone, 
                                                 
14 Where, as de Sales writes, “there is, for example, not a single hospital nor any industry” (2002:342). Additionally, as 
an indication of their poor hinterlands, Baglung and Myagdi Districts display some of the highest shares of marginal 
farm households (less than 0.5 ha) (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003).  
15 Gurung describes the overall mid-western region as “one of the least developed in the country” (in de Sales 
2002:342). For other accounts of socio-economic and cultural conditions in the areas surrounding the immediate study 
area, refer to Fisher (2002), Millard (2002) and Ramirez (2000b).  
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ranked 3rd and 10th, respectively in terms of development budget allocation (Danida/East Consult 
2000)—developments that appear symptomatic of a general ‘upliftment’ in aggregate terms, and of 
resource flows into the Western Development Region16. 
Table 2 provides a non-exhaustive17 overview of development activities in the Dhaulagiri Zone 
after 1990. A couple of elements are notable in the context of post-1990 institutional and socio-
economic development efforts in the zone. First of all, the variety in terms of scope and sectors of 
the projects should be noted; drinking water and sanitation was a dominant theme, as was a focus on 
more direct livelihoods improvement activities, ranging from improved seeds and community 
forestry to irrigation and other infrastructure, as well as the more diffuse notion of ‘income 
generation’. Secondly, the concentration of activities in the most accessible parts of the zone, i.e., 
Parbat and Baglung Districts, is evident. Mustang District features in two instances only, and a 
distinct geographical focus on west Baglung and west Myagdi occurs only in two cases, both of 
which involve faith-based Non-Government Organisations. Thirdly, the involvement of Non-
government Organisations (including community-based organizations) as project implementers, 
either in combination with government organizations or on their own, is symptomatic of the post-
1990 institutional plurality that has characterized development in Nepal (see section 4.2). In this 
context, it is further notable though, that in most cases, project collaboration has been with 
traditional line agencies. Only in a couple of (albeit rather prominent) cases have donors actively 
supported local government. 
 
Table 2 
An Overview of Development Projects in the Dhaulagiri Zone from 1990 
Project Name  District Coverage Scope/Sectors Main Implementers 
Nepal–United Kingdom 
Community Forestry Project 
(Department for International 
Development) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Community forestry Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Seed Sector Support Project 
(Department For International 
Development) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Vegetable seed production Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Lutheran World Service  West Baglung Integrated community 
development 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
Farmer Income-Generating Project 
Along the Pokhara–Baglung 
Highway (DANIDA) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Commercial vegetable 
production 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
                                                 
16 Comparative data from an earlier period is not available; however, there is general agreement among observers that 
the Dhaulagiri Zone ranked much lower before the 1990s. As Gurung suggests in a 2005 review of regional 
development efforts in Nepal, “Among development regions, as in 1977, the Central [Region] ranks first. The second 
place is taken by the Western Region, superseding the Eastern” (2005:28). 
17 The table is exhaustive with respect to major multilateral and bilateral projects. For smaller Non-Government 
Organisation projects, of which there have been numerous, however, the list is not complete. 
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Project Name  District Coverage Scope/Sectors Main Implementers 
International Nepal Fellowship West Baglung, West 
Myagdi 
Integrated community 
development 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
Nepal Safer Motherhood Project Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Reproductive health Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Rural Infrastructure Development 
Programme  (Asian Development 
Bank) 
Baglung Road construction Government/Non- 
Government 
Organisations 
Rural Energy Development Project 
(United Nations Development 
Programme) 
Parbat, Baglung Renewable energy Government 
(local)/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Irrigation Development (Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency) 
Parbat Irrigation, community 
development 
Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Food for Work (Gesellschaft for 
Technisches Zusammenarbeit) 
Parbat, Baglung Community infrastructure 
rehabilitation 
Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Medecins Du Monde  Parbat, Myagdi Public health, community 
development 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
HELVETAS (Self-reliance 
Drinking Water Project) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Drinking water and 
sanitation 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
Micro-enterprise Development 
Project (United Nations 
Development Programme) 
Parbat, Myagdi Micro-enterprise 
development 
Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Sustainable Soil Management 
Project 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Promotion of Soil fertility Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Rural Water and Sanitation Fund 
Development Board (World Bank, 
Department for International 
Development) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi 
 
Drinking water and 
sanitation 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
Rural Water and Sanitation Project 
(Finnis Interntional Development 
Agency)) 
Parbat Drinking water and 
sanitation 
Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Gorkha Welfare Scheme 
(Department for International 
Development) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Drinking water and 
sanitation 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
Water Aid (Department for 
International Development) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Drinking water and 
sanitation 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
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Project Name  District Coverage Scope/Sectors Main Implementers 
Energy Sector Assistance Project 
(DANIDA) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Promotion of renewable 
energy 
Non-Gvernment 
Organisations/private 
companies 
Participatory District Development 
Project (United Nations 
Development Programme) 
Baglung, Parbat Myagdi Community organization, 
local government 
Government 
(local)/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
Sustainable Development (United 
Nations Development Programme) 
Myagdi Community development Government 
Institutional Capacity 
Development Programme  
(Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke Nepal) 
Baglung, Parbat, Myagdi Community development, 
strengthening of local Non-
Government Organisations 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development 
Project (International Labour 
Organisation) 
Baglung, Parbat, 
Myagdi, Mustang 
Irrigation development Government/Non-
Government 
Organisations 
CARE Nepal Baglung, Parbat, 
Mustang 
Various income generation Non-Government 
Organisations 
Source: Yogendra Pant, Dhaulagiri Community Resource Development Centre, Baglung, pers. comm., May 2006. 
While the reduction in democratic space that began in 2002 (see section 4.7.1) meant a reduction in 
NGO activities, the most recent count nevertheless includes eight NGOs in each of the district 
headquarters of Baglung and Parbat Districts, a handful in Myagdi District, and at least two in 
Mustang District that receive foreign funding (Yogendra Pant, pers. comm., May 2006). 
5.6  Trade, Mobility and Rural Development 
5.6.1  Historical Perspectives 
As alluded to above, the concentration of economic development resulting from flows of goods, 
capital and people, historically and contemporarily, within the eastern and central parts of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone are closely related to those of the trade route that links mountains and hills with the 
plains (see map 3). The nature of these dynamics and their current manifestations will be dealt with 
in more detail in subsequent sections; at this stage, the aim is to draw attention to the historically 
constructed regional context as a necessary step towards understanding the contemporary socio-
economic, socio-cultural and socio-political characteristics of the Dhaulagiri Zone and, eventually, 
the case communities.  
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Trade between plains, hills and mountains is a particularly important pattern of activity, if we are to 
understand the characteristics of the Dhaulagiri Zone. In this context, the low population density 
and the relative remoteness of Mustang District belie its historical influence in the region. Trade 
expanded significantly during the 19th century in Nepal, with the rise of the Newar as a merchant 
class, migrating from the Kathmandu Valley to strategic locations along Nepal’s north–south trade 
routes. However, along the trade route that originates in Tibet and transects the Dhaulagiri Zone to 
end in India, the Thakali people of southern Mustang came to dominate the trade in salt, grain and 
livestock well into the 20th century, as a combined result of the government awarding customs 
collection contracts to the Thakali and the strategic location of Thak Khola above a narrow gorge at 
the ecological transition from mountains to hills.  
Controlling the trade made certain families rich and influential, while, as a spin-off, the substantial 
petty trading benefited many more. Capital accumulated by Thakali working as tin-mining 
contractors in the 19th century, particularly in Myagdi District, seems to have been important as well 
(see Whelpton 2005, Fisher 2001). The rise to the status of a merchant class enabled some Thakali 
to direct business southwards to compete with Newar traders and benefit from the expanding 
Indian–Nepali border trade in the early 20th century (Seddon et al. 1979); when, in 1928 the Thakali 
monopoly on the north–south trade was lifted, many Thakali purchased mules and diversified their 
trading portfolio to include a variety of goods that they sold in the bazaars along the trade route 
(Vinding 1998). In connection with the trading patterns, Thakali women opened inns, initially along 
the main north–south trade route, as a temporary (winter) occupation, but over the years also as 
permanent operations along highways and at bus stations (Vinding 1998). This southward 
expansion was facilitated by the existence of rotating credit associations (dhikur) set up in order to 
raise capital for individual members (see section 9.7.1). 
The Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1959 disrupted the flow of salt and wool from Tibet, and the 
construction of a road from the Indian border to Pokhara in the 1960s made cheap Indian salt 
available in the hills (Adhikari and Seddon 2002). This meant a drastic decline in the traditional 
trade. During the following decades, large numbers of Thakali left Thak Khola for the south. As 
Vinding (1998) notes, a number of scholars have attributed this wave of migration to reasons that 
range from the disruption of the salt trade to overpopulation, food shortages and subsequent 
hardship. Vinding, however, based on interviews with migrants in Pokhara argues that ‘pull’ 
factors, including the existence of investments in the south, were more important than ‘push’ 
factors. Therefore I argue, the wave of migration of the 1960s and 1970s should be seen as another 
wave of re-direction and diversification of business southwards, somewhat similar to that seen in 
the early 20th century, and should, it appears, be understood in the context of the established nature 
of Thakali opportunity migration (as noted by Blaikie et al. 2005) and investment along the trade 
route.  
As a result of these dynamics which, as Vinding (1998) points out, should also be understood in the 
context of general emigration from the mountains and hills, Thakali have spread their businesses as 
far as Kathmandu, but remain concentrated in the bazaars along the old north–south trade route and 
its tributaries. The majority reside in Myagdi and Baglung Districts where, despite their making up 
less than two per cent of the population, they “are far more visible than their proportion of the total 
population would make them” (Fisher 2002:119). In addition to farming and landownership, 
livelihoods are earned from a variety of sources including hotels, high-value commodities, shops, 
contracting business, money-lending and, as an outcome of their economic power, the holding of 
political office (Vinding 1998) as well as transportation. Most importantly in the context of the 
institutional landscape of the area, the emigration and settlement of Thakali in these districts and 
beyond has led to a spread of the previously mentioned rotating credit associations (dhikur) to other 
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ethnic groups, to the extent that with volumes of transactions exceeding those of the banking system 
(Bhattachan 2002) they constitute important regionally specific institutional vehicles of capital 
accumulation. 
Groups other than the Thakali, particularly Newar traders, have contributed to the economic growth 
and development of urban settlements in the Dhaulagiri Zone from what were originally 
fortifications at strategic points created by the Gorkha empire to “secure and administer for tax 
purposes the outlying areas and trade routes of an expanding state” (Blaikie et al. 2005:119). That 
the north–south trade route and the agricultural hinterland were particularly important sources of 
both taxation and trade profits is witnessed by the close proximity18 of the large urban centres and 
district headquarters of Parbat (Kusma), Baglung (Baglung Bazaar) and Myagdi (Beni) Districts 
and the concentration of the population of the Dhaulagiri Zone in and along the Kali Gandaki 
Valley in the immediate hinterland of these towns.  
5.6.2 Contemporary Economic Dynamics 
Blaikie et al. (2005) in their 1974 study of the Western Development Region pointed to three 
determinants of urban growth or decline (and rightly state that a major difficulty in analysing such 
determinants concerns satisfactorily distinguishing the relative importance of particular factors). In 
addition to (1) the growth of the bureaucracy, these factors are (2) increase in the volume of trade, 
predominantly of imported (as opposed to locally produced goods) as a result of the growth of the 
rural population and its inability to produce its needs directly, and (3) the construction of major 
roads through the region concentrating the distribution of imports to a smaller number of on-road 
locations. These three main factors continue to have considerable relevance in the case of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone. However, owing to added complexity, this picture, and the centre–periphery–
underdevelopment analysis on which it is based—and which has informed much of the literature on 
regional development in Nepal (see, for example, Seddon et al. 1979, Seddon 1987)—is no longer 
clear-cut, as additional determinants need to be added to the list.  
The population in the Western Development Region has indeed almost doubled from the 2.5 million 
people reported in the early 1970s (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 
2001), although growth may well have declined in recent years as a result of emigration to other 
parts of Nepal and abroad. However, all four district headquarters of the zone have grown rapidly 
over the past decade for reasons that include, but also go beyond, those proposed by Blaikie et al. 
(2005). First of all, the civil war, which has caused an influx of people from the hinterlands, in 
search of a combination of economic opportunity and relative security, needs to be added as 
determining factor. Secondly, a general trend towards urbanization has been fuelled by a tendency 
to invest funds remitted from overseas in urban areas, where consumer goods have become 
increasingly available, as a result of the motorable road that has connected the three hill-district 
headquarters with Pokhara and beyond for almost a decade.  
Thirdly, there are indications that the roles of Kusma, Baglung Bazaar and Beni are no longer solely 
as supply and distribution centres for goods and services required in the hinterlands. As dealt with 
in some detail in section 9.5.2, the increased urban demand in these towns has been met with 
considerable response in the immediate hinterlands, particularly from irrigated areas that, unlike a 
decade ago, now supply considerable proportions of the fresh vegetables, milk and to some extent 
poultry products consumed in the district headquarters. However, a significant proportion of the 
                                                 
18 This is a unique feature in the hills of Nepal where administrative centres can be very remote. Kusma is 55 km from 
Pokhara, Baglung is 69 km, and Beni is 82 km. 
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rural population who live on unirrigated land, away from trading arteries and urban areas, remain, 
as diagnosed by Blaikie et al. (2005), unable to produce their needs directly.  
Jomsom, the headquarters of Mustang District, and indeed Mustang District itself never really fitted 
into the picture of determinants depicted by Blaikie et al. (2005), chiefly because of the trade 
dynamics described earlier, and a district population that has been reduced almost by half from 
close to 27,000 in 1971 to 15,000 in 2001 (International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development et al. 2001). Mustang District remains largely untouched by the armed conflict, and 
Jomsom, unlike the district headquarters to the south, has not experienced an influx of ‘refugees’. 
However, it has grown dramatically from a ‘one-horse town’ (Jomsom Airport) in 1972 (Vinding 
1998), particularly since it became the district headquarter in 1975 (Vinding 1984), to today’s 
substantial settlement. Not the original trading centre of the district, the economic importance of 
Jomsom has increased mainly as a result of the presence of army and government personnel (in line 
with Blaikie et al.’s ‘growth of the bureaucracy’ as a determinant), trekking tourists, and to some 
extent remittances. As is the case in the districts to the south, virtually all non-consumables and 
luxury goods are imported, mainly from the south, but increasingly also from China to the north. 
Perhaps even more than in the southern towns of the Dhaulagiri Zone, the immediate hinterlands 
appear strongly linked to this small urban centre and virtually all vegetables, meats, grains (except 
rice which is imported from the south) and alcohol are supplied from surrounding villages. 
Moreover, in addition to livestock (sheep) taken down to Pokhara in connection with the winter 
migration, apples and locally bottled alcohol are exported to the south and sold in the bazaars along 
the old trade route and beyond.  
5.6.3 The Role of Migration 
The added complexity with respect to economic dynamics is closely related to increased overall 
demand. This leads to the issue of another characteristic of the Dhaulagiri Zone, namely, the 
importance of migration for the economy. Adhikari and Seddon (2002) provide a fitting assessment 
of the economy outside Pokhara (the main supply and distribution centre for the Dhaulagiri Zone): 
they suggest that rural households have become mainly consumers who buy commodities from cash 
incomes obtained directly from outside sources, or indirectly, i.e., from employment which itself 
results from the flow of remittances to affluent households with external incomes. Considering the 
already mentioned tendency to invest remitted finds in urban areas, this characteristic would apply 
to urban areas as well.  
High levels of migration and subsequent remittances are indeed a major characteristic of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone. As already illustrated in the case of the Thakali, migration, seasonal or temporary, 
has always been central to livelihood strategies in the mountains, mainly for trading purposes. 
Migration has also been a central livelihood strategy in the hills for centuries, initially in the shape 
of army migration (in the British or Indian armies) and, in recent years, in the shape of labour 
migration19. As is evident from table 3, below, which shows the proportion of the population that, at 
the time of enumeration for the census in 2001, had been abroad for more than six months, far from 
all households in the Dhaulagiri Zone are affected by migration and its direct and indirect effects. 
The number of affected households, however, is much higher than the average for Nepal, and also 
                                                 
19 A strategy that has to be understood in the context of historical factors: for reasons of internal control, it was a 
primary interest of the Rana rulers and the rulers of the petty states of western Nepal to obstruct rather than facilitate 
internal movement (Seddon et al. 1979) and subsequent economic development, preferring instead to extract taxes from 
isolated areas. Regmi suggests that this feudal policy often meant that peasants found conditions intolerable and left the 
land (Regmi 1999a, see also Chapter 1). 
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compared to other hill and mountain districts (International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development et al. 2001). Moreover, overseas migration is likely to have grown significantly since 
2001, and continues to grow (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006).  
Table 3 
Absentee Population in the Dhaulagiri Zone, Total and by Destination 2001 
Origin Total Population 
Abroad (%) 
In India (%) In Other Asia (%) Outside Asia (%) 
Parbat 10 82 17 1 
Baglung 11 82 16 1 
Myagdi 8 43 53 4 
Mustang 6 45 32 23 
Nepal 3 77 20 3 
Source:Compiled from data in International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development  et al. (2001). 
Note: Rounded figures. 
It is an important characteristic of the relatively high rates of labour migration from the Dhaulagiri 
Zone that compared to other areas, more migrants end up in the ‘lucrative’ labour markets of South-
East Asia, the West and the Gulf countries. Some 57 per cent of migrants from Myagdi District, 55 
per cent from Mustang District, 18 per cent from Baglung District, and 17 per cent from Parbat 
District (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003) end up in these 
markets rather than the less lucrative Indian market (the national average is 20 per cent). This  
migration to lucrative markets is probably related to networks associated with recruitment for 
Gurkha regiments as well as ethnically based networks (Fisher 2002), and most certainly to initial 
endowments (Seddon et al. 1998) that again may well be related to the existence of capital 
formation institutions such as the already mentioned rotating credit institutions (dhikur).  
Improved purchasing power is indeed evidenced by an increased variety of imported luxury goods 
in local shops, particularly by television shops and the ubiquitous video parlours. Fisher noted in 
1997 in Myagdi District that “the focus on becoming modern was striking and the common mode of 
expression was through consumption, buying, eating and possessing modern things” (2002:126). 
This ‘obsession’ is mainly visible in the bazaars of the Dhaulagiri Zone where, to provide an 
example, mobile phones, owned by many, and actually flaunted in public for quite some time before 
the mobile phone network became operational in 2005, have become the latest status symbol. 
5.7  Agricultural Livelihoods 
In continuation of the section on trade and mobility, the purpose of this section is to provide an 
overview of the characteristics of agricultural production and the conditions associated with the 
earning of agricultural livelihoods in the Dhaulagiri Zone.  
Rural livelihood characteristics vary significantly between the four districts. Official data suggest 
that the majority of the population in the hills has agriculture as its main source of livelihood. 
Officially, the ratio of the adult economically active population engaged in non-agricultural to 
agricultural activities is 0.19 in Myagdi District, 0.26 in Parbat District, and 0.35 in Baglung 
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District (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). In Mustang 
District, agriculture plays a significantly lower role as a central source of livelihoods, the ratio being 
1.64. As the data on migration suggest, it is widely acknowledged that the centrality of agriculture 
as a general source of livelihoods in all four districts has decreased over the past couple of decades, 
but the pace of livelihoods diversification, like its corollary, urbanization, cannot be adequately 
quantified20. However, despite increasingly diversified livelihoods suggested by high levels of 
migration, most people outside the district headquarters of the Dhaulagiri Zone continue to portray 
themselves as farmers, regardless of their fundamental direct or indirect source of income. 
In physical terms, elevation and its effects on crop mixes and food production affect agriculture in 
the Dhaulagiri Zone, as in other hill and mountain areas of Nepal. The latter is particularly affected, 
as the duration of fallow time increases as a result of agro-climatic changes associated with 
increasing altitude and latitude (Bishop 1990). Rice, wheat, maize, millet, potato, buckwheat and 
naked barley are the most common crops in the zone. Rice is cultivated at lower altitudes (i.e., not 
in Mustang District), while millet, buckwheat and naked barley are cultivated at relatively higher 
altitudes. Maize, wheat, potato and oilseed pulses are cultivated at both low and high levels of 
elevation. The proportion of operational agricultural area that is irrigated is very high in Mustang 
District (83 per cent), as arid conditions render non-irrigated agriculture largely futile. Proportions 
of irrigated area are much lower in the hill districts (but above the hill average), at 14 per cent in 
Myagdi and Parbat Districts, and at eight per cent in Baglung District (International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). 
5.7.1  Macro-Policy Contexts 
Agricultural policies in Nepal associated with structural adjustment and deregulation have focused 
predominantly on removing subsidies for fertilizers, water-lifting irrigation technology in the terai, 
and organizational reform of both agricultural input and marketing corporations. In general, 
however, studies tend to attach limited importance to these macro-level reforms in the context of 
hill farmers. Rather, focus is on socio-political structures, access to resources, low purchasing 
powers, etc. in the context of food security (Adhikari and Seddon 2005), and on transportation, 
fragmentation of plots, limited availability of arable land, etc. (Asian Development Bank 2002, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation 2003) as constraints to earning agricultural livelihoods.  
 
For the Dhaulagiri Zone, being a hill and mountain region with reasonable access21 in central areas, 
the impact of macro-policies, if any, would concern the removal of the fertilizer subsidy. The fact 
that the majority of agricultural activities, particularly outside the supply ‘catchments’ of the urban 
centres, is primarily for meeting own consumption needs, using locally produced organic fertilizer, 
suggests that the removal of subsidies is of little importance. Even for farmers whose production 
may depend on supplementary external inputs and for whom transportation is feasible, i.e., those 
close to the main transport arteries, the effect, it appears, has been negligible, as the relative 
disadvantage of possibly increased prices22 has been off-set by increased availability resulting from 
the removal of the government monopoly on chemical fertilizer distribution. Additionally, the 
                                                 
20 Due to the current pace of both phenomena.  
21 Thus not dependent on the supply of relief food supplies from the Nepal Food Corporation, such as parts of the Mid-
Western and Far Western Development Regions. 
22 In the second part of the 1990s, the official price of chemical fertilizer increased by some 18 per cent. The retail price 
of food crops increased by 11–18 per cent over the same period (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2003).  
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actual price effects of the removal of subsidies is somewhat disputed because areas with road 
access, in particular, benefit from supplies of subsidized Indian fertilizers that seep across the 
border and enter the market (Asian Development Bank 2002, Food and Agriculture Organisation 
2003). 
Another macro-policy issue concerns the staple-crop economy of the Dhaulagiri Zone. The majority 
of households in the Dhaulagiri Zone are food-deficit23 but not necessarily food insecure, as long as 
non-farm income from, for example, migration enables them to purchase food. Most households 
depend, in particular, on external supplies of cereals (rice) from the terai and India to supplement 
their own production for part of the year but, for some, rice is both a ‘subsistence’ and a ‘cash’24 
crop. As an example of the “inability to produce needs directly”, noted by Blaikie et al. (2005) (see 
section 5.6.2), rice is purchased in local markets where road access and Indian fertilizer subsidies 
have made both Indian and Nepali rice from the terai relatively cheap (see Asian Development 
Bank 2002) compared with locally produced rice. In urban centres, local rice is also expensive 
compared to imported rice because of its dispersed marketing channels and because demand from 
wealthy consumers (who can afford to eat local rice, considered to be of superior quality) outstrips 
supply.  
Some farmers, therefore, sell local rice in the bazaars and (as also reported by Adhikari and Seddon 
2005) purchase imported rice for their own consumption. However, locally grown rice is also 
consumed in the villages where rice-surplus households, depending on the distance to markets, tend 
to sell to their neighbours before selling rice in town. Some local rice also ends up as payment from 
tenants to landowners who have moved from village to town without selling their land. Despite 
these internal flows, both the rural and urban parts of the Dhaulagiri Zone remain heavily dependent 
on imports of rice, as well as lentils, another central component of the Nepalese diet. Given the 
local demand for local ‘luxury’ rice and the fact that most households are food-deficit for part of the 
year, the import of ‘cheap’ rice benefits most farmers, not least the poor. 
5.7.2  Crop Diversification in Response to Urban Demand 
Crop diversification to include crops other than the staples already mentioned is a recent 
phenomenon that has appeared only in the past decade, as a combined result of access to 
information, agricultural extension, demand and possibly—for some larger, rice-surplus farmers—
competition from ‘cheap’ imported rice as mentioned above. As mentioned in the previous section, 
irrigated farmers have been able to respond to rising demand in the district headquarters (and in 
Pokhara and beyond), by growing typical ‘cash’ crops (including vegetables, fruits, ginger and 
cardamom) to the extent that conventional cropping patterns are changing. Significantly, farmers 
cultivate these new crops in irrigated (khet) lands traditionally reserved for grain crops.  
The institutional and the livelihoods implications of this switch will be dealt with in section 9.5.3; at 
this point it is brought to attention because, as was the case with the dynamics of urbanization and 
the remittance economy touched upon in the previous section, it adds complexity to the centre–
periphery discourses that have informed much of the literature on regional development in Nepal, 
and which tend to depict rural areas as places that, in the absence of rural–urban production 
linkages, depend entirely on larger towns, the terai and India. As such, it has implications for 
                                                 
23 According to a recent study, some 70 per cent of rural households in Myagdi District, 80 per cent in Baglung District, 
and 76 per cent in Parbat District are food-deficit (Department for International Development 2003). 
24 As staple crops such as rice and wheat are sometimes sold the term cash crop is inadequate but refers in the present 
context to crops that are produced predominantly for sale in the market rather than for direct consumption. 
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conventional perceptions of rural areas as importers of even basic foodstuffs, unable to produce 
these needs directly. The findings (see 9.5.2) of a survey of consumers and vegetable-cum-grain 
wholesalers and retailers carried out in Baglung Bazaar in early 2006, suggests a more complex 
picture. 
5.8 Tenure Arrangements and the Historical-Spatial Context of Irrigation in the 
Dhaulagiri Zone 
An internal paper, presented at a Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project planning workshop in 
1994 notes that: 
“… the nature of irrigation development is somewhat problematic and presents a dilemma as 
regards reaching the poorest of the rural population—mainly because we deal with farmers 
who already have (khet) land. In Nepal, as most of us have observed, there is a tendency for 
people to get poorer and poorer the further up the hills we go, where soils are of lower 
quality and where slopes are difficult to cultivate and—most importantly—where water 
resources are scarce and difficult to control” (Berg 1994:1).  
In the following sections, this dilemma will be contextualized in terms of ethnic and social 
geography. 
5.8.1  The Ethnic Geography of Irrigated Agriculture 
Irrigation, because it results in higher productivity per unit of land, is an important determinant with 
respect to the ability to sustain agricultural livelihoods, whether in a subsistence or commercial 
fashion. As such, agricultural development is intimately linked with irrigation (Pradhan et al. 1987). 
Wet rice, or paddy culture, the irrigated farming technology that is historically associated with the 
Parbatiya25 or caste Hindus residing in the hills, is only successful below 1800 m without forceful 
germination (Bishop 1990)26. Hence, in the context of the hills and mountains of Nepal, altitude and 
irrigation are strongly related, but in the specific context of the hill districts of the Dhaulagiri Zone, 
access to irrigated land is strongly correlated with caste and ethnicity as well. The most dominant 
spatial tenure–ethnicity pattern of the hill districts of the zone reflects the situation “over much of 
the hills with Tibeto-Burman groups predominating at higher altitude and Parbatiya at lower ones” 
(Whelpton 2005:27). In other words, the Parbatiya who introduced wet rice cultivation in the 12–
14th centuries in valley bottoms (Whelpton 2005) continue to farm the most fertile hill land, at 
relatively low altitudes.  
                                                 
25 Parbatiya (literally ‘people of the mountains’), as also mentioned in footnote 12 is a term denoting hill-residing Hindu 
groups—sometimes referred to in racial terms as Aryan or Caucasian—whose ancestors migrated into the subcontinent 
from the west, reaching what is now western Nepal during the first millennium AD (Whelpton 2005). While recent 
‘sons of the soil’ (janajati) movements, asserting the rights of Tibeto-Burman groups (sometimes referred to as 
Mongoloid) in the hills, have a tendency to portray the Parbatiya as invaders, it has been suggested that the predominant 
settlement pattern was not necessarily a result of pushing ‘indigenous’ peoples off the land; rather it may have been the 
combined outcome of land being plentiful and the technology and skills introduced by the newcomers (see Whelpton 
2005:27) as well as the importance of animal husbandry for, e.g., the Magars, which suggest that they may already have 
been living in upland areas (Jest et al. 2000). This is in some contrast to Hagen who refers to the process as an 
infiltration, as a result of which “the original inhabitants of Nepal found themselves faced with an overpowering 
pressure from the lowlands, before which they had to retreat” (1972:78). 
26 Bishop (1990) explains that while paddy in the Karnali Zone, immediately to the west of the study area, may be 
grown up to 2680 m, this requires the laborious creation of hothouse conditions before transplantation. 
 83
In effect, this ethnic geography means that the ethnic settlement pattern (and subsequently the 
ability for one or other ethnic group to make a living from the land as the above quote by Berg 
suggests) is also largely a function of altitude. While the proportion of the population that belongs 
to the Tibeto-Burman groups increases in absolute terms in a south-to-north direction within the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, with the population of Parbat District in the south being predominantly Parbatiya 
and that of Mustang District in the north almost homogenously Tibeto-Burman, it also increases in 
relative terms, at lower latitudes, with altitude. This situation is particularly pronounced in Baglung 
and Myagdi Districts, where the contrasts between thriving agricultural Brahmin/Chettri (the major, 
high-caste Parbatiya groups) communities enjoying multiple harvests at valley bottoms and often 
destitute and depopulated Magar (the major Tibeto-Burman group) communities may be witnessed 
by taking a short walk uphill, at any given locality. 
While, in the hills, a poverty and altitude relationship is the general pattern indeed, the picture is 
varied as well. Irrigated communities may also be located on riverbanks in rather remote areas 
and/or at some altitude on mid-slope plains (known as tar), where fragile ecological conditions 
render irrigation precarious and agricultural livelihoods problematic. Yet, even in these cases, 
moving further uphill is likely to lead to unirrigated communities that are even poorer. Conversely, 
a number of Magar communities above the paddy culture belt are relatively wealthy, typically 
because ex-army servicemen pensions and remittances act as considerable supplements to 
agricultural incomes based on the sale of, for example, oranges or alcohol made from millet, one of 
the main upland staples.  
Furthermore, wet rice cultivation is not solely restricted to Parbatiya. Particularly in what may be 
termed the ‘peri-remote’ areas of Baglung and Myagdi Districts, towards the west and the north, 
Magar—the original inhabitants—and Newar and Thakali—immigrants to the area—have adopted 
wet rice cultivation skills and share irrigation systems with Parbatiya. Moreover, there are, as also 
observed in the Magar-dominated areas south of the Dhaulagiri Zone, numerous multi-ethnic 
settlements and hamlets that “are in contact without totally intermingling” (Jest et al. 2000:55,58). 
On the whole, however, the ethnic map corresponds with altitude, and there is a clear correlation 
between ethnicity, altitude, agricultural and socio-economic conditions in the hills of the Dhaulagiri 
Zone. In Mustang District, this correlation does not exist. The irrigation systems are typically 
located on valleys and tar as they are in the hills, but the arid conditions that render non-irrigated 
agriculture largely futile, also mean that settlements are equated with irrigation (excepting Jomsom, 
the administrative and market town), i.e., virtually no one lives outside irrigated communities.  
5.8.2  Access to Land 
Compared with altitude, the ethnic geography in the Dhaulagiri Zone corresponds much less closely 
with access to land in quantitative terms. However, caste does; and in the hill districts, the landless 
or the ‘effectively landless’ often include the 20 per cent of the populations that belong to low-caste 
Parbatiya (Kami, Damai and Sarki) groups (Department for International Development 2003). 
These so-called occupational groups are also found in Mustang District but in small numbers; most 
villages typically have one or two blacksmith (Kami) households for the production and repair of 
agricultural implements. In the hills, the ‘effectively landless’, which also include higher-caste 
Parbatiya and other ethnic groups, own less than 0.25 ha, and tend to be food-deficit (i.e. in terms of 
what they can grow but not necessarily in terms of what they can buy) for up to nine months a year. 
‘Marginal’ farmers with less than 0.5 ha also experience severe food deficits, while ‘large’ farmers 
with more than 1 ha may produce a surplus (International Center for Integrated Mountain 
Development et al. 2003, World Bank 1991), depending, as in the previous categories, on the nature 
of the land, not least whether it is irrigated or not. In the mountains, a farmer is expected to possess 
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more than 1.5 ha of irrigated land in order to produce a surplus (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development 
Project b 1992). While average farm sizes seem to undergo a constant process of reduction due to 
land fragmentation, it is widely agreed that both hills and mountains are characterized by owner-
operator farmers. Only 15 per cent of agricultural land in the hills is rented (in or out) (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 1997), and degrees of landlessness—in the sense of having no land at all—are 
low.  
Official, national-level data suggest an agrarian structure with average farm sizes being relatively 
small; average sizes have been estimated at 0.7 ha for hills and 0.9 ha for mountains (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2004). In the Dhaulagiri Zone, averages range from 0.41 ha in Baglung District, 
to 0.42 ha in Myagdi District, 0.44 ha in Parbat District and 0.47 ha in Mustang District 
(International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). Another source suggests a 
slightly larger average size of 0.61 ha for the three hill districts (Department for International 
Development 2003). While, as already suggested, the hills do not exhibit severe concentrations of 
landholdings, the distribution of land nevertheless appears skewed. In the hills of Nepal, some 48 
per cent of the farmers own more than 1 ha, 33 per cent own between 0.5 ha and 1 ha, and 19 per 
cent own less that 0.5 ha (Central Bureau of Statistics 2004). District-wise, comparative data, 
available for Baglung District only (but believed to resemble that of Parbat and Myagdi Districts), 
confirms much smaller than average landholdings compared with the national figure: some 15 per 
cent farmers own more than 1 ha land, about 21 per cent farmers own 0.5–1 ha land and about 61 
per cent farmers have less than 0.5 ha of land. In absolute terms, the top 15 per cent of farmers in 
Baglung District own 55 per cent of the land, while the bottom 82 per cent of farmers own 26 per 
cent of the land (ESAP 2002).  
5.9  The Institutional Landscape of the Dhaulagiri Zone 
In this final section of the chapter, an overview of the institutional landscape of the Dhaulagiri Zone 
in the 1990s and early 2000s will be provided. As mentioned in section 4.2, manifestations of 
political and institutional life increased significantly throughout the democratic Nepal of the 1990s, 
compared with the monolithic patronage of Panchayat era (SAPPROS 2001), which, as Whelpton 
suggests, was modelled on other Asian forms of ‘guided democracy’ and “designed to allow an 
element of popular representation while the king ruled unhindered by the pressures of parliamentary 
democracy” (2005:101). As elsewhere in Nepal, the institutional plurality since 1990 in the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, in reaction to decades of centralist ‘development’, consisted of at least five major, 
parallel elements. 
First of all, democratic decentralization involved elected District Development Committees, Village 
Development Committees and Municipalities27 as a result of constitutional change. Secondly, what 
maybe termed, somewhat contradictorily, ‘privatization decentralization’, involving user groups 
such as irrigation associations, Non-government Organisations and ‘self-help’ groups, promoted by 
international donors and reflecting liberal ideology and concerns with ‘participation’. Thirdly, 
political associations, ranging from political parties to ethnic and caste-based associations, seeking 
to gain influence in the democratic political environment, as well as the Maoists, seeking to 
overthrow that environment. The private, commercial sector in the shape of chambers of commerce, 
trade associations and the media may be added as a fourth element: the 1990s saw an upsurge in 
associational activity in the private sector, fuelled to a large extent by the increase in commercial 
activity that has been described elsewhere in this chapter and, in the case of the media, the freeing 
                                                 
27 In urban areas; only Baglung Bazaar is officially classified as urban. 
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of the press and its political backers. The fifth element consists of social/religious institutions that 
obviously existed prior to 1990, but which, as commented on later in this section, continued to 
undergo significant changes. 
Table 4 below lists the most prominent types and categories of institutions and organizations that 
make up these five elements in the Dhaulagiri Zone from 1990 to 2002. The list is meant to provide 
an overview, and is based on interviews with Non-government Organisation staff in the urban areas 
of the Dhaulagiri Zone, on interviews with villagers (see chapter 9 for more details on the 
institutional setting in relation to irrigated communities), and on observations. 
Table 4 
Summary List of Institutions and Organizations in the Dhaulagiri Zone by Category,  
1990–2005 
Democratic/ 
Government/Public 
Private/Individual/ 
Cooperative 
Political Commercial Social/Religious 
District 
Development 
Councils 
Village 
Development 
Councils 
Baglung 
Municipality 
Line agencies 
Courts 
Chief District Office 
Police 
Army 
Schools 
Health Posts 
Hospitals 
Village Assembly 
(Mustang) 
Higher Education 
(Baglung) 
NGOs 
Registered user 
groups (irrigation, 
forestry, etc.) 
Unregistered natural 
resource 
management 
institutions 
Cooperatives 
Mothers’ groups 
Dhikur* 
Parma** 
 
Legal political 
parties 
Ethnic affiliations 
Maoists 
Chambers of 
commerce 
Trade associations 
Media 
Daily, periodic, 
commodities/labour 
markets 
Schools 
Commercial 
networks 
Caste 
Class 
Sharecropping 
Land renting 
arrangements 
Festivals 
Temples 
Monasteries 
 
Notes: *Rotating credit associations. **Labour exchange arrangements. 
At the aggregate level, the table presents the institutional landscape and the spheres (public, private, 
political, commercial, social and religious) in the (rural) economy of the Dhaulagiri Zone that are 
spanned, utilized or which—sometimes as constraints rather than opportunities—influence the 
construction and the playing out of livelihoods, and the various mixes that may be obtained 
depending on ‘power’, endowments and entitlements. It follows from this that the categories and 
types of institutions obviously overlap in many instances, and that they are not mutually exclusive 
in terms of utility: user groups often function as platforms from which local elites gain access to 
representation in local government bodies; mothers’ groups, as suggested in chapter 9, serve both 
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cultural and economic functions; parma or labour exchange groups (also chapter 9 for more 
details), informal as they may appear, are related to cropping regimes and markets labour markets; 
and so on. 
One institution in particular, the dhikur, or rotating credit institution, has a particular local flavour. 
As suggested in previous sections, dhikur are directly related to livelihood construction, as vehicles 
for capital formation. As such, dhikur, in the context of the Dhaulagiri Zone, have undoubtedly 
contributed a great deal to the historical, regional, economic dynamics outlined in this section, not 
least in the shaping of spatially specific rural–urban economic linkages. Dhikur are also explained 
in more detail in chapter 9. 
As social capital—defined as networks of social relations—most of the listed institutions appear to 
constitute assets that may affect bargaining and other forms of power, and probably levels of shared 
norms and identity among entire communities or among those included in specific institutions. In 
line with this proposition to view institutions as predominantly complementary, categorization into 
‘democratic/government/public’ and into ‘private/individual’, where irrigation associations belong, 
should not be understood as directly dichotomous from a livelihoods analysis perspective, but rather 
as way of presenting the two most significant directions of institutional plurality since 1990. This is 
not to underestimate the importance of the ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ nature of institutions, when it 
comes to the ability of people to utilize these and to span institutional spheres. It is suggested, 
however, that even among the poorest, certain matrices of institutions are available (including the 
Maoists, ethnic associations and labour markets). 
The issues of exclusion and inclusion lead on to the role of social ‘vertical’ institutions that are 
based on access to and control of productive means and, subsequently, caste and class. In the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, these relationships are chiefly manifest in labour arrangements that range from the 
hiring of labour on market terms to semi-feudalistic arrangements as central institutional elements, 
along with sharecropping and other land-renting arrangements. With some 20 per cent of the 
population of the Dhaulagiri Zone belonging to so-called occupational castes, the area is no 
exception in the Nepalese context, where institutions based on caste and class are indeed important 
determinants of the livelihood conditions of the poor, particularly—as suggested above—their 
abilities to span institutional spheres. 
However, both the ‘vertical’ and the religious institutions continue to change as part of overall 
political and ‘organized’ institutional change. They do so as a result of changes in attitudes and 
ideas associated with factors that range from improved levels of information, social remittances 
associated with migration, and inclusionary practices on the part of development Non-government 
Organisations to the disruption of religious–cultural and oppressionary practices by the Maoists. 
The rise of the Maoist movement as a prominent element in the post-1990 institutional landscape in 
the Dhaulagiri Zone and elsewhere is closely related to the democratic space of the early 1990s that 
created substantial room for manoeuvre for the fully-fledged organization of leftist movements. It is 
also closely related to the persistence of feudalistic institutions such as those mentioned above and 
those that characterize the state machinery from central to local levels (see e.g. the quote by 
Gyawali, section 4.7.1). As mentioned in section 5.5.2, Maoist concentrations in the Dhaulagiri 
Zone are closely related to intra-zone inequalities and access (broadly understood), symptomatic of 
Nepal’s east–west divide. However, even if the Maoists may not be (at the period of fieldwork for 
this thesis) directly in control in the eastern part of the Dhaulagiri Zone, i.e., along the main road 
where the irrigated communities of this investigation are concentrated, their influence is pervasive.  
At the time of fieldwork for this thesis (2004–06), the Maoists arguably constituted the single most 
important institutional presence in the area, measured in terms of ability and ambition, with respect 
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to the exercise of power and control over institutional, social, economic and political life, from 
village-based cooperatives to district-based Non-government Organisations, along much the same 
lines as in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s (see Paerregaard 2002)28. As will be dealt with in more 
detail in chapter 9, this exercise of power, combined with the army’s efforts to counteract Maoist 
influence (and in some cases replace it with army control) became a serious constraint to the pursuit 
of improved livelihoods.  
Suffice it to suggest at this stage that the civil war had begun to render political and organizational 
life increasingly problematic around the turn of the century, resulting in a decline in interlinked 
economic and institutional activities. Talks with villagers in the hills at the time of the fieldwork 
revealed—in addition to a great deal of suspicion towards outsiders—that the aspirations, personal 
or collective, that fuelled a great deal of institutional activity in the 1990s and which often resulted 
in progressing livelihood trajectories, had increasingly been replaced by pessimism and frustration 
concerning the future. People had increasingly begun to doubt, in particular, their ability to become 
part of the ‘modern world’ as farmers.  
5.10 Summary  
The journey into the Dhaulagiri Zone was accomplished along the ‘new’ road with its combined 
metaphorical ‘hopes of delivery’ and concrete meanings. The road opened and facilitated market 
economic potentials in the area, and a blatant ‘roadside bias’ (Chambers 1983) sustained 
institutional activities and the political space upon which they were contingent by transporting 
projects and funds during the political-economic moment. The eastern area of the Dhaulagiri Zone, 
near the main transport artery and the district headquarters where most of the irrigated communities 
under study are located, thereby received a (disproportionate) share of public benefits throughout 
the 1990s. 
It became apparent in the regional-level analysis that variation on a number of levels—west–east, 
north–south, caste, ethnicity, elevation, etc.—is a major characteristic of the area indeed. However, 
the initial focus on the road, or more specifically, the trade route on which its alignment is based, 
led to a focus on the common factors that continue to shape the region and its institutional 
landscape. It was established that communities with access to irrigation in the Dhaulagiri Zone 
distinguish themselves from other farming communities, chiefly by virtue of production 
characteristics (i.e., irrigation technology) that have developed in historical/spatially specific 
contexts (including the immigration of high-caste Hindus and the resulting ethnic geography). From 
these regional-level perspectives, the commonalities associated with livelihood conditions in the 
irrigated communities of the Dhaulagiri Zone (including access to markets and institutions, 
elevation-specific agricultural production characteristics etc.) were pointed out. The thesis is, 
therefore, now poised at the gate to the micro-level analysis that will follow in the next chapter. 
 
 
28 Because this area was not under complete Maoist control, events are probably not completely comparable with those 
of Peru. However, Paerregaard’s depiction of Maoist control of institutional life in Alto Cunas, where the Shining Path 
“forced the villagers to dissolve the cooperatives established in the 1970s and to partition the communally owned sheep 
and cattle herds” (2002:64) bears some resemblance to the Dhaulagiri Zone in the early 2000s. 
Chapter 6: The Irrigation Systems 
6.1 Introduction 
The regional analysis of chapter 5, points towards irrigated communities as distinct categories 
among a great deal of variation, social, political, cultural and otherwise. The micro-level analysis of 
this chapter will continue this narrowing down of the characteristics of irrigated communities, with 
a specific focus on the nine cases. In the previous chapter, we gained access to the ‘local’ by means 
of the road as a prominent conduit of change. In order to set the stage for the micro-level analysis, 
this chapter will introduce the hill and mountain settings, respectively, in the narrative fashion that 
also characterized the beginning of the previous chapter. In line with the temporal dimensions of the 
re-study methodology of this thesis, these brief accounts pick up on the pervasive notion of access 
to ‘the external’, often perceived as ‘the modern’, imaginary or real, that also featured in the 
narrative accounts of chapter 5.  
However, I will first attempt to define ‘the irrigated community’ and its households as a meaningful 
analytical concept. It is argued that the cases may—despite economic and social divisions—be said 
to constitute ‘communities’, not least because of the shared conditions of production associated with 
common property regimes. 
6.2 The Case Communities as Analytical Units 
As mentioned in the methodology section, the units of analysis in this study consists of (1) the 
wider political economy, regionally, nationally and globally, (2) irrigation systems, understood to 
include interdependent physical and institutional-cum-social relational aspects, and (3) households 
with irrigated land living in these irrigation systems. Combined, the irrigation systems and these 
households are understood as communities. This is owing mainly to the presence of an irrigation 
system as the connecting, shared element that, in the case of cooperation-dependent irrigation, 
justifies the use of an otherwise contested and sometimes fuzzy notion of ‘community’ (see e.g. 
Agrawal and Gibson 1999 for a discussion), but also because irrigation systems are largely 
coterminous with settlement boundaries. 
Because of the shared element and the distinct physical entities, the term community more 
adequately denotes the combined unit than, for example, ‘village’. In addition, ‘village’ in Nepal is 
often associated with the wider administrative unit of the Village Development Committee, which 
usually covers several settlements, irrigated and unirrigated. In the present spatial context, each of 
the nine discrete populations that were sampled for the surveys in the 1990s and in 2004 represent 
an “identifiable community of interdependent users” (Feeny et al. 1990:4), by virtue of being 
“exclusive clubs” of detached settlements, nucleated or more scattered, but physically located in the 
immediate proximity of the irrigated area. Virtually all households in the analytical unit possess 
irrigated land, as observed elsewhere in the hills of Nepal (see Martens 1989). Therefore, 
‘community’ in the analytical context of this study refers only to that particular, physically tangible, 
settlement of households with irrigated land that have access to the irrigation resources; those 
excluded from access to the irrigation resource reside apart from those included, often along the 
lines of the ethnic geography outlined in section 5.8.1. 
In the hill communities, even households belonging to occupational castes, although often located at 
the fringes of the core settlements, tend to possess small plots of irrigated land, and are therefore 
included in the sampled population (N). Those who do not posses irrigated land tend to live in 
separate clusters, at varying distance from the core settlement. In the mountain communities, where 
 89
only a handful of families are occupational, all possess some irrigated land and reside in the core, 
nucleated settlement. In the following sections, the communities, the locations of which are evident 
from map 4, will be introduced in a south–north direction along the Kali Gandaki River. The hill 
and mountain community profiles, owing to substantially different characteristics, are presented 
separately, and each category is introduced in narrative style, in terms of archetypes. 
6.2.1  An Episode: The Archetype Irrigated Hill Community 
It was a hot spring day in 1995. Our project evaluation team of six persons was making its way up 
the stone steps towards the village of Pakuwa in Parbat District. Agitated shouting could be heard 
somewhere up the trail. The source of the shouting, it turned out, was a local farmer who, having 
met other farmers on the trail, was airing his frustrations about a cow, which he was bringing to the 
market to sell. The large black and white cow, seemingly of the Holstein-Friesian variety (known as 
‘improved’ cows in Nepal), was unperturbed by the commotion and the complaints voiced against 
it: it did not yield half the milk that was promised, had cost a fortune and was constantly sick, did 
not want whatever fodder was available, could not cope with the heat, and, moreover, the medical 
bills were enormous; in sum, a useless cow. Seeing our team of outsiders approach, the farmer—
apparently equating us with the kind of people who had, in the first place, recommended that he 
should purchase the improved cow—raised his voice even further, denouncing the advice of 
agricultural advisers and the like and pledging to stick to local cows forever. He rounded off his 
tirade by strongly suggesting that we buy the cow there and now and take it back down to where it 
(and we) came from. 
The above is based on an actual, particularly illustrative event, but numerous examples of clashes 
between the ‘modern–external’ and the ‘traditional–local’—notions that evoke dimensions of both 
access and temporality—could have been hit upon. Not least within the area of agricultural 
extension where the theoretical ‘modern’ recommendations of technicians—in Nepal and 
elsewhere—continue to be at odds with that of farmers for whom secure agricultural production is a 
key concern. The example is not meant to lead to a focus on asymmetrical information or 
appropriate technology but to illustrate how access to elements of the modern and the external may 
affect the lives and livelihoods of the communities investigated. These elements are, however, 
unlike the almost theatrical example of the man with his cow, not particularly visible: like other 
rural settings in Nepal, the case communities offer elements of a time warp, and one may feel, in the 
early 2000s, almost as Matthiessen did in 1972, “a century away” (see chapter 5). The following 
portrayal of the ‘archetypal’ hill setting is framed within these temporal contrasts. 
At first glance, the archetype irrigated, subtropical hill setting—and one estimate suggests that there 
may be thousands1 of such settings in Nepal—predominantly inhabited in this study by Parbatiya 
(hill Brahmin and Chettri) farmers offers a timeless pastoral setting: fields are tilled using century-
old implements with bullocks as the main source of draft power; women carry heavy loads of 
firewood, fertilizer, crops, etc. in doko (baskets) on their backs; neat courtyards flank traditional 
mud-plastered houses; and the scent of cow dung and cooking, and the sounds of Radio Nepal (a 
reminder that we are not exactly a century away) played on transistor radios fill the air. None of the 
communities are electrified as such, but a few wealthy individuals may own small hydropower 
generating devices. The irrigated area, varying in its degree of terracing, depending on the gradient, 
                                                 
1 The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has estimated that Dhading District alone has some 3000 
farmer-managed irrigation systems. If, as Benjamin and Shivakoti suggest, “we consider Dhading as a typical district, 
and count just 60 (excluding the Himalayan districts) of Nepal’s 75 districts to be similar, we would arrive at an 
astonishing number” (2002: 59). 
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technically known as the command area in engineering language, is colloquially referred to as the 
khet (irrigated land). It is usually so sufficiently small and contained that an overview of the 
hydrological system is easily obtained.  
Typically, this khet, where chiefly wet rice, maize and wheat are grown, is fed by water originating 
in a stream that may be several kilometres away, and brought by a khulo (channel) cut by farmers 
into often difficult terrain, sometimes more than one hundred years before. In contrast to, for 
example, larger lowland systems, the water sources of these gravity systems tend to have ample 
water or to be dedicated to the community that they serve, which is also the community that 
developed the system in the first place. Inter-community water conflicts are therefore largely 
absent, although they do occur occasionally, particularly if attempts are made at using upstream 
water for water mills or micro-hydro (electricity-generating) devices.  
The houses, often surrounded by small kitchen gardens, tend to be located away from the highly 
productive land, scattered on the sloping land above the command area, a location that also 
facilitates the one-way transportation of manure from the cattle kept at the farmstead to the fields 
below (Bishop 1990:165). Here and further up the slope we also find the bari (unirrigated land), 
where dry rice, maize, and at higher altitudes, millet are typically grown. Forested areas in the 
vicinity of the houses may be sacred and contain small Hindu temples; additionally, most houses 
and courtyards will contain areas dedicated to worship. Depending on the size of the community, it 
usually contains one or more shops selling basic goods, from slippers to batteries to torches and 
instant noodles, and (often combined with retail shops) teashops where, in addition to tea, meals of 
dhal bhat (rice and lentils) may be had, if ordered in advance. Often these shops will be in the 
vicinity of a chautari, or a platform built under a shady tree, that constitutes a public space where 
men tend to gather, and where village meetings may take place.  
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Map 4 
Case Communities 
6.2.2 Hill Community Profiles 
The above introduction to an irrigated community in the hills is distilled from the following 
community profiles that aim to familiarize the reader with the overall setting. The focus in the 
presentation is on location, access, ethnic composition, and irrigation history. 
Pakuwa 
The location of Pakuwa in Parbat District, less than one-hours walk from the main road and another 
half-hour by bus from Kusma (the headquarters of Parbat District), and at an altitude of some 
1200 m, makes it one of the most accessible of the studied communities. Pakuwa is approached via 
a suspension bridge over the Modi River, and a steep ascent through a profusion of green leads 
straight into the command area of 55 ha, located on a tar (a flat area at mid-slope) above the river. 
122 households (with 732 people) possess land in the command area, two-thirds of these are 
Brahmin, and most of the rest are Chettri and Thakuri (a high-caste claiming to be of royal origin): 
only one lower-caste household, a Kami (smith), resides in the community and has irrigated land.  
Controlled and common-property-regime-based irrigation2 is relatively new in Pakuwa. The present 
scheme, fed by a 3.5 km channel from the Jahare River, was developed with the assistance of the 
then District Panchayat in 1979, and was rehabilitated (involving mainly cement lining and concrete 
culverts) in the period from 1991–92 under the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project. A water 
users’ management committee was registered in 1991 (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 
1996). According to farmers, improved water control had, by 2004, resulted in expansion of the 
khet by some 25 per cent. The close proximity of the road and subsequent market access has 
resulted in some cropping diversification; most significantly, a majority of farmers sell potatoes in 
Kusma. The average landholding size at 0.36 ha is below the average for the district (0.44 ha) 
(International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development et al. 2003). Pakuwa used to have a 
Junior Technical Assistant (from the Department of Agriculture) but the post was transferred in 
1999. A school and a health post remain. 
Lampata 
Lampata in Parbat District is practically as accessible as Pakuwa. It is located less than one-hours 
walk from the main road between Kusma and Baglung, and less than half-an-hour by bus from the 
former, at an altitude of some 900 m. The vast majority of the 60 households (360 people) who have 
land in the 30-ha command area are Brahmin and Chettri; no lower-caste households have irrigated 
land. As in Pakuwa, controlled irrigation is relatively new in Lampata, where, the first channel (‘the 
upper’) was constructed in 1965, apparently by the community itself, and the second 1.5-km 
channel (‘the lower’) was constructed (rather than simply rehabilitated)3 with the assistance of the 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project from 1992–93. Several minor landslides along the 
alignment of the lower channel mean that it is predominantly used in summer. A water users’ 
management committee was registered in 1992. The addition of the second channel led to the 
expansion of the command area by some 30 per cent, according to farmers. Farmers in Lampata 
report substantial crop diversification over the past decade, from 2–3 crops (wheat, maize and rice) 
within the khet area to vegetable and potato farming in and outside the khet, much of which is sold 
                                                 
2 As opposed to irrigation that relies on a multitude of small streams and springs for individual or clusters of fields.  
3 The scheme, however, figures as ‘rehabilitation’ rather than new in the DIDP records; probably because of the 
addition of an extra channel to an already irrigated area rather than the introduction of irrigation to an area. 
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in nearby Kusma. The average landholding size of 0.44 ha corresponds with the average for the 
district. A school is the only public facility in the community. 
Amalachaur 
Reaching Amalachaur in Baglung District involves walking for an hour from Kusma along a mule 
trail. The command area of 35 ha, at 1100 m, is located on the western bank of the Kali Gandaki 
River and is farmed by 102 households (625 people). As in the neighbouring irrigated communities, 
the vast majority of farmers are Brahmin, followed by Chettri. However, somewhat uniquely in the 
context of irrigation in this area, some low-caste Majhi (fisherfolk) households have land in the 
command area. The average landholding sizes of 0.34 ha compares with 0.41 ha for Baglung 
District. As in Lampata, the command area is divided into an upper and a lower part. The history of 
the system is unclear, but informants agree that it is at least 100 years old. The Dhapa River feeds a 
1.2-km channel that services both parts of the command area, and which was rehabilitated under the 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project between 1992 and 1993 (Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project1996).  
According to farmers, the system worked well until 2001 but increasingly seepage has meant that 
the lower part has been getting most of the water during winter. The command area has not been 
expanded since rehabilitation but, as elsewhere, farmers report cropping diversification, from two 
main crops of maize and paddy, to another main crop of wheat in the khet, and a growth in minor 
crops such as potatoes and vegetables inside and outside the khet. The relatively large village of 
Kusmi Sera, located less that one-hour walk from Amalachaur, represents the closest market centre. 
However, the majority of crops are sold in Kusma which, like other district headquarters, has 
experienced substantial growth. A primary school is located in Amalachaur; other facilities are 
located at Kusmi Sera and Kusma. 
Kurgha 
To reach this relatively large irrigated community with an 80-ha command area at 1100 m in Parbat 
District, we have to again start at Kusma and, depending on the season, walk (three hours) or drive 
(1–2 hours) along a seasonal road, southwards along the western bank of the Kali Gandaki River, 
via the sizeable settlement of Phalebas. The 234 households (1170 people) with land in the 
command area are fairly dispersed on a slope above the command area; except for one lower-caste 
household, all are Brahmin. The 3.3-km irrigation channel dates back to 1933, when an individual 
named Chiranjibi Poudel “with the expectation of being blessed with a son in return for his pious 
deed”, as the present water users’ management committee chairman explains, donated cash and 
kind, and initiated work on the channel with labour contributions from people in the village. The 
channel was rehabilitated under the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project from 1991–93, 
during which period a water users’ management committee was formed.  
Shortly after rehabilitation a landslide occurred4, and the project (in 1993) laid down pipes in the 
fragile area of the slide. The irrigation system, according to farmers, then worked well until 2003, 
when construction of a katcha (earthen) road caused yet another landslide. However, after repairs, 
the system is in order again, even if leaking occurs. Water supplies are not a problem in summer, 
but in winter farmers resort to tapping water from various sources for individual fields that average 
0.29 ha (2004), a figure well below the district average of 0.44 ha. As in other communities, farmers 
report substantial diversification. Most farmers grew only two main crops (maize and paddy) prior 
                                                 
4 Whether the landslide was actually caused by the rehabilitation works remains unclear. 
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to rehabilitation, now wheat has been added as another main crop, and vegetables, potatoes and 
mustard as minor crops. The irrigated area, however, did not expand as a result of rehabilitation. 
Kusma represents the most important market for products. Kurgha has a number of schools, public 
and private; a lower secondary school and a police station (though now closed as a result of Maoist 
activity) are located in nearby Phalebas. 
Arjewa 
Located four-hours walk from Kusma, opposite Kurgha on the eastern bank of the Kali Gandaki 
River in Baglung District, at approximately 1000 m, on a tar that overlooks the river, this relatively 
small system with a command area of 20 ha is farmed by 1265 households (800 people) who hold 
on average 0.16 ha, a figure that is remarkably low, considering the district average of 0.41 ha. This 
community also stands out from those introduced so far by not being Brahmin-dominated; 75 of the 
households are Chettri, and the remainder are Brahmin. Also unlike other communities, houses are 
interspersed with the command area. Accounts of the history of the system vary; some think that it 
dates back to the ‘days of the small kings’6. Others suggest, equally imprecisely, that it is at least 
three generations old.  
No outside assistance had been received until that of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project. 
A water users’ management committee was formed in 1992, and by early 1993 the 0.5-km canal 
had been lined with cement (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 1996), and—because of the 
low-yielding spring that is the source of water—a storage tank had been constructed. These works 
did mean better water supply and control for the first couple of years. However, the first leak 
occurred in the tank in 1996; this was subsequently repaired by the project, but by 2004 more leaks 
had rendered the tank redundant. To make matters worse, landslides have swept away parts of the 
canal; in these parts, pipes have been laid down. Rehabilitation has not resulted in expansion of the 
irrigated area, nor has the main cropping pattern changed and unlike neighbouring communities 
cultivation of vegetables has not caught on. There is a school in Arjewa, and the nearest market is in 
Kusma. 
Pipalbot 
To reach Pipalbot (1100 m) in Myagdi District we have to travel some distance northwards along 
the Kali Gandaki River to Beni, the capital of Myagdi District, and walk for some five hours in a 
north-westerly direction along the Myagdi River, passing through numerous irrigated communities 
located in the river valley. The mule trail that eventually leads to the high pasture of Dhorpatan is 
good, and was built in the early 1990s under the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project; in the 
dry season, it is passable by jeep up to the bazaar of Babiachaur, one hour before Pipalbot. The 
ethnic composition in Pipalbot indicates that we are now on the fringe of the Parbatiya heartland. 
More than half of the 75 households (600 people) with irrigated land are Magar (Tibeto-Burman) 
and the remaining are Brahmin and Chettri. 
                                                 
5 There is a significant discrepancy between DIDP data on the number of farmers in Arjewa with land in the command 
area and that of the present survey. The DIDP records suggest that 60 households share the 20 ha of command area, 
whereas the present survey found the number of households to be 126. However, as the figure of 0.16 ha per average 
holding is fairly consistent throughout the data and may also be arrived at by dividing 20 with 126, it would appear that 
0.16 ha is the most plausible figure. Besides, interviews in the community confirmed that plots are rather small. 
6 This refers to the ancient principalities that became integrated into greater Nepal during the process of unification 
from 1744–1810. The status of the (vassal) principality was finally abolished in Nepal in 1960 (see Ramirez 2000b). 
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All the high-caste Parbatiya in this area live and work in the valley bottoms as irrigated farmers, and 
some of the Magar, who otherwise predominate in the settlements at higher altitudes, have adopted 
irrigated agriculture (see section 5.8.1). The 75 households farm plots that average 0.41 ha (lower 
than the district average of 0.44) in the 33-ha command area. The exact history of the irrigation 
system is unknown (“it was built by our forefathers more than 100 years ago”). Fed by a minor 
tributary of the Myagdi River, the 2.5-km canal was rehabilitated from 1992–93. A water users’ 
management committee was formed and registered in 1992. The system performed well for the first 
nine years after rehabilitation, a period which saw the introduction of maize and wheat, in addition 
to the already cultivated paddy in the irrigated area, and expansion of the irrigated area from the 
original 31 to 40 ha.  
However, the intake to the channel and parts of the channel itself were severely damaged in a flood 
in 2002, and the command area was reduced to the present 33 ha. As in other communities, farmers 
report significant diversification into minor crops. These used to be transported to Beni, but strongly 
increased militarization in the area since 2002 has made road transport somewhat irregular. The 
militarization is another factor that indicates that we are on the fringe of not only the Parbatiya-
dominated area, but also the ‘central parts’ of the Dhaulagiri Zone. At the time of investigation, the 
Maoists operated out of the Darbang area a few hours beyond Pipalbot to the north-west, and with 
the military operating out of Beni to the south, this situated Pipalbot in a fluctuating combat zone. 
While a school and a health post remain in the area, other infrastructure such as a forestry office and 
an agriculture office has retreated to Beni. 
Basic community profile information for the hills is summarized in table 5 below.  
Table 5 
Basic Data, Hill Irrigated Communities, 2004 
Community  Irrigated 
Households 
Average Irrigated 
Landholding Size 
(ha) 
Main Ethnic 
Groups 
Total Population 
Amalachaur 102 0.34 Brahmin, Chettri 625 
Arjewa 126 0.16 Chettri, Brahmin 800 
Kurgha 234 0.29 Brahmin, Chettri 1170 
Pakuwa 122 0.36 Brahmin, Chettri 732 
Lampata 60 0.45 Brahmin, Chettri 360 
Pipalbot 75 0.41 Magar, Brahmin 600 
Source: Cross-sectional Survey 2004; Key Informant’s Survey2004 
6.3 An Archetype Irrigated Mountain Community 
The archetypal mountain setting (based on the areas of Pacgau and Baragau) offers an equally 
timeless impression to that of the hills: mani walls (rows of Buddhist prayer wheels on a wall) greet 
visitors to settlements that are nucleated with narrow lanes and archways separating large, two-
storey houses with flat roofs (where firewood is stored). These houses are where life during 
daytime, when heavy winds prevail, tends to be lived. Fields are tilled using implements equally 
traditional to those in the hills as well as draft power based on hybrids between normal cattle and 
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yaks known as jho. Unlike in the hills, however, both men and women carry heavy loads in doko 
(baskets).  
Most work is carried out before 10 a.m. when winds have not yet risen and after 5 p.m. when they 
have died down. These winds define daily cycles, and the Kali Gandaki River and its tributaries, 
along which all arable land is located, define human habitation under conditions that are 
progressively more arid in a south–north direction. Hence a settlement equates with access to 
irrigation, and close to 90 per cent of the arable land is irrigated. Barley, naked barley, buckwheat 
and sometimes maize, as well as apples are grown under oasis-like conditions (see Messerschmidt 
1995). As in the hills, water is brought to the khet via ancient khulo, but in the mountains the canals 
are often in fragile terrain, sometimes involving tunnels through rock, and alignments along steep 
and unstable cliff-faces which, when landslides occur, pose complex technical problems. 
While the people, who generally refer to themselves as either Thakali or Gurung, belong to different 
clans and have notions of high and low social standing, caste identity is not as much an issue here as 
in the hills; everyone lives in the same nuclear settlement, including occupational people. The 
settlements, particularly those close to the Kali Gandaki River, have electricity, and where transistor 
radios blare in the hills, it is television sets that provide news and entertainment in the mountains. 
Shops are also considerably different from hose in the hills in that—in addition to the ubiquitous 
instant noodles, biscuits and slippers—the range of alcohol (some of it bottled locally) and beer 
(sometimes Chinese from across the border to the north) is impressive, despite the fact that many 
households have distilleries of their own. The settlements often possess squares where meetings 
may be held, but otherwise social life is focused around the gompa, the Buddhist monastery, the 
presence of which, it appears, is almost as defining for human habitation as irrigation. 
 
6.3.1  Mountain Community Profiles 
Thini 
Reaching Thini involves three days of walking northwards from Beni in Myagdi District, along the 
Kali Gandaki River and a relatively steep ascent. Part of the walk, follows the western fringe of the 
Annapurna Circuit trekking route. At the point where the route passes through the ‘deepest gorge in 
the world’ and transcends from the hill ecological zone, on to the increasingly arid mountain 
ecological zone, trekkers of all nationalities mix with trains of mules, huge flocks of sheep, seasonal 
migrants, porters carrying impossibly heavy loads and groups of riders on small, sturdy horses. It is 
along this funnel-like route that the meaning of the Kali Gandaki corridor7, as a relatively 
demarcated geographical band, with steady directional flows defined by historical north–south 
economic linkages8, stands the clearest. Emerging from the gorge, the Thak Khola Valley opens up 
and the remaining trip to Jomsom, the administrative headquarters of Mustang District, may be 
completed along a motorable road. Thini (2800 m) and its relatively large command area of 93 ha is 
a 30-minute walk from Jomsom, on the western side of the Kali Gandaki River. 
                                                 
7 The planning concept that originates from Nepal’s Fourth Development Plan (see chapter 5). 
8 The traditional salt/grain trade with Tibet, described in section 4.5.1 having been replaced, to a large extent by tourism 
(see Vinding 1984 , Haffner et al. 2003) 
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The white, flat roofed two-storey houses in the nucleated settlement that constitutes Thini village 
are perched on a slope above the khet. 167 households have irrigated land9 in the khet; 100 of these 
households belong in Thini, the remaining are in Jomsom10. They farm plots that average 0.56 ha, 
close to the district average of 0.47 ha. The vast majority (80 per cent) claim to be Thakali and most 
of the rest refer to themselves as Gurung (both of whom are groups of Tibeto-Burman descent) 
except three occupational caste households (of Parbatiya descent)11. Buddhism predominates, as 
witnessed by the existence of a large monastery above the village, but Hindu festivals are 
increasingly being observed.  
The irrigation system is as old as the settlement of Thini12 and the 3.2-km channel that diverts water 
from the Thini River, along an almost barren, rocky slope, was rehabilitated by the Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project from 1992–93. A water users’ management committee was 
registered in 1992. Apart from culverts, this did not involve much cementing of the channel itself 
(which has been cut out of rock), but rather a great deal of stabilization work in the landslide-prone 
environment, and securing of the intake from floods13 with gabion boxes14. This has not led to any 
expansion of the irrigated area, but to a steady water supply and far fewer labour inputs compared to 
the pre-rehabilitation period. Four main crops are grown in Thini; wheat and naked barley as winter 
crops, and maize15 and buckwheat as summer crops. Apples are grown in orchards on the fringes of 
the command area, as are vegetables. The administrative and tourists centre of Jomsom represents 
an important market for Thini. Apart from Thini’s own school and a reputed health centre, a wide 
range of services is available in Jomsom. 
                                                 
9 The arid physical conditions of Mustang mean that agriculture (except for forest crops) is only possible with irrigation; 
hence, practically all households in Thini have some irrigated land.  
10 This sharing of a command area by two settlement is a unique feature in the context of the cases examined in this 
study. The Jomsom residents who have land in the command area mainly reside in ‘Old Jomsom’ to the north of 
‘Jomsom Airport’. Both Jomsom and Thini residents are included in the sample survey, but the qualitative investigation 
has mainly taken place in Thini itself. This is because a great deal of the interaction took place around the irrigation 
channel that runs along the fringe of Thini village, and because more key informants were available in Thini. 
11 The ethnic origins of the residents in Thini are not always clear, and ethnic claims on the part of certain groups are 
often contested by other groups. Among anthropologists the definitions are contested as well: Vinding (1998) in his 
discussion of the topic arrives at the conclusion that there are three subgroups of the largest ethnic group, the Thakali 
(Tamang, Mawatan and Yhulkasompaimhi Thakali); these politically and financially dominant groups are concentrated 
south of Jomsom in what is referred to as Thak Khola, i.e., the southernmost part of Mustang. They use well-known 
clan names. The Towa who originate in Tibet are the second largest group, and have resided all over southern Mustang, 
including Thak Khola, for quite some time. Some of the Towa call themselves Thakali (which ‘real’ Thakali do not) and 
others Gurung. The third most prominent group appear to be what Vinding refers to as people who are ‘culturally 
Tibetan’ (Vinding 1998:27), i.e., Tibetan speakers who predominantly reside in northern Mustang, but who, like the 
Towa before them, increasingly migrate southwards as part of a north–south migration dynamic. 
12 Which was apparently, at some point in time, shifted from a geologically unstable location immediately south of the 
present location; exactly how old the present village is has been difficult to ascertain, but it is one of the original five 
settlements of Pacgau (‘five villages’) in Thak Khola (the area from Cimang in the north to Dhyuda in the south). See 
Vinding 1984, 1992.  
13 A major flood destroyed the intake in the early 1980s, and securing the intake was, until the DIDP intervention, an 
extremely labour-consuming task. 
14 Stones and boulders collected from the riverbed and placed into brick-shaped 1-m3 ‘boxes’ held together by wire. 
15 Maize is increasingly replacing buckwheat as a major crop, apparently because it requires less labour than buckwheat, 
but probably also because imported rice is replacing buckwheat-based food as a main staple. 
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Tiri 
At 3000 m, this hamlet with 79 people on the western bank of the Kali Gandaki River is one of 12 
villages in the area of Baragau (‘12 villages’), located four-hours walk north of Jomsom. Tiri is 
located in the so-called restricted16 area, beyond the strategically located village of Kag Beni, which 
demarcates Upper Mustang from Lower Mustang. Eleven households out of 14 have land in the 
command area of 11 ha, with plots averaging 1 ha. All farmers are Tibetan speakers and, unlike the 
more syncretic Thini–Jomsom area, Tibetan Buddhism prevails in Tiri, which has an old monastery, 
perched on a small ridge above the community. The irrigation system, in addition to its agricultural 
purposes, serves as a source of drinking water (and as such provides the raison d’etre for the 
settlement). Prior to Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project involvement from 1992–93, when a 
water users’ management committee was registered, the system had an exposed canal that was often 
blocked by boulders and subject to substantial water loss from seepage and evapotranspiration (the 
combined loss of moisture from plants and soils). Under the project, a pipe was laid down from the 
intake 700 m along a gorge above the village, sink boxes were installed, and a storage tank built 
close to the village. According to farmers, these works have resulted in a doubling of the water 
supply. Due to wind erosion, the command area could not be expanded as a result of rehabilitation; 
however, the naked barley/barley (winter) and buckwheat/maize (summer) cropping regimes have 
become more secure. Vegetables, apples and other minor crops are negligible. Tiri has a small 
school. 
Khinga 
At 3450 m, Khinga with 245 residents is the highest of all the irrigation systems that the DIDP 
became involved with, and is among the highest in Nepal. Like Tiri, Khinga is located in the 
Baragau area, five-hours walk from Jomsom. Trekkers and pilgrims pass by Khinga en route to the 
holy site of Muktinath and the Thorung pass, which separates Mustang District from Manang 
District. While the steady flow of travellers may be a source of entertainment, the economic 
benefits to Khinga of this transit traffic are limited to the operation by a teashop-cum-hotel by one 
villager and the sale of some agricultural products to tourist restaurants in adjacent villages. The 34 
Tibetan-speaking Gurung households, all possess irrigated land in the 45-ha khet and operate 
0.76 ha on average.  
The irrigation system was constructed when the village was shifted to its present location from a 
landslide-affected area nearby, some 200 years ago. The 2.7-km channel, which diverts water from 
the Uungbu River, was rehabilitated under the DIDP from 1992–93 (DIDP 1996), and involved a 
combination of cement lining and the laying down of pipes in landslide-prone sections of the 
alignment. The rehabilitation has, according to farmers, resulted in a substantially increased water 
supply (despite the fact that a number of landslides have occurred recently), although not in any 
increase in the irrigated area. The valley in which Khinga is located creates protection from the 
otherwise heavy winds of Mustang District and, despite the altitude, creates a beneficial micro-
climate for a cropping regime that (in addition to naked barley)—unlike in Thini and Tiri—allows 
for the growing of wheat in winter. Buckwheat predominates in summer, and apples, vegetables and 
                                                 
16 Upper Mustang, which protrudes into Tibet, was until some decades ago a rather ‘sensitive’ border area because 
Mustang was home to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored guerrilla forays into Tibet in the 1970s (for details 
Google ‘khampas, cia, mustang or search articles at www.nepalitimes.com); the reason for keeping Upper Mustang as a 
restricted area these days seems to be money. Foreign visitors pay about US$ 80 per day to the central authorities and, 
as with other restricted areas, limited access reproduces the Shangri-la myth of the ‘forbidden kingdom’ of Mustang.  
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potatoes are common. The people of Khinga are affiliated with the large monastery in adjacent 
Jharkot, where the school is also located. For other services, Jomsom is the nearest place. 
Basic community profile data for the mountains are summarized in table 6 below. 
Table 6 
Basic Data, Mountain Irrigated Communities, 2004 
 
Community  Total Households Average Irrigated 
Landholding Size 
(ha) 
Main Ethnic 
Groups 
Population 
(Irrigated) 
Thini 167 0.56 Thakali, Gurung 1254 
Tiri 11 1.10 Gurung 79 
Khinga 34 0.76 Gurung 218 
Source: Cross-sectional Survey 2004, Key Informant’s Survey 2004 
 
Chapter 7: The Workings of the Irrigation Systems 
7.1  Introduction 
Following the introduction to the irrigated communities in the last chapter, this chapter will contain 
analysis of the nature, the significance, and the workings of irrigation systems in the study area. In 
other words, I will now follow up on what was noted in section 5.2, i.e., that the intensity of 
cultivation and the location of dwellings and fields in the extremely difficult terrain suggested 
something more than the mere physically tangible. And that, in particular, the terraces and irrigation 
systems on the sides of valleys suggested dynamics associated with ancient agricultural and 
engineering skills and, above all, modes of organization.  
Analytically, we will remain at the level of the internal workings of the irrigation systems, with a 
focus on what may be termed enduring features associated with irrigation system organization, and 
the relationship between irrigation system activities—particularly those associated with water 
distribution, operation and maintenance—and the agricultural cycle. The use of the term enduring in 
this context is not meant to suggest stability or stagnancy or even assumptions of homogeneity 
across systems; indeed, as will be evident later on, emphases and practices vary a great deal across 
systems and change over time. Rather, the intention is to identify and describe some of the more 
generic, critical activities that take place in irrigation systems, and enable these systems to function 
productively. This identification is part of the construction of an analytical framework that enables 
analysis of performance in the next chapter. 
The chapter introduces a framework for analysing irrigation system activities at the internal level. It 
is based on the highly grounded and pioneering—in the context of Nepal—documentation of the 
workings of irrigation systems provided by Martin and Yoder (1988b) in their studies of the Raj 
Khulo and the Thulo Khulo irrigation systems in the hills of Palpa District south of the Dhaulagiri 
Zone. Martin and Yoder’s detailed research, carried out in 1981–83, was seminal in that (at least to 
my knowledge) it documented the dynamics of ‘indigenous’ irrigation for the first time in the 
context of Nepal and, in doing so, provided an analytical and conceptual framework that still holds.  
While the focus on analysing activities internal to irrigation systems is akin to the ‘internal 
workings’ tendency noted within the collective action school (see section 2.3.1), Martin and 
Yoder’s multi-disciplinary approach1 differs from that of the neo-institutionalist and public choice 
approaches of the collective action school by virtue of its emphasis on understanding irrigation 
institutions as functions of the physical, social and economic environment, rather than the aggregate 
outcome of the agencies and interests of individuals. They recognize “that institutions are needed 
for the development and operation of irrigation systems” (1988b:148) as they serve regulatory 
functions and facilitate aggregation of resources beyond individual capacity, and that institutions 
are made up of norms and behaviours, persisting over time to serve collectively valued purposes. 
The analytical framework is explained in more detail in section 7.4 
7.2 Irrigation in the Dhaulagiri Zone 
It rains a lot in certain parts of the Dhaulagiri Zone. At the weather station in Lumle, less than 
20 km (as the crow flies) from Pakuwa (see map 4), rainfall amounts to some 6 m per year 
                                                 
1 Their works on irrigation may be characterized as socio-technical in nature. However, while using quantitative, natural 
science methods, their works also contain a great deal of the ‘qualitative’ characteristics along the lines of what later 
became known as informal methods (including Rapid Rural Appraisal, Participatory Rural Appraisal etc.). 
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(Benjamin 1992). While local micro-climatic factors may mean some variation in the six hill 
communities, not least in the pre-monsoon periods, rainfall during the monsoon is quite a deluge. In 
the hills, the sharply defined seasons, particularly the four months of monsoon rains from June to 
September, define the agricultural cycle with wet rice production as a very central element. During 
the winter season from October, it rarely rains, except sometimes during January when there may be 
a drizzle for a few days. Intermittent rain starts occurring as the heat builds up in April and May 
before the actual onset of the monsoon in mid-June, but these violent burst of precipitation that 
often include hailstorms are unreliable and sometimes do more harm than good to crops. In the 
mountain communities of Mustang District, located in the rain-shadow of the Himalayas, monsoon 
rains may ‘spill over’ from the hills to some extent, but precipitation (often as snow in the winter) 
rarely exceeds 200 mm per annum2.  
Regardless of the amounts of rain received, irrigation in the hills and mountains of Nepal is, as 
elsewhere, about water control—about being able to supply water to a given crop when that crop 
needs it—irrespective of the vagaries of rainfall. Irrigation in Nepal as elsewhere is, as defined by 
Stern, “any process, other than natural precipitation, which supplies water to crops, orchards, grass 
or any other cultivated plants” (1989:13). The type of irrigation that characterize the hills and 
mountains of Nepal is referred to as surface or, more precisely, gravity irrigation: surface because 
water is applied at ground surface level (as opposed to sub-soil irrigation), and gravity because we 
are dealing with falling water that is brought to the irrigated surfaces without any need for pumps.  
The fact that we are in an environment where water, as a result of topography and climate, is indeed 
falling—along often steep slopes, in creeks and rivers fed by upstream lakes or glaciers and, of 
course, directly from the sky—serves to emphasize that the growing of crops depends on the ability 
to control the flow of falling water. The water has to be directed, retained and drained sensibly. 
Terraces are effective means of such run-off interception, irrespective of whether the fields on the 
terraces are upland, i.e., unirrigated (depending on rainfall only), or irrigated, i.e., connected to a 
system whereby water, in addition to rainfall, is brought to a field by means of a main channel and a 
subsystem of distributary channels. As explained in earlier chapters, upland types of fields are 
generally known in Nepali as bari, while irrigated fields (or rather interconnected systems of fields) 
are known as khet3. In this study, we are concerned with khet, where the term is also used 
interchangeably with the irrigation engineering term ‘command area’ to denote what is always a 
concentration of irrigated, fields connected in a hydrological system where the flow of water is 
controlled.  
Yoder, in his 1984 description of the process of constructing irrigated terraces in the hills of Nepal 
captures the challenges associated with steep terrain and water control: 
“The most striking feature of irrigated agriculture in the hills is the terraced fields. To grow 
flooded rice, fields must be levelled and bunds build to hold the water. Tremendous labour 
has gone into reshaping the hill slopes into bunded terraces. This work is usually done by an 
individual cultivator’s family, although a wealthy landowner may hire labour or have it done 
                                                 
2 According to farmers in Thini, the southernmost of the three communities studied in Mustang. 
3 Aubriot (2000) defines khet, in the context of the hills, as a field planted with wet rice at least once a year. Martin and 
Yoder (1988b) define khet as fields that have been terraced for the cultivation of flooded rice. However, in my 
experience, farmers refer to khet as fields that are usually, but not always terraced, it depends on the slope. Because of 
this and because the current study also deals with irrigation in the mountains, where rice is not grown (but where 
farmers also refer to their irrigated fields as khet), I prefer the latter, broader definition of khet that is based on a 
farmer’s perception of what constitutes khet land. 
 102
on contract. In the past, corvee labour may have been the major input for the construction of 
terraces. Terrace building usually does not begin until the irrigation channel is complete and 
it is certain that it will operate. Then year by year the terraces are built as labour is available. 
Expansion continues to the extent that there is enough water to irrigate or until all the land 
available to those who have the right to use the irrigation water has been converted into 
terraces. The terraces are built by constructing a rock or earth wall and then cutting away at 
the slope to make a level platform. If the hill is steep, terraces must be narrow. The soil type 
determines to a great extent the slope of the outer wall of the terrace. It is made as steep as 
possible to minimize the amount of land used by the wall and bund, but if it is too steep it 
may break when it is flooded” (in Benjamin and Shivakoti 2002). 
The process for gaining access to and controlling irrigation water described above was, as 
mentioned in chapter 5, introduced to the hills of the Dhaulagiri Zone by Parbatiya or Hindu groups  
as a technology for growing wet (paddy)4, rice. In that sense, irrigation is intimately associated with 
agrarian change and agricultural development in Nepal (Pradhan et al. 1987), as its introduction 
heralded intensification of agricultural production, along the lines of Boserup’s (1965) observations 
that, for populations dependent on agriculture, intensification tends to take place in response to 
population growth. In both the hill and the mountain communities, many of which are characterized 
by food insecurity, a larger degree of certainty to water supplies is also closely related to a constant 
struggle to minimize risks in an unpredictable environment.  
The history of irrigation in the mountains is not particularly well described; however, it may be 
assumed that irrigation (although obviously not wet rice technology, as rice cannot be grown at this 
altitude) has been a feature in even early-recorded settlements5 in the arid environment. 
Accordingly, in addition to improved water supply certainty and risk minimization—factors that 
apply to both hills and mountains—the fact that irrigation is an input without which agriculture is 
largely impossible is an added dimension for farmers in the mountains. The main characteristics of 
the study’s irrigation systems are summarized in table 7 below. 
                                                 
4 Originally a Malay word (padi) I use the terms paddy rice and wet rice interchangeably 
5 Huttel 1994 (in Vinding 1998) reports that people in the historic settlement of Khalun were engaged in farming around 
the 10th century. Considering the arid nature of the area, it is difficult to imagine, then as today, farming without some 
irrigation. 
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Table 7 
Basic Characteristics of Irrigation Systems, 2004 
Community  Altitude (m) Channel Length 
(m) 
Command Area 
Size (ha) 
Age of System 
Amalachaur 1100 1200 35 100+ 
Arjewa 1000 500 20 n.a. 
Kurgha 1100 3250 80 71 
Pakuwa 1200 3500 55 25 
Lampata 900 1500 30 41 
Pipalbot 1100 2500 31 100+ 
Thini 3000 3200 93 100+ 
Tiri 3000 700 11 100+ 
Khinga 3450 2700 45 200 
Sources: Cross-sectional Survey 2004, Key Informant’s Survey 2004 
All the systems accounted for in table 7 are small-scale6, ranging from the 11-ha command area of 
Tiri to the relatively large 93-ha command area of Thini. In official terms, all systems belong within 
the category of farmer-managed irrigation systems as opposed to agency-managed irrigation 
systems, the latter typically being large scale, and developed and managed in Nepal by the 
government (within the last 4-5 decades) and usually located in the terai. Most farmer managed 
irrigation systems in Nepal are characterized by diversion structures7 at the intakes to the irrigation 
channels that are temporary (and often washed away during floods after which they are repaired 
again), and earthen channels that may be prone to seepage. However, following DIDP 
rehabilitation, all the above systems are characterized by more permanent diversion structures and 
cement-lined channels. 
7.3 Irrigation and the Agricultural Cycle 
While irrigation is crucial for any agricultural production under the temperate and arid conditions of 
the mountains, the main direct benefit of irrigation to farmers in the subtropical hills of Nepal is 
higher and less variable yields per unit of land, particularly as regards wet rice, but, also in the case 
of other crops (see, for example, Angood et al. 2002, Martens 1989, for ‘with’ and ‘without’ 
situations). Another direct advantage (see chapter 8) is the ability to cultivate additional crops over 
the year. This beneficial role of irrigation has to be understood in the context of the agricultural 
cycles of the hill and mountain areas, respectively. 
                                                 
6 In official terms, an irrigation system in the hills with a command area of less than 500 ha is classified as small-scale. 
7 I.e., the structures that divert water away from the river into the irrigation channel (also known as the headworks at the 
intake) or structures that divert water from one channel onto another (such as weirs). 
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The agricultural cycle as practiced in the six hill irrigation systems, although in varying mixes, is 
shown in table 8 below. Natural conditions for irrigated agriculture are quite uniform. The 
conventional irrigated cropping regime that consists of maize, rice and wheat is divided into three 
seasons: pre-monsoon, monsoon and winter. Taking the pre-monsoon season as a point of 
departure, maize is usually sown in March–April. The maize may be irrigated at the time of sowing 
to facilitate germination, but this is usually not required because the first thundershowers, occurring 
as the heat builds up, have moistened the ground; furthermore, in the far reaches (the ‘tail-ends’) of 
many systems, irrigation during this season is not possible, owing partly to limited stocks of 
irrigation water after months of dry weather. The maize is harvested in June–July. In a few systems, 
or parts of systems where water is plentiful, spring rice (also known as early paddy) is planted and 
transplanted in March, instead of maize8. More commonly, however, while the maize ripens on the 
fields, rice is planted in small beds that allow for careful water control at a time when irrigation 
water is often in short supply. 
In mid-June when the monsoon rains set in, the maize (or sometimes the early paddy) has been 
harvested, the soil has been prepared (by men) and flooded, and the rice is transplanted (by 
women). While sometimes rainwater may suffice, supplementary irrigation water normally has to 
be distributed during what is by far the busiest period in the annual agricultural cycle. The monsoon 
usually ceases by later September/early October, and the rice is harvested in October-November. 
The period September to November when the rice ripens could be termed the post-monsoon season, 
but because additional water or other inputs are not required it is not considered an agricultural 
season, but rather a ‘slack period’; owing to the number of religious festivals, it is also referred to as 
the ‘festival season’. Following ploughing and the application of manure, wheat is planted for the 
winter season that starts in November/December, and may require several rounds of irrigation, 
particularly if the January rains fail. When the wheat is harvested in March, the winter season, and 
the agricultural cycle as depicted here, is complete.  
                                                 
8 Early rice is a risk-prone crop and, therefore, not universal in the systems. It may be destroyed by hail, or water 
supplies may become insufficient. On the other hand, farmers who have opted to plant some early rice report that the 
market premium is fairly high. 
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Table 8 
Agricultural Cycle in the Six Hill Systems, 2004 
Crop Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Rice (main)             
Rice (early)             
Wheat             
Maize             
Tomatoes             
Potato             
Cauliflower             
Cabbage             
Oilseeds              
Sources: Cross-sectional Survey 2004 and Key Informant’s Survey 2004. Note: Maximum growing periods. 
Possibly as an outcome of national ambitions to become self-sufficient in foodstuffs (particularly 
rice), hill cropping regimes are often depicted in ‘productivist’ terms (see Wilson and Rigg 2003, 
also section 8.3) as if they only consisted of staples. In reality, even if staple crops dominate in 
terms of area, the cropping picture has been quite diverse for some time, and has become even more 
so in recent years, as discussed in the context of economic linkages in chapters 5 and cropping 
diversification in chapters 8 and 9. Hence, in addition to the main crops, the pre-monsoon crops 
include tomatoes and oilseeds, and the winter crops include potato, cauliflower and cabbage, as well 
as minor vegetables; all of which are in high demand in both local and external markets.  
As illustrated in table 9, the agricultural cycle in the three mountain systems is distinctly different 
from that in the hills, but no less complex. The relatively long cropping periods mean that there are 
only two cropping seasons, summer and winter. The dominant regime consists of maize (often 
intercropped with beans) and buckwheat, as summer crops, sown in July and harvested in October. 
Naked barley (used for making alcohol and as a staple), hull barley (animal fodder) and 
occasionally wheat is sown in October/November and harvested in the spring. In the early 1990s, 
buckwheat was the dominant staple in the area but, by 2004, it had given way to maize as the 
dominant summer crop. Farmer-stated reasons for this regime change include the following: rice, 
imported from the south, has increasingly become a part of daily meals, so the demand for 
buckwheat has decreased; maize is less vulnerable to disease than buckwheat; maize has more uses 
than buckwheat; and maize cob can be consumed by both humans and animals, and the leaves and 
stems can be used for fodder.  
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Table 9 
Agricultural Cycle in the Three Mountain Systems, 2004 
Crop Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Maize             
Buckwheat             
Beans             
Naked barley             
Hull barley             
Wheat             
Potatoes             
Sources: Cross-sectional Survey 2004; Key Informants Survey 2004 and Vinding 1998. Note: Maximum growing 
periods. 
As is also the case in the hills, the cropping portfolio in all systems (but particularly in Thini, 
located close to the administrative centre of Jomsom) has diversified over the years. The picture in 
2004 is shown in table 9: in summer various vegetables (including radish, cauliflower and cabbage) 
are increasingly grown in response to local demand, as discussed in section 4.6.2. Following 
harvests, prior to sowing either winter or summer crops, the land is always irrigated. 
As in the hills, the most critical period for crops in the mountain systems is in the spring months 
when rising temperatures and high winds combine to increase levels of evapotranspiration, i.e., the 
combined loss of moisture from plants and soils. The winter crops are irrigated up to six times 
during this period. As irrigation sources are augmented by snowmelt at higher altitudes, water 
supply is usually not a problem at this time of year, but floods may damage irrigation structures. 
The summer crops require similar frequencies of irrigation and, in the case of Tiri, where the source 
of irrigation water is a high-altitude lake, this sometimes causes problems if winter precipitation has 
been low.  
7.4 The Workings of the Irrigation Systems 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Martin and Yoder’s work is central in the literature 
that has drawn attention to the indigenous organization of irrigation, and has thereby contributed to 
their central place in rural development planning. In particular, their ‘Irrigation System Activities 
Matrix’9 (Martin and Yoder, 1988b, Pradhan et al. 1987; see also Uphoff et al. 1985, Pradhan 1989, 
Ostrom et al. 1992) is a useful model for analysing the complexity associated with activities internal 
to irrigation systems, and the interactions between activities. The matrix may be seen as depicting 
the irrigation institution, with its different levels of activities constituting different institutional 
scales, and may, as such, be seen as specifying Ostrom’s (1992) concept of rules-in-use or working 
rules. Although it may be seen as a generic model, it is based on (early 1980s) empirical research in 
the hills of Nepal in the Western Development Region, south of the Dhaulagiri Zone. Hence the 
                                                 
9 The matrix is referred to as the ‘Yoder Matrix’ by Ostrom et al. 1992. 
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concepts involved are particularly applicable in the context of this investigation. The matrix is 
shown below. 
Figure 2 
Irrigation System Matrix 
Decision making 
A
llo
ca
tio
n 
 
Irrigation management is explained as consisting of three interrelated level of activities. Starting 
from the bottom, one level (or set) of activities concerns the water which must be acquired 
(channelled), allocated, distributed and, particularly during the monsoon when there may be excess 
water, drained. A second level of activities relates to the physical system, particularly the operation 
and maintenance of physical structures to acquire and control water. A third level of activities 
focuses on organizational management activities, such as decision-making, resource mobilization, 
communication, and conflict management. Obviously, all these levels are interrelated, and the 
matrix illustrates the interactions, such as the need for the organizational level to decide how to 
operate the physical systems in order to distribute the water. The matrix is particularly illustrative 
because it is very comprehensive; each box is a potentially important interaction. It follows from 
this that not all activities are important in all systems and, in many cases, entire blocks of 
interaction boxes are not important for particular systems; the relative importance of activities in 
particular locations is reflected in the activity portfolio of individual irrigation management 
institutions. These portfolios, as this and forthcoming chapters will show, vary substantially. 
The matrix will conceptually inform and structure the analysis of activities internal to the workings 
of the irrigation systems in the remaining part of this chapter and partly in the next chapter as well. 
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However, as will be suggested in the following, the model will be nuanced somewhat by creating a 
clearer conceptual separation between, on the one hand, water allocation as a historically rooted, 
combined relational and structural access mechanism, and, on the other hand, distribution, operation 
and maintenance as the basis of irrigation organization and management. 
7.5  Conceptualizing the Dynamics of Water Allocation and Access to Irrigation 
Water allocation is basically about entitlements of water to individual farmers from an irrigation 
system. In the first level of Martin and Yoder’s model and in much of the irrigation literature in 
general, these entitlements tend to be presented merely as operational rules for assigning the water 
to which a farmer is entitled. It may be seen to have two dimensions: one dimension concerns the 
quantitative allocation of water, i.e., the amounts, the timing. As depicted in the Martin and Yoder 
model, allocation in this sense is closely linked to distribution, i.e., it is understood as the 
implementation of allocation principles. The second dimension of allocation is not depicted in 
model, but concerns the wider circumstances surrounding access to irrigation, i.e., it concerns the 
distinction between farmers or fields with access to irrigation and those without access (Pradhan 
1989) as well as intra-system access to irrigation water. 
In the following, I will discuss mainly the access dimensions of water allocation. Conceptually, the 
point of departure is to see property rights, chiefly land rights as a proxy for water rights. Therefore, 
water allocation should be understood as more than operational rules, as it is based on access to land 
as private property. This makes water allocation a fundamental mechanism for gaining access to the 
benefit streams of irrigation resources as a common property resource. The proxy function of land 
rights has several implications. One is the exclusion problematic associated with the spatial 
dimension of gaining access to the benefits of irrigation. In the hills of Nepal, this problematic 
compounds the targeting of irrigation to benefit the poorest segments of society, as described earlier 
in its historical context of ethnic geography and elevation.  
The problematic is central to understanding why, as noted in a 1994 National Planning Commission 
review of irrigation policies in Nepal, “irrigation development as yet has rarely been targeted to 
directly benefit the poor” (National Planning Commission 1994:46) and the equity concerns voiced 
in the context of implementing the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project (see section 5.8). In 
addition to the equity problematic vis-à-vis external access to irrigation resources, notions related to 
access are important for understanding how water is distributed within (i.e., intra-system access) the 
irrigation systems. Just as land rights are a proxy for water rights, the spatial distribution of land 
matters: access to more valuable, advantageously located land may be seen to be associated with 
access (distribution) to water within the irrigation system, and probably system productivity, i.e., 
the so-called ‘tail-end problem’, a central concept in the context of irrigation. The ‘problem’ refers 
to the fact that farmers in the head-reaches of a khet and/or (depending on the design of the system) 
farmers with fields close to the channel will often have access to water earlier than farmers at the 
end-reaches of the khet; water in the main channel as well as the distribution channels may not only 
reach tail-end farmers rather late, but it may also become reduced substantially in quantitative 
terms.  
So we know that the historical process of gaining access to irrigation water in the hills of Nepal 
involved the settlement by Hindu groups in valleys and other suitable low-altitude places; access 
that was probably mediated by possession of the required technology for wet rice cultivation. We 
also obtain an idea of how that technology is applied to terracing as a central feature of an irrigation 
system, and of the labour investments required, when we look at Yoder’s description (see section 
7.2) of terrace construction. However, the social dynamics of gaining access to irrigation resources, 
as they have been (and no doubt continue to be) played out in the course of developing the systems 
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dealt with in this study, have not been investigated in detail, neither in the documentation from the 
1990s nor in the 2004/05 investigations10. Therefore, clues about the processes and dynamics need 
to be obtained from elsewhere. 
Pradhan (1993), in a study of the process of extending a hill irrigation system in Palpa District 
(south of the Dhaulagiri Zone), provides an example of such dynamics, the principles of which 
appear reasonably applicable to elsewhere. He explains that property rights and relations such as 
water rights were related to pioneer investments in construction, i.e., that such rights were basically 
a function of groups of landed farmers: 
“… who in each sub-command acquired water rights by virtue of having invested in the 
system through labour, cash payments, and/or agreeing to future and continuing re-
investments. These sub-commands were physically linked to one another through the fact 
that they drew water from the same intake and made use of a single canal. However, that 
physical linkage must be seen as the outcome, not the cause of the property structure that 
underlies it. These property rights, especially water rights, had been negotiated over time 
among the different groups thus creating and maintaining a common group of users, 
organized in a hierarchy of senior and junior rights holders” (1993:9,10).  
In Pradhan’s example, social relations relate mainly to a relatively recent case of groups of farmers 
vis-à-vis other groups who make claims on water. As such, it is an example of a mechanism of 
access to a physical resource, which, as Berry reminds us, partly depends on the ability to negotiate 
successfully, something which involves investment “in the means of negotiation as well as the 
means of production per se” (1993:15). Thus, the investment in access—as suggested historically 
by the ethnic geography of irrigation as well as Pradhan’s example—is likely to depend on social 
relations, not least patronage and social identity, which in the hills appear to be closely related with 
caste and ethnicity. Patronage mechanisms of access, it may be speculated, may also be important 
when irrigation systems are developed at the initiative of (and with the cost borne by) a wealthy 
individual, as was the case in Kurgha, or with a heavy government component, as was the case of 
Pakuwa (see section 6.2.2), and even when irrigation systems have been rehabilitated with the 
assistance of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project.  
The farmers in this particular location had developed a public record of water rights, which included 
the stipulation that “in the canal, water was common property whose control and use was governed 
at the community of users’ level. It became individual property when it entered a user’s field” 
(Pradhan 1993:10). In irrigation systems, these fields, contrary to other common property regimes 
such as those associated with forests or grazing lands, are practically always private property, while 
the water and its conduits constitute the communal element. These private and common property 
rights combined mean, as Pradhan puts it, that “property rights and relations determine who gets 
what and how much: it is an instrument of acquisition, distribution and alienation” (1993:4). This 
‘political economy’ of water allocation or rotation principles to the private plots in the irrigation 
system explains why allocation in proportion to landholding size, combined with certain time limits, 
is the most common system in the hills (Martin and Yoder 1988b), including the hill systems of this 
study. 
                                                 
10 What was known at the time of Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project intervention, however, was the ownership 
pattern within the command area of the irrigation system that requested rehabilitation assistance. Farmers were, as part 
of the application process, requested to come up with a list of landholdings (specifying name and landholding size). The 
list was then verified with the local land registration office. It would have been interesting to see if ownership patterns 
changed as the land became more valuable with improved irrigation. 
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7.6  Water Distribution 
With respect to the practical distribution of water, allocation in proportion to landholding size 
naturally implies (1) that different sizes of plots receive different amounts of water, and (2) 
irrigation is by turns in a rotational water distribution system, whereby water is directed to blocks of 
adjoining fields, located along secondary channels. The sequence of these turns has not been 
investigated in the hill irrigation systems under study11; hence we know very little about the social 
dynamics at play in the process of arriving at a schedule, but it seems appropriate to assume that 
powers to negotiate and access to authority, defined in whatever way, would matter to some extent. 
What we do know though, is that adherence to the schedule is considered very important during the 
monsoon period; and that, in most systems, caretakers (called chowkidar in the hills and katuwal in 
the mountains) are employed to monitor the flow of water and see that gates are opened and closed, 
and that proportioning weirs (saacho) are in place to divert a proportionate flow, calculated on the 
basis of allocations, to specific sections of the command area.  
Reflecting the diversity in the organization of water management in Nepal, the means of 
distribution in the cases of this study show considerable variation, as illustrated in table 10 below. 
In one system (Kurgha), members of the same family that financed the original irrigation system 
assume these responsibilities voluntarily. In Arjewa, there is no caretaker and water is obtained on a 
first-come, first-served basis (something that normally reflects an abundance of water, but which in 
this case probably reflects institutional erosion combined with the physical nature of water delivery; 
see section 6.2.2). In Pipalbot, where no caretaker is employed either, an on-demand system is 
practiced in the water abundant head-reaches of the khet, while a scheduled system is practiced in 
the water-scarce tail-end of the khet. However, with these two exceptions, water distribution 
schedules—reflecting the urgency of water control during the monsoon period—are usually adhered 
to rigorously. During the winter and pre-monsoon seasons when the more extensive (in terms of 
labour input and timing) wheat and maize crops are irrigated, distribution is less regulated, and 
usually contains elements of on-demand.  
While also based on landholding size and rotation, the water distribution methods in the three 
mountain irrigation systems differ substantially from those in the hills. Water is distributed 
randomly to individual farmers based on water shares that, as in the hills, reflect landholding size 
but, unlike the hills, have provisions for differential allocation for different crops, with cereal crops 
receiving the highest priority. While small variations exist among the systems, the following 
summarizes the general workings of the method. Small farmers receive one share per 28-day cycle, 
whereas larger farmers with up to 15 ropani receive three shares per 28-day cycle. A share 
corresponds to a specific date within the cycle—decided upon by means of a lottery—on which 
individual or groups of households are allowed to irrigate their fields.  
An actual lottery, a public and fairly lively affair participated in by all households, was observed in 
the spring of 2004 in Tiri; however, methods vary between the systems, and I was told that in Thini 
the lottery is more of an administrative procedure. In the small system of Tiri, on the given date 
‘won’ in the lottery, it is the farmers’ responsibility to distribute water to their own fields, and to 
ensure that gates are closed upon completion. In the larger systems of Thini and Khinga, there is 
also a strong element of individual responsibility to adhere to the schedule, but full-time caretakers 
appear to monitor distribution closely in all seasons. The employment of a number of full-time 
                                                 
11 For a good account of the technicalities involved in a rotational system in Nepal (Arghakanchi District) see Aubriot 
2000. 
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caretakers in the mountains reflects the complex and multipurpose nature of resource management 
(see section 7.8) 
It appears that the significance of the lottery system of the mountains is that, compared with the 
distribution systems of the hills (based as they are on taking turns according to a pre-defined, 
somehow negotiated system), water is relatively equally distributed across the khet with reduced 
room for controlling access to irrigation water through access to authority. This may help reduce the 
so-called tail-end problem, explained in section 7.5. This problem is often perceived in irrigation 
literature as mainly technical or organizational. Sometimes technical problems (such as water 
scarcity in relation to command area size) are indeed an important part of the problem. However, as 
also suggested in section 7.5, tail-end problems are—like most resource utilization problems—often 
multi-causal and interrelated with not only the general social dynamics associated with water 
allocation and distribution but also economic dynamics. Problems may, for instance, be 
compounded if head-reach farmers intensify production and start producing early rice or vegetables, 
as these crops are more water-consuming than those in conventional cropping regimes. This issue is 
dealt with in more detail in sections 8 and 9. Suffice it to say here that it appears that water 
distribution in the hills is becoming less and less regulated during the winter and pre-monsoon 
seasons as vegetable crops are tending to gain in prominence. Finally, it needs to be mentioned that 
water distribution may also be sometimes influenced by political events. Round-the-clock irrigation 
turns in Thini, for instance, were until recently disturbed by a night-time curfew aimed at 
preventing movement by Maoist insurgents. Defiance by those who tried to catch their irrigation 
turns at night and therefore move about the khet with lamps was met with warning shots from the 
army camp across the valley. 
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Table 10 
Water Distribution Methods in Study Communities 
Community System of Distribution Means of Distribution 
Pakuwa Time-bound turns/fixed rotation in monsoon. 
During other seasons, water is acquired on-
demand. 
Caretaker employed for three months during the 
monsoon season. Maintains schedules, operates 
gates, weirs, etc. Paid Nepali Rupees 2000 per 
month, collected from all households. 
Kurgha Time-bound turns/fixed rotation in monsoon. 
Committee to be consulted during other seasons. 
Handled by the grandson and family of the 
original benefactors of the system voluntarily. 
Maintain schedules, operates gates, weirs, etc.  
Lampata Time-bound turns/fixed rotation in monsoon. 
During other seasons, water acquired on-
demand. 
Caretaker employed for five months from June 
to October. Maintains schedules, operates gates, 
weirs, etc. Paid 4 mana* of rice per ropani** of 
land, collected from all households. 
Amalachaur Time-bound turns/fixed rotation in monsoon. 
During other seasons, water acquired on-
demand. 
Caretaker employed for three months during the 
monsoon season. Maintains schedules, operates 
gates, weirs, etc. Paid 2–4 mana of rice paid per 
hal***, depending on the amount of water 
required at certain periods. 
Arjewa On-demand in all seasons. No caretaker employed. During the monsoon, 
farmers use individual sources of water (springs, 
rivulets). During winter and spring, farmers line 
up to use water collected in a tank and released 
every 12 hours. 
Pipalbot  Time-bound turns/fixed rotation during 
monsoon in the tail-end of the system, on-
demand in other seasons. Water on-demand in 
head-reaches in all seasons. 
No caretaker employed. In tail-end, ‘trusted’ 
farmers maintain schedules and operate 
structures. In head-reaches, farmers, acquiring 
water at any given time, operate the system. 
Thini Differentiated (by landholding size) water 
shares/lottery. 
Households take turns to supply eight caretakers 
employed permanently at any given time. Under 
supervision of two head caretakers (who monitor 
schedules), operate gates, weirs, etc., at a salary 
of Nepali Rupees 15,000 each per year. 
Tiri Differentiated (by landholding size) water 
shares/lottery. 
Households take turns supplying two caretakers 
employed permanently at any given time 
Caretakers conduct routine maintenance and 
monitor schedules, farmers themselves operate 
structures on given dates. Salaries undisclosed. 
Khinga Differentiated (by landholding size) water 
shares/lottery. 
Households take turns supplying four caretakers 
employed permanently at any given time, who 
monitor schedules, and operate structures. 
Salaries undisclosed. 
Source: Cross-sectional Survey 2004.  
Notes: *A volumetric measure, roughly 0.5 l; ** 0.05 ha; ***0.07 ha (the area that an ox ploughs in a day). 
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7.7  Maintenance of Irrigation Systems 
The maintenance of physical structures to acquire and control water is an important aspect of 
irrigation system management. Maintenance activities in both the hill and mountains systems are 
closely related to the agricultural cycle, and a distinction should be made between regular and 
emergency maintenance. Both require a collective labour effort, and while the number of times that 
farmers need to carry out emergency works is unpredictable, regular, collective maintenance efforts 
are required, in most systems, twice a year, in winter and in summer.  
In the hills, the most intense periods for regular maintenance are the pre-monsoon and monsoon 
seasons. In the pre-monsoon season in May/June, main channels are cleaned of debris and mud 
collectively and secondary channels are cleaned individually, and head-works and other structures 
repaired (collectively) if damaged. It is fairly crucial that this happens at the right time so that 
sufficient water supplies are ensured for the preparation of seedbeds for rice. Additionally, during 
the monsoon period, the canal is patrolled regularly either by the employed caretakers who also 
distribute water (see table 10 above) or by farmers. These persons usually carry out minor repairs. 
Particularly in ecologically fragile systems, regular preventive maintenance and early detection of 
problems is important, if water is to be kept flowing. 
In the mountain systems, the full-time caretakers carry out minor maintenance activities throughout 
the year on a regular basis. As in the hills, collective maintenance works take place twice a year. 
The most thorough and intense operation is in spring and summer (May–June), when farmers need 
to be able take advantage of the warm weather in a timely manner. Hence, regular, collective 
maintenance is carried out before the irrigation that takes place prior to the sowing of the summer 
crops. The environment is fairly fragile, and the channels of Thini and Khinga carry a great deal of 
silt, which has to be removed. Debris, typically rocks, is removed regularly by the caretakers. In 
Tiri, where water is collected in a tank through pipes, regular maintenance involves cleaning of silt 
from the tank as well as opening of checkboxes. 
Emergency maintenance activities are hard to avoid, although regular maintenance routines, 
particularly the cleaning of culverts12, mean that some problems are detected early. Unlike in the 
hills, the summer period in the mountains does not warrant additional vigilance, as rainfall is 
limited. However, caretakers increase patrols for detecting problems in the winter, when ice and 
snow may block channels, and in the spring, when melting snow at high altitudes causes rivers to 
swell and subsequently damage intake structures. The latter problems are particularly felt in Thini 
and in Khinga, where relatively large river bodies feed the irrigation systems. Although annual 
precipitation in the mountains is less than 200 mm per annum, freak rainfall, sudden snowmelt and 
resultant floods sometimes lead to the breaking of irrigation dikes and the deposit of unproductive, 
sandy silt in the khet. In both the hill and mountain systems, channels often pass through fragile 
sections that are prone to landslides. This is a particularly severe problem in Khinga, Kurgha, 
Amalachaur and Lampata, where certain sections tend to sink with resultant high requirements for 
labour inputs. During the monsoon, landslides—occurring as part of both natural processes and 
because of human interference—are a generic problem in the hills that occur on all scales. Many 
irrigation systems experience minor landslides at some point during the rains. 
The formal basis for resource mobilization for maintenance differs between the studied hill and 
mountain systems. The basis for labour contributions to regular maintenance in all hill systems is, in 
principle, that each household should commit labour proportional to landholding size, but in 
                                                 
12 A transverse drain that enables surface water to pass above the irrigation channel. 
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practice each household is expected to send at least one member (the head of household or a 
representative) to this scheduled event. Some households, presumably the larger ones, claim to send 
more than one. Some respondents perceive attendance as voluntary, and others complain that 
defaulting is common, although no one interviewed admits to this on the part of their own 
household.  
For emergency and structural damage, all who are present in the community at the given moment 
are expected to join, but in practice the number of people who turn up depends on the scale and 
location of the problem; for minor damage to the channel, for instance, the farmers who are 
immediately affected will join hands in fixing the problem. The caretaker usually alerts farmers. 
Provisions for fines do exist but are not actually levied and, in contrast to what is reported from 
elsewhere in the hills, water taxes are not levied either (see, for example, Yoder and Martin 1983). 
Subsequently maintenance funds do not exist in any of the systems. For serious damage, assistance 
is often sought from local authorities for the financing of materials and labour. If funds need to be 
raised in the community, these are generally collected ad hoc, on the basis of landholding size. 
Maintenance systems in the mountains are more structured than in the hills (as exemplified by the 
employment of permanent caretakers). Labour contributions are on the basis of a ‘flat rate’: each 
household has to send at least one able-bodied person between 15–57 years of age, irrespective of 
landholding size or other factors. Abstention leads to fines of Nepali Rupees 100–200 per day, 
which are reportedly levied; however, abstention is not considered to be a problem because 
absentees tend to pay labourers to participate on their behalf. In cases of emergency, caretakers 
inform the irrigation management level (see below), which in turn mobilizes labour from each 
household and maintains records.  
7.8 Organizing it All 
The third level of activities in the Yoder Matrix associated with an irrigation institution concerns 
the level at which decisions are made and enforced. The activities described in the above sections, 
associated with water allocation, distribution, maintenance and mobilization of labour and 
materials, suggest not only a management level but also some degree of embeddedness in 
superjacent governance13 structures. However, the focus here remains on managerial aspects; 
understanding of the irrigation institutions in the context of wider institutional landscapes is dealt 
with in a later section. Again, as may be surmised from the last couple of sections, there is great 
variation with respect to institutional architecture and managerial activities. Martin and Yoder 
(1988) observe that 
“… some irrigation systems have only informal management: everyone uses water 
according to need, with one of the irrigators functioning as a de facto leader when problems 
arise. Other systems exhibit a high level of management intensity and organizational 
structure: leader, secretary and members of a committee are elected; minutes of meetings are 
recorded; written records of members’ water allocation and work attendance, as well as 
accounts of the organization are maintained; fines for missing work are imposed. Between 
                                                 
13 Although sometimes used interchangeably, I define the terms management and governance rather narrowly: 
management is about internal workings and directly operational (planning, organizing, leading, controlling, etc.) 
matters, whereas governance systems connote structures of authority. At the ‘operational’ level, governance connotes 
allocation of resources and coordination of activities in society; it may, in other words, be thought of as the ways in 
which power is exercised.  
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these extremes, there are various systems with more or less complex organizational 
structures” (pp. 86–88 in Aubriot 2000: 267). 
The most complex institutional structures are found in the mountains. In all three Mustang District 
communities, the irrigation resources are governed through multipurpose village councils whose 
responsibility is to organize public works, enforce regulations, manage funds, solve conflicts, 
summon meetings, and impose fines with respect to all physical resource management, including 
irrigation, forestry, grazing, livestock and infrastructure.  
However, even among the Mustang District systems, major differences may be noticed between the 
relatively large village of Thini and the small villages of Tiri and Khinga. Thini and Old Jomsom, 
which share the command area, have two councils, with eight members each, each headed by a 
mukhya14 (village chief) and assisted by one head katuwal (caretaker), three deputy katuwal, two 
secretaries and a treasurer. As mentioned in section 7.6, the head katuwal appears to receive 
NRs 15,000 per annum as remuneration; whether the mukhya and the deputy katuwal receive 
anything is undisclosed. The mukhya are currently elected and the katuwal selected (on the basis of 
merit) for a period of two years, but some years back responsibilities rotated annually (Vinding 
1998). In the context of irrigation, mukhya keep records, maintain irrigation schedules, take 
decisions about maintenance activities, mobilize resources, and mediate in conflicts. A general 
assembly is held annually each spring.  
Partly reflecting scale and thus a lower level of complexity, and partly cultural differences15 
between northern and southern Mustang District, the mukhya leadership concept does not seem to 
apply in Tiri and Khinga, with their 11 and 34 households, respectively. Reportedly the structure is 
more flat, with village assemblies (known as gempa) that are characterized by joint leadership, with 
representation from each household. These assemblies meet at least once a year (Parajuli and 
Sharma 2000), but interviews with villagers give the impression that this happens more frequently, 
and usually in connection with practical activities such as irrigation system maintenance and the 
water distribution lottery already described. The de facto authority with respect to irrigation matters 
in Tiri and Khinga appears to be related with the practical level, and rests with the katuwal. Tiri and 
Khinga have only one katuwal, respectively, a duty that rotates between households every year. 
These katuwal do not seem to receive actual salaries as in Thini, but are possibly compensated in 
kind. In all three villages, the katuwal are responsible for routine maintenance of canals and other 
structures, the organization of routine and emergency works, the collection of fees and fines, etc.  
A variety of cooperative systems for the management of natural resources, particularly forests and 
irrigation, exist in the hill systems (see Pradhan 1989, Yoder 1994). Unlike in the mountains, these 
consist of single-purpose institutions that deal with only one resource at a time. In the case of 
irrigation, the more loosely structured maintenance activities noted in section 7.6 also echo a loser 
structure in general in the hill systems compared with the mountains. On paper, however, all 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project systems have a Farmers’ Irrigation Association of which 
all households with irrigated land are members. The Farmers’ Irrigation Association  is represented 
                                                 
14 The mukhya (also referred to as amali in Bista 2000) were appointed by the central government until the end of the 
Panchayat and were, as tax collectors, quite powerful. One interviewee characterized the Panchayat mukhya as mere 
stooges. For details on the political systems of Mustang see Vinding 1998. In the shared Thini–Jomsom irrigation 
system, the Thini mukhya is superior to the Jomsom mukhya. In the words of the present mukhya, this is “because Thini 
is the older of the two settlements.”  
15 Thini and Tiri are both located in the Baragaun (12 villages area), and are what Vinding (1998) calls ‘culturally 
Tibetan’ (p 27). 
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by a Water Users’ Management Committee16, headed by an adhyakshya (leader), with a treasurer, a 
secretary, and a number of ex officio representatives of block committees (typically head, middle 
and tail sections of the command area).  
This structure (which was also applied in the mountains) was a prescribed part of the Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project package, that in addition to physical rehabilitation intervention, 
included efforts at restructuring ‘traditional’ irrigation organization. The explicit purpose of this 
was to formalize the institutions vis-à-vis a reformed political decentralization framework, thus 
rendering the FIAs legal entities that could be registered with the local authorities (see page xx). 
The current status of these ‘crafted’ irrigation institutions is analysed in more detail in chapter 8. 
Suffice it to say at this point that while all the hill irrigation systems do have identifiable (by other 
farmers) adhyakshya and other people associated with leadership, degrees of management intensity 
vary tremendously from case to case, as already suggested in sections 7.6 and 7.7.  
7.9 Perspectives on the Determinants of Irrigation Organization  
The obvious differences in the way that irrigation organization is structured in mountain and hills, 
respectively, prompts attention to the tendency, within part of the irrigation literature, to explain 
organizational diversity and characteristics in irrigation management through physical determinism 
and related structural factors. Vinding, for instance, somewhat akin to Wittfogel (1957) (inasmuch 
as Wittfogel proposed that irrigation required political institutions, but not in the sense that it also 
required coercion), states in the case of villages in the Pacgau area of Mustang District that  
“… the political organization at the village level is strong in Pacgau because the fields in the 
area are irrigated and the construction, maintenance and operation of the irrigation systems 
require strong political institutions” (1998:283).  
Vinding, elaborating his point, characterizes villages in Pacgau (which includes Thini) as 
democratic because rules are decided upon by voting, and compares them with the 6th century B.C. 
Greek city states. The strong level of organization, he further notices, is necessitated by the 
relatively large size of the villages (Thini itself has more than 100 households). Other observers 
(Furer-Haimendorf 1975, Messerschmidt 1995, Parajuli and Sharma 2000) of mountain 
communities in the same area find that village councils with consensual leadership and high 
accountability, along with strong cooperation from villagers in common property management, are 
critical factors for survival under harsh physical conditions.  
Along similar lines, Cederroth in a study of irrigation in Nepal’s terai, emphasizes the role of the 
physical environment and states that  
“… in cases where the farmers will face great difficulties, and perhaps even starvation 
unless they join forces to prevent it, chances that cooperative institutions will arise are, of 
course, much greater than when this is not the case. All the communal works and all the 
mobilization of labourers which is involved in constructing and maintaining the Rajapur 
irrigation systems would perhaps never have been realized had the natural conditions been 
less severe” (1994:37).  
                                                 
16 The Farmer Irrigation Associations adopted, as part of the ‘package’, bye-laws with provisions related to penalties, 
elections and the representation of women, of which there had to be 20 per cent in the Water User Management 
Committees (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project n.d.). 
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While it is difficult not to agree—as in the case of Mustang District—that sophisticated forms of 
organizing resource management does help under harsh physical conditions, it is more problematic 
to see such conditions as the main determinants of high levels of organization. I note that Cederroth 
talks about chances rather than applying predictive determinism as such, and perhaps cooperation 
would not have emerged in the way that it has without a challenging ecology in his specific case. It 
is not, however, difficult to find examples of highly structured irrigation organization from the 
Balinese subak systems (see Geertz 1980) to some of the more functioning hill irrigation systems 
(see, for example, Aubriot 2000, Martin and Yoder 1988, for informative cases) in Nepal where 
ecological conditions may be described as relatively benign. 
In the case of Rajapur, other issues associated with social relations and entitlements, such as for 
instance the social identity of the (landed) irrigated farmers, their shared interests and the processes 
associated with gaining access to irrigation resources in what is actually one of the most socially 
differentiated areas17 of Nepal, seem hard to ignore as factors that would shape institutional 
structures. Moreover, similar to the weaknesses associated with the tendency in collective action 
thought to explain institutional dynamics as practically self-propelled internal-level processes, 
ecological determinism, though part of the picture, appears rather static.  
Much of the ecological determinism is related to the powerful Malthusian disaster narratives18 that 
also featured prominently in the environmental literature on Nepal in the 1970s and 1980s (see, for 
example, Gurung 1989, MacFarlane 1976, Eckholm 1976). However, the attribution of 
disproportionate explanatory value to the role of population pressure, ecologically harmful practices 
and carrying capacity in relation with organizational characteristics of common property regimes 
(and associated access and rights) and rural natural resource management in general has been 
increasingly challenged over the past decades. This does not mean that ecology should be 
discounted altogether. Mosse (1997) provides a useful example of a multi-factorial explanation that 
includes ecological conditions. In a specific irrigation context, using examples from Tamil Nadu, he 
argues that differences in the way water management is organized reflect both ecological 
characteristics (different soil types) and factors associated with colonial markets, settlement 
patterns, property rights, etc., in a complexity which “has to challenge any oversimplified 
ecological deterministic reading of the pattern of collective action” (1997:495). In the more 
paradigmatic sense, Blaikie (1985), from a political ecology perspective, was among the first to 
draw attention to the politico-economic contexts of natural resource management and degradation in 
rural areas, with some examples from Nepal.  
I will argue in later sections that indeed multi-factorial pictures of the complexity associated with 
the trajectories of irrigation institutions need to include understanding of the historical and 
contemporary basis for the strong resource mobilization dynamics found, for instance, in the 
mountain communities of this study. These dynamics are associated (in addition to ecology) with 
“communities of trust” (Blaikie et al. 1979:211) and shared interests, as manifest in irrigation, 
credit associations (dhikur) and other forms of social relations through which people gain access to 
benefits. Likewise, in both the hills and the mountains, the picture includes both structural and 
                                                 
17 Some of Cederroth’s own data suggest that 45 per cent of the population in Rajapur are landless bonded labourers 
(kamaiya). These labourers work the land of the irrigated farmers (Cederroth 1994).  
18 The ‘Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation’ basically postulated that overpopulation and subsequent 
over-utilization of natural resources in the hills of the Nepal led to soil erosion; the soil eroded from the hills was seen 
as the cause of flooding in the downstream countries such as Bangladesh (see Ives and Messerli 1989 for an early 
refutation of the theory). 
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relational access mechanism associated with ethnic geography, road infrastructure, markets and 
market forces, development projects, and political events. Some of these mechanisms were dealt 
with earlier in this chapter as well as in the regional analysis in chapter 5. 
I will round off this chapter by suggesting that while the physical factor theme appears at different 
levels of explanation and for different purposes in the irrigation literature, Bromley’s (1992) widely 
accepted notion of common property regimes is particularly useful. Oakerson (1992) proposes that 
the management arrangements that surround irrigation and other common property regimes are 
related to the characteristics of the resource in question. As he explains, “collectives select property 
regimes on the basis of their suitability for the resource in question—its variability, its productivity 
and so on” (1992:12). By pointing out that the resource characteristics of, for example, irrigation 
systems necessitate organization and cooperation, he has created clarification regarding 
understanding of the basis of institutions for common property regimes. This addresses, as also 
suggested in chapter 8, the issue at a very useful level of explanation, as it suggests that property 
regimes change in line with their usefulness to specific forms of production. The role of the 
physical attributes will continue as a theme in the following chapter, which will focus on 
performance changes in the political-economic moment. 
 
Chapter 8: Irrigation System Performance Trajectories 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a picture of the current status and the trajectory of the 
irrigation systems in the particular political-economic moment (1990–2005) covered in this over-
time study, as regards performance and efficiency criteria. Understanding the status and how it has 
come about is a prerequisite for investigation of the broader context of factors that may impinge, 
negatively or positively, on irrigation. This chapter marks a shift in the investigative approach from 
that of the (relatively speaking) static mode of describing irrigation systems that characterized the 
preceding chapter to a more dynamic approach involving a temporal dimension. The analysis thus 
constitutes the backdrop for further analysis of the possible factors that affect performance, directly 
or indirectly. The data are drawn mainly from the cross-sectional key-effects monitoring surveys of 
the 1990s and the repeat cross-sectional survey of 20041, which contain mainly quantitative 
questions but also some questions of a qualitative nature. Responses to the latter, meant to 
substantiate the former through assignment of reasons for a yes or a no response, were summarized 
from the questionnaires, and have been sorted into manageable categories. 
The focus will remain at the level of the internal workings of irrigation institutions, i.e., how water 
distribution, operation and maintenance, and related resource mobilization are related to 
performance, as elements that (as established in the previous chapter) form the basis of irrigation 
organization and management along the lines of Martin and Yoder’s irrigation system activities 
matrix. However, as suggested by the nature of the data to be treated in this chapter and the need to 
consider physical factors that may impinge on irrigation performance, that framework will be 
supplemented by Oakerson’s (1992) conceptual and analytical framework for analysis of the 
commons. 
8.2  A Framework for Analysing Performance in the Commons 
The Martin and Yoder framework, while focusing on the internal workings of irrigation institutions, 
sees their form and functions as dependent on the social, economic and physical environment2, with 
emphasis on the latter in the tradition of natural science/geographical approaches. Institutions, in 
line with classical institutionalism, are seen mainly as set-ups that regulate the actions of 
individuals; as ‘rules of the game’, they consist of practices and relationships. They contribute to 
production by facilitating the aggregation of human resources, thus enabling required collective 
management of resources, and may be formalized into, for example, irrigation organizations. This 
more resource-focused approach precedes approaches to the commons that are influenced by new 
institutional economics to some extent. While recognizing, as in the Martin and Yoder framework, 
physical-technological contexts and the regulatory and structuring role of institutions, particularly 
as rules-in-use (Ostrom 1992), the latter approaches tend to emphasize, to a greater extent, 
institutions and their activities as functions of the utility-maximizing behaviour of individuals and 
groups within a rational choice framework (see chapter 2). 
However, both of these related approaches are concerned with organization as key to efficiency in 
irrigation systems, and recognize water distribution and operation and maintenance, in particular, as 
functions that affect agricultural production. Therefore, in combination with indicators related 
                                                 
1 Supplemented by the qualitative key-informants survey 2004. 
2 Not much attention is paid to exactly how these environments influence forms and functions. 
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directly to agricultural output (the raison d’etre of irrigation), these functions constitute key 
indicators of irrigation performance. As the focus in this chapter will be on such performance 
indicators, a useful supplementary framework for systematically analysing performance that is more 
firmly rooted in neoclassical economic thought and associated with common-property school 
approaches than that of Martin and Yoder, i.e., Oakerson’s framework for analysing the commons, 
will be introduced. 
Oakerson describes the framework and its function as: 
“A framework that can be used to collect information about the commons and analyze it 
across a variety of resources and facilities. Such a framework must be specific enough to 
offer guidance in the field, yet general enough to permit application to widely variable 
situations. The trick is to develop concepts that identify key attributes shared broadly by the 
commons in its many manifestations and that take on different values from one 
circumstance to another. This allows a systemic approach to the study of a phenomenon that 
has great variation” (1992:42). 
Figure 3 
A Framework for Analysing the Commons 
Source: Oakerson 1992. 
The above quote and the model, as depicted in figure 3, suggest a fairly versatile framework. 
However, Oakerson suggests, as the point of departure for the model, that the “problems of the 
commons are rooted in constraints given in nature or inherent in available technology” (1992). So 
while physical and technological attributes obviously matter a great deal, as discussed to some 
extent in the previous chapter, it also entails a fairly restrictive framework for analysis, probably 
even more so than that of Martin and Yoder. Then why, in the context of the scope and ambitions of 
the present investigation, apply such a relatively narrow framework? The reason has to do with the 
specific nature, purpose and ambition of particularly the qualitative elements of the over-time data, 
which call for a pragmatic analysis of the commons. 
The background for such an ‘eclectic’ approach is explained in chapter 2, where I also suggest that 
there is indeed a great deal more to the management of common property than collective action 
a 
b 
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c Physical attributes 
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frameworks are capable of capturing. At present, however, the issue is one of the applicability of 
conceptual frameworks to specific data contexts. A great deal of the repeat survey data gathered by 
means of cross-sectional surveys lends itself to and, it may be argued, even necessitate, attempts at 
causal explanation through the forces of variables that may exist independently of external social 
and economic forces. In other words, the data have to be dealt with meaningfully and faithfully. 
The quantitative data in particular entail identification of relatively isolated factors. In combination 
with the analytical concepts of the Martin and Yoder framework, developed as they are in the 
specific empirical context of Nepal, Oakerson’s framework is considered a useful tool for dealing 
with physical and technical factors in the broader analytical sense. Some of these physical and 
technical factors may be considered potential confounders (broadly understood) and, without 
analysis of their importance, the risk of constructing spurious arguments is great. Attention to these 
factors is a prerequisite for subsequent analysis of putative links between broader social, economic 
and institutional factors, and the possible chain of causality that may have influenced the trajectory 
of current irrigation systems. 
The use of Oakerson’s model is not to suggest that complex reality may be reduced to models or 
even mere graphics, but to engage with an analytical and theoretical framework that contributes to 
understanding the irrigation commons in the context of specific empirical data. The model itself 
should, as most other such graphical displays, be considered merely a convenient shorthand attempt 
at depicting complexity. As mentioned in section 3.3, re-studies are prisoners of the past (Blaikie et 
al 2002), and it should be recalled that the 1990s data are monitoring data. The use of Oakerson’s 
framework reflects the specific circumstances and spirit under which the Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project’s monitoring was conceived. These circumstances were characterized by 
diagnostic purposes and concerns with performance and equity in the commons in relation to 
physical and technical factors, rather than holistically understood societal processes and their actors. 
Analysis of the latter indeed requires a much more dynamic framework, in line with the ambitions 
of this thesis to contribute towards such a framework; that framework will be attempted in the 
following chapter.  
The historical-methodological significance of Oakerson’s framework is owing to its role in the early 
days of ‘counter-Hardin’ research into common property regimes that initiated a deluge of case 
study research into the commons, generating empirical evidence of working commons, denoted in a 
somewhat broad-brush manner as the ‘collective action school’ in this thesis. The framework, 
conceived in the early 1980s, was adopted by the Panel on Common Property Resource 
Management in Developing Countries and used to organize a number of case studies at an 
international conference in 1985 under the auspices of the (United States) National Research 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences (Oakerson 1992, Dietz et al. 2002). As Bromley 
explains, the purpose of the said panel was to “determine if indeed there were any reasonably 
successful common property regimes operating in the world” (1992:5).  
The role of the Oakerson framework as a template for documenting common property regimes was 
restated in Bromley’s 1992 collection of common property case studies that originate in the 1985 
workshop. The concepts proposed in this generic, archetype ‘mother of frameworks’ for analysis of 
the commons feature prominently in many of the subsequent collective action or ‘common property 
school’ case studies and models (not least Ostrom 1990, 1992; see also Dietz et al. 2003 for a 
review of approaches). In other words, the framework found resonance in what Nabli and Nugent 
(1989) identify as the strand of new institutional economics, which deals with collective action in 
relation to public or collective goods and common property resources (see chapter 2). This will 
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become evident in the following, where I also draw on the more prominent theorized derivatives of 
the Oakerson framework3, particularly Ostrom’s (1992) notion of institutions as rules-in-use. 
The framework distinguishes between four types of systematically related attributes or variables. 
• Physical attributes and technology 
• Decision-making arrangements 
• Patterns of interaction 
• Outcomes 
Similar to Bromley’s approach to the commons (see section 2.5.1), the physical attributes of the 
resources in question are an important point of departure in describing a commons, but Oakerson 
includes, as a related feature, the technology available and used to obtain the yield (benefits) of the 
resource. These physical and technological attributes (the first variable) determine the degrees to 
which individuals are able to subtract from the resource, i.e., the subtraction limits for deriving joint 
benefits. Similarly, the degree of exclusion-cum-access control that is required in a commons 
depends on the nature of the resource and the technology available, an issue related to allocation, as 
elaborated on in section 7.5. Indivisibility is another function of mainly the physical attributes of the 
resource; for example, common resources such as irrigation water are not easily divided among 
private property holders without impairing their production value. 
The decision-making arrangements (the second variable) demanded by the attributes of the resource 
are understood as the “rules that structure individual and collective choices with respect to the 
commons” (Oakerson 1992:46) in the shape of the discrete institutions which, as Bromley (1992) 
suggests, make up a broad set (again depending on the attributes of the resource) of management 
arrangements which may be referred to as common property regimes. Oakerson sorts decision-
making into three subsets that are nested in one another: firstly, operational rules, which are 
basically rules that serve to “limit user behaviour in the interest of maintaining the yield of the 
commons” (1992:46), akin to Ostrom’s rules-in-use (Ostrom 1992). These operational rules are 
nested in the second subset, i.e., conditions of collective choice. These are the rules that “establish 
conditions of collective choice to allow a group of appropriators to manage their commons” 
(Oakerson 1992:47) in a common property arrangement in which “individuals are no longer entirely 
free to decide for themselves how to make use of the commons, but participate in a process of 
collective choice that sets limits on individual use” (Oakerson 1992:47). This subset is somewhat 
under-theorized in the Oakerson framework, but may be understood as constituting the common 
property governance arrangement, as determined by the attributes of the resource. The rules include 
qualifications for access to the resource (e.g., land in the case of irrigation) within the (informal) 
legal domain of the collective decision-making arrangement.  
The subset has, within the common property school, been further theorized to the extent that it is the 
rules and patterns of behaviour that matter and constitute the common property institution-cum-
organization (see Ostrom 1990). This theorizing has been translated in policy guidance (Stern et al. 
2003) that emphasizes ‘getting the rules right’ and designing them into institutions. In the practical 
irrigation context, the institutions have become known by a variety of names, including self-
                                                 
3 This is not to claim that later theories on the commons are mere derivatives of the Oakerson framework; indeed 
commons scholars such as Ostrom (and Oakerson himself) draw on earlier contributions within institutionalism and 
collective action. The Oakerson framework, however, appears to somewhat paradigmatic in the discursive context of 
placing local natural resource management institutions on the agenda of policy options for managing natural resources. 
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governing irrigation systems (Ostrom 1992), farmers’ irrigation associations (see International 
Labour Organisation 1995 for a procedural manual), etc. Empirically, this theorizing is, as 
mentioned earlier, rooted in irrigation experiences (see Ostrom 1990, 1992, Ostrom et al. 1992, 
Ostrom 2002) and has, in many irrigation policies, led to the realization that “without effective 
institutional arrangements that sustain a pattern of productive working relationships, increasing the 
amount of physical investment alone is insufficient for improving irrigation performance” (Lam 
1998:137). 
The third and final subset in which conditions of collective choice are nested is that of external 
arrangements, chiefly “decision structures outside the immediate group that that impinge on how 
the commons is organized and used” (Oakerson 1992:46). I consider this subset to refer to what is 
now more commonly known as formal legislative frameworks, and the presumed ‘nestedness’ of 
common property institutions within such frameworks to refer to the notion of legal pluralism, 
defined as the “coexistence and interaction of different legal orders in a social field” (Pradhan and 
Pradhan 2000:202). The neoclassical flavour of the Oakerson framework is apparent in the 
assumption that ‘patterns of interaction’ (the third variable) emerge from the behaviour of utility-
maximizing individuals, who are seen to make rational choices, given the physical attributes of the 
resource, the technology and the regulating governance arrangements. The choices are based on 
perceptions of costs and benefits, and result in incentives to act or not to act.  
In this context, two contrasting strategies on the part of individuals are central to interactions (or 
lack of the same) in the commons, and to understanding of cooperative endeavours in general: one 
strategy is that of reciprocity (i.e., the interaction of individuals who jointly contribute to a common 
effort)—a notion that is at the heart of collective action theory. Reciprocity is made challenging by 
the fact that the immediate quid pro quo (‘something for something’) relations that are seen to 
regulate exchange relationships4 in other contexts, depend, in the case of the commons, on what 
Oakerson calls “mutual expectations of future positive performance” (1992:50). Refining this point, 
Ostrom et al. have later, with trademark emphasis on the role of rules, suggested that incentives are 
more than quid pro quo rationality:  
“… incentives are more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the positive and 
negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular 
actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context” (1993:8, 
quoted in Berthelsen 1997).  
The other strategy, or choice, is to free-ride while others proceed with collective efforts. The 
immediately undermining effects of a free-riding strategy depend, largely, on the subtractiveness of 
the individual’s use of the commons, i.e., the extent to which the commons can cope as a physical 
system with free-riders. Such behaviour erodes reciprocity-cum-collective action, and the challenge 
at the decision-making level is to “sustain mutual choices of cooperative strategies among a 
sufficient number to sustain the yield of the commons” (Oakerson 1992:50). Exactly how to go 
about doing that has preoccupied a number of collective action scholars, and has been most 
powerfully theorized by Ostrom and expressed in her already mentioned emphasis on institutions as 
rules. These rules are not only key to understanding how the commons work, but commons may 
also be made to work through appropriate rules (see Ostrom 1990, 1992, Vermillion 2001, see also 
section 2.3.1).  
                                                 
4 Oakerson explains that “while exchange is based on ex ante conditions (that is an exchange does not occur until certain 
conditions are met on both sides), reciprocity is subject to ex post conditions (i.e., to conditions that are met following 
one’s contribution to a joint undertaking) (1992:50). 
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Outcomes (the fourth and final variable) are largely the result of the ‘filtering’ that stems from 
patterns of interaction (except when they constitute ‘hard constraints’; see below). Oakerson applies 
two sets of related criteria in this context, efficiency and equity. Efficiency relates to evaluative 
criteria that are translated into operational measures. These measures, in the case of irrigation 
systems and the data generated in this survey, include yields and cropping intensity, as dealt with in 
the succeeding section. Efficiency relates to a number of factors, including the optimal rates 
indicated by the technical and physical attributes of the resource; both aggregate overuse and 
underutilization suggest inefficiency. In Oakerson’s words “inefficiency of the commons is apt to 
be closely associated with inequity” (1992:52). The concern relates to inequities in distributional 
terms, such as whether individuals are “getting a reasonable and fair return on their contribution to 
collective undertaking that regulates behaviour” (1992:52). As Oakerson explains, asymmetries 
aggravate equity problems by creating opportunities for some at the expense of others, and the 
bottom line is that inequities may lead to the collapse of reciprocity as a central mechanism in 
collective action. Although not mentioned by Oakerson in this general model, equity as an 
efficiency concern in irrigation is closely related to the notion of the tail-end problem (see section 
7.5). 
The causal relationships in the model are fairly self-explanatory, but with reference to the particular 
applicability of the model for the type of data to be analysed in this chapter, solid line ‘c’ demands 
special mention. This is because physical and technological attributes are considered ‘hard 
constraints’ or factors, which, while also affecting patterns of interaction, have the potential to 
affect outcomes directly and independently of “human choice and interaction” (Oakerson 1992:52). 
Examples of this will become evident in the analysis where I refer to, for example, natural 
calamities as confounding events. 
Before going ahead with the analysis it needs to be mentioned that in line with the inductive, case 
study approach of this thesis, the analysis in this section contains only limited attempts at 
establishing statistical relationships such as is otherwise common in the treatment of cross-sectional 
survey data. It is felt that given the multitude and relative nature of factors that influence change in 
the irrigation commons, and the sometimes-inconsistent nature of the re-study data, attempts at 
causal inference through the strengths and significance of correlations between variables is not 
particularly meaningful. Rather, the approach will be one of searching for causal paths and 
associations through analysis of consistencies and patterns over time, with emphasis on how 
variables may have mattered to outcomes rather than on how much they may have mattered 
(Bardhan and Ray 2006). It follows from this that qualifying and explanatory elements (mainly 
farmers’ perceptions of events) are applied to the extent possible.  
8.3 Agricultural Productivity: Conceptual and Methodological Issues 
Oakerson recommends that in order to use the framework as a diagnostic tool, one should work 
backwards through the model. Therefore, we begin with outcomes: the analysis of irrigation 
performance in the period from 1992 to 2004 commences with analysis of agricultural yields for 
staple crops and of cropping intensities as operational measures that, in accordance with Oakerson’s 
framework, may be used to appraise outcomes specific to irrigation. Both measures are usually 
considered the most direct means of assessing performance of agricultural systems, including both 
physical and institutional elements (see, for example, Ostrom et al. 1992, Ostrom 2002).  
In a wider rural development perspective, the yield and cropping intensity performance indicators 
are commonly considered to be the two most important measures in the context of notions of 
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national food security concerns. These concerns, as Wilson and Rigg (2003) note, until recently 
reflected a general Malthusian pessimism that was couched in what some would call ‘productivist’5 
terms, implying that the common use of these indicators, particularly with respect to stable crop 
performance in the context of national concerns with food security, is rooted in the notion that such 
security was associated with adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs. The fact that it was the 
monitoring of the productivity of these crops that was of central concern to the Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project in the 1990s reflects this (as did at least partly the interventions with respect to 
irrigation system rehabilitation). In reality, however, as the analysis of cropping intensities in the 
command area of the irrigation systems will reveal, the diversity of cropping portfolios warrants a 
focus beyond that of staple crops. Likewise, the notion of food security, as already suggested in 
chapter 5, is more complex than household or national-level self-sufficiency in rice. 
In terms of data collection methods, agricultural yields are, in principle, a relatively straightforward 
quantitative performance measure of the output per hectare per annum, and most farmers recall such 
yields without much hesitation. Therefore, interviews (in line with the general shift towards 
participatory methodologies over the past decades) have become the preferred method of yield 
estimation over former costly and often inaccurate practices of crop-cutting6. Cropping intensity is 
not as straightforward a quantitative measure as that of yields per unit of land, as it contains higher 
risk of recall errors owing to the number of variables involved. Particularly in circumstances of the 
complex cropping portfolios associated with improved irrigation where, for instance, relay and 
intercropping is likely to increase. Therefore, this measure often requires a great deal of 
triangulation as well as patience on the part of both the interviewer and the respondent.  
The measure refers to the volume of land under cultivation in specific seasons. There are, as noted 
in the previous chapter, three ‘official’ seasons in the hills (summer, spring and winter) and two 
such seasons (summer, winter) in the mountains. If all irrigated land were planted in all seasons, 
then the maximum cropping intensities of 300 per cent in the hills and 200 per cent in the mountains 
are achieved. If all irrigated land were planted in only one season, cropping intensities would be 
only 100 per cent in both settings. If half of the irrigated land is planted in each season, then the 
cropping intensity would be 150 per cent in the hills, and 100 per cent in the mountains, and so on. 
With reference to section 7.3 on irrigation and the agricultural cycle, both the yields and the 
cropping intensities obviously depend on the extent to which farmers are able to obtain timely and 
controlled water supplies during the busy monsoon season where water control is essential, and 
adequate supplies during the following seasons when water becomes increasingly scarce.  
                                                 
5 ‘Productivism’ and the ‘productivist era’ is sometimes used to refer to a period when the main “preoccupation of 
agriculture was maximum food production to ensure national or regional self-sufficiency” (Wilson and Rigg 2003:682), 
characterized by “the discursive emphasis on production, commodity production maximization and rhetoric focusing on 
national/regional self-sufficiency” (Wilson and Rigg 2003:688). The notions of ‘productivism’ and its mirror-image 
notion of ‘post-productivism’ are, however, fairly contested, and as Wilson and Rigg suggest, perhaps even analytically 
inadequate concepts in relation to agricultural reality in developing countries. I use the term here to illustrate a 
(‘productivist’) policy context in which the discursive emphasis assigns central place to quantitative performance 
measures such as yield and cropping intensity. It may be noted in this context that, at least for part of the 1980s, Nepal 
was an exporter of foodgrains (see, for example, table 16 in Thapa and Rosegrant 1995). 
6 Crop-cutting in Nepal for purposes of gathering national yield statistics has traditionally involved random multi-stage 
sampling, and the cutting and weighing of sampled crops. The method requires high levels of accuracy, reliable 
weighing equipment, and high numbers of staff working under close professional supervision; however, financial and 
institutional capacities do not reflect these ambitions (see Balogun 1989 and Gill 1993 for further discussion of the 
merits of official yield data). Current official practices for obtaining national data are not known to this author; 
however, virtually all investigations by donors and others now involve ‘recall’ methods. 
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Farmers in all the surveys that form the basis for the data in this section were asked what the yields 
of the last harvest were and in case of cropping intensity, how much of their irrigated land was 
planted to various crops during the last relevant season. However, in the figures that will be 
presented, year refers to the year that the data were recorded. As all surveys were conducted in the 
spring, from April to early June, the de facto yields for rice are those of the harvests of October–
November of the preceding year, and for maize they are those of June of the preceding year. 
However, for wheat the yield denotes March in the reporting year. Considering that the systems 
were formally completed in July 1993 but had been in operation for some time by then, the 1992 
data should be considered ‘without project’ data for all crops, the 1993 data should be considered 
‘partly without project’ data, and the 1994 data onwards as ‘with project’ data7. In the mountains, 
where yield data are available for buckwheat (harvested in October) and naked barley (harvested in 
June), the de facto yields are entirely those of the year prior to that of recording. As in the hills, all 
mountain systems were completed in July 1993. 
Yields, in particular, are subject to the ‘hard constraints’ that Oakerson mentions are imposed in the 
context of physical and technological attributes. A range of physical and technological factors such 
as the general conditions for irrigated agriculture, changes in varieties of seeds, the use of fertilizer 
and pesticides, and the status of physical structures affect yields; likewise, the climate or natural 
calamities may seriously impact on the yields of specific crops in specific years. The choice of 
crops to be grown is also influenced by access to technology and markets. Given the potential 
variety of hard constraints, the DIDP’s own monitoring and evaluation guidelines, mentioning that 
“surveys should be designed and implemented so as to enable the isolation of variables that 
influence unanticipated effects for output over time” (Berg 1995: 45), seem somewhat unrealistic. 
That ambition, if at all attainable, would probable require a more complete time series than has been 
possible with the present data, possibly in the shape of a rigid cohort approach. I discuss 
methodological concerns in more detail in section 8.3.5. The role of technical and physical factors 
in affecting outcomes is further discussed in section 8.3.6. Suffice it to say at this point, that in view 
of both generic and specific methodological concerns, the ambition with respect to the following 
data is to provide a picture of the general drift of change with respect to agricultural production. 
8.3.1  Hills vs. Mountains 
It was established in the preceding chapter that modes of irrigation management vary considerably 
between irrigation systems, particularly that there is a notable difference between the more 
structured organization of irrigation in the mountains compared to that of the hills. In view of this, 
and because agricultural characteristics differ considerably between these regions, the performance 
data on hills and mountains will for the most part be presented separately. It must be noted though 
that the scope of the investigation is not one of a comparative analysis between hill and mountain 
systems (although this would be an interesting exercise in itself). Rather, the comparative 
perspectives will be addressed within the ambits of the overall problematic of this thesis (i.e., how 
                                                 
7 The extent to which the 1993 data should be considered ‘with project’ data for wheat is somewhat uncertain; most 
projects were actually completed earlier than the formal July 1993 ‘handing-over’ date but were subject to a testing 
period. Considering that wheat yields of March 1993 (see chart 3) in the 1993 recording show a uniform increase, 
suggests that 1993 data could be considered ‘with project’. In rice and maize, the 1993 data also suggest increases, 
although not as uniformly. Similarly, in the mountains, it is not unlikely that the October 1992 buckwheat harvest 
(recorded in June 1993) benefited from an improved system. The 1994 data, recording rice in October 1993, maize in 
June 1993, wheat in March 1994, buckwheat in October 1993, and naked barley in June 1993 certainly qualifies as 
‘with project’, given that the formal completion date was considerably later than the de facto completion date. 
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socio-economic changes affect irrigation), so as to retain a multi-variation perspective on the 
investigation of processes of change. 
8.3.2 Yield Performance in the Hills 
The trends with respect to productivity for rice, maize and wheat are described below. In the case of 
all three crops, the trends throughout the entire period from1992 to 2004 are interesting for a 
number of reasons, not least because they depict a performance trajectory with and without external 
intervention. The trends thus enable comparison of the ‘without project’ and ‘with project’ 
situation, where the ‘without project’ data may be seen as constituting the benchmark against which 
2004 yields should be assessed in terms of overall change. As will be discussed later, the 1994 and 
1995 data are relevant in the context of relative change, and concern the investigation in the sense 
that they suggest optimal productivity potential, i.e., when conditions are optimal in terms of 
irrigation facilities because “limiting conditions that pertain to the natural replenishment or 
maintenance of the resource” (Oakerson 1992: 44) had been reduced, following the completion of 
rehabilitation works. It needs to be emphasized though, that, given the focus and scope of this 
investigation, evaluation of the effect of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project’s irrigation 
intervention on productivity is not a central concern, even if the data appear quite telling with 
respect to the viability of irrigation interventions in hills and mountains. What is of major concern 
is, as already mentioned, the general direction of change that can be detected from the data.  
Chart 1 presents average yields for rice in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 2004. The data in 
the first and the second column for each system (1992 and 1993) constitute base-data (or ‘without 
project’ data), i.e., yields prior to intervention by the project.  
Yields in rice have remained relatively steady over the years, with a tendency to peak, or stagnate, 
in most systems, at some point in the first years following system rehabilitation. In Amalachaur and 
Kurgha, yields peaked at 3.6 tonnes per hectare (t/ha) and 3.8 t/ha, respectively, in 1994, and 
dropped only slightly to 3.3 t/ha in Amalachaur and 3.7 t/ha in Kurgha by 2004. Similarly, Lampata 
witnessed quite a surge from 1994 (2.8 t/ha) to 1995 (3.8 t/ha) but yields dropped to 3.3 t/ha in 
2004. Pipalbot also experienced peaking yields at 3.4 t/ha in 1994, dropping to 2.6 t/ha in 2004. 
Arjewa displayed very high ‘without project’ yields in 1992 at 4.4 t/ha; these dipped in 1993 and 
1994 and rose to 1992 levels in 1995, before dropping to a record low of 3.6 t/ha in 2004. Pakuwa 
did not experience mid-1990s peaking of rice yields. Rather, yields gradually increased from 2.4 
t/ha to 3.1 t/ha in 1994 and 1995 to reach 3.9 t/ha in 2004. 
The picture across the systems suggests, in addition to the tendency for yields to peak in the first 
years following rehabilitation, continuously high yields. In overall, comparative terms, these rice 
yields that, for the period 1994–2004 range from a lowest average of 3.0 t/ha in Pipalbot to a 
highest average of 3.9 t/ha in Arjewa, compare favourably with national data that report rice yields 
by the mid-1990s amounted to an average of 2.5 t/ha, and by 2001 to an average of 2.7 t/ha (FAO 
2003, Appendix Table 5). The yields are also high in the regional hills context, where in early 2003, 
4.0 t/ha (Department for International Development 2003) were considered high yield levels.  
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Chart 1 
Average Rice Yields, Hill Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
(tonnes per hectare) 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
Yi
el
d,
 t/
ha
Amalachaur Arjewa Kurgha Pakuwa Lampata Pipalbot
Scheme
1992
1993
1994
1995
2004
 
Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Repeat Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
 
Chart 2 
Average Maize Yields, Hill Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
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Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
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The general trend for maize yields (chart 2) resembles to some extent that experienced for rice, i.e., 
yields peaked at close to 3.0 t/ha in the mid-1990s. However, compared with rice yields the maize 
yields fluctuate substantially, and drop quite dramatically—in some cases by more than a tonne—
between the mid-1990s and 2004. 
As was the case with rice, Pipalbot was the worst performer in terms of maize yields in 2004 at 
1.1 t/ha, but yields also dropped in those systems that did relatively well in terms of rice yields, i.e., 
Pakuwa, Kurgha and Amalachaur. In the latter two, as well as in Arjewa, the 2004 yields were 
lower than in the base year of 1992. The average 2004 yields for these systems at 1.8 t/ha, however, 
matched the national average for 2001 (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2003, Appendix Table 
5), but were obviously far below the potential.  
 
Chart 3 
Average Wheat Yields, Hill Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
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Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
As suggested in chart 3, the general trend for wheat yields resembles that of rice and maize in the 
sense that yields peaked in the mid-1990s and dropped in 2004. However, the difference between 
peak yields and those of 2004 is more pronounced for wheat than for the other crops; in all cases, 
yields were reduced by close to or more than half; in the case of Pipalbot, the reduction was more 
than 1.5 t/ha, almost two-thirds of the 1994 high. The average 2004 yield performance of just above 
1 t/ha appears particularly dismal, not only in the relative context of these systems, but also in the 
context of national figures, where average yields amounted to some 1.8 t/ha in 2001 (FAO 2003, 
Appendix Table 5). In sum, the yield trajectory in the hills appears as one in which yields peaked at 
various points in time in the mid-1990s, following irrigation system rehabilitation. Of the three 
crops, rice displays the most stable yields over time, with 2004 yields tending to be close to 
‘without project’ yields. Maize and wheat yields in 2004 were drastically reduced in relation to 
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maximum yields and, particularly in wheat, also in relation to ‘without project’ yields and the 
averages for the 1992–1995 period.  
8.3.3 Yield Performance in the Mountains 
In the mountains, data have been recorded on buckwheat and naked barley, the two crops that were 
considered by the DIDP in the 1990s to be the two most important as regards to food security in the 
area. As mentioned in the previous chapters, naked barley is a winter crop, and buckwheat a 
summer crop, but both are grown under arid and temperate conditions, and require—somewhat 
similar to the dry season crops in the hills—water adequacy and care in ensuring comprehensive 
water distribution during the relatively long growing periods, rather than the acute attention to water 
control and timeliness associated with wet rice cultivation in the hills. 
Buckwheat (chart 4) experienced an increasing trend in the cases of Thini and Khinga, from a base 
in Thini of 2.0 t/ha in 1992 to a high of 2.5 t/ha in 2004 (an increase of 25 per cent), and from a 
base in Khinga of 0.8 t/ha in 1992 to a high of 1.7 t/ha in 2004 (an increase of over 110 per cent). In 
Tiri, the first season with a rehabilitated system (1994) saw an increase of 20 per cent with yields up 
from 1.5 t/ha to 1.8 t/ha. However, overall yields in Tiri were relatively constant, but had declined 
slightly by 2004. The peaking yields in the years immediately following rehabilitation that were 
characteristic of the hills are not evident in buckwheat, except in Tiri.With respect to naked barley 
(chart 5) the effects of rehabilitation seem to be more evident than for buckwheat, particularly in 
Thini and Khinga. Record yields of 4.7 t/ha were recorded in Thini in 1994, but dropped to 3.4 t/ha 
in 2004, although they remained higher than the base-level yields of 3.1 t/ha. In Tiri, no such mid-
1990s surge was experienced, but yields had increased by 2004 to 4.9 t/ha. In Khinga, a very low 
base of 1.5 t/ha had more than doubled in the mid-1990s to 3.4 t/ha in 1994; however, by 2004 
yields stood at some 2.7 t/ha. 
Chart 4 
Average Buckwheat Yields, Mountain Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
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Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
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Chart 5 
Average Naked Barley Yields, Mountain Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
(tonnes per hectare) 
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Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
Buckwheat and naked barley are minor crops in the national context of Nepal8, and as such very 
little is known about yield levels, be it in the national or regional context. Therefore, and also 
because of the short timeframe over which yield performance has been recorded (and this obviously 
pertains to the hill data as well), the extent to which the fluctuations that may be observed from the 
mid-1990s onwards (when these mountain systems, as in the hills, were seemingly optimal) are 
‘normal’, cannot be verified using official figures. One study, however, while not providing actual 
comparative figures, notes that yields of these two crops are indeed high in the area in question 
(Haffner et al. 2003). 
With respect to the general drift in productivity in both hills and mountains, it appears that trends 
differ quite substantially between these two ecological regions. The picture appears one of relatively 
stable yields in the mountains, while in the hills the trend is one of seriously declining yields for dry 
season crops compared to the mid-1990s, but less so compared to the base-data of 1992. The 
monsoon rice crop is relatively more stable in overall terms.  
8.3.4 Cropping Intensity 
The average cropping intensities from 1992 to 2004 for the cropping regimes of the hill systems that 
include rice, wheat, maize, vegetables, oilseeds and potatoes are shown in table 11 below.  
                                                 
8 One report notes, with respect to buckwheat, that “very little research has been done and there is practically no 
extension for this crop” (Khadka 2002:9). 
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Table 11 
Average Cropping Intensities, Hill Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
(percentage points) 
Scheme 1992 1993 1994 1995 2004 Change 
(Intensity) 
1992–2004 
Amalachaur 176 227 251 259 (266) 246 70 
Arjewa 224 250 230 (233) 293 (296) 275 51 
Kurgha 228 233 (241) 272 (282) 269 (290) 266 42 
Pakuwa 185 191 (197) 210 (215) 218 (227) 206 21 
Lampata n.a. 189 (198) 207 (214) 241 (251) 237 48 
Pipalbot 211 206 259 n.a. 209 -2 
Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
Note: Figures in brackets denote cropping intensity including potatoes. 
The most significant trends with respect to cropping intensities are that—except in Pipalbot—
cropping intensities increased in absolute terms between 1992 and 2004, and that cropping 
intensities tended to peak in the mid-1990s (1994 and 1995). This corresponds with a tendency for 
yields to peak in the years immediately following rehabilitation. It has to be noted that the area 
under potatoes was recorded inconsistently in the surveys of the 1990s. For that reason and because 
the potato crop was not consistently quantified as part of the survey in the hills in 20049, the 
cropping intensities with this crop, where available, are shown in brackets. The figures, without the 
potato crop—and the absolute change between 1992 and 2004—are therefore an underestimation of 
changes in cropping intensities.  
In terms of the general drift, the cropping intensities (without potatoes) increased in all systems 
compared with the base-data. The highest increment in absolute terms was in Amalachaur, while in 
Pipalbot the 2004 cropping intensity was lower than before project intervention. In Pakuwa, the 
second lowest performer in terms of absolute increment, change was without doubt considerably 
higher than suggested, as farmers reported a substantial increase in the production of potatoes in 
2004. In fact, farmers in all systems except Pipalbot, gave the impression that potatoes were an 
increasingly popular cash crop, and it seems plausible to assume that the area under potatoes in 
2004 was certainly no less than it was in 1995; therefore, the 2004 cropping intensities—again 
excluding Pipalbot—were probably close to those of 1995. 
                                                 
9 Owing to an error in the survey design: I had meant to have potatoes included under ‘vegetables’, but in the Nepali 
context they belong to a separate category and were subsequently not recorded consistently. Interviewers, both during 
the surveys of the 1990s and for the one in 2004, asked farmers about the area under cultivation with a specific crop 
(known to be grown in a specific season). I realized, when designing the repeat survey, that perhaps a better method 
would be to leave things more open, and take season by season, asking what was grown and how much. That way, I 
would have avoided misunderstandings regarding the classification of potatoes, and would probably also have mapped 
the cropping regimes more accurately. However, in order to gain consistent data I opted to repeat the method of the 
1990s in the 2004 survey. 
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As mentioned in section 8.3, the recording of cropping intensity is a measure with some risk of 
recall errors, not least in the context of cropping diversification and increasingly complex cropping 
portfolios. Considering that maximum attainable yields in the hills (with three seasons) is 300 per 
cent, the figures, particularly for Amalachaur, Arjewa and Kurgha, should indeed be considered 
quite high compared with the national average of about 180 per cent in the late 1990s (Sharma 
1999) but not implausible when compared with credible studies that record average cropping 
intensities of 250 per cent for hill irrigation systems (Ostrom et al. 1992).  
In the mountains (where area under cultivation with potatoes, as well as buckwheat, maize, naked 
barley, hull barley, wheat, and vegetables, has been recorded), the tendency has been, as in the hills, 
one of enhanced cropping intensities following rehabilitation, and increases in absolute terms 
between 1992 and 2004, although only in Thini and Khinga. Tiri, as a result of water shortages, 
experienced a 25-percentage-point reduction in cropping intensity between 1993 and 2004. 
Cropping intensities in Thini were relatively stable over the period, while Khinga saw a steady 
increase in cultivated area from the mid-1990s to 2004 (table 12).  
Table 12 
Average Cropping Intensities, Mountain Systems, 1992–1995 and 2004 
(percentage points) 
System 1992 1993 1994 1995 2004 Change 
(Intensity) 
1992–2004 
Thini 164 185 184 183 180 16 
Tiri n.a. 191 183 192 166 -25 
Khinga 138 163 156 156 171 33 
 
These cropping intensities need to be analysed in the context of cropping diversification and 
markets; this is done in chapter 9. For now, summarizing the trends, it appears that for the both the 
hills and the mountains cropping intensities peaked in the years following rehabilitation. Except for 
two systems (Pipalbot and Tiri), cropping intensities displayed an upward or stable trend over the 
period. 
8.3.5 Limitations of the Productivity Data 
One of the problems in repeat surveys, as mentioned in sections 3.3 section and 8.2 of this chapter, 
is that the ‘historical’ data are characterized by certain concerns, specific to the project and the 
period. Another, related problem is that the need for consistent and comparative data compels the 
researcher to obtain data in the repeat survey in much the same manner as in the first rounds of 
surveying, or to discard certain elements. I will, in the following, discuss issues relating to the 
limitations imposed by the latter dimension of ‘repeat survey slavery of the past’, as well as issues 
pertaining to the reliability of the yield data. As is evident from the analysis of the yield data so far, 
reported levels for the mid-1990s in the hill systems are indeed high in comparison with other data, 
particularly official agricultural statistics. For that reason, the high yields reported were received 
with some degree of surprise in the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project at the time when I 
was responsible for supervising the surveys (1992–1995). I therefore initiated a number of efforts to 
test the reliability of the figures. These included additional spot interviews with farmers, checks 
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with the District Agricultural Officers, and obtaining second opinions from NGO fieldworkers, in 
addition to double-checking (both in the 1990s and in 2004) that the teams that assisted with data 
collection understood local measuring units and their conversion into the metric system. The 
conclusion to these investigations was that the reported yields were high indeed, but quite probable 
in irrigated hill agriculture in the region and at the altitude of the systems. The case for relying on 
micro-level yield data, rather than national-level data, was shored up by donor efforts at the time 
that aimed to improve the standard of agricultural statistics in Nepal. Commenting on the reliability 
of official data in the early 1990s in Nepal, one report found that national-level agricultural data 
were “characterized by unreliability, gaps, over-aggregation inaccuracies, mutual inconsistencies 
and lack of timely reporting” (Gill 1993: 4; see also footnote 6 in this chapter for the merits of the 
crop-cutting methodology). While the quality of national-level data might have improved by 2004, 
it was still the norm for donors to rely on micro-level (or case study) data. The yardsticks offered by 
the other small-scale surveys that also appear with the data presentation suggest that yields for rice 
and maize are quite comparable. For wheat, however, they are relatively low.  
The second yardstick against which the reliability of the data may be judged consists of the 
qualifying comments on productivity provided by farmers in the cross-sectional survey itself and in 
the qualitative surveys that followed. From these comments, it appeared that, in general, 
productivity had improved compared to the pre-rehabilitation situation. Based on this, I gathered 
that while the reduced yields for wheat and maize might appear alarming from a production-
optimization position, it may actually suggest more of a reduction of yields relative to the optimal 
potential (see the next section for details), rather than in more absolute terms. Most farmers, when 
asked about changes to their agriculture over the period—contrary to the immediate impression 
provided by the data—point out that their production has in fact increased in overall terms since the 
systems were rehabilitated. With a few exceptions (as noted in the next sections), the fundamental 
impacts of irrigation rehabilitation have been the cultivation of additional winter and spring crops10 
and diversification in cropping as a gradually growing phenomenon across the various khet. These 
trends would most likely have been more adequately captured if the cross-sectional surveys had 
been designed to capture total annual productivity (and then have the farmers specify crops) rather 
than the output for main crops per unit of land. 
In the case of wheat, where the tables would suggest that yields had, by 2004, in most systems, 
dropped to levels below even that of the base level, many farmers still declare that output had 
increased in absolute terms. This is because most farmers did not grow wheat at all prior to 
rehabilitation; the few who did were typically those located at head-reaches or those otherwise well 
endowed with water11, and their average yields were relatively high. It is not certain how many 
farmers actually grew wheat prior to rehabilitation, something that renders statistical analysis 
problematic12. However, with a much larger number of farmers growing wheat under the varying 
conditions of the different reaches of the khet in 2004, average yields were likely to be lower than 
before rehabilitation.  
                                                 
10 As also noted by Angood et al. 2002, in a study on the impact of irrigation in a related geographical setting in Nepal. 
11 I.e., those with access to alternative sources such as springs. 
12 The first Key-Effects Monitoring surveys do not report on this in a reliable fashion; it appears that sometimes data 
had been obtained for both irrigated and non-irrigated areas. However, farmers, across the systems, suggested in the 
2004 surveys that some wheat was grown in the command area prior to irrigation system rehabilitation, by farmers with 
good access to water.  
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It also needs to be acknowledged that given methodological caveats surrounding yield data 
collection, the yield trends would no doubt have been more reliable if the time series had been more 
complete, i.e., if the four years in the 1990s had been compared with several more years in the 
2000s. Although farmers consider the cropping seasons on which the 2004 data are based to be 
average (see the next section), the notion of what constitutes ‘average’ or ‘good’ or ‘bad’ years are, 
in my experience, fairly subjective, depending among other things on expectations and the temporal 
perspective applied. The cases of two hill irrigation systems of Kalleritar (Dhading District) and 
Yampaphant (Chitwan District)—settings that are relatively comparable with the hill systems of my 
study—illustrate this. In these systems, farmers suggest that yields vary substantially from the mean 
in what farmers define as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ years: during ‘bad’ years, yields of rice, wheat and maize 
variations are perceived to range from -34 to -45 per cent, while in ‘good’ years the variations are 
perceived to range from +23 to +45 per cent (Angood et al. 2002). The point here is not that these 
perceptions are incorrect, but that notions of what constitutes ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘average’ years or 
seasons are likely to vary considerably, ranging, for instance, from those of old farmers who may 
recall singular historical crop failure events to younger farmers whose temporal frame of reference 
may not include similar extremes. The more complete the time series, the better the chance of 
capturing both these subjective variables as well as variables associated with hard constraints. 
8.3.6  Implications of the Trends in the Context of the Role of ‘Hard Constraints’ 
In this section, attention is directed towards the role of the physical and technological variables, and 
the extent to which, in relation to the yield and cropping intensity data, these influence optimal rates 
of efficiency and impose limiting conditions on the natural replenishment of the resource, as 
Oakerson suggests that they may do. In the spirit of the framework, I understand physical and 
technological factors as ‘hard constraints’ that affect outcomes directly, along with other influences 
on agricultural production, such as farming inputs that are not covered in subsequent analyses. In 
the present context, physical factors are understood as confounding factors13. This is because, as 
relatively isolated and unpredictable factors largely beyond the influence of human actions, they 
trigger events that undermine the conditions for irrigated agriculture.  
These ‘lurking variables’ need to be considered, so as to reduce the risk of constructing spurious 
relationships when analysing other factors, that otherwise belong within the sphere of Oakerson’s 
patterns of human choice and interaction, in the attempt at explaining changes in the trajectory of 
irrigated agriculture. Obviously, as the political ecology literature (see, for example, Blaikie 1985) 
reminds us, deteriorating physical conditions are indeed often related to the wider social and 
economic contexts that surrounds farming. Likewise, farm inputs, not least external inputs such as 
chemical fertilizer and seeds, cannot be understood in isolated terms. However, given the scope of 
this investigation and the nature of the repeat study data, only limited attention will be provided to 
the political economy associated with these specific factors.  
Climate, as accounted for in the previous chapter, is an important physical variable that interacts 
with both irrigation and farming technology and affects outcomes. In terms of climate in relation to 
agricultural production, farmers in the hills did not point to any of the seasons covered by the data 
as being particularly unusual in climatic terms. With respect to rice, they considered the analytically 
crucial 2003 monsoon on which the most recent yield data are based to be fairly average in the 
                                                 
13 In line with a tendency in this investigation to rely mainly on qualitative methodology, I do not use this term in the 
statistical sense of a spurious relationship that occurs due to a confounding factor, but merely to illustrate the existence 
of lurking variables or ‘killer assumption’ events that may constitute causality (a landslide that buries irrigated fields 
during the monsoon is clearly a reason for low yields). 
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sense that its onset was timely in relation to transplanting, that rainfall lasted until late September 
and was sufficient, and that no major calamities (such as landslides) disturbed water supplies. 
Similarly, for wheat (winter 2003/04) and maize (spring 2003) no excessive droughts (or rains and 
hailstorms) were reported in the relevant cropping seasons. It is only in the ecologically fragile 
system of Tiri that a direct climatic factor may be confidently isolated: lower than average 
precipitation in the high mountains above the village in the winter of 2002/03 affected the spring 
snowmelt on which irrigation water at lower levels depends; this subsequently affected the 
buckwheat crop recorded in 2004 for all farmers.  
Over the years, heavy rainfall has caused floods and landslides that have affected irrigation 
structures and outcomes. It is important, in this context, to understand the trajectory of the irrigation 
structures. Farmers suggest that by 1995 (when yields for all crops were above average in most 
systems) the communities were in possession of relatively effective irrigation structures for all 
cropping seasons; this again suggests that the rehabilitated schemes had by then reached their full 
physical potential. Various teething problems, some more serious than others14 had, at this point in 
time, been overcome and the rehabilitated systems were functioning optimally, as witnessed by 
yield levels. This continued to be the case in all systems until at least mid-1996, when monitoring 
came to an end with the completion of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project.  
Indeed, the 2004 investigation revealed that a number of disrupting events took place in late 1990s 
and early 2000s in four of the hill systems. In Arjewa, leaks in the tank had, by 2001, as farmers 
pointed out, made the rehabilitated system virtually redundant, but that in itself does not appear to 
necessarily constitute a confounding factor15. In Amalachaur, a flood in 1999 affected the canal to 
the extent that leakages were a problem for some time, but by 2004 the situation was under control; 
hence, in relation to the yield data, the physical state of the system should not be considered a 
serious confounder. Landslides and gradually sinking canals have plagued farmers in Khinga over 
the years, and while this has resulted in high labour inputs, these events should not be considered 
confounding in relation to output either. However, in two systems natural calamities probably 
should: the Pipalbot system was seriously damaged by a flood in 2002, and in Lampata a series of 
minor landslides, also in 2002, affected one of the two channels quite seriously. Farmers explained 
that this had impacted on the productivity of wheat in particular, but it was not possible to ascertain 
how many farmers had been affected.  
Nevertheless, the factor may be, if not exactly isolated, then at least narrowed down as one variable 
that may help account for falling yields in these systems. It needs to be mentioned though, as also 
suggested earlier, that these disruptive physical factors are not necessarily so confounding as to 
have affected the major gains from system rehabilitation; the majority of farmers continued to 
produce three crops as opposed to the two crops that were typical prior to rehabilitation. At this 
stage, what should be noted is that in the remaining hill systems, where disrupting factors pertaining 
directly to the physical system do not apply, the productivity of the dry season crops had also been 
                                                 
14 Such as a landslide that occurred during construction in Kurgha, and which required a combination of bio-
engineering and the laying down of pipes instead of an open channel. Additionally, the tank at Arjewa, as reported in 
chapter 6, started leaking in 1996 and was repaired by the DIDP in the same year.  
15 Irrigation water supply in Arjewa actually depends on a number of dispersed sources (springs) and channels, which, it 
appears, make water control somewhat problematic during the monsoon, but which ensure a relatively reliable supply of 
water during the dry period. While—in hydro-ecological terms—Arjewa obviously represents a system of sorts, the lack 
of a common irrigation element means that characterization as a ‘common property regime irrigation’ system is 
problematic. 
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drastically reduced, at least relative to optimal yields. This rather uniform reduction in dry season 
yields obviously means that other impinging factors need to be considered to help account for the 
observed discontinuities in yield performance. Cropping diversification into vegetable production 
and the subsequent individualization of water use is a likely candidate, as dealt with in the 
following chapter. 
Ideally, in addition to hard constraints associated with climate and physical structures, analysis of 
yield levels also requires attention to various inputs including external technological ones such as 
chemical fertilizer and improved seeds. Changes with respect to these factors have not been 
investigated in much detail in the present survey16. However, changes in seed types are generally 
not, in the context of hills and mountains of Nepal, considered a particularly important factor—at 
least not in the period covered in this investigation (see, for example, Thapa and Rosegrant 1995, 
Brabben et al. 2004, Ostrom et al. 1992). Fertilizer, though, whether in the form of locally produced 
farmyard manure and compost or as external chemical fertilizer, is an important input in the context 
of performance (see Brabben et al. 2004). It is known from the cross-sectional surveys of the 1990s 
that most farmers in the hills, particularly those near transport arteries, apply considerable amounts 
of chemical fertilizer to rice. In contrast, maize and wheat crops in the hills depended mainly on 
farmyard manure and compost. As many more farmers than before stated in the 2004 survey that 
improved access to chemical fertilizer had helped them sustain production, access to (or rather lack 
of) chemical fertilizer in the hills should not be considered an issue that has contributed to reduced 
yields, at least not in non-remote hill systems. In the mountain systems, only locally produced 
organic fertilizer is applied, and there was no indication that this has changed over the years. 
Based on the discussions in the last two sections, it appears that the bottom line is one of production 
having increased in overall terms for the many farmers who point out that yields for winter (wheat) 
and spring crops (maize) increased for some time (i.e., in the peak years) after rehabilitation. It may 
be argued in this context that optimal conditions such as those of the mid-1990s are likely, even 
under ideal conditions, to be followed by stagnation and possibly some degree of downward 
adjustment of yields. The reduction in yields of both maize and wheat, however, remain striking. In 
the following, I will continue to assemble pieces of the mosaic in order to detect the overall pattern 
in which the drift of change may be understood.  
8.4 Water Distribution Performance 
Moving away from the hard constraints and into the territory of decision-making arrangements and 
patterns of interaction, it may be recalled from the previous chapter that the organization of water 
distribution—together with operation and maintenance—forms the basis of irrigation organization 
and management. It may also be recalled that water distribution methods display great variation 
across the irrigation systems, ranging from voluntary arrangements and temporary employment of 
caretakers in the hill systems to permanently employed caretakers in the mountain systems. 
Likewise, the method of distributing water differs substantially, and variation between hills and 
mountains is particularly manifest; in the latter, turns are decided by lottery every year, whereas 
turns in the former are of a more permanent nature. In addition, while the highly regulated method 
                                                 
16 The repeat survey was not a direct replica of the original survey in all respects. In light of the logistical problems 
associated with conducting the survey (see the methodology section), I decided to reduce the size of the questionnaire, 
and questions pertaining to fertilizer use were left out. This was a trade-off that provided more time for qualitative 
investigations associated with ‘direct’ livelihoods issues pertaining to migration and incomes, in particular. 
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of distribution remains the same throughout the year in the mountains, regulation of distribution is 
more of a phenomenon during the monsoon in the hills.  
Water distribution invokes the notion of the tail-end problem introduced in the previous chapter, 
and is considered an important parameter of irrigation organization and, subsequently, efficiency. 
This is because the extent to which water is distributed to individual farmers directly influences the 
extent to which production in the system can be made optimal. Water distribution, therefore, as a 
critical performance parameter, pertains both to the amount of water available and the extent to 
which it actually reaches farmers’ fields. In Oakerson’s terms, it includes dimensions of physically 
limiting conditions and equity. Inefficiency, particularly when based on equity parameters, is 
difficult to measure, “compelling reliance on rough and ready indicators such as whether most 
members of the commons community seem to be relatively satisfied with existing arrangements” 
(Oakerson 1992: 52). 
The DIDP cross-sectional survey questions were indeed phrased along qualitative lines. Farmers 
were asked two questions. One sought to investigate changes with respect to water availability for 
individual farmers and went: ‘Do you get sufficient water for your crops?’ It was included from 
1993 in surveys for Amalachaur, Kurgha, Pakuwa and Pipalbot, and from 1994 for Arjewa and 
Lampata, and again in the 2004 surveys for all systems except Arjewa17. The other question was of 
a more general nature, seeking to uncover potential tail-end problems, namely, ‘Do farmers along 
the head-, middle- and tail-reaches of the canal get fair shares of water?’ In the hills, this question 
was included from 1993 in Amalachaur, Arjewa, Kurgha, Pipalbot, and from 1994 in Lampata, but 
it was only included in the 2004 repeat survey for Pakuwa. In the mountains, both questions were 
asked consistently in all systems in 1993, 1994 and 2004. 
8.4.1  Water Sufficiency 
It is evident from chart 6 below that farmers perceive water adequacy as a problem and that the 
problem has increased over the years. In 1994, when—as the yield data of the previous sections 
suggest, the rehabilitated systems were reaching their full potential—close to two-thirds of farmers 
on average expressed satisfaction with water sufficiency. The top three at the time in terms of 
finding water sufficient were Kurgha, Amalachaur and Pipalbot. The farmers least satisfied with 
water adequacy in 1994 were those in Arjewa18, Pakuwa and Lampata. In 2004, many more farmers 
found water insufficient, with only about one-third of farmers, on average, finding that they had 
sufficient water for their crops. The top three in terms of being satisfied with water supplies were 
the farmers of Pipalbot, Kurgha and Pakuwa. The least satisfied farmers were those in Lampata and 
Amalachaur. In the mountains (chart 7), the vast majority of the farmers—more than 90 per cent—
found that water was sufficient as early as 199319. A year later, the farmers of Thini were even 
more satisfied, but in Tiri and Khinga the number of satisfied farmers had dropped by some 40 per 
cent. In 2004, the vast majority of farmers in Thini remained almost as happy with supplies as they
had been a decade before, while in Tiri (where, as previously mentioned, a physical factor may
clearly isolated) less than one-third of farmers found water sufficient. In Khinga, satisfaction had 
increased slightly.  
 
 be 
                                                 
17 Where the question was omitted by mistake. 
18 This suggests that problems with the tank in Arjewa, which according to records started leaking in 1996, may have 
occurred earlier than ‘officially’ recorded. 
19 This may suggest that rehabilitation works did not interrupt flows significantly; most of it took place when the need 
for irrigation water was minimal. 
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Chart 6 
Farmers Finding Water Sufficient, Hill Systems, 1993, 1994, 2004  
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Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
 
Chart 7 
Farmers Finding Water Sufficient, Mountain Systems, 1993, 1994, 2004  
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Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
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Summarizing the general direction of change with respect to water adequacy, it appears that in both 
the hills and the mountains—but much more so in the hills—fewer farmers found that water was 
sufficient in 2004 than in the 1990s. 
8.4.2  ‘Fair Shares’ of Water 
The avoidance of tail-end problems was a central concern in the DIDP, as a reflection of notions 
pertaining both to performance and equality in the more social sense. As chart 8 suggests, the vast 
majority of farmers found that distribution was fair in the 1990s, while in 2004 the number of 
farmers who found that water was distributed fairly had reduced by some 20 per cent on average, 
although with substantial variation. Reductions are particularly evident in Amalachaur, Arjewa and 
Lampata, while Pipalbot showed the smallest reduction. In addition, fewer farmers in the mountains 
(chart 9) found that water was as fairly distributed along the head-, middle- and tail-reaches of the 
command area in 2004 than in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the vast majority (some 85 per cent in 
overall terms) still found, in 2004, that water was distributed fairly. Down from 100 per cent in all 
three systems in 1993 and 1994, in 2004, 90 per cent of farmers in Thini and Khinga found that 
water was distributed fairly, while 80 per cent in Tiri found so. 
In summary, relatively few farmers in the hills in 2004 found that all reaches of the command areas 
received fair shares of water. In the mountains, on the other hand, the vast majority continued to 
find distribution fair throughout the recording period. 
Chart 8 
Farmers Claiming to Receive ‘Fair Shares’ of Water, Hill Systems, 1993, 1994, 2004 
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Sources: DIDP Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
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Chart 9 
Farmers Claiming to Receive ‘Fair Shares’ of Water, Mountain Systems, 1993, 1994, 2004 
(percentage) 
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Sources: DIDP Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
 
8.4.3  Interpreting the Water Distribution Trends 
As was the case with the productivity data, physical factors also need to be considered with respect 
to farmers’ perceptions of water sufficiency. The relationships are, however, not all that clear, 
possibly as a reflection—as mentioned earlier—of the fact that the degree to which these factors 
actually impinge on individual projects is somewhat uncertain. In Arjewa, where the rehabilitated 
system probably never worked according to intentions, the fact that no one found water sufficient in 
2004 indeed suggests that as far as concerns the ‘irrigation system’ (see footnote 15) as a conduit of 
water, things had gone from bad to worse. In contrast, Pipalbot displays surprisingly little difference 
over the years, despite damage to the system in 2002. Conversely, the physical factors mentioned in 
section 8.3.6 seem to manifest themselves clearly with respect to the farmers of Lampata and 
Amalachaur; in both places, the dissatisfaction in 2004 was massive compared with 1994. The same 
may be said for drought-ridden Tiri.  
Regardless of the role of physical factors, the important finding with respect to water sufficiency in 
terms of the general direction towards which the data point may be likened to that of yields. Even in 
the systems without apparent physical problems (where performance in terms of productivity is 
relatively good), perceptions of water sufficiency had decreased. Kurgha and Pakuwa in the hills are 
important cases in point. In table 13 below, the reasons given as to why water was considered 
insufficient by those farmers who perceived it as such have been categorized. 
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Table 13 
Nature of and Reasons for Water Insufficiency, All Systems, 2004 
(percentage) 
Nature of Water Insufficiency Reason for Insufficiency System  
Winter, 
Spring 
Crops  
Summer 
Crops  
Not 
Specified 
Source, 
Intake 
Leakages System 
Manage-
ment 
Location 
in Khet 
No 
Reason 
Stated 
Amalachaur 
(n=30) 
27 0 73 19 55 14 0 12 
Arjewa 
(n=22) 
27 0 73 55 40 2 0 3 
Kurgha 
(n=31) 
63 13 24 6 38 6 19 31 
Pakuwa 
(n=30) 
53 0 47 0 82 0 16 2 
Lampata 
(n=10) 
90 0 10 0 0 0 0 100 
Pipalbot 
(n=15) 
50 0 50 17 0 0 17 66 
Thini 
(n=30) 
0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Tiri 
(n=10) 
0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 
Khinga 
(n=10) 
0 100 0 0 60 0 0 40 
Source: 2004 cross-sectional survey. 
The table shows the nature of water insufficiency as well as the assigned reason for the 
insufficiency among those farmers who found water insufficient in 2004 (see charts 6 and 7). Most 
farmers perceived water scarcity as a hard constraint in Oakerson’s sense of the term, i.e., as 
something that relates directly to outcomes. It was seen by most as a problem that was chiefly 
related to the source of water, mainly the intake, or (as in the case of Tiri) the hydrological source. 
Relatively few farmers immediately associated the extent to which they had sufficient water for 
their crops with the way the irrigation system was managed. This could be related to the nature of 
the inquiry; direct questions that imply criticism of authority are notoriously prone to ‘positive’ bias  
in the cultural settings of both the hills and the mountains systems. However, it is also quite likely 
that farmers simply considered the hard constraints (i.e., that there is only so much water to go 
around) to be the most important. Only in four systems did some of the farmers (ranging from all of 
the otherwise proportionally very few farmers who found that water was insufficient in Thini, to the 
considerably higher numbers in Pipalbot, Kurgha and Pakuwa) associate insufficiency with the 
location of their fields in the khet. There is, in fact, no pronounced relationship between satisfaction 
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with water sufficiency and location in these four systems; some 28 per cent were head-reachers, 37 
were middle-reachers, and 34 per cent were tail-enders—a distribution that corresponds roughly 
with the distribution across all systems. 
Another important finding in the context of performance is that increased dissatisfaction with 
respect to water supplies over the years is mainly associated with winter and spring crops. Most, but 
far from all, hill farmers who experienced water scarcity pointed out that it affected winter crops 
and maize; only in Kurgha, was it mentioned that rice was affected. These perceptions obviously 
complement what was already suggested with respect to the falling yields of these crops. In the 
mountains, scarcity affects only summer crops during periods of high levels of evapotransporation. 
However, water scarcity as perceived by farmers should probably not be understood only in the 
sense that quantities of water have been reduced compared to the previous situation. Changed 
aspirations with respect to the farming of marketable winter crops such as vegetables and potatoes, 
and the limiting conditions imposed by the quantities of water available, may also be an explanatory 
factor. This would certainly be the case in Lampata and Kurgha, but may also be so in Arjewa 
which, despite farmers’ perceptions of high levels of water scarcity and physical-structural 
problems displayed relatively high levels of cropping intensities (see table xx). This issue is dealt 
with in more detail in the next chapter. 
The association between increased dissatisfaction and winter and spring crops has institutional 
performance implications. This is because, as suggested in the previous chapter, irrigation of the 
more extensive (in terms of labour inputs and timing) wheat and maize crops is less regulated than 
the more intensive rice crop, and usually contains elements of on-demand. However, in water scarce 
systems, as pointed out by Martin and Yoder (1988), it should ideally be the other way around; less 
formal regulation is usually a function of abundant water supply in the agriculturally-speaking less 
urgent (compared with the monsoon) winter and spring seasons. Subsequently, the situation in the 
hill cases, where water distribution in these seasons is characterized by both informality and 
scarcity, would suggest institutional problems. 
As a rough indicator, the fact that not all farmers appear to be affected by water scarcity suggests 
some degree of unequal distribution of water, as is also confirmed by the responses to the question 
on whether farmers perceived the distribution of water across the khet as fair. In table 14 below, the 
explanatory statements provided by those farmers who perceived distribution as unfair have been 
categorized. 
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Table 14 
Reasons for ‘Unfair’ Distribution, All Systems, 2004 
(percentage) 
System Water Insufficient (Source, 
Intake, Leakage)  
Management/Operation  
 
No Reason Assigned 
 
Amalachaur 
(n=30) 
61 14 25 
Arjewa 
(n=22) 
56 0 44 
Kurgha 
(n=31) 
35 12 53 
Pakuwa 
(n=30) 
61 0 39 
Lampata 
(n=10) 
37 0 63 
Pipalbot 
(n=15) 
80 20 0 
Thini 
(n=30) 
100 0 0 
Tiri 
(n=10) 
100 0 0 
Khinga 
(n=10) 
100 0 0 
Source: 2004 cross-sectional survey. 
The figures in table 14 show the reasons assigned by those farmers who, as illustrated in charts 8 
and 9, found water to be unfairly distributed in 2004. Most of the farmers in most of the hill systems 
confirmed that water was not distributed equally. Somewhat similar to the reasons assigned for 
water scarcity, as illustrated in the second column of the table, unequal distribution was perceived 
as mainly a hard constraint. Only in three systems did farmers (all tail-enders) mention ‘bad 
management’ and ‘influential households take all the water’ as reasons for unequal distribution. The 
farmers’ tendency to attribute tail-end problems to hard constraints maybe somewhat surprising 
when—as discussed in the previous chapter—unequal distribution is often perceived—at least by 
analysts—as a combined management and technical problem. Oakerson would see it as a symptom 
of inefficiency, rooted in a lack of congruence between the technological and physical attributes and 
those related to decision-making that leads individuals into “counterproductive patterns of 
interaction” (1992:52).  
Martin and Yoder (1988), in more nuanced terms, would see it as related to the systems in place for 
distributing water, the extent to which rules are adhered to, and the sheer availability of water in 
quantitative terms. In any case, unequal distribution of water is associated with inefficiency because 
it suggests less than optimal production, for the simple reason that the tail-ends of khet are not likely 
to receive as much water as the head-ends. This again may translate into reduced incentives on the 
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part of tail-enders to contribute to collective action (see below). On a methodological note, 
considering that these statements have been recorded as part of a cross-sectional survey without the 
in-depth triangulation and reflection that could have generated more nuanced responses, the 
attribution of distributional problems to hard constraints may be expected. In the context of this 
survey, most farmers preferred to assign an immediate and obvious reason, based on the plain 
physical fact of there being only so much water to go around.  
It seems worth noting that the relationship between the extent to which water is perceived as scarce, 
and the extent to which it is considered to be unequally distributed, is very pronounced in the hills, 
i.e., the systems where most farmers consider water scarce, are also the systems where most farmers 
consider it unequally distributed. This relationship is less pronounced in the mountains, as 
illustrated in the case of Tiri and Khinga, where proportionally large numbers of farmers find water 
scarce but far fewer find it unequally distributed, and in Thini, where very few farmers find water 
either scarce or unequally distributed. These tendencies seem to confirm—as was postulated in 
chapter 7—that the lottery system of distribution that is practiced in the mountains may ensure more 
equal distribution and subsequently, efficiency (broadly understood), than the fixed-turn system of 
the hills.  
8.5  Maintenance Performance 
The maintenance of an irrigation system chiefly entails the mobilization of both labour and 
materials, and, as Yoder and Martin point out, “the ability to mobilize resources in a timely fashion 
is the major factor distinguishing a well-operating irrigation system from an ineffective one” 
(1983:5). Maintenance is essential in order to ensure that the system continues to produce benefits 
to farmers. In other words, the ability of an irrigation organization to operate and maintain an 
irrigation system is closely related to productivity. There are two main modes of resource 
mobilization for carrying out maintenance activities. One involves, as noted in chapter 5, the 
employment of caretakers—full-time in the mountains, and part-time (i.e., during the monsoon) in 
the hills—who carry out minor repairs in addition to performing water distribution functions. As 
‘mobilized resources’ their employment depends on cooperative commitments from all the irrigated 
households who, according to the system’s rules, have to contribute (either in cash or kind) to 
remunerate them for their work. Another mode—the one that will be focused on in this section —
involves maintenance activities carried out by farmers as a cooperative labour contribution, 
according to rules that typically stipulate the frequency of the activity and the labour to be supplied 
by each irrigated household.  
This mode of maintenance, where the irrigated community ‘joins hands’, with representatives of 
households with land in the khet being expected to turn up on scheduled days and in cases of 
emergency, is the one activity in an irrigation system that epitomizes the complexity associated with 
collective action. It invokes the powerful notion of ‘free-riders’ whose activities (or lack of the 
same) are to be avoided, if local institutions are to be perceived as efficient forms of organizing 
economic activity (see Ostrom 1990, Vermillion 2001, Ostrom 1992). It is a very transparent 
manifestation of commitment to common interests that exposes community strengths and 
weaknesses. In the Oakerson framework, maintenance takes place within the ‘patterns of 
interaction’ sphere and is—as mentioned earlier—particularly challenging because for rational 
individuals the incentives to participate in this kind of collective action is based on expectations of 
future benefits rather than immediate quid pro quo gratification. In Ostrom’s theorization (1990, 
1992), the ability to apply longer-term perspectives and thus go beyond quid pro quo thinking 
depends on the rules-in-use, particularly the extents to which they make sense in specific contexts 
and to which they are enforced. 
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It was an implicit objective of the Dhaulagir Irrigation Development Project to reduce the number 
of labour days used in maintenance of irrigation systems (in order to enhance productivity) and, 
therefore, questions related to the maintenance of the irrigation systems were included in all 
surveys. Farmers were asked if their household contributed labour to the maintenance of the 
irrigation system; if so, how many days per year and on what basis; if fines were imposed; and, if 
they were satisfied with organization of maintenance. The basis for labour contribution was 
described in chapter 7. In this section, the focus will be on trends with respect to labour days, 
sanctions and attitudes, with respect to how maintenance is organized. The following tables, based 
on the entire study population (as everyone claims to contribute labour), suggest the trends, for 
selected years, with respect to both regular and emergency maintenance works. 
Table 15 
Labour Contributions for Maintaining Irrigation Systems, Hill Systems,  
1992–1995 and 2004 
(average person-days per household per annum) 
System  1992 1993 1994 2004 
Amalachaur 13 9 3 3 
Arjewa 12 10 3 3 
Kurgha 17 26 4 6 
Pakuwa 33 12 5 3 
Lampata n.a. 8 9 4 
Pipalbot 4 2 6 4 
 
The questions on maintenance were first asked in the spring of 1992 before any of the systems had 
been completed. As suggested by table 15 above, Pakuwa, where before rehabilitation, as one 
farmer put it, “far too much time was spent on maintenance in an unsystematic way”, topped the list 
in 1992 with 33 labour days per household on average. The abnormally high level of labour 
contribution in Kurgha in 1993 was owing to the landslide reported earlier (see footnote 14). Labour 
contributions were never particularly high in Lampata and Pipalbot. By the mid-1990s, when, as 
suggested earlier, systems were experiencing optimal conditions, labour contributions had been 
drastically reduced, not just in Pakuwa, but also in the other systems. The trend in the hill systems is 
for labour contributions to fall steadily over the period, from an average of some 16 days per 
household in ‘before-project’ 1992, to 11 days in 1993, to five days in 1995 and four days in 2004. 
The 2004 figures cover some variation; from a low of three days in Amalachaur, Arjewa and 
Pakuwa, to four days in Lampata and Pipalbot, and six days in Kurgha. 
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Table 16 
Labour Contribution for Maintaining Irrigation Systems, Mountain Systems,  
1992–1994 and 2004  
(average person-days per household per annum) 
System  1992 1993 1994 2004 
Thini 16 11 8 4 
Tiri n/a 15 8 8 
Khinga 77 9 23 10 
 
Labour contributions in the mountain systems display the same tendency to fall as those of the hill 
systems but, with the exception of Khinga, the reductions are not quite so dramatic. In Thini, the 
pre-project labour contribution per household amounted to some 16 days per annum; in 1993 it had 
been reduced to 11 days, in 1994 to eight days, and in 2004 to four days. In Tiri, in the first year of 
recording, labour contribution per household amounted to 15 days; in subsequent years, it was 
reduced to eight days. Khinga was quite an emergency before rehabilitation, with farmers claiming 
some 77 days per household in 1992. A year later that figure had been reduced to nine days but, as a 
result of a landslide (see section 8.3.6), labour contributions increased to 23 days in 1994. However, 
by 2004 they had fallen to an average of 10 days per annum. In average terms, farmers in the 
mountains contributed slightly more than seven days of labour compared to four days in the hills. 
When keeping in mind that in addition to collective maintenance activities, permanently employed 
caretakers also carry out maintenance activities in the mountains, it seems safe to conclude that the 
level of these activities is considerable higher in the mountains than in the hills. 
Ostrom suggests that opportunistic behaviour, or free-riding, may be reduced by means of rules that 
contain provisions for the sanctioning of free-riders (1992). Possibly based on that insight, the 
constitutions and bye-laws of the farmer’s irrigation associations provided by the Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project include provisions for sanctioning those absent from collective 
maintenance works. In the 1990s, farmers were asked in a direct fashion if they had ever paid a fine 
for being absent from maintenance works. In the larger hill systems (Kurgha and Pakuwa), a couple 
of farmers occasionally admitted to having paid some amount, usually around Nepali Rupees 50 
(i.e., an amount close to the daily salary of a labourer at the time). In 2004, the question was 
phrased in more general terms, as, ‘Are you fined if you do not contribute labour and, if so, how 
much?’ Therefore, the data are not directly comparable20, and over-time trends not detectable. 
However, the 2004 data on their own do provide an idea of the extent to which farmers were aware 
of rules-in-use with respect to sanctions, and the extent to which these rules were enforced. 
                                                 
20 I overlooked this rather subtle difference when designing the re-study. 
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Table 17 
Awareness of Sanctions for Abstaining from Maintenance Works, All Systems, 2004 
System Proportion of Farmers who Believe  
they will be Sanctioned (%) 
Types of Sanctions Mentioned 
Amalachaur 
(n=30) 
23 Pay NRs* 100–150 per day 
Arjewa 
(n=22) 
0 n.a 
Kurgha 
(n=31) 
58 Work another day (6 farmers);  
pay NRs 50–100 per day (12 farmers) 
Pakuwa 
(n=30) 
30 Pay NRs 100 per day 
Lampata 
(n=10) 
0 n.a 
Pipalbot 
(n=15) 
53 Pay NRs 5 per ropani of land 
Thini 
(n=30) 
83 Pay NRs 150–200 per day 
Tiri 
(n=10) 
100 Pay NRs 100–200 per day 
Khinga 
(n=10) 
90 Pay NRs 100 per day (8 farmers);  
payment in kind (1farmer) 
*NRs: Nepali Rupees. Source: Cross Sectional Survey 2004 
Table 17 above shows that in the cases of Arjewa and Lampata no one thought that sanctions were 
an issue. Indeed, there were no records of fines being imposed in the past for these systems. In the 
remaining hill systems, between a fifth and three-fifths of farmers thought they would be fined if 
they abstained from collective works. Data from the mountains suggest a high degree of awareness 
for the provisions of fines in all three systems. Two (large) farmers in Thini claimed that they had 
paid Nepali Rupees 150 per day to the mukhya because they were incapable of sending a 
representative. In Tiri and Khinga, where everyone (i.e., not just one family member) between the 
ages of 15–57 years is expected to turn up, no one claimed or admitted to have paid money in lieu 
of work. 
The last issue to be dealt with in this section concerns farmers’ attitudes with respect to 
maintenance activities. Table 18 below shows responses, in the years for which data are available21, 
to the question, ‘Are you satisfied with the way in which the irrigation system is maintained?’ 
                                                 
21 The data for 1992, 1993 and 1994 are not directly comparable; every year a specific question (e.g., are you satisfied 
with outlet, the intake, etc.) deemed relevant for process monitoring purposes at the time was asked. 
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Table 18 
Farmers Dissatisfied with Irrigation System Maintenance, All Systems, 1995 and 2004 
Proportion of Dissatisfied Farmers  
(%) 
Summarized Reason for 
Dissatisfaction 
System 
1995 2004 2004 
Amalachaur 
(n=30) 
14 30 System badly 
managed/coordinated 
Arjewa 
(n=22) 
18 26 Labour contribution not 
commensurate with shares of 
water received 
Kurgha 
(n=31)* 
37 13 Unequal distribution of efforts, 
bad coordination 
Pakuwa 
(n=30) 
13 13 Penalties for abstention not 
imposed, bad coordination 
Lampata 
(n=15) 
30 0 n.a 
Pipalbot 
(n=15) 
n.a. 0 n.a 
Thini 
(n=30) 
0 0 n.a 
Tiri 
(n=10) 
0 0 n.a 
Khinga 
(n=10) 
0 0 n.a 
Note: * 1994 data. Source Cross Sectional Surveys 1995 and 2004. 
In Amalachaur, the proportion of dissatisfied farmers had doubled over the years and in Arjewa it 
had increased by about a quarter. The increase should possibly be understood in relation to 
perceptions of water adequacy and fairness of distribution; farmers in both systems were amongst 
the most dissatisfied on both accounts. In Pakuwa, a system where neither hard nor soft constraints 
were particularly pronounced, there was no change, and in Kurgha, the other relatively well-
functioning hill system, the proportion of farmers who were dissatisfied had been reduced by almost 
two-thirds. In Lampata, no one appeared dissatisfied in 2004 compared with the 30 per cent who 
were in 1995. In the mountains, where farmers consistently tended to find water both relatively 
equally distributed and sufficient, and tended not to assign problems to the way systems were 
managed, the non-existence of dissatisfaction with respect to maintenance arrangements seems 
entirely probable.  
8.5.1  Implications of the Maintenance Trends 
The limited awareness of what Oakerson refers to as the operational rules that limit user behaviour 
such as free-riding, in the hills, i.e. sanctions is striking. However, because over-time data on 
awareness of sanctions for abstaining from maintenance works are not available, nothing much can 
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be said about trends in this regard. In terms of system performance, and the centrality of 
maintenance in that respect, it is nevertheless worth keeping in mind the words of Ostrom, “Rules 
are useless unless the people they affect know their existence, expect others to monitor behaviour, 
and anticipate sanctions for non-conformance” (1992:20). In that sense, the limited awareness of the 
rules-in-use displayed in many hill systems appear symptomatic of irrigation systems that do not 
perform optimally. 
However, the central questions that need to be answered in the context of maintenance are: to what 
extent do the reduced maintenance contributions shown in tables 15 and 16 reflect reduced 
maintenance needs, and to what extent do they reflect reduced commitment to collective action? A 
few issues need to be discussed in relation to this. Irrigation rehabilitation projects aim—in addition 
to enhancing system performance—to free labour for productive activities. It is well known that the 
lining of canals with cement (Lam 1998) and the construction of relatively permanent concrete 
intake structures protected by gabion boxes particularly reduce the amount of labour time needed to 
keep an irrigation system in repair (see, for example, Martens 1989, Berthelsen 1997). This is 
because mud and stone head-works tend to be washed away by floods more easily than concrete 
ones, and because unlined earthen canals need constant repairs to avoid leakages. Additionally, 
concrete intake structures are sometimes (in Thini, for instance) designed to serve as de-silting 
mechanisms that reduce the amount of silt that would otherwise be deposited (and would have to be 
removed) downstream in the canals.  
Lam (1998) in a survey of hill irrigation systems in Nepal has found that in systems with permanent 
head-works some two days of labour contribution22 per household per year are required. In systems 
with partial cement lining of canals but without permanent head-works, some five days are required. 
In systems that have neither lined canals nor permanent head-works, some 8.5 days are required. 
Obviously, factors such as the age23 of what Lam terms “engineering infrastructure”(Lam 1998:73) 
(as opposed to more indigenous infrastructure), the nature of the technology used, the length of 
canals, and the fragility of the local ecology influences the requirements for labour contributions. It 
is therefore somewhat problematic to directly relate Lam’s data to the current data; some systems, 
for instance have pipes instead of lined canals either along part (Khinga, Kurgha) or most of the 
conveyance system (Tiri). In other cases, water is not diverted from rivers but springs (Arjewa and 
to some extent Tiri), and in most cases the canals are only lined in critical sections (Pakuwa, 
Kurgha, Khinga). However, if we consider that the systems possess a variety of technological 
attributes—a little of everything under very varying ecological conditions—Lam’s finding of 
something between 2–5 days for systems with some technological improvement corresponds 
reasonably well with the 3.8 days that households in the hills contributed in 2004. For the 
mountains, the average contributions of more than seven days per household in 2004 exceeded 
Lam’s findings from hill systems. 
However, keeping in mind that the ability to mobilize resources for maintenance purposes is a 
major challenge—and one that is at the heart of the collective action problematic—in irrigation 
systems, it would be too hasty to conclude that the reduced maintenance contributions were solely 
the result of improved technology. As discussed earlier, output and other indicators suggest that 
systems functioned optimally by the mid-1990s. However, cement-lined canals and concrete intakes 
                                                 
22 It is not clear if these data refer to regular, routine maintenance only, or if they also include emergency maintenance, 
as in the case for the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project data. 
23 While Lam’s data do show the age of irrigation systems, it is not clear how many years down the line, from the time 
of the introduction of engineering infrastructure, the survey was undertaken. 
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that are often referred to in dichotomous terms as permanent or temporary irrigation structures, are 
in fact far from permanent. As discussed earlier, landslides and floods have affected these 
‘engineering structures’; but it also needs to be pointed out that even under the most benign of 
physical conditions (e.g., no landslides, no floods, etc) in the hills and the mountains, these 
improved structures deteriorate. The cement lining cracks as a result of scouring, exposure to the 
elements and falling rocks; and intakes, culverts and other structures sink and shift as a result of 
erosion and other physical impacts.  
Repair and maintenance activities rarely entail the use of cement and other engineering 
infrastructure technology as the skills and financial resources24 required to use these technologies 
are not available in the irrigation communities, but require external intervention25 (see Martens 
1989). These issues are obviously central to any discussion of technological change and invoke the 
concept of social carriers of technology, which entails the idea that the social carrier (for example, 
an irrigated community) “fosters either implementation, operation or change in the technology by 
integration of the societal conditions and the technological conditions” (Berthelsen 1997:80). 
Berthelsen applies the concept in the context of technological change in small irrigation systems in 
Tanzania26, where she finds that farmers do not maintain their improved irrigation systems for a 
number of reasons27, including variance between different social carriers of technology. 
In the current Nepalese context, irrigation systems are, unlike the Tanzanian case, maintained; 
however, in the absence of external resources, farmers resort to solutions that better match 
technological and societal conditions than the external technology, i.e., they apply local technology 
in the maintenance of their systems. This means that expensive cement is replaced by earth, stones 
and, to some extent, wood, in the course of a process during which the ‘new’ irrigation systems 
gradually revert to the technological characteristics of the ‘old’ irrigation systems. This process, 
which takes place at a varying pace, depending on local ecological conditions and incidents of 
floods and landslides, was clearly evident in the projects visited in 2004 and 2005, although I did 
not recorded it systematically. The point here is that, particularly in systems affected by 
confounding damage to structures (such as at Lampata and Pipalbot, and to some extent 
Amalachaur), but also in relatively unaffected systems, requirements have not diminished since the 
mid-1990s, rather they have increased, and the deteriorating physical state of the systems does, in 
                                                 
24 Martens (1989) estimates, as an example, that to repair 100 m of collapsed canal using cement, etc. in a hill project in 
1985 would require US$ 13,000. 
25 The projects of the  Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, similar to any other infrastructure projects, were 
obviously subjected to cost-benefit analysis during which the expected life of a project was factored in. I have not been 
able to identify the exact project-life assumptions in the project’s documents, but a related source (Bhorletar, another 
International Labour Organisation project in the hills of Nepal) calculates the internal rate of return for a 50-year period 
(Martens 1989). The risk of creating dependence on outside resources was acknowledged in the DIDP approach (see, 
for example, Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 1996), and the ambition was to limit external inputs, and for 
example, use ‘appropriate’ technologies to the extent possible, and to train local masons. At the same time, however, 
there was an implicit expectation, on the part of farmers and project staff alike, that the Department of Irrigation would 
extend services in situations when repairs exceeded local capacity. This has not happened in any systems following the 
ending of the project in 1996. 
26 These irrigation systems were implemented through a largely similar approach to that of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project systems. 
27 The time elapsed between implementation of the systems in Berthelsen’s investigation is not clearly spelled out; 
hence the extent of the possible deterioration of the Tanzanian systems and the actual need for maintenance (which in 
the cases from Nepal is not great in the very early years of an improved system) is not entirely clear.  
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my opinion and indeed in that of many farmers with whom I inspected the systems, warrant more 
maintenance than provided, not the reduction suggested by the data.  
8.6  Summary of Findings 
The cross-sectional surveys that form the basis for the data in this chapter provide a picture of the 
performance trajectory of the irrigations systems in the socio-economic period from 1992 to 2004, 
in terms of indicators of agricultural productivity, water distribution, and maintenance. The key 
findings, with respect to the performance indicators used, are as follows. 
Agricultural productivity, hills 
Judging from data on three crops, the production of grain crops in the six hill systems peaked in the 
mid-1990s in the immediate years following rehabilitation, but appeared to have reduced over the 
period. Cropping intensities, in contrast increased over the period, as a result of an increase in land 
used for the cultivation of non-grain crops. 
• Rice yields peaked in most systems in the mid-1990s, but remained relatively stable over the 
period, at averages that exceeded 3 t/ha in most systems. 
• Maize yields peaked in all systems in the mid-1990s, at close to 3 t/ha. In the 2004 survey, these 
yields had reduced considerably by about 1 t/ha in most systems. The 2004 yield levels were 
slightly lower than or equal to the levels of the pre-project situation in five of the six projects. 
• Wheat yields also peaked in the mid-1990s (at about 2.5 t/ha in most systems), but had reduced 
by about half in most systems in the 2004 survey. The 2004 levels were below pre-project levels 
in all systems. 
• While all systems had experienced overall cropping intensity increments during the period, 
intensities had reduced slightly since they peaked in the mid-1990s. They remain considerably 
higher than the pre-project situation owing to an increase in vegetable and potato production. 
Given that the potato crop has reportedly gained in importance recently, cropping intensities 
may still be increasing in some systems, while they are stagnating in other systems. 
• Hard constraints, such as droughts, landslides and floods, appear to have affected production 
negatively in at least three systems (Amalachaur, Lampata and Pipalbot) in 2004. 
Agricultural productivity, mountains 
Judging from data on two crops, the production of grain crops in the three mountains systems has, 
in contrast to the situation in the hill systems, remained relatively stable. 
• Buckwheat yields increased steadily by about 0.5 t/ha in two systems over the period. They 
reduced slightly in one system. 
• Naked barley yields increased over the period, but reduced quite considerably by about 1 t/ha in 
two out of three systems since a peak in the mid-1990s. 
• Increments in cropping intensities have been experienced in two of three systems. 
• Hard constraints reflected negatively on yields in at least one system (Tiri) in 2004.  
Water distribution, hills 
• Farmers in all systems increasingly found irrigation water to be insufficient: two-thirds of 
farmers considered irrigation water to sufficient in the mid-1990s. By 2004, that figure was 
down to one-third. Water scarcity was mainly associated with dry season crops. 
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• Similarly, the vast majority of farmers considered that water was distributed ‘fairly’ in the mid-
1990s; far fewer found distribution to be fair in 2004. The proportion of farmers who found 
water to be unfairly distributed was highest in systems where water was also perceived as 
insufficient. 
• Most farmers ascribed water scarcity and unfair distribution to hard constraints; however, of 
those who do not, but rather point to water management problems, most are tail-end farmers. 
Water distribution, mountains 
• Farmers in two out of three systems increasingly found irrigation water to be insufficient. 
• While slightly more farmers found water to be unfairly distributed in 2004 than in the past, the 
vast majority did not. There is no pronounced relationship between farmers’ perceptions of 
water insufficiency and perceptions of unfair distribution. All farmers in all systems ascribed 
scarcity to hard constraints rather than management problems. 
System maintenance, hills 
• Household labour contributions to system maintenance fell steadily over the period, from an 
average of some 16 days in 1992 to four days per annum in 2004. 
• Reductions were particularly evident in the mid-1990s, following system rehabilitation, and had 
continued to decrease in 2004. 
• In two systems, more than half of farmers were aware of the existence of sanctions for 
abstaining from collective maintenance works; in another two systems, between a quarter and a 
third knew of their existence; while in the remaining two systems, no one was aware of 
sanctions.  
• In two systems, more farmers were dissatisfied with irrigation system management in 2004 than 
in 1995; in two systems, that number had reduced; and in one system, it has stayed at the same 
level. Data were lacking for one system. 
System maintenance, mountains 
• Household labour contributions to system maintenance fell steadily over the period, from an 
average of some 47 days in 1992 to seven days per annum in 2004.  
• A reduction was particularly evident in the mid-1990s, and had by 2004 decreased even further. 
Compared with the hill systems, contributions remain relatively high and, considering that 
caretakers carry out ad hoc work, the level of maintenance in the mountains systems remained 
high. 
• Practically all farmers were aware of the existence of sanctions for abstaining from collective 
maintenance works. 
• Neither in 1994 nor in 2004 did a single farmer express dissatisfaction with irrigation system 
maintenance. 
8.6.1  Concluding Remarks 
In the hill systems, the production of staple grain crops had declined quite considerably, at least 
compared to mid-1990s data. Hard constraints played a role in this, but the almost uniform 
reduction in dry season yields implies that factors other than hard constraints need to be considered. 
Likewise, hard constraints do play a role in explaining the rather strong tendency for farmers to find 
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water supplies increasing insufficient, but given that the tendency was manifest not only in systems 
afflicted by calamities, other factors need to be considered as well. Furthermore, the reduction in 
labour contribution for maintenance—an activity that epitomizes the complexity associated with 
collective action—is not warranted by the physical state of systems, particularly where these have 
been subjected to natural calamities, but also where they have not. Moreover, the finding that water 
scarcity in the hills is associated with mainly dry season crops is particularly indicative of irrigation 
system inefficiency. So are the findings that many more farmers find water to be distributed more 
unfairly than in the past, and that awareness or enforcement of operational rules is limited. 
However, the indicators do not point unequivocally in a downward direction, as it appears that 
agricultural productivity when measured in terms of cropping intensity is stable, and may even have 
risen. 
Even so, the overall picture of the irrigation system performance trajectory in the hills is one of 
lowered performance during the political-economic period of recording, particularly since the mid-
1990s. In contrast, performance in the mountain systems has remained relative stable: yield 
fluctuations in overall terms and in terms of the period since rehabilitation have been limited. Quite 
importantly, because, as Oakerson suggests, inequities tend to lead to the collapse of reciprocity 
arrangements, experiences of water insufficiency in the mountains are not matched by perceptions 
of unfair distribution. While labour contributions have been reduced following rehabilitation, they 
remain fairly high, and there is a high degree of awareness of rules-in-use with respect to 
maintenance arrangements. These contrasting findings confirm the picture presented in the previous 
chapter of highly structured irrigation systems in the mountains, and more loosely structured 
systems in the hills. The findings also raise a host of questions with respect to the causes of reduced 
performance and institutional erosion, other than hard constraints. Consequently, factors associated 
with the broader social, economic and institutional context will be investigated in the following 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 9: Changing Livelihoods, Changing Institutions 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a picture of the performance trajectory of the irrigation systems was 
constructed. By applying Oakerson’s framework for analysis of the commons, it was established 
that irrigation system performance, measured in terms of key indicators, had been reduced on a 
number of accounts during the socio-political period under examination. This reduction was 
particularly noticeable in hill systems, while mountain system performance had remained relatively 
stable. Reduced performance in the hills could, to some extent, be linked to ‘hard’ physical 
constraints, but it appears that other impinging factors are at play as well. Therefore, the aim of this 
chapter is to investigate the economic, social and institutional contexts that may be important as 
additional factors influencing the irrigation system performance trajectory, negatively or positively. 
The focus of the analytical endeavours, in accordance with the overriding re-study methodology, 
remains one of studying the processes of change, particularly the relationships between livelihoods 
change and change in irrigation organizations and related natural resource management institutions 
in the 1990-2005 political-economic period. 
As in most of the previous chapters, I will start with an ‘episode’.  
9.2 An Episode: From the Village to the Gulf 
As noted in earlier chapters, a seemingly timeless atmosphere meets outside visitors to both the hill 
and mountain village settings. One may still experience, as Matthiessen did (see chapter 5), an 
initial feeling of being ‘a century away’. However, re-visiting villages in the Dhaulagiri Zone in 
2004, after almost a decade away, some changes were soon apparent. First of all, people were, 
thanks to the availability of affordable Chinese garments, generally better dressed and no longer 
went cold during the winter season. Secondly, the cropping portfolio had been expanded from the 
predominant stable crop regimes to regimes that included many more vegetables, sometimes grown 
in the khet, and sometimes in the immediate vicinity of the homesteads (where household 
wastewater provided part irrigation). Thirdly, the young men, their idle restlessness normally very 
visible in public places of any village, were virtually absent. The latter was possibly the most 
notable change. The absence of young men was also notable in some villages in the early 1990s, 
particularly, in Myagdi District, where long-established recruitment of Gurkha soldiers to the 
British and Indian armies have created migration networks among certain ethnic groups 
(particularly the Magar) and in Mustang District, where migration is an equally long-established 
livelihood strategy. However, in the Brahmin villages of the hills known for agricultural 
livelihoods, migration was not particularly visible in the 1990s, and but had increased significantly, 
I was told, over the past decade. 
A late evening Qatar Airways flight out of Kathmandu in November 2004 elucidated the link 
between the village situation and migration. I was, seemingly, one of the only foreigners on the 
flight to Qatar, apart from the person sitting next to me—ironically a Pakistani labour recruitment 
agent based in Qatar. Not only were my fellow passengers all male, they were all also young. Most 
of the guys looked tired. Their unkempt hair and ruffled clothes gave the appearance of having slept 
rough while waiting for final arrangements in Kathmandu. The speed with which the in-flight meals 
were consumed suggested that they had not come too soon. ‘Where are you going?’ I asked the guy 
across the aisle. ‘Arab,’ (the generic term for countries in the Arabian Gulf area) he replied, and 
pulled out a roll of papers from inside his clothing to show me. The crumbled paper, with the 
letterhead of a Kathmandu Manpower agent, mentioned an address in Saudi Arabia. ‘What kind of 
work will you be doing?’ I asked. ‘Work’, the young man replied. 
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Another event, a few months earlier, also served to place the villages of the Dhaulagiri Zone in a 
global perspective. In late August, news started seeping into Nepal that a militant group in Iraq had 
executed 12 Nepalese labourers that they had been holding hostage. The incident went largely 
unnoticed outside Nepal, overshadowed as it was in western media by the kidnapping of western 
journalists. It was, however, vehemently noticed in Kathmandu. In the late evening of 31 August, 
crowds had begun to set fire to tyres in the streets, and by noon the next day the metropolitan area 
was experiencing some of its worst riots in recent times. Rumours of impending curfews reached 
my residence, and while queuing for supplies in front of the grocer’s shop, the local drunkard’s mad 
ranting against the ‘mussulmans and all their evil’, although drawing a few discreet smiles, did little 
to ease the collective feeling of anxious uncertainty.  
Curfews were imposed for five days, but barely quelled the looting and arson that were aimed at the 
more than 100 or so manpower companies in Kathmandu and ‘Muslim’ institutions and businesses, 
ranging from the central mosque to the Qatar Airways office to bead shops (a traditionally Muslim 
enterprise) and the Egyptian Embassy, carried out mostly—judging from newspaper pictures—by 
young men. When things had calmed down, the media attempted to analyse the genesis and the 
dynamics of the event, but as is often the case with riots in Kathmandu the analyses were largely 
speculative, blaming—real or imaginary—Maoist and Hindu fundamentalist ‘hands’. Equally 
speculative, perhaps, I leaned towards believing that at least some of the culprits would have 
belonged to the body of aspirant labour migrants who, as often reported in the newspapers, faced 
with the high entry costs of overseas migration, cough up huge fees to beat the red tape on which 
the manpower industry thrives, and end up feeling cheated and frustrated when their endeavours are 
unsuccessful. Surely not everyone standing in the long lines in front of embassies or hanging 
around manpower offices would be lucky enough to end up in a Qatar Airways flight out of Nepal. 
Whatever the genesis of the riots, most analyses, including my own, probably failed to fully 
understand what one observer termed “the political economy of popular disenchantment” (Lal, 
2004). 
9.3 Analytical Approach 
The above account may appear somewhat off the track in relation to an investigation into irrigated 
agriculture. Migration, remittances and social and political upheavals, however, are part of the 
political, economic, social and institutional contexts of rural change. The young man who will be 
working in ‘Arab’ will not, at least not as long as he is away, work in agriculture. The funds that he 
saves while abroad are, for the most part, likely to be invested outside agriculture1, at least in the 
longer run; hence the likelihood that his children will become farmers is slim. But how do we deal, 
analytically, with these and the many other complexities of diversification?  In line with the 
positioning in the theory chapter (where I discussed the theoretical background for these 
problematics) livelihoods analysis emphasizing the role of institutions for mediating access to assets 
is considered a useful framework for informing and structuring such an analysis. Ellis’ definition of 
a livelihood is as follows: 
                                                 
1 De Haan (1999) in a review of the migration literature concludes that the extent to which re-investment of remittances 
into agriculture takes place depends, to a large extent, on whether the right incentives for agriculture exist. Even though, 
as the previous chapter showed, the growing demand for vegetables would seem to constitute such incentives for some 
farmers, the fact that plots are small and increasingly fragmented, and that there is limited scope for capital investment, 
combined with the uncertainties associated with the political situation and the lack of educational facilities (to mention 
just a few factors, some of which are dealt with in more detail in this chapter) would, it seems, appear to outweigh 
incentives for substantial investment of remittances in agriculture. 
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“A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), 
the activities and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that 
together determine the living gained by the individual or household” (2000:10). 
It may be noted that Ellis makes a distinction between institutions and social relations. The former 
are understood by Ellis as rules that shape human interaction (as in collective action thinking), and 
which govern access to natural resources, markets etc. The latter are understood as gender, kin, 
family, class, caste, and ethnicity and so on that more indirectly, as social norms, influence options 
for access (Ellis 2000). This distinction may be seen as being in contrast to the theoretical 
propositions of chapter 2, which understand all institutions to be subsumed in social relations; 
however, my recognition of Ellis’ separation of institutions into these categories does not imply 
conceptual ‘reductionism’. Rather, it implies recognition of a need for conceptual pragmatism, 
promoted by a need to make practical distinctions between organizational and more abstract 
manifestations of institutions, as explained in the following. 
The system performance data of the previous chapter lent itself to analysis using an analytical 
framework rooted in neo-classical economic thinking. The socio-economic and institutional 
trajectory data of this chapter focus less on the irrigation systems themselves, and more on the 
livelihoods that are played out by households in irrigated communities. Thereby they lend 
themselves to analysis within a livelihoods framework that is based on both the operational as well 
as the more abstract concepts associated with livelihoods and institutions. Social relations denote 
theoretically abstract and complex relationships, and are not as easily operationalized in the 
practical sense as are the ‘institutions at work’ referred to by Ellis and many others within the 
framework of livelihoods analysis. After all, the collection of the data to be analysed was originally 
conceived in a development project context of livelihoods improvement that, in the main, 
recognized organizational manifestations of institutions. In particular, the largely socio-economic 
data in the first part of this chapter lend themselves to analysis using operational concepts, while 
data in later parts are better explained through frameworks that more clearly acknowledge 
institutions as constitutive of social as well as economic relations. 
9.3.1  The Analytical Framework 
What follows then is a framework (figure 4, below) for thinking through and structuring the 
analysis of the relationships between social, economic and political change, and changes (other than 
those deriving from ‘hard’ technological constraints) in irrigation organizations. The framework is 
based on Ellis’ (2000) framework for livelihoods analysis but has not only been tailored so as to 
better fit the data context of this research but has also been extended in line with the ambition to 
understand relationships between livelihood changes and changes in irrigated agriculture. Other 
sources of inspiration include Seddon and Adhikari’s (2003) livelihoods analysis in the context of 
food security in Nepal, and the access mechanisms described in Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘Theory 
of Access’ (see chapter 2).  
The ‘historical political economy of access’ in column A constitutes the starting point in the 
framework. In the context of this framework, the concept is borrowed from Seddon and Adhikari 
(2003) who, as mentioned above, use it to analyse food security in Nepal. They refer to the  
“… historical political economy of food production, distribution and consumption capable 
of providing a broad framework within which to examine and explore the key issues of 
unequal food availability and unequal entitlements to food that together determine the food 
security of local communities” (2003: 23), 
in a context where, 
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“… for the majority of Nepalis in rural areas, livelihoods are risky and uncertain at the best 
of times. They are also highly dependent on a nexus of social relationships with others, both 
in their immediate locality and beyond, and on the ability (or lack of it) to gain control of 
and access to resources and income-generating opportunities in the public and private 
sectors” (Seddon and Adhikari 2003:49). 
Notions of food security (which may be achieved either through the production or the purchase of 
foodstuffs) are thus closely related to livelihoods. I therefore take historical political economy to 
refer, in the context of livelihoods trajectories in the irrigated communities under investigation, to 
the ‘who gets what and where’ aspects of access to opportunity. The historical political economy is 
made up of the (historical) structural contexts associated with irrigation in Nepal that were 
presented in chapter 1 as well as, in a more regional context, in chapter 5. Institutions should, in the 
context of historical political economy, be understood as ‘formal’ legislative (e.g., land titles), 
‘informal’ legislative (e.g., claims to land) and common property regimes that arose as a result of 
claims to and appropriation of land. Caste and ethnicity were, in chapter 5, also identified as 
important institutions, or social relations, in this context. 
Including historical political economy in the livelihood analysis frameworks also serves to avoid the 
historical de-contextualization that has tended to characterize not only analysis of the commons (see 
chapter 2) but also the ‘sustainable livelihoods’ analysis of donor agencies (see, for example, 
www.dfid.com, Ellis 2000, chapter 2), which typically have the assets (column B in this 
framework) as their starting point. However, access to assets (or entitlements), not least those 
associated with the natural (water), physical (irrigation infrastructure) and social capital (as 
networks, associations), by irrigated households has come about, as also suggested in chapter 2, in 
the context of historical and contemporary processes and dynamics. In the same vein, the use of 
historical political economy as a contextual backdrop serves to de-emphasize the rational choice 
and utility-maximizing interpretations of livelihoods analysis2. Access to various assets is not only 
modified (implying both facilitation and constraints), as the framework (column C) suggests, by 
existing social relations/institutions, but also by the historical political economy under which these 
social relations/institutions have come about. 
Natural and physical capital (column B) are concepts that can be related in a straightforward 
manner to the earlier analyses of the workings of irrigated agriculture in chapters 7 and 8. Financial 
capital is also relatively straightforward and typically refers to the stocks of money that a household 
has access to such as cash, savings or credit (Ellis 2000). It should be noted though, that in the 
Dhaulagiri cases, savings are often held in other forms such as livestock, firewood, stocks of 
supplies (mainly in the mountains) or as gold and jewellery (in both hills and mountains) for 
reasons of inaccessibility to financial institutions, risk-spreading and social status3. Compared with 
the assets already mentioned, the concept of human capital (column B) takes us into somewhat 
more intangible territory. It chiefly refers to labour, and its education, skills and health (Carney 
1998). Government investment in formal education and training is usually seen as the key to 
increasing human capital. However, increases in human capital may also be seen, as will be the case 
in the coming analysis, as something that comes about through more informal channels. These 
channels are associated with reduced information asymmetries in the socio-political period under 
                                                 
2 Gore, for instance, talks of the “welfarist view of social disadvantage which Amartya Sen has begun, but which, in the 
guise of the concept of capabilities, still remains wedded to an excessively individualist and insufficiently social view” 
(1995:9). See also chapter 2 for comments in this regard. 
3 In Mustang District, for instance, vast amounts of firewood placed on rooftops are a visible sign of affluence. 
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investigation, as well as with the social remittances (see Levitt 1996) associated with migration and 
the combined changes in ideas and perceptions (see chapter 4).  
The last and most intangible asset is that of social capital. It is also in many ways the most 
controversial because of its association with Putnam’s (1993) envisaging of social capital as being 
largely related to horizontal social activity such as in clubs and associations of like-minded 
individuals (Ellis 2000), and its ensuing widespread but analytically contested usage (see, for 
example, Harriss and de Renzio 19974). The most useful definition of the concept, at least in the 
context of the hills and mountain settings, involves taking a step back from the organizational 
manifestations of institutions and understanding social capital in terms of the “community and 
wider social claims [both horizontal and vertical—my insertion] on which individuals and 
households can draw” (Ellis 2000:36). This connotes notions of communities of trust and shared 
interests as well as the networks of social and familial relations (Seddon and Adihikari 2003) and 
reciprocity that contribute to, for instance, explanations of historical economic dynamics in the 
mountains and in mountain diasporas (see chapter 5). Notions of shared interests and reciprocity 
are, as the performance analysis of the previous chapter illustrate, also quite central to irrigation 
system performance. 
Using social capital in Putnam’s associational terms in the context of the livelihood framework 
would also tend to overlap with the rubric of institutions (column C). However, just as assets do not 
merely appear out of nowhere, nor do the institutions in column C. This is regardless of whether 
they serve to respond to collective action problems by modifying access to resources or are 
important in playing out other livelihood pursuits. As proposed earlier, these institutions are best 
understood through some degree of historical political economy and contemporary contextual 
analysis of, among others, the “socio-economic factors that affect the myriad of relations on which 
property, common property and other forms of resource entitlement are based” (Johnson 2004:409).  
This argument is obviously fairly central to this thesis. So is the more implicit understanding that 
power relations influence access to resources (as suggested in the context of understanding water 
allocation and distribution), and that these relations are important for understanding how institutions 
govern or modify use and access to natural resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003, Beck and Fajber 
2006). Ribot and Peluso’s proposition, in particular, that “privileged access to the individuals or 
institutions with the authority to make and implement laws can influence strongly who benefits 
from the resource in question”, suggests that analysis of changes with respect to the meaning and 
importance of institutions would benefit from analysis of power relations within the realm of the 
institutional landscape within and surrounding the irrigated communities. The data, however, it 
needs to be emphasized, do not lend themselves to analysing power relations directly, such as, for 
example, in the empirical sense of mapping an individual’s privileged access to resources. More 
indirectly, power is understood as subsumed in social relations and political economy, including the 
                                                 
4 Harriss and de Renzio (1997) argue that that Putnam’s ‘associational’ use of the term—“attractive to both the neo-
liberal right…and to those committed to ideas about participation and grassroots empowerment” (1992:920)—which 
celebrates the role of ‘civil’ society as a determinant of socio-economic development and ‘good’ government, is an 
over-simplification because it does not distinguish different forms of capital and power relations, and poses ‘civil 
society’ against the state (rather than recognizing that the state and its political institutions may also produce ‘social 
capital’). They contrast Putnam’s usage of the term with that of Coleman (1990) and Bourdieu (1980), and argue that 
the latter two authors’ emphasis on the accumulation and reproduction of social capital, its relationship with social-
structural resources and how it “inheres in the structure of relationships between persons and among persons” (Coleman 
1990:302), among other things, creates analytically sounder foundations. The purpose of Harriss and De Renzio’s 
critique is to counter the widespread usage of Putnam’s interpretations of social capital in development policy. 
 160
 161
ability of communities and individuals to utilize the pluralistic institutional and legal settings that 
emerged in the socio-political period to enhance livelihoods. 
Figure 4 
Framework for Analysing Relationships Between Livelihoods Changes and Irrigated Agriculture/The Commons 
A B C D E F G 
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Adapted from Ellis (2000: 30), Seddon and Adhikari (2003:23) 
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It should be noticed that unlike the Oakerson framework of the previous chapter the number of 
arrows in the present framework is limited. This is because there is not necessarily a linear order of 
causal links in the framework, particularly not between columns B, C and D. For instance, social 
relations and other institutions may be seen to influence access to and configurations of assets, and 
also the other way around, in many cases. Likewise, trends and shocks may influence claims and 
actual access to assets and the institutions that mediate such claims and access. Some of the trends 
and shocks (column D) have already been touched upon as hard constraints in the previous chapter; 
the major themes that will appear in the coming analysis (but which have also been touched upon in 
earlier chapters) are those of democratic policies (trend), civil war and democratic regression 
(shocks), migration and globalization (trends), and the local economy (trend). 
While the historical political economy forms the longer-term contextual backdrop, the relationship 
between assets, modifying processes, trends and shocks, and livelihood activities unfolds in the 
shorter term. As Ellis points out,  
 “… the manner of this unfolding and the stresses and strains that result in new patterns of 
activities emerging are influenced by trends and events that are in varying degrees 
exogenous to the household and to local circumstances” (2000:39).  
In this case, the political-economic period in which these relationships unfold is between the early 
1990s and the early 2000s. This pointing towards dynamic interactions, rather than a clear order of 
causality, it may be argued, is symptomatic of post-modern claims to complexity. Indeed, as the 
analysis will suggest, the relationships are multi-causal, multi-factorial and changeable. What 
matters in the context of the framework and its ambitions is that assets, institutions and exogenous 
factors in various combinations result in the “adoption and adaptation over time of livelihood 
strategies” (Ellis 2000:40), i.e., strategies for coping, survival and improving the quality life 
(column E).  
In rural contexts such as the hills and mountains of Nepal, these strategies translate into a 
combination of natural-resource-based activities (in the context of this investigation the cultivation 
of irrigated crops, but forestry, livestock, collection, etc. are other such activities) and non-natural-
resource-based activities (column F). Closely related to the hypothesis of this thesis (see below), it 
will be argued that diversification has taken place within and between the two categories. As 
already suggested in chapter 8, cropping portfolios have diversified, as have livelihoods in general, 
which now include sources other than natural resources. Both categories have effects on livelihoods 
(column G) and livelihood security, through income levels and the degrees of risk associated with, 
for example, seasonality.  
Deviating from conventional livelihood analysis frameworks, I add the rather subjective notions of 
priorities and perceptions as the sum of columns A–F. This is to suggest that livelihood changes 
lead to changed priorities with respect to education and other social aspirations as well as 
perceptions of what constitutes well-being. I suggest a causal relationship between such change 
with respect to where people see themselves in the future and of irrigated agriculture, as illustrated 
by the vertical arrow in column G. This strong nod in the direction of recognizing people’s agency 
as a prominent element in livelihoods strategies (column E) is in line with Sen’s arguments that 
people’s own perceptions, in their own social contexts, of notions such as well-being matter a great 
deal with respect to strategies for livelihood construction (see Bagchi et al. 1998). In sum, the 
vertical arrow in column G from livelihoods to irrigated agriculture denotes the putative causal 
relationship that is central to the hypothesis of this thesis, i.e., that increasingly diversified 
livelihoods affect irrigated agriculture in a number of ways, from organization to cropping patterns 
to maintenance levels and productivity.  
 163
9.3.2  Methodological Considerations 
The framework encourages the focus of attention towards assets/entitlement. Not as qualities in 
their own right, but rather as resources whose functions depend on historical ‘access conditions’ and 
a wide range of dynamic interactions with institutions and the trends and shocks of the politico-
economic moment. Assets and entitlements that, when transformed by interactions, may affect 
irrigated agriculture. As mentioned above, the framework does not claim to represent in a linear 
fashion, cause and effects relationships. Obviously though, the framework does imply an overall 
drift from the structural ‘historical political economy’ conditions of column A towards the effects 
on irrigated agriculture of column G.  
The nature of the data, based as it is on an over-time study and the limitations imposed by this 
approach (the prisoner of past data ‘slavery’ described in chapters 3 and 8), would, in any case, 
mean that a mechanical or linear approach is problematic in that the available data do not—
something that Ellis notes is a general problem with livelihood frameworks—meet the “apparent 
information requirements of complying with the framework in its entirety” (2000:47). As the 
recognition of the fluidity of relationships implies, multiple factors influence the livelihood 
trajectories of a specific social, economic and cultural segment within a given socio-political period. 
Nonetheless, the framework enables the structuring of the analysis and the inductive search for 
explanation that characterizes this investigation, but it is not meant as a totalizing framework. As 
another disclaimer, it must be mentioned that not all the factors listed in the framework will receive 
equal attention in the analysis. Some factors, such as the ‘world economy’ and the ‘national 
economy’ of column D, are understood to be structural factors that influence, for example, labour 
migration but are not dealt with in much detail.  
9.4 Improved Livelihoods 
The visible changes in the studied villages, described in section 9.2, had (in the context of this 
study) taken place in a socio-political period characterized by considerable trends and shocks 
including democratic reforms, the Maoist insurgency, the democratic regression following the royal 
takeover, and considerable social, economic and cultural upheavals (see chapter 4). In order to 
throw light on the somewhat contradictory courses of events during the politico-economic moment, 
I posed the broad question: ‘Has life in (village name) become better or worse over the last 10 
years?’ The question was asked to key informants, all of whom were farmers with a record of being 
active in water users’ associations (see methodology section for details). Somewhat surprisingly, 
not least given the accelerating pace of the civil war in 2004, practically all respondents found that 
life in their villages—except in Tiri in Mustang District—had improved. Explanations as to how 
and why this was the case may be summarized as follows. 
In the mountains (i.e., in Khinga and Thini) ‘improved conditions for agriculture’ competes with 
‘more business opportunities’ as the main reason for finding that life had improved. Better 
conditions for agriculture have come about as a result of more stable (and ample) supplies of water, 
while business opportunities are explained in terms of improved conditions for trade and tourism. In 
Tiri, where life, had apparently became worse over the 10-year period of the study, deteriorating 
physical conditions for agriculture is assigned as the main reason, and increased competition within 
traditional areas of trade, as the secondary reason for this state of affairs. 
In the hills, ‘improved agriculture’ competes with ‘foreign employment’ as the principal reason for 
finding that life had improved. Improved agriculture is understood holistically as related to 
irrigation, production, diversification, extension, and market access/transportation. Migration in 
search of greener pastures is not—at least not by those who stay back and certainly not openly—
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considered painful or an act of distress, but rather as the fulfilment of long dreamt of opportunities. 
Indeed, lives are seen to have improved considerably because “these days our boys can go abroad” 
and because “most men are now working abroad”. These typical statements are fairly telling of the 
almost mythical light in which foreign employment (particularly in countries other than India) is 
viewed. While a long established livelihood strategy for army families and other groups, 
particularly in the mountains, foreign migration has now become accessible to new groups, 
including Brahmin farmer families. 
In the element of the survey that sought more specifically to establish livelihoods trajectories, a 
related personal question was asked purposively—and sometimes randomly (see methodology 
section)—to selected farmers: ‘Are you and your family better off these days than when you were a 
child?’ The responses reveal a picture of longer-term improving livelihoods trajectories. All 
respondents found that their livelihoods and quality of life in general had improved tremendously 
compared to their childhoods. While the personal nature of the question prompted a variety of, as 
well as more nuanced, qualifying comments, the themes that had also been emphasized by the key 
informants in response to the ‘has life become better or worse’ question, remained dominant, as 
expressed in table 19 below, which sums up responses to both questions. 
Table 19 
Reasons for Improved Livelihood Trajectories, 2004, (n=18+11) 
General, short-term themes (decade) Better conditions for agriculture (irrigation, transport, 
markets) 
More opportunities for trade and business* 
Access to foreign employment/remittances 
Personal, longer-term themes (generation) Better conditions for agriculture (irrigation, land, 
transport, markets) 
More opportunities for trade and business* 
Access to non-agricultural sources of income, including 
foreign employment/remittances 
More (and more varied) food available 
Less drudgery (walking, carrying) owing to bridges, 
roads, water supply 
Availability of clothes, shoes 
Sanitation, hygiene 
Education 
Sources: Key-Effects and Livelihood Trajectory Survey 2004. 
Note: *In the mountain communities. 
Many farmers were quite resounding in their judgment of changes since childhood, stating that 
‘well, you just cannot compare’, and ‘differences are like night and day’. A low-caste farmer with a 
small plot of land in Kurgha whose parents had been landless labourers even exclaimed that in 
comparison with the past ‘life today is bliss’ because, as she explained: 
“We did not own land. There was the 50 per cent system where we had to give half of the 
harvest to the owner. We used to survive like that; there was no way of earning just a few 
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rupees. We had nothing. Now my brothers have grown up and gone to India. Compared to 
our parents, we are in a better position.” 
At the other end of the social scale, a high-caste farmer in the same community with considerable 
landholdings and a son working in the Gulf explains that: 
“My parents had to carry, for example, things like sacks of salt on their backs for 10 days to 
get here, just to survive. It is available here now. In those days, there were no bridges across 
the rivers and that caused all sorts of problems, but now we have these facilities. Particularly 
thanks to transportation all the necessary items are available here. We used to have to hire 
teachers to come here, but now schools have been opened. All my daughters have their 
School Leaving Certificate, and so does my son. But we have to constantly think about how 
to increase our income.” 
Advances with respect to physical, natural and human capital are matched by larger stocks of 
financial capital, as shown in tables 20 and 21 below.  
 Table 20 
Average Annual Household Incomes, Mountain Systems, 1995 and 2004  
(Nepali rupees) 
System 1995 2004 2004 (adjusted)  Percentage change 
Thini 72,667 178,345 115,284 58.6 
Tiri 51,400 170,000 109,890 113.8 
Khinga 66,000 114,625 74,095 12.3 
Sources: DIDP Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
The incomes, which in the tables have been adjusted for inflation5, should chiefly be considered 
indicators of magnitude, as information on income is notoriously prone to bias6. Income 
differentials between the hills and the mountains are striking, with the 2004 mountain incomes—
ranging from Rupees 74,095 (US$ 1015)7 in Khinga to Nepali Rupees 115,284 (US$ 1579) in 
Thini—amounting to double and even triple of hill incomes. Hill incomes range from Nepali 
Rupeess 31,674 (US$ 433) to Nepali Rupees 43,956 (US$ 602). It is also in two of the mountain 
communities (Thini and Tiri) that increases over the period have been the most significant.  
                                                 
5 The incomes in the tables have been adjusted by taking into consideration the total change in the price index while 
comparing the 1995 and 2004 income levels, as follows. The Economic Survey published annually by the Ministry of 
Finance considered 1995/96 as the base year for computing consumer price indices (CPI) for successive years. 
Compared to the average CPI for 1995/96, the index is 154.7 for 2003/04 (Ministry of Finance 2004). This means that 
there has been a total change in the price index of about 54.7 per cent over the period. This is the total inflation for the 
period whereas annual average inflation is about six per cent for the period.  
6 In order to offset bias, the information was arrived at indirectly, by asking first of all about expenditures such as food, 
school fees, etc. (which people tend to be happy to disclose) and then about the ways that the expenditure was met. This 
method is probably still prone to under-reporting, as savings and emergency expenditures are not included. 
7 Exchange rate used: US$ 1=Nepali Rupees 73. 
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The increase in Tiri of 114 per cent is particularly spectacular, and appears to contradict the above-
mentioned perceptions of deteriorating livelihood conditions; in that particular location, the 
distribution of income, however, is very uneven and the increases appear to have primarily affected 
two rich households. The increase in Khinga is relatively modest. Income changes in the hill 
communities, as shown in table 21 below, range from a modest 19 per cent in Kurgha to 77 per cent 
in Pakuwa. 
Table 21 
Average Annual Household Incomes, Hill Systems, 1995 and 2004  
(Nepali rupees) 
System 1995 2004 2004 (adjusted)  Percentage change 
Amalachaur 27,000 61,000 39,431 46.0 
Arjewa 28,000 51,000 32,967 17.7 
Kurgha 31,000 57,000 36,846 18.9 
Pakuwa 23,000 63,000 40,724 77.1 
Lampata 25,000 49,000 31,674 26.7 
Pipalbot n.a. 68,000 43,956 – 
Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
Official figures also suggest considerable income differentials between mountains and hills, with 
reported household incomes (2004 figures) of Nepali Rupees 84,896 (US$ 1163) for Myagdi 
District, Nepali Rupees 85,820 (US$ 1176) for Parbat District, Nepali Rupees 80,517 (US$ 1103) 
for Baglung District, and Nepali Rupees 173,498 (US$ 2377) for Mustang District. The national 
average household income amounted to Nepali Rupees 92,154 (US$ 1262) for the same year 
(United Nations Development Programme 20048). Another official source, the Nepal Living 
Standard Survey9, found average household incomes in 2003/04 for the ‘Western Mountains and 
Hills’10 to be NRs 64,677 (US$ 885) (Central Bureau of Statistics 2004). So while the data of tables 
21 and 22 do reflect proportional variations between mountains and hills, as well as limited 
variation in the hills communities, in line with official data, the incomes are not particularly 
impressive in comparison with the aggregate data available, either for the hills or the mountains.  
However, there is reason to be cautious with respect to using official data as a yardstick. Firstly, 
official figures include the urban areas of districts. The increasing concentration of wealth in urban 
areas (see chapter 4) would, as concluded in another micro-level study (Angood et al. 2002) that 
compares incomes in two irrigated hill communities in the hill district of Dhading with official data, 
                                                 
8 While not specified in United Nations Development Programme 2004, the figures are assumed to be net incomes. 
Exchange rate used: US$ 1=Nepali Rupees 73. 
9 Supported by the World Bank, the Nepal Living Standard Survey were undertaken by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
in 1995/96 and in 2003/04. They are based on a cross-sectional survey of 3345 households across Nepal, and are 
considered reliable (see Blaikie et al. 2002). 
10 Which includes the Western, Mid-Western and Far Western Development Regions. 
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mean that such aggregate data are likely to be biased by higher urban incomes. Secondly, it appears 
that the methodology applied to obtain income data differs: both the United Nations Development 
Programme and the Nepal Living Standard Survey figures appear to include the value of own farm 
produce consumed in the household, in addition to what is sold. The data of tables 21 and 22 only 
count the value of agricultural products that are sold (i.e., cash incomes from agriculture) as well as 
wages, remittances, etc., and are therefore likely to be lower than the yardstick data.  
In any case, the main focus of interest in the context of this investigation is the relative changes in 
income and livelihood conditions that have taken place for irrigated farmers over the course of the 
political-economic period, as witnessed both by people’s perceptions and the income data. The 
trend that is evident in the micro-level surveys is in line with the positive changes shown in more 
aggregate terms by the Nepal Living Standard Survey, which finds that national average household 
incomes grew by more than 80 per cent from 1995/96 to 2003/04 (Central Bureau of Statistics 
2004), a period that roughly corresponds with that of tables 21 and 22. Average household incomes 
in the western hills and mountains grew by more than 85 per cent over the same period (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2004). Also according to the Nepal Living Standard Survey, ‘self-reported 
welfare’ for Nepal as a whole has improved. Inadequacy in food consumption has declined by 21 
per cent, housing by 23 per cent, clothing by 22 per cent, health care by 31 per cent, and access to 
schooling by 24 per cent (Central Bureau of Statistics 2004). For the Western Mountains and Hills 
category (which includes the Dhaulagiri Zone), perceptions of inadequacy appears to have declined 
even more; in food consumption by 24 per cent, housing by 25 per cent, clothing by 29 per cent, 
health care by 35 per cent, and access to schools by 34 per cent (CBS 2004). These also happen to 
be the themes highlighted by farmers in figure 19, above. 
These improving livelihood trends in rural Nepal are confirmed by the acclaimed (see, for example, 
Murray 2002, Rigg 2006) repeat study made by Blaikie et al., which, also explained in chapter 3, 
sought to understand the  
“… construction of livelihood trajectories (or the course of individuals and households 
through time, in terms of occupation, income, investment and consumption decisions and 
other key economic variables) and the implications for class composition and agrarian 
change” (Blaikie et al. 2002:1256).  
With a focus on the hill and terai areas immediately south of the Dhaulagiri Zone, the authors—
using a repeat cross-sectional survey combined with qualitative investigations—compared patterns 
of rural lives between 1974/7511 and 1996/97. They found that not only had ‘middle peasants’12 
(the category that best seems to match the irrigated farmers of this study) as a class category grown, 
they had also fared quite well over the 20-year period that saw higher incomes, more resil
livelihoods, and generally better standards of living. Blaikie et al. observe: 
ient 
                                                
“… a large core of households… have coped tolerably well on the whole over the past 20 
years. Coming from a production base involving the ownership of very small plots of land, 
they have prudently bought and sold small parcels of land, experimented with fertilizer and 
improved seed, increased irrigation, borrowed or lent moderate amounts of money for 
investment and consumption, put more children (including some daughters) into formal 
 
11 See Blaike et al. (1980) for the first study (see also chapter 3 where considerable reference is made to this 
publication). 
12 The sample was divided into categories of labourers, labourers and peasant producers, small employers and large 
employers with or without non-agricultural income. The ‘middle peasant’ refers to peasant or ‘domestic’ producers.  
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education, and maintained basic consumption patterns based on self-provisioning food 
security. But most important, rural households in western Nepal have been active in 
encouraging individual migration and securing remittances from those migrants” 
(2002:1267). 
In sum, it appears that certain groups such as the ‘middle (i.e. typically irrigated and landed) 
peasant’ have experienced improved access to a variety of assets, resulting in improving livelihoods 
trajectories, not just in the political-economic moment covered by my investigation, but also in the 
longer term covered by Blaikie et al. In the following, the character of changed livelihoods in the 
nine irrigated communities under study, with a focus on the proportional differences between 
agricultural and non-agricultural incomes, will be analysed. 
9.5  Sources of Livelihoods 
The cross-sectional surveys of the 1990s and that of 2004 sought to highlight the composition of 
incomes. Agricultural income was defined as sale of grains, vegetables, fruits, livestock, etc., 
whereas sources of non-agricultural income were defined as hotel/tourism, remittances, government 
service/army, shop-keeping, agricultural labour, trade, portering or transportation. Tables 22 and 23 
below show the share of income derived from agriculture by quartiles in 1995 (the year for which 
data are most complete) and 2004, in mountain and hill communities, respectively.  
In Thini, it appears that the importance of agricultural incomes has decreased. Whereas 53 per cent 
of households earned between one-quarter and three-quarters of their income from agriculture in 
1995 that figure had been reduced to 37 per cent in 2004. There had been a matching increase from 
47 per cent to 63 per cent in the proportion of households that earned up to one-quarter of their 
income from agriculture. In Tiri, on the other hand, more households in 2004 (60 per cent) earned 
between one-quarter and a half of their income from agriculture than in 1995 (50 per cent). This 
was matched by a decrease from 50 per cent in 1995 to 40 per cent in 2004 in the proportion of 
households that earned up to one-quarter of their income from agriculture. In Khinga, the 
proportion of households that earned between one-quarter and a half of their income from 
agriculture had decreased from 30 per cent to 20 per cent over the period; however 10 per cent of 
households in 2004 depended for up to three-quarters of their income on agriculture, compared with 
none in 1995. The proportion of households that only depends for up to one-quarter of their income 
on agriculture was high and had remained stable at 70 per cent over the years. In sum, the tendency 
had been one of decreasing importance on agriculture as a source of income in Thini, but of 
increasing importance of agricultural incomes in Tiri and to some extent in Khinga as well. The 
latter community, however, remained the one in which the least proportion of households depend 
on agricultural incomes. However, agriculture still constituted an important part of incomes in all 
three communities. 
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Table 22 
Proportion of Total Income from Agriculture by Household, Mountain Systems,  
1995 and 2004 
(percentage) 
Thini Tiri Khinga Percentage of 
Income from 
Agriculture  1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
0–25 47 63 50 40 70 70 
26–50 50 37 50 60 30 20 
51–75 3 – – – – 10 
76–100  – – – – – – 
Sources: DIDP Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
Compared with the mountains, agricultural incomes in the hills constituted a relatively higher share 
for many more households, and a minority had no other sources of income. In Amalachaur, the 
proportion of households who earn between one-quarter to three-quarters of their income from 
agriculture had increased from 43 per cent in 1995 to 67 per cent in 2004, and there had been a 
concomitant reduction in households where agriculture only constituted up to one-quarter of their 
income from 46 per cent to 20 per cent. In Arjewa, agricultural incomes also appeared to be 
increasingly important for a number of households, while in Kurgha and Pakuwa the shares of 
income from agriculture had increased dramatically. Households earning between one-quarter and a 
half of their incomes from agriculture had increased in Kurgha from 43 per cent in 1995 to 87 per 
cent in 2004, and in Pakuwa from 30 per cent in 1995 to 60 per cent in 2004. In Lampata, the 
proportions had remained relatively stable over the years. 1995 data from Pipalbot is not available.  
Table 23 
Proportion of Total Income from Agriculture by Household, Hill Systems,  
1995 and 2004 
(percentage) 
Amalachaur Arjewa Kurgha Pakuwa Lampata Pipalbot Percentage of 
Income from 
Agriculture 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
0–25 46 20 59 41 50 7 67 27 20 20 n.a. 13 
26–50 39 54 41 46 43 87 30 60 50 50 n.a. 60 
51–75 4 13 – 13 – 3 – 10 30 20 n.a. 20 
76–100  11 13 – – 7 3 3 3 – 10 n.a. 7 
Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
While the original survey design does not allow for the provision of exact ratios of agricultural to 
non-agricultural incomes, it appears that agricultural incomes in most of the hill communities were 
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more important in 2004 than they were in 1995. The results of two follow-up questions in the 
qualitative survey on livelihood trajectories on the share of income from agriculture/non-agriculture 
are, if no more exact, then indeed more illustrative of changes over the 10 years of the study and the 
circumstances involved. Table 24 below provides some examples. 
The cases in table 24 are fairly representative of the variation in income composition and income 
sources across a spectrum of households, ranging from those for whom agricultural incomes 
constitute almost the only source to households for which agricultural incomes are negligible. Two 
aspects should be noted. Firstly, that most farmers had experienced changes in the composition of 
their income over the decade of the study, either as a result of the sale of vegetable products, 
remittances or local non-farm employment. Only in one of the cases (the blacksmith from Thini) 
had agricultural incomes decreased; for the vast majority, the changed composition reflected 
enhanced overall incomes in absolute terms and higher levels of economic activity in general, as 
also suggested in the previous section.  
Secondly (and here I also refer to tables 22 and 23), the continued importance of agricultural 
incomes among these irrigated farmers is at variance with Nepal Living Standard Survey yardstick 
data which suggest that at the aggregate level the share of ‘farm’13 income in total income for Nepal 
declined from 61 per cent in 1995/96 to 48 per cent in 2003/04 (CBS 2004). Summing up these last 
sections it is evident that—at some variance with national-level data but not the observations made 
by Blaikie et al. (2002)—agricultural share of incomes has not declined, except in a few 
communities; rather income portfolios have been expanded with increasingly diversified (‘within’ 
and ‘without’ agriculture) livelihoods and progressively improving livelihoods trajectories as an 
outcome. In the following, the composition of these livelihoods, within their respective agriculture-
based and non-agriculture-based categories (column F in the analytical framework), will be 
examined. 
                                                 
13 Which, as already mentioned, includes the value of crops consumed in the household. 
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Table 24 
Agricultural vs. Non-agricultural Incomes, 2004 
Characteristics Agricultural to Non-
Agricultural 
Source for  
Non-Agricultural 
Change? 
Medium farmer, female, 
Brahmin (Arjewa) 
50/50 Teaching Increased agricultural 
income from vegetables 
Large farmer, male, 
Chettri, ex-serviceman 
(Arjewa) 
50/50 Army pension No change 
Medium farmer, female, 
Brahmin, widow with 
sons (Lampata) 
90/10 Sons’ remittances Increased agricultural 
income from vegetables; 
remittances recently 
Medium farmer, male, 
Brahmin (Amalachaur) 
85/15 Son’s remittance Remittance recently 
Large farmer, male, 
Brahmin (Amalachaur) 
70/30 Teaching/ 
sons’ remittances 
Remittances very recently 
Medium farmer, male, 
Brahmin, ex-policeman in 
India (Pakuwa) 
55/45 Police pension No change 
Medium farmer, male, 
Brahmin, politician 
(Pakuwa) 
50/50 Government pension No change 
Large farmer, male, 
Brahmin, ex-army in 
India (Pipalbot) 
35/65 Army pension Increased agricultural 
income from vegetables 
Small farmer, female, 
low-caste (Kurgha) 
50/50 Husband’s remittance Remittance increased 
Small farmer, female, 
Thakali (Thini) 
5/95 Husband’s army salary Increased salary income 
Small farmer, male, low-
caste (Thini)  
10/90 Blacksmith work Increased non-agricultural 
income/decreased 
agricultural income 
Sources: Livelihood Trajectory Survey. 
9.5.1  The Role of Agricultural Activities as Sources of Livelihoods 
What appears in section 9.4 to be a situation of augmented incomes with high agricultural shares 
calls for further attention to diversification of ‘within-agriculture’ activities. Therefore, in the 
following, the over-time drift within crop diversification, and its possible effects on irrigated 
agriculture will be discussed. Except, of course in the statements of farmers, this drift is not well 
captured in the repeat cross-sectional survey of chapter 8, characterized as it is by a 1990s 
‘productivist’ focus on staple (grain) crops as opposed to horticultural crops; hence the discussion 
 172
will draw on data collected outside the core surveys, on international evidence, and on revisiting 
relevant cross-sectional data. 
Starting with the latter, the cropping intensity data (which in chapter 8 was presented as averages, 
unspecified by crop)—table 25 shows the proportion of land planted to different crops in the mid-
1990s and in 2004. Lampata, Amalachaur and Kurgha are prominent examples of systems in which 
production has intensified and diversified substantially, with the land under vegetables more than 
quadrupling in the latter system. The water supply problems of Arjewa (see chapter 8) have 
seemingly caused low levels of vegetable adoption, and the reduction in area under vegetables in 
Pipalbot should, according to farmers, be ascribed to the insurgency and the resultant reduced 
market access in this the most-geographically remote of the hill communities. It needs to be noted 
that the table does not show the full extent of diversification, as the area under potatoes, as also 
discussed in chapter 8, was not quantified as part of the survey in the hills in 2004. It is known 
though, that in 1995 the potato crop was grown on nine per cent of the land in Pakuwa, 21 per cent 
in Kurgha, 10 per cent in Lampata, seven per cent in Amalachaur, three per cent in Arjewa and six 
per cent in Pipalbot (DIDP 1995). It became clear, during interviews with key farmers in 2004 that 
potatoes have gained further ground in recent years, particularly in road-near Pakuwa from where 
substantial amounts are shipped to Pokhara. This probably explains the limited growth in the area 
under vegetables (excepting potatoes) in this otherwise—in terms of road access—well-endowed 
location. 
Table 25 
Total Irrigated Area Planted to Various Crops, Hills Systems, 1995 and 2004 
(percentage) 
Rice Wheat Maize Vegetables System  
1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
Pakuwa 98 95 39 45 73 62 1 3 
Kurgha 100 97 58 54 86 89 5 23 
Lampata 95 100 50 42 87 74 8 22 
Amalachaur 99 100 60 57 85 87 2 7 
Arjewa 100 100 95 79 99 95 0 1 
Pipalbot 98 97 56 60 54 52 6 1 
Sources: Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004 
As is evident from table 25, the areas under rice show limited variation. The areas under wheat and 
maize appear, though, to have been slightly reduced in four of the six systems, most probably as the 
result of an increase in the areas under vegetables and potatoes. The latter crop is increasingly 
grown in the pre-monsoon season, thereby competing with maize. 
As in the hills, the cropping portfolio in all three mountain communities (but particularly in Thini) 
has diversified to some extent over the years, as shown in table 26. In summer, various vegetables 
(including radish, cauliflower and cabbage) are increasingly grown in response to local demand. 
Similar to the hills case, the table does not represent the full picture of cropping diversification; in 
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2004, apple cultivation, representing an earlier wave of cropping diversification14, took up some 15 
per cent of (the fringes) of the command areas in Thini, 10 per cent in Tiri, and 11 per cent in 
Khinga. In the latter location, areas under apples reportedly increased during the timeframe of the 
repeat study, under conditions that are quite favourable due to a sheltered microclimate. As an 
indicator of diversification that involves a staple crop, maize was not found in the 1990s, but has 
now been introduced to the area. It may also be noted that the cultivation pattern in Khinga differs 
from that of Thini and Tiri on a number of accounts: in the former, the two ‘old’ crops of the 
mountains still dominate, with buckwheat as the main summer crop and naked barley as the main 
winter crop, grown parallel with wheat, a crop that is no longer grown in Thini. 
Table 26 
Total Irrigated Area Planted to Various Crops, Mountain Systems, 1995 and 2004 
(percentage) 
 Naked Barley Hull Barley Buckwheat Wheat Maize Vegetables 
 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
Thini 61 54 19 28 62 31 0 0 22 53 2 12* 
Tiri 73 69 13 15 74 18 1 15 13 42 3 6 
Khinga 78 62 0 7 76 53 24 24 0 9 3 6 
Sources:Key Effects Monitoring Surveys 1992–1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004.  
Note:*The figure includes both potatoes and vegetables. 
Even though the share of agricultural income is not particularly high in Thini in relative terms (see 
table 22), the sale of agricultural products (cereals, vegetables, apples, alcohol) and livestock 
products is important. Its close proximity (45 minutes) to the district headquarter, tourist centre and 
transport hub (airport) of Jomsom Bazaar creates a great deal of demand for agricultural products. 
The importance of Jomsom Bazaar has increased significantly since it became a district 
headquarters in 1975, with army and government personnel representing considerable demand. In 
Tiri, conditions for agriculture are relatively harsh, and irrigation water supplies are critical at times. 
In Khinga, cropping conditions are relatively more benevolent, but in both places the dynamics of 
the regional economy have less of a positive effect on agriculture than in Thini. This would, it 
appears, partly explain not only lower levels of diversification into marketable crops, but also lower 
incomes in absolute terms, compared to Thini. 
9.5.2  The Extent of Diversification 
In line with competitive advantage notions (see section 4.4) of the Agricultural Perspective Plan  
(National Planning Commission 1995), degrees of cropping diversification in the irrigated 
communities and the mixes of crops often reflect, in addition to sufficient irrigation and location-
specific growing conditions, access to roads and urban markets. The combination of improved 
                                                 
14 Introduced some decades ago with Japanese technology, apples are now used for the production of brandy and as 
animal fodder. Also, in season, when the price of apples is very low, they virtually become a ‘main staple’, not least for 
labourers and porters in the area.  
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infrastructure and increased urban demand means that produce from the hill communities is sold in 
local markets, and in the town of Pokhara and beyond. 
The following data are based on a survey of consumers, vegetable-cum-grain wholesalers and 
retailers and government officials, carried out in Baglung Bazaar—the largest and economically 
most important in the study area—in early 2006, and throw some light on changes in cropping 
patterns. One consumer, asked about the difference in availability of horticultural crops a decade 
before, reminisced about how his family’s move to Baglung Bazaar in the late 1980s, from a village 
10 km away had been a dietary shock; compared to the village very few vegetables (only onions, 
potatoes and sometimes spinach) had been available in the market. This previous scarcity of 
vegetables was echoed by many, some of whom also commented that the eating of a variety of 
vegetables and fruits was a rather recent, ‘modern’ habit. One of the main differences between the 
situation then and now is that a variety of fruits and vegetables is now available in these ‘urban 
markets of rural towns’, and that many of them are produced locally as shown in table 27.  
 ‘Local’ in the context of the table means that vegetables are supplied from roadheads within an 
estimated 10-km radius of Baglung Bazaar15. Produce is brought to town by a combination of 
trucks and public transport, usually by wholesalers. The actual production areas are often one or 
two hours further away, above the roadhead. This spatial supply pattern roughly repeats itself with 
respect to all the four district headquarters of the Dhaulagiri Zone, and involves a great many of the
irrigated communities that are included in this
 
 study.  
                                                 
15 Main production areas include: Bakunde, Sigana, Lekhnath, Malika, Nalibang, Farse, Mallajh and Banskarka from 
where they are carried to the nearest roadhead (such as lower Mallajh, Milanchok or Sallyan/Dahiring). 
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Table 27 
Fruits and Vegetables in Baglung Bazaar by Source, March 2006 
Fruits and Vegetables Source 
Papaya Local 
Orange India (but local in season) 
Apples India (but also from Mustang District in season) 
Grapes India 
Bananas India 
Tomatoes Local 
Ginger Local 
Carrot Local 
Cauliflower Local 
Radish Local 
Chili Local/Indian 
Onion Local 
Garlic Chinese 
 
The vegetable wholesalers, of which there are at least five in Baglung Bazaar, asserted that demand 
for fruits and vegetables has increased dramatically over the last 10–15 years. It is, however, only in 
the last decade, following road access, that local produce has begun to replace imports, but the 
respective local and import contents vary considerably by season (and these are more defined in the 
hills than in the terai). Particularly cabbages and cauliflower are known as ‘off-season’ vegetables, 
denoting the post-rice-harvest autumn/winter season. Customers generally prefer local products due 
to their freshness and quality, but local supplies are unable to meet demand. Therefore, in a context 
of increasing overall demand, the proportion of imports remains slightly higher, and on the increase, 
compared with local produce. This state of affairs is blamed on a dispersed local marketing pattern 
that results in irregular supplies. Not surprisingly, the local content increases considerably during 
general strikes (bandh) when vehicular movement is prevented. Such disturbances, however, 
increase supplies from farmers in urban fringe or ‘peri-urban’ areas who carry produce to town in 
the morning, and sell directly to consumers.  
The dispersed marketing channels and the seasonal nature of vegetable production make assessment 
of the volume of local production difficult. In addition to what is consumed in local towns, a great 
deal of the seasonal surplus production is exported to Pokhara and sometimes beyond. In fact, much 
more than what passes via Baglung Bazaar is actually exported from the district, as wholesalers 
from other towns buy from farmers at the nearest roadhead to the farms, and transport produce from 
there. While trucks carry some of the produce, buses are a more important means of transportation, 
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and there is widespread agreement that further export potential is severely hampered by the 
stoppage of night bus services16. The main exported products include cauliflower, tomato, cabbage, 
chillies and potatoes.  
Again, the dispersed marketing channels make assessment of the amounts problematic: one 
wholesaler claims to send vegetables worth Nepali Rupees 150,000 to Pokhara monthly, and 
another claims that in season he sends some 7–8 tonnes of tomatoes to Pokhara. A representative 
from the Department of Agriculture suggests that 200 tonnes of winter vegetables are shipped out of 
the district per annum. What this means in the context of, for example, overall supplies to Pokhara 
is somewhat uncertain, but it would constitute some eight per cent using 1999 figures, suggesting 
that in total 2400 tonnes of winter vegetables are imported to Pokhara per annum (Adhikari and 
Seddon 2002)17. Nevertheless, considering the dispersed marketing channels and the fact that the 
figures presented in this section represent only one district in the Dhaulagiri Zone, it is reasonable 
to assume that the role of the zone and the farmers in it as exporters of agricultural produce is 
growing. 
9.5.3  Crop Diversification as an Impinging Factor to Cooperative Management of Irrigation 
The mounting evidence of considerable crop diversification in central areas of the Dhaulagiri Zone, 
including many of the irrigation systems in this study, renders this form of diversification a major 
impinging factor in relation to irrigation as common property regimes. The collective action 
school’s notion of exit options (or earning opportunities not closely tied to the commons) usually 
connotes non-farm livelihoods as alternatives to cooperating in the commons (see Stern et al. 2002 
and figure1, section 2.6.4). However, exit options may also, as Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson note, 
and as will be discussed in this section, be found “outside the commons but not outside of 
agriculture” (2002:100). The role of crop diversification as an impinging factor in the performance 
of common property regime irrigation is complex. It stems from the fact that vegetable production 
is relatively intensive with respect to water and labour, and in order to be successful, depends on 
individual rather than the collective water-use regimes associated with staple (cereal) crops. In 
realization of this, Gyawali and Dixit note in the context of the Tinau basin in the hills to the south 
of the Dhaulagiri Zone that a shift towards more vegetable crops requires more intensive use of 
water, and they contemplate that this may lead to “change in existing arrangements of allocating 
water and to increased disputes” (1999:79). The speculative nature of the comment is fairly 
representative of the stage at which research into this issue finds itself in Nepal, something that in 
turn reflects the relative novelty of commercialized agriculture in the western hills and mountains18, 
as the data from Baglung District also suggest.  
In the context of performance, tail-end problems should be considered a corollary of the issue. 
Recalling the Oakerson framework, tail-end problems connote unequal distribution of water, and as 
such constitute a critical performance factor with implications for ‘patterns of interaction’ in the 
commons. This was touched upon in chapter 8, where some farmers reported water shortages as 
head-reach farmers intensified production and started producing highly water-consuming early rice 
                                                 
16 The authorities until recently had prohibited night bus services for security reasons. 
17 That figure, however, is likely to have increased because of population growth in Pokhara. 
18 Two factors appear important here. At the academic level, it would appear that notions of dependency discussed in 
chapter 5 have until recently informed much research on the western hills and mountains. At the same time, 
commercialization is indeed a relatively recent phenomenon, compared to, for example, the eastern hills, where the 
commercialization of agriculture is well-documented (see, for example, Sharma 1997). 
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or vegetables. The role of crop diversification as an impinging factor in this context appeared again 
in the same chapter, where it was found that the number of farmers who considered water to be 
distributed in an unfair fashion had increased over a period when crops in the community had 
diversified. It was further found that increased dissatisfaction was associated with winter and spring 
crops, i.e., the seasons when vegetables compete with wheat and maize in the hills.  
On the whole, it appears that water is indeed a main constraint to the expansion of vegetable 
production in many systems. This is likely to mean that those who grow vegetables at a significant 
scale are often either located in the head-ends of command areas, have access to other surface water 
sources, or have invested in water storage or well facilities (or all three). Those who merely grow 
vegetables for home consumption tend to depend on household wastewater for irrigating minute 
plots. Close proximity to water sources is of essence given the labour intensiveness of vegetable 
production and the scarcity of labour in the hills.  
Consider the case of a vegetable-growing household, headed by a widow, in Lampata, a one-hour 
walk from the road between Kusma and Baglung. In 2003, the household earned Nepali Rupees 
60,000 (823 US$), some 90 per cent of its cash income, from the production of vegetables. The 
family of 14 persons includes one son, his wife and their small children. The son, the daughter-in-
law and the widow herself represent the only members of the household of working age who live at 
home. The neat vegetable plots of some 2 ropani19 extend from the homestead into the upper 
portion of the command area immediately below. The son explained that expansion of the 
production of vegetables is constrained mainly by lack of labour, not demand for produce. With 
only three working persons in the household, there are limits to how much they can produce, and 
labourers are not readily available.  
What enables the household to operate a relatively large plot of vegetables is a relatively reliable 
water source that serves both domestic and agricultural purposes, i.e., a private spring connected 
with a pipe. The spring does not yield the required amounts of water during the winter season; 
hence the pipe is connected to a covered water storage tank from where water is carried to the 
vegetable plots. The son of the house explained that most of the households that have success in 
producing vegetables have similar, individualized sources of water such as springs, small streams or 
ponds. Many farmers in Lampata, he added, would like to adopt, or expand vegetable production, 
but face a combination of labour and water constraints. 
The individualization of water use has come about in order to overcome shortcomings in 
community-operated irrigation systems, geared organizationally towards the fixed schedules 
demanded in rice production, but unable to meet the demands for flexibility required by vegetable-
producing farmers. In that sense, the effects of crop diversification and the commercialization of 
agriculture resemble the drastic reduction of the cooperative element in irrigated agriculture as a 
result of the widespread use of pumps for groundwater irrigation by individual farmers noted 
throughout Asia (see, for example, Shah 1998, Barker and Molle 2002). As the extent of crop 
diversification emerged as a relatively late, important theme in the research process, the present 
study has not examined the extent and effects of individualization of water in detail. We may, 
however, find some clues in some of the most illuminating regional research on the effects of the 
commercialization of agriculture from the highlands of northern Thailand. Here the relationship 
between market access and erosion of communal forms of irrigation organization (known as 
                                                 
19 1 Ropani=approximately 500m2 
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muang-fai) has been documented. Elstner and Neef observe, in a village with good market access 
that supplies vegetables to the city of Chiang Mai and beyond20, that: 
“… until the mid-1980s farmers in Muang Kham21 produced mainly wet rice with the 
traditional muang-fai system… with the economic and infrastructure development and 
improved market access, farmers changed their cropping patterns which induced the 
individualization of water management. With this development, the quantities of water used 
and the requirements on water quality have increased” (2004:11). 
However, commercialization in Muang Kham, located some 30 km from the markets of the 
provincial capital of Chiang Mai, has not led to individualized water management completely; in 
addition to accessing water through streams, springs and private wells, it is also accessed through 
one of the canals that originally supplied water for wet rice cultivation. Here, farmers benefiting 
from the canal still perform collective maintenance activities at the call of a caretaker, but with 
respect to distribution the collective element has disappeared; farmers withdraw water individually 
in accordance with their requirements. Elstner and Neef compare the situation in Muang Kham with 
a more remote village, that of Mae Lana, where poor infrastructure and limited market access has 
meant the continuation of wet rice production as the main source of agricultural livelihoods, and the 
continuation of relatively stable community-based water management arrangements. The water 
management situation in the market-oriented village of Muang Kham and many other villages like 
it is described as one of legal and institutional pluralism (Elstner and Neef 2004, Heyd and Neef 
2004), a concept denoting the co-existence of different tenure systems, as well as legal orders in a 
social field such as a community or irrigation organization (Pradhan and Pradhan 2000) 
characterized by heterogeneity of stakeholders.  
As already mentioned, the extent of individualization of water management has not been studied in 
detail in this investigation, so its prevalence across the communities in the Dhaulagiri Zone is 
unclear. However, considering the increasingly vibrant regional economic linkages (see chapter 5) 
and the Baglung data of this section there seems to be little reason not to assume that dynamics 
resembling those observed in Thailand are at play in the Dhaulagiri Zone, albeit at a much more 
nascent stage. There would seem to a particularly strong relationship between the growth of 
agricultural diversification and market access in the cases of Lampata, Kurgha, Amalachaur and 
Pakuwa in the hills, and to some extent in Thini in the mountains. If the case of Lampata, where the 
vegetable-growing marketing cooperative has 75 members, is anything to go by, then the 
individualization of water sources is probably a rather common corollary of increased vegetable 
production, as indeed the farmer from Lampata suggests.  
Therefore, the prevalence of vegetable production, and the ambitions of farmers to expand such 
production (as illustrated in the case of Lampata) may well explain, to a large extent, why 
perceptions of water deficiency (see e.g. table 13, section 8.4.3), mainly associated with winter 
crops, are particularly pronounced in some of the high-level vegetable production communities 
(particularly Kurgha, Lampata and Amalachaur). To the extent that vegetable production entails the 
appropriation of water by farmers in privileged locations of the command area, the pronounced 
increase in the number of farmers who find water unequally distributed in these high-vegetable-
producing villages also appears quite telling. Likewise, the decreased productivity in maize and 
wheat may well be related to the increase in vegetable production. After all, these crops are grown 
                                                 
20 Farmers in this village are even engaged in contract farming of capsicum with multinational companies. 
21 In the Mae Sae watershed in Chiang Mai province. 
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in roughly the same seasons as vegetables and compete, during these seasons, for labour, water and 
fertilizer. However, the relationship between individualized water management and the erosion of 
community-managed irrigation is likely to vary a great deal from community to community 
depending, to a large extent, on the ability of specific institutional arrangements (such as those 
associated with water distribution, see chapter 7) to secure equality in the irrigation commons in the 
face of heterogeneity of stakeholders and legal pluralism.  
Climate also needs to be factored into the equation. In the context of the individualization of water 
management, it would go a long way in explaining how wet rice cultivation in the hills of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone continues to be an important and universal crop in all hill communities with 
relatively stable yields. It would also help in explaining the legal and institutional pluralism 
associated with accessing water through both common property water management regimes and 
individual water management regimes. Nothing much other than rice—and certainly not high-value 
vegetables22—can be grown during the monsoon. It is tempting then to suggest that as long as 
peoples’ ‘within-agriculture’ livelihood strategies include both wet rice and vegetables as important 
crops, with climatic factors as a ‘hard constraint’ that hampers the expansion of one at the expense 
of the other, then legal pluralism, including the common property management regimes associated 
with wet rice cultivation, will continue. However, other factors play a role as well, as analysed in 
the following sections. 
9.5.4  Non-Agricultural Activities as Sources of Livelihoods 
Shares of incomes from agricultural and non-agricultural sources were dealt with in section 9.4, 
where it was established that while income portfolios had expanded and diversified over the years, 
this was not necessarily at the expense of agricultural incomes. Table 28 shows the sources of non-
agricultural income in the irrigated communities but only for 2004, as earlier survey data have 
proven not to be comparable23. Hence, while it appears from previously presented data that incomes 
from non-farm activities have increased, the figures in table 28 do not reveal actual changes in the 
composition of non-farm income sources. 
The differences in shares of sources of income to total non-farm income and in the composition of 
income in the hills and the mountains reflect variation in livelihood strategies between these areas. 
While remittances are important in the hills, they are much less so in the mountains. Conversely, 
trade is important in the mountains but not in the hills, where, however, government service and 
labouring play significant roles. Culled from both the quantitative and the qualitative surveys, as 
well as informal conversations, these variations in non-farm income portfolios will be discussed in 
the following, with an initial focus on the highly diversified mountain communities. 
                                                 
22 Only common, cheap spinach types may be grown during the rains. 
23 Disaggregating non-agricultural income sources from total income sources has not been feasible. 
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Table 28 
Sources and Average Share of Non-Agricultural Income to Total Non-Agricultural Income, 
2004 
(percentage of households) 
System  Non-Agricultural Income Sources* (n=188) 
 Hotel Remittances Govt. Ser Shop Labouring Trade Portering Other 
Amalachaur – 57 20 13 3 – – 3 
Arjewa – 64 23 9 23 – – 18 
Kurgha – 10 58 26 23 – – 3 
Pakuwa – 33 50 7 17 – – 10 
Lampata – 20 50 – 30 – 10 10 
Pipalbot – 40 13 – 27 – – 13 
Thini 7 – 23 7 10 13 – 33 
Tiri – 20 – – – 100 – 40 
Khinga 10 – – – – 70 – 10 
Sources: Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
Note: Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100; not all households have non-agricultural incomes (some two per 
cent), and some have more than one source.  
Starting in Thini, trade, a source of income for at least 13 per cent of households, chiefly connotes 
the buying and the selling of livestock (jho24, horses) purchased in the northern part of Mustang 
District. For seven per cent of households, the running of hotels for tourists is another source of 
income, while for another seven per cent the operation of shops, mainly catering to the same 
tourists is another source. The relatively large proportion of households that claims to have ‘other’ 
sources of income covers over a vast range of activities, ranging from irrigation caretaking, private 
teaching and, most importantly, (predominantly winter) business activities outside the district. 
These activities include the sale of woollen garments (on the decrease) and taking care of ‘interests’ 
(hotels, inns, manufacturing industries) outside the district, with a concentration in the districts 
immediately to the south, mainly along the trade route described in chapter 5, but also in other 
economically dynamic areas, including Chitwan District, the road corridor from Pokhara to 
Kathmandu, and Kathmandu itself. Government service is also a source of employment for nearly a 
quarter of households in Thini; members typically work as either an assistant in the administration 
or as teachers. 
In Tiri and Khinga, some 4–6 hours walk to the north of Thini, the main non-agricultural sources of 
income are associated with seasonal trade. This involves the spatial extension of the southwards 
trading patterns described in chapter 5. Sons and sometimes daughters from most households go to 
                                                 
24 A cross-breed between yak and common cattle. 
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Guwahati in Assam (India) to trade for 3–4 months every winter where they sell woollen garments. 
Woollen garments used to be made from local sheep and taken for retail to India, but they are now 
purchased wholesale in India and retailed in markets and through other channels. Furthermore, 
people in Khinga and Tiri are involved in the buying and selling of livestock and Chinese consumer 
goods from across the border with Tibet (a pattern that bears some resemblance to the salt trade 
described in chapter 5); some of the latter are also traded on to India. However, both forms of trade 
are under threat. Particularly in Tiri, concerns were voiced about increased competition in the 
Himalayan trade pattern; in essence, the traditional winter trade in India faces increased competition 
from people in southern districts of Nepal who have also started to go to India to sell (Chinese) 
garments. Additionally, the north–south trade in non-garment Chinese goods is not as lucrative as it 
used to be, as Chinese goods are increasingly abundant in both Nepal and India through other 
channels.  
Hence, the non-farm livelihood strategies and the challenges to these strategies in the three 
communities should be understood in both their local and global contexts. The relatively dynamic 
economy of Mustang District, exemplified by increasing flows of goods, services and tourists, 
affects Thini’s (as a central place) economy positively, chiefly because of its close proximity to the 
district headquarters, the tourist and transportation hub of Jomsom. In Tiri and Khinga, the effects 
of local demand are less deeply felt, and as a consequence trading activities are focused on both 
northern and southern markets. The competition for ‘indigenous Himalayan products’, with which 
the people of Tiri and Khinga (along with other mountain peoples) are traditionally associated in 
India, may be seen as one consequence of globalization, at least in the sense that the term connotes 
increased flows of goods and mobility of people. Regardless of these perceived threats, the 
important thing to note in the context of the possible effects of livelihoods diversification on 
irrigated agriculture is—with respect to all three communities—that these highly diversified 
livelihoods, where the non-farm shares of total income are higher than the farm shares, are long 
established (see chapter 5) and, as the income data of table 20 suggest, relatively lucrative. 
These livelihood patterns stand in stark contrast to those of the hills, where total incomes are not 
only comparatively meagre, but where higher shares of agricultural incomes to total incomes also 
suggest a lower degree of diversification than in the mountains. In the hills, trade and other 
commercial activities are restricted to the keeping of shops, usually outlets for basic goods. 
Government service is a major source of income for many households in Kurgha, Pakuwa and 
Lampata, sometimes gained from work as assistants in local administrations, but more often as 
teachers, either in their own or in neighbouring localities25. In Amalachaur, Arjewa and Pipalbot, it 
is remittances that make up the most important share of the non-agricultural income portfolio. 
9.5.5  Remittances and Labour Migration 
While other non-agricultural sources of income may potentially impinge on irrigation as common 
property regimes, I will in the following focus on the role of migration and remittances, as the 
latter—as shown in table 29—feature prominently in the non-farm income portfolios of the hill 
communities, in particular and have, as mentioned in chapter 4, emerged as a major theme in 
diversification discourses in Nepal. With the numbers of people and transfers of funds involved 
having increased significantly over the past few decades, migration and the remittances that follow 
may be categorized under ‘trends’ (as in tendency) and ‘shocks’ (see column D) in the analytical 
framework. However, the long-established nature of labour migration as a livelihood alternative 
                                                 
25 Most farmers are hill Brahmin, something which typically entails a cultural background of learning and teaching. 
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(the ‘trend’), historically associated with colonial relations26 and socio-politically induced hardship 
(the ‘shocks’), means—as also touched upon in chapter 3—that the phenomenon also belongs 
within the category of ‘historical political economy’ in the analytical framework. In this and the 
next sections, I will examine how migration and remittances as a major theme in livelihood 
diversification are manifested in the nine case communities, and will discuss the meaning of the 
phenomenon in the context of agricultural livelihoods and collectively managed irrigation systems. 
Migration as a livelihood strategy takes two major forms: entire households may leave remote areas 
for more central places, and individuals may migrate, either temporarily or more permanently, as 
wage earners or as traders and the destinations may be both national and international. With respect 
to the first form, key informants (n=11), believed to have overviews of changes at the community 
level, were asked about household migration patterns as reflected in tables 29 and 30. With respect 
to the second form of migration, farmers in 1995 and again in 2004 were, as part of the cross-
sectional survey, asked if any members of their household lived and worked outside the locality for 
more than six months of the year27 and, if so, where. That data are reflected in table 31.  
Household-level rural–urban migration is often understood as being historically incorporated into 
wider processes of agrarian change involving the structural transformation of predominantly rural 
and agricultural societies to predominantly urban and industrial ones. In Nepal, however, rates of 
urbanization are high, but are not directly accompanied by transfers of people and resources from 
the agricultural sector to the (urban) industrial sector. As Seddon et al. (1998) note, linkages are 
more indirect and rural–urban transfers take place largely as a result of the remittances that are 
associated with individual-level migration, and do not come in the shape of conventional growth-
linkages. Incomes from the remittances that result from individual migration may be ploughed back 
into rural communities in the short run, as Seddon et al. (1998) point out (see also de Haan 1999, 
footnote 1 this chapter), but more than anything they serve to induce household-level migration. I 
was unable to ask in much detail about the reasons behind the household migration shown in tables 
11 and 12, but it seems likely in the regional context, as also suggested in chapter 5, to be linked to 
remittances, where urbanization is fuelled by a tendency to invest remitted funds in urban areas. 
Seddon et al. note that in Myagdi District: 
“All remittance-earning households were reported to have invested their savings in land and 
housing in Kusma, Baglung and Beni, the growing urban centres. The price of land in these 
centres is reported to be exceptionally high—higher than in Pokhara” (1998:105). 
Viewed in this light, both types of migration—to the extent that the movement is rural–urban—
should probably be understood in the context of a trend towards structural and, subsequently, 
demographic change that is not restricted to Nepal, and which—according to one estimate—may 
see urban populations surpass rural populations in a number of developing countries within a couple 
of decades (Pinstrup Anderson et al. 1999). For some, particularly the wealthier households, the 
decision to leave the village may have been the result of ‘distress’ factors such as the insurgency. 
For others, the decision may have been more ‘opportunity’ driven. However, the distinction 
between what constitutes ‘push factor’-cum-‘distress’ decisions and ‘pull factor’-cum-‘opportunity’ 
                                                 
26 Although Nepal was never colonized, the British and Indian Gurkha connection should be understood in the context 
of British India (see, for example, Whelpton 2005). 
27 In both the surveys of the 1990s that form the comparative base for the repeat survey, and consequently in the 2004 
repeat surveys, distinctions were made between temporary (less than six months) and permanent (more than six months) 
migration, in line with Central Bureau of Statistics practice.  
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decisions, both in the context of looking for greener pastures at the household level and in the 
context of individual migration, is blurred28. 
It needs to be noted as well, as de Haan (1999) points out in the international context, and as table 
29 below shows in the mountain context, that household migration is not just a rural–urban dynamic 
but is also rural–rural. Over the 10 years of the study, Khinga saw no household migration. 
However, six households had emigrated from Thini (apparently to Pokhara and Kathmandu). In line 
with established practice, they had not actually sold their property; rather, their houses and 
agricultural land had been leased out, in this case to immigrants from areas to the north, i.e., Upper 
Mustang, and the population had remained stable. Tiri, on the other hand, had seen a reduction of 
households, and in 2004 had 14 households compared to 16 households some 10 years before. Five 
households had emigrated south, out of the district, while three have immigrated from the 
neighbouring mountain district of Dolpo and also from Upper Mustang. While, as Vinding (1984) 
observes, the rate of emigration from Mustang District may have slowed since the 1970s, a north–
south migratory dynamic29 remains evident. 
Table 29 
Migration patterns, Mountain Systems, 1995–2004 
(households)  
System  Households 
Emigrated 
Households 
Immigrated 
Change (HH) Households (2004) 
Thini 6 6 0 190 
Tiri 5 3 -2 11 
Khinga 0 0 0 34 
Sources: Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project Key Effects Monitoring Survey 1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 
2004. 
The pattern of migration is somewhat different in the hill communities where, as shown in table 30 
below, a total of 38 households or some five per cent have emigrated over the decade of the study. 
While agricultural land is leased out, immigrant households, unlike in Mustang District, have not 
replaced the vacating households; rather the drift suggests slow depopulation of the villages and 
increasing urban populations along the lines of the already-mentioned dynamics associated with 
remittances as well as the civil war and the changing nature of the regional economy, as described 
in chapter 5. Some households, however, have also left for the terai30, but whether they have settled 
in urban or rural areas is unknown. Over the period 1995–2004, Lampata was the most severely 
                                                 
28 I find the notions somewhat shallow and most useful in the macro-structural context of the relationship between the 
geographical origin and the destination of migrants; I would, for instance, not hesitate to characterise the (seasonal) 
labour migration from impoverished and food-deficient regions such as Far Western Nepal to India as distress 
migration.  
29 Messerschmidt (1995) also mentions this dynamic in connection with the village of Marpha close to Thini. 
30 Migration from the hills to the terai has been a feature of rural–rural migration since the terai (initially Chitwan 
District) was ‘opened’ for settlement in the 1950s. The contribution by Agergaard (1998) provides a thorough account 
of the dynamics of this form of migration in Nepal. Somewhat ironically, one objective of the DIDP was to halt 
migration to the terai, an area that by the 1980s was perceived as having reached ‘carrying capacity’. 
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afflicted community, with a net household emigration of some 14 per cent, followed by Arjewa 
with seven per cent, Pipalbot with six per cent, Pakuwa with close to four per cent, and Kurgha and 
Amalachaur with some two per cent each. It appears that the recent focus on the dynamics of the 
remittance economy in Nepal (and elsewhere) has turned attention away from the permanent 
household-level migration from rural areas that preoccupied earlier migration research in Nepal 
(see, for example, Gurung 2005, Agergaard 1998, see also footnote 30). Hence, no contemporary 
‘yardstick’ data with which these data may be compared have been identified. 
Table 30 
Migration Patterns, Hill Systems, 1995–2004 
(households) 
System  Households 
Emigrated 
Households 
Immigrated 
Change Households 
(2004) 
Amalachaur 3 0 -3 119 
Arjewa 10 0 -10 127 
Kurgha 5 0 -5 234 
Pakuwa 5 0 -5 122 
Lampata 10 0 -10 60 
Pipalbot 5 0 -5 75 
Sources: Dhaulagir Irrigation Development Project Key Effects Monitoring Survey 1995; Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. 
Turning to individual migration, the final project evaluation of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation 
Development Project noted in 1996 that:  
“… the number of people migrating to India or the terai is very different from village to 
village. In certain villages it is very high: 1 to 2 persons per household (Arjewa) are 
migrating, while in others this phenomenon is almost non-existing (Pakuwa)” (Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project 1996).  
Such non-existence of migration from Pakuwa is no longer the case; while more households in 
Arjewa still have members that migrate than in Pakuwa, the latter community seems to be catching 
up, as shown in table 31 below (as well as in table 30 above). Over-time comparative cross-
sectional data on individual migration exist only for Thini, where the proportion of households with 
migrated members has increased from 53 per cent in 1994 (Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development 
Project 1994) to 60 per cent in 2004. In all communities though, respondents claimed unanimously 
that migration, particularly to foreign countries, had increased substantially over the 10 years of the 
study, a factor that, as previously mentioned, is assigned as a key reason for perceptions of 
‘improved lives’.  
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Table 31 
Households Affected by Individual Migration, All Communities, 2004 
(percentage) 
Destinations (proportional among  
households with migrants) 
System Proportion of 
households with 
migrants 
Main migrants 
Nepal India Others* 
Amalachaur 50 Husbands, sons 8 79 13 
Arjewa 50 -do- 20 63 17 
Kurgha 32 -do- 57 36 7 
Pakuwa 37 -do- 50 29 21 
Lampata 40 -do- 57 36 7 
Pipalbot 33 -do- 17 17 66 
Thini 60 Sons, daughters 56 11 33 
Tiri 60 -do- 10 50 40 
Khinga 10 -do- 0 0 100 
Source: Cross-Sectional Survey 2004. *Note: Mainly Gulf countries.  
The figures provided in table 31 confirm reports of high levels of individual migration from this 
region (see Seddon et al. 1998,  Seddon et al. 2001 and chapter 5). They also confirm that in the 
case of migration abroad, India—with its relatively low entry costs—represents the most important 
destinations for migrants from hill communities, as also suggested by both regional and national 
figures. Pipalbot is the exception among the hill communities; 66 per cent of its migrants travel to 
‘other countries’ in line with the more general picture from Myagdi District (see chapter 5). In 
comparison with most of the hill communities, the mountain communities also have fairly high 
shares of migrants in what is often perceived as lucrative ‘other country’ labour markets.  
There is an ethnic geography to this kind of mobility that reflects the national picture. Generally, in 
the overall ethnic geography of migration in Nepal, the proportion of jobs taken by Brahmins in 
lucrative labour markets is less than their proportion in the population (Seddon et al. 1998, Seddon 
et al. 2001). The Brahmin-dominated communities of Amalachaur, Kurgha, Pakuwa and Lampata 
also display this characteristic; as relative newcomers to migration overseas, securing access to 
lucrative labour markets appears relatively problematic in the absence of established networks. The 
Magar, Thakali and Towa of the remaining communities, on the other hand, are able to draw on 
long-established trail-blazing networks associated both with recruitment for the overseas Gurkha 
regiments (the Magar) and the dynamic diasporas of mountain people, particularly for the Thakali 
and Towa (see Fisher 2002). Chettri-dominated Arjewa also has army migration networks that 
mainly secure access to India. 
Linked to the role of networks, there seems, at least for the hill communities, to be a relationship 
between the share of remittances in the non-farm income portfolio (see table 28) and the proportion 
of households with migrants. In Amalachaur and Arjewa, where the proportion of households with 
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migrants is high, the remittance shares of the non-agricultural incomes are also relatively high, at 57 
per cent and 64 per cent, respectively. In Kurgha, which has the least number of households with 
migrants, remittances make up only 10 per cent of the non-agricultural income portfolio, and in 
Pakuwa and Lampata the shares are 33 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. It seems reasonable to 
assume a self-propelling effect; the higher the number of households with migrants in the 
community, the more established the pattern and the networks that facilitate migration. Considering 
that households with migrants tend to have more than one migrant member (the average is 1.5 
persons), these dynamics may also be present at the household level. 
There does not, however, in the hill communities, seem to be much of a relationship between the 
shares of remittances in the non-farm portfolio and the proportion of migrants in lucrative markets. 
The high shares of the portfolios in the cases of Amalachaur and Arjewa derive from India, and 
even in the case of Pipalbot, where 66 per cent of migrants are in ‘other countries’, a 40 per cent 
share of the portfolio seems meagre. The relationship may be clearer when it comes to total 
household income: Pipalbot (with a high number of migrants in ‘other countries’) has the highest 
average household income (Nepali Rupees 44,000) of the hill communities, whereas Arjewa (also 
with a high number of migrants, but in India) has the lowest income (Nepali Rupees 33,000). The 
picture becomes more blurred in the remaining hill communities, where the livelihood portfolios are 
more strongly agriculture-based as a characteristic of Brahmin-dominated communities. However, 
the two ‘extreme’ cases of Pipalbot and Arjewa would suggest that the destination of migrants 
matters a great deal, as does a recent contribution to the debate on the importance of remittances in 
Nepal. It suggests considerable ‘qualitative’ differentiation depending on migrants’ destinations: for 
Nepal, the average annual remittances from a Gulf country is said to amount to Nepali Rupees 
90,000, while from India it is only NRs 9000. For ‘western countries’ (including Japan), it is said to 
be a relatively massive NRs 450,000 (Kollmair et al. 2006).  
It became clear during the course of the fieldwork that the amounts remitted not only depend on the 
destination of the migrants, but also on whether their relationship to the household is that of sons or 
husbands. The amounts remitted by sons, even when in overseas markets, do not necessarily 
constitute large income components, but rather small (albeit important) income supplements, either 
because the sons remit funds to their ‘own’ spatially separate households or save the funds for 
themselves to set up households. As one farmer responded when asked what he received from his 
three sons who all worked in presumably lucrative overseas labour markets, “Nothing much; they 
are all detached from my house.” Remittances matter a great deal more to household incomes when 
it is husbands who are the source of earning. In the same context, it needs to be kept in mind 
though, that while children working overseas may not send back vast amounts to their parental 
households, they have nevertheless become—to use a phrase commonly heard in rural Nepal—
‘earners instead of eaters’. They are no longer the burdens to the household that young males with 
School Leaving Certificates and professional ambitions that do not include farming often represent 
in rural Nepal. This issue will be touched upon later. 
Turning to the mountains, it may be noted that Thini has a relatively large share of migrants in 
Nepal itself, something which should be chiefly attributed to the business activities (inns, hotels, 
contractor business, etc.) for which the people from this area are historically renowned (see chapter 
5). The large share of migrants is not reflected in remittances; most migrants appear to invest 
outside the area rather than remit funds, and some are students. The relatively large share of 
migrants in ‘other countries’ from the mountain communities has already been touched upon; these 
migrants also appear to invest savings outside the area. For the most part, these ‘other countries’ 
include the highly lucrative labour markets of Japan, the United States, and Malaysia. It may be 
noted though, that unlike in the hills, most individual migrants from the mountains are sons (and 
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daughters), as opposed to the husband-and-sons pattern of the hill. This is, as mentioned above, 
likely to have effects on remittance flows, and contributes to explaining why remittances play much 
less of a role than do trade and, to some extent, agriculture. However, considering that remittances 
from western countries amount to fairly large amounts, as reported above, it does seem likely that 
remittances contribute significantly to the high average incomes of mountain households when they 
do occur, as shown in the case of Tiri (see table 28).  
It appears that the different patterns of migration that characterize the hills and mountains reflect, 
more than anything, vastly different and to a large degree, historically rooted livelihood strategies. 
In the hills, increasingly diversified agriculture combined with foreign employment and indeed 
employment within Nepal are the main livelihood strategies, but remittances tend to supplement 
agricultural income. In the mountains (excepting Tiri), it is agriculture that tends to supplement 
other forms of income. Agriculture—diversifying, but far from the extent seen in the hills—is 
combined with commercial activities both within and outside the immediate community. Spatial 
livelihoods diversification as typified by seasonal trade migration of individuals has historically 
been important in earning livelihoods in the mountains31, and continues to be a central, long-
established livelihood strategy, unlike in the hills, where labour migration is a relatively novel 
element in the livelihood portfolio. 
9.6  Migration and Remittances as Factors that Influence Cooperation in and Performance 
of Irrigation Systems  
To what extent do migration and remittances, as dominant themes in livelihood diversification, 
affect the irrigation commons? The already-proposed macro-perspective that migration should be 
understood as a form of livelihood diversification that is part of structural change leading to reduced 
importance of agriculture and increased urbanization is, as touched upon earlier, supported by near 
consensus in the migration literature that very little remitted money is reinvested into agriculture 
(thus affecting its institutions) in the long run (de Haan 1999, see footnote 1). This also appears to 
be the long-term drift in the Dhaulagiri Zone, albeit not in the conventional growth-linkages sense 
of structural transformation; the drift stimulates vegetable production for an urban market where 
demand is fuelled by remittances. There is more disagreement with respect to the three related 
‘micro’ themes, on the possible direct effects of migration on agriculture that dominate in the 
literature (see de Haan 1999 for a review): first of all, the effects of (male) migration on local labour 
availability; secondly, its effects on labour allocation in the gender-dimensional sense; and thirdly, 
the extent to which migration affects incentives and ‘investment’ decisions in natural resource 
management (David 1995), broadly understood. 
In the specific Nepalese context, these themes resonate with concerns raised regarding the ability of 
communities to manage water, owing to reduced repair and maintenance activities as a result of 
labour shortages (Gyawali and Dixit 1999, Pradhan 2003). Failing institutional memory in 
situations where decision-making and management decisions with respect to collective property are 
the domain of men, who are increasingly absent, is another concern (Meinzen-Dick et al.1997). The 
latter aspect is related to concern with respect to increased feminization of rural life (Blaikie et al. 
2002) and subsequent increased livelihoods vulnerability (Cameron 1998), because women’s rights 
                                                 
31 Prior to the 1970s, emigration was particularly high for various reasons, including the collapse of the traditional salt 
trade, thus explaining the presence of Thakali in Kathmandu, Pokhara and along the trading routes southwards from 
Thak Khola, most of whom are engaged in hotel and restaurant business. Vinding (1984) suggests that this emigration, 
rather than resulting from distress only, was also to a large extent opportunity-driven. 
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to property are more loosely defined than those of men (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). Additionally, 
concerns with respect to disintegration of the ‘moral economy’ (Blaikie et al. 2002) and the social 
capital (Macfarlane 2002 ) of villages as a result of migration have been voiced.  
9.6.1 Migration and Labour Shortages 
Pradhan proposes, in an article that seeks to take stock of the status of farmer-managed irrigation 
systems in Nepal, that:  
“Able-bodied youths from rural areas have migrated to urban centres and other countries in 
search of employment. Because the maintenance of FMIS [farmer-managed irrigation 
systems] is a labour-intensive task, without the muscle power of young men, the tasks of 
repair and maintenance have been neglected in many systems” (2003: 332). 
There appears to a shortage of labour in general in the Dhaulagiri Zone. Migration and remittances 
in Parbat District are, as noted by Seddon et al. considered to have created labour shortages—to the 
extent that “those who remain behind find it difficult to recruit labour to perform some of the farm 
work normally done by men—such as ploughing and digging” (2001:105)—as well as wage 
increases. In the present study labour shortages were identified in Mustang District, particularly 
Thini, where it appears that labourers that traditionally came from Baglung District for the summer 
harvest have now failed to turn up in the required numbers, possibly as an effect of improved 
employment opportunities in southern districts. Reportedly, labourers from Dolpo District to the 
west of Mustang District only fill the seasonal labour gaps to some extent. There seems to be little 
reason not to believe that leaving women behind, with all household and productive responsibilities, 
would for many, particularly poorer, households exacerbate a labour division that is already skewed 
in favour of men32. However, it also appears that the women who are left behind hire more labour 
than before, not least for tasks that convention dictates should be done by men in the Brahmin 
communities of the hills. As a women farmer from Amalachaur, whose husband works a teacher in 
another district, explains, “We are now growing three types of crops a year as well as vegetables. 
That means an added workload in our family. I am single, so I have had to use more hired labour.” 
Indeed, a majority of farmers report that mainly owing to an increase in agricultural production they 
now hire more labour (at a higher cost) than they did in the past. 
We know from chapter 8 that labour contributions for irrigation system maintenance have been 
reduced in most systems, while the physical status and the performance of the systems do not seem 
to justify such a reduction. To what extent may labour shortages, resulting from migration, be a 
factor in this context? Judging from farmers’ responses probably not very much: only one farmer 
(in Pakuwa) commented that fewer hands mean reduced ability to maintain the systems. Apart from 
this comment, the issue does not feature in either the reasons stated for farmers’ dissatisfaction with 
irrigation system maintenance (see chapter 8) in the cross-sectional survey, or in the related 
questions posed as part of the qualitative surveys; farmers in general point to symptoms (leakages, 
location, etc.) and to some extent institutional problems (management), but not to labour shortages 
as such.  
Female-headed households of the hills claim not to hire labour for operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation system. The criterion of sending an able-bodied person from the household (see chapter 7) 
is reportedly adhered to strictly. In households where an adult male is present, this generally means 
male attendance, but in the absence of such males, the (temporary) female head of the household 
                                                 
32 In overall terms, women are reported to work 30 per cent longer than men in Nepal (Central Bureau of Statistics 
1998/99). 
 189
attends. It seems more common for farmers in the mountains, probably owing to seasonal migration 
patterns that may sometimes overlap agricultural schedules, to send representatives for operation 
and maintenance tasks when absent; however, these representatives tend to be relatives rather than 
outside labourers, probably so as to adhere to stipulations about sending someone from the 
household. So while migration may create some degree of labour shortage in some areas, and most 
probably stimulates the hiring of labour in most areas, it does not appear to directly affect operation 
and maintenance activities in the sense suggested by Pradhan. Rather, prestige, status and 
reputation—the desire to be visibly not free riding—seem to play a major role. Berry’s observation, 
in an African context, that  
“… individuals contribute labour on compound fields or to village work parties, not in 
exchange for immediate remuneration, but rather to validate or strengthen their position 
within the group—and hence their ability to draw on its support or assistance in other 
contexts” (1989:48) 
seems to also apply in the livelihood context of the hills and mountains of Nepal.  
There also seems to be a case for questioning the extent to which the migrant group, particularly the 
‘young men’ that Pradhan refers to, would have contributed with their ‘muscle power’ to operation 
and maintenance activities in Brahmin communities, had they remained in the villages. I noted early 
in this chapter that young men were ‘normally very visible in public places of any village’ in the 
1990s. I also found, in the 1990s, that these groups of young men, though present in the village, 
were not sent as representatives of the household at times of collective action to any significant 
extent. Women farmers though, not least young women along with older, married male farmers, 
were always present in great numbers.  
While obviously rooted in wider gender relations, this phenomenon should also be understood in 
the sense noted by Blaikie et al. in their previously mentioned analysis (see section 9.3) of change 
in the hills that “it is human capital which has shown a profound upheaval” (2002: 1268) over the 
past decades. This upheaval has come about partly because, as observed by the same authors, more 
children have been put into schools. Secondary school enrolment has in fact doubled in Nepal over 
the past 30 years but for girls the number of years of schooling is still half that of boys (Asian 
Development Bank 2004). In Brahmin communities such as those of the hills, where educational 
achievement is both part of a strong cultural tradition and an important livelihood strategy, boys 
with secondary school aspirations are intended for jobs outside the village. They are not usually 
expected, and do not themselves expect, to take part in agricultural activities. 
In addition to education, upheavals are also thought to have come about through enhanced exposure 
to the outside world, facilitated by, among other things, reduced information asymmetries (see 
chapter 3) that also involve the social remittances of migrants in the political-economic period in 
question. This has, as touched upon earlier, raised aspirations on the part of both parents and 
children for livelihoods that do not seem to include farming. Very little research seems to have been 
done on the educational levels of overseas migrants, but it seems quite credible that for this 
particularly well-exposed but largely superfluous group of young men, most of whom cannot be 
absorbed into the economy—given that the labour market sees 300,000 new entrants each year 
(International Labour Organisation/UNICEF/World Bank 2003)—overseas migration is the option. 
Coming from ‘middle farmer’ Brahmin households that have been able to invest in education, this 
group is probably better able to pay the entry costs of gaining access to overseas markets than are 
other groups.  
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9.6.2 The Feminization of Rural Life 
In the context of the effects of labour migration on a community’s ability to manage water 
resources collectively, it is interesting to note, as I did in section 9.5.5 (see also table 31), that 
practically all migrants in the hill communities are reported to be husbands or sons, while in 
Mustang District it is sons and daughters who tend to migrate. The importance of the existence of a 
productive base consisting of both husband and wife ‘back on the farm’ is not entirely clear, but it 
seems to counter the increased feminization of agriculture that seems to be a consequence of the 
migration of husbands and sons in the hills. This feminization does not necessarily, as already 
argued, affect the maintenance aspects of irrigation but may, in the longer run, affect institutional 
memory in a social context where men usually take irrigation decisions.  
In the hills, the make up of Water Users’ Management Committees and/or the groups of men who 
informally play active roles in organizing irrigation seems to have changed very little over the past 
decade or so. I was struck during fieldwork by the frequency with which I found myself 
interviewing older versions of the same key informants (i.e., people on irrigation committees or 
otherwise active in relation to irrigation) that I had last interviewed some nine years before. In some 
cases it appeared that this continuity was the result of clinging on to positions of power, in other 
cases it seemed that respondents continued their tasks somewhat acquiescently. In none of the cases 
though did the institutional settings appear dynamic or even contested, and women, though 
obviously constituting a higher proportion of farmers than ever before, were no more institutionally 
active than in the 1990s. It was difficult to assess if institutional ageing without replacement by 
younger people had any impact on institutional performance, since institutional memory was 
retained in the still active male farmers that I interviewed. However, it does not seem unlikely that 
institutional problems, as probably already witnessed by the increasing dissatisfaction with both 
operation and maintenance and distributional aspects of irrigation that was accounted for in chapter 
8, will be compounded by age and gender-related aspects in the coming years. 
The last issues to be dealt with in this section are those associated with vulnerability aspects, the 
‘moral economy’, and social capital aspects of migration in relation to irrigation. This is a fairly 
mixed cocktail with potentially indiscernible ingredients, but notions of heterogeneity, inequity and 
differentiation seem to cut across variations in meanings. 
9.6.3 Migration, Remittances and Vulnerability 
In livelihoods frameworks, vulnerability is defined as a high level of proneness to shock (column D 
in Figure 4). The vulnerability context is related to the feminization of agriculture, and is closely 
associated with female-headed households in a social and legal realm such as the villages in the 
hills, where women’s access to property is less defined than that of men and, more broadly, where 
access to resources and opportunity leaves women disadvantaged compared with men. In this 
context, female-headed households are particularly vulnerable if they change from being 
temporarily female-headed into de facto widow-headed households when remittances cease to flow 
from migrant husbands (Blaikie et al. 2002). Such change in status may come about for various 
reasons, including the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic that is typically associated with widespread 
‘distress’ migration to India from the impoverished regions of the Far West of Nepal (see chapter 3, 
and Nepali Times, Vol. 224, 2004). While these aspects were not investigated in this investigation, 
there seems to be little reason why increased male migration should not, even in the relatively well-
endowed irrigated communities of this study, increasingly make some households vulnerable.  
How this may affect the commons in the Dhaulagiri cases is largely speculative at the moment. On 
the one hand, increased feminization of agriculture, involving a growing number of households with 
limited ‘in-house’ human resources and capabilities to engage in maintenance activities and 
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institutional responsibilities in general, is unlikely to improve institutional performance. On the 
other hand, the feminization of agriculture may also create possibilities for women to access 
opportunities hitherto restricted to them and this, in turn, may create new institutional dynamics. 
With reference to the findings of section 9.6.1, it does not seem plausible, at this stage, to assume 
that increased vulnerability will affect commitment to cooperative tasks. De facto female-headed 
households without the ability to gain access to opportunities other than (conventional) farming are 
likely to pursue strategies that not only entail consolidation of group membership but also serve to 
secure the conditions for irrigated farming. 
9.6.4 Remittances and Inequality  
The focus in the following remains on the labour-migration-affected hills. Seen as a ‘middle farmer 
class’, these irrigated farmers have—as noted by Blaikie et al. (2002) (see section 9.4)—in general 
managed to secure remittances over the past decades. The immediate livelihood benefits from 
migration—i.e., the remittances—are, for households that invest in this livelihood option, to a large 
extent determined by the ability to pay high entry costs, and/or take advantage of other mechanisms 
of access such as emerging networks, to lucrative labour markets. While employment generation in 
local economies may have certain had certain ‘re-distributional’ effects in terms of employment 
generation, it follows that the rewards of migration are unevenly distributed.  
In general terms, but certainly not everywhere in the Dhaulagiri Zone33, the households who do not 
have migrant family members (see table 31) are, with average annual incomes of Nepali Rupees 
37,360, at the bottom of the income ladder. The second-lowest group consists of households with 
migrant members in Nepal only, earning average incomes of Nepali Rupees 54,600. With average 
incomes of Nepali Rupees 80,306, households with members in India (often more than one 
member) come close to the highest-earning households, i.e., those with migrants in ‘other countries’ 
where average incomes amount to Nepali Rupees 81,533. Considering that migration has 
accelerated over the years, these findings would then to a large extent confirm a general conclusion 
on the part of Seddon et al. 1998 and 2001) on migration and equity in Nepal that the tendency, is 
for foreign labour migration to deepen social and economic inequalities.  
Equity and inequity in the commons may be understood, on the one hand, in the relatively 
uncontested, ‘tail-ender’ and internal context of Oakerson, which associates unequal returns to 
contributions to collective undertakings with inefficiency. The issue here, however, which is one of 
the relationship between ‘exit-option’-induced economic inequality and the use and management of 
commons, is contested indeed (see Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002 for a review of the issues), 
and, it appears, very context-specific. Two relatively large research contributions from the hills and 
terai of Nepal may serve as relevant comparisons to the present study: Varughese and Ostrom 
(2001) suggest a modest correlation between wealth disparity and problems of cooperation in forest 
use in 18 villages, while Lam (1998) in his previously cited study (see section 8.2) of irrigation 
systems in Nepal unequivocally finds that income inequality is negatively related to water delivery 
performance and productivity.  
There seems little reason not to assume that Lam’s findings in particular may be transferable to the 
hill systems of this study. However, social and economic inequality should be considered indicative 
                                                 
33 Although not included in any of the surveys in this study, it is reported from the community of Salyan in Parbat 
District, located close to the highway to Pokhara, that landless farming households (who rent land) earn around 
NRs 60,000 per annum from the sale of vegetables. Some (landed) farmers in Salyan earn up to NRs 250,000 per 
annum on vegetables. Apparently, these income opportunities have reversed the wave of overseas labour migration (see 
Aasted 2005). 
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of, rather than an explanatory factor of, relatively low performance in the hill communities of this 
study, for the very basic reason, expressed by Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, that: 
“If resource users have relatively lucrative earnings outside the commons, this can affect 
their individual incentives, as well as the power of social cohesion to promote cooperative 
behaviour” (2002:94). 
However, while earnings outside of the commons no doubt can affect incentives for some 
households (and probably do to the extent that some may eventually move out of the village), the 
findings so far provide little evidence that this is the case in overall terms. As the income data 
suggest, the importance of agriculture as a source of livelihoods has not been reduced; rather it is 
characterized by shifts towards ‘within agriculture but outside the commons’ diversification that 
seems to affect the importance of cereal crops, and hence cooperation in the associated common 
property irrigation regimes. 
9.6.5 ‘Moral Economy’ and Social Capital 
Migration and remittances may, as alluded to above, be associated with the power of social 
cohesion (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002) and associated notions of moral economy and levels 
of social capital in the sense that reciprocal arrangements, networks and social fabric disintegrate if 
livelihood interests are no longer shared. Macfarlane suggests that this has happened at practically 
all levels of human interaction in a strongly migration-affected Gurung village near Pokhara over 
the past decades, with the help of external cultural influences (Macfarlane 2002). If we, along the 
lines of Ostrom directly and with a singular focus, associate cooperation in irrigation with social 
capital in the sense that the rules that make up the institutions for cooperation are the social capital 
(Ostrom 1990, 1992), then that social capital in irrigation, i.e., the reciprocal arrangements that are 
central to cooperation in irrigation, appear to have been reduced in the studied communities, as 
witnessed by reduced performance on a number of accounts. However, in a broader sense—
notwithstanding that some ‘left behind’ households (such as those that are female-headed) may 
experience ‘exclusion’ in spatially separated families and in terms of access to commons 
resources—levels of these somewhat hazy notions appear not to have been reduced in general terms 
in the cases here, at least not as a result of ‘exit options’. Applying a broader, institutional-
dynamics, ‘no condition is permanent’ (Berry 1993) perspective, it appears that cooperative 
arrangements may simply have taken on other forms. This will be discussed in coming sections. 
9.7 Changing Institutional Landscapes  
As argued earlier, the dominant rural development and collective action discourses have assigned 
important places to local resource management institutions—including irrigation institutions—as 
central institutions to safeguard livelihoods in rural economies thought to depend on agriculture as 
the central source of livelihood. Likewise, it is generally assumed, that external sources of income 
will negatively affect the institutional mechanisms that ensure the success of the commons and 
other cooperative endeavours. This tends to be associated with reductions in social capital, usually 
understood as trust, shared norms and interests, and associational life.  
In contrast to the singular focus on commons institutions, livelihood thinking recognizes to a greater 
extent the diversified nature of rural livelihoods and the notion that livelihoods are pursued within 
matrices made up of a variety of institutions, i.e., that diversified rural livelihoods and the existence 
of an array of institutions go hand-in-hand. In the following, I will attempt to map the institutional 
landscapes and trace institutional trajectories in the irrigated communities with a view to assessing 
the extent to which the institutional landscapes may be seen to impinge on, otherwise affect, or 
explain the trajectory of the common property regimes in irrigation. This element of the 
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investigation is purely based on qualitative surveys without the benefit of ‘hard’ comparative over-
time data. 
9.7.1   Institutional Landscape of the Communities 
An overview of the institutional landscape within the nine irrigated communities is provided in 
tables 32 and 33. The list draws on the qualitative surveys across the communities: key informants 
(n=14) were asked about their involvement in committees and boards within the communities, as 
well as the existence of agricultural institutions in the community; additionally, randomly selected 
farmers were asked which institutions were present in the community in two surveys that sought to 
trace institutional (n=16) and livelihoods trajectories (n= 18). The listed institutions, which 
probably should not be considered exhaustive, are divided into socio-economic (Table 32) and 
socio-cultural institutions (Table 33) so as to suggest their relevance in a livelihood context. 
 
Table 32 
Socio-Economic Institutions at Community Level 
Institution Amalachaur Arjewa Kurgha Pakuwa Lampata Pipalbot Thini Tiri Khinga 
1. Irrigation 
(adhyakshya) 
•  •  • • • •    
2. Irrigation 
(mukhya)       
•  • • 
3. Savings/Credit 
Association(s) 
•  •  • • • •    
4. Vegetable 
Cooperatives 
•   • • •     
5. Mothers’ Group •   • • • • •  • • 
6. Forest Users’ 
Association 
•  •   •  • •  •  
7. Dhikur Groups •  •   •  • •  • • 
8. Parma   •  •    • 
9. Beekeepers’ 
Association    
•      
10. Goat Farmers’ 
Association    
•  •    
11. Coffee Traders 
Association    
•      
12. Seed 
Production Group      
• •    
13. Health Post 
Committee 
•  •   •      
14. Drinking Water 
Committee   
•       
15. Motor Road 
Committee      
•    
16. Energy Group      • •  •  
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17. Post Office       •    
18. ACAP (i)       •  • • 
19. NEWAH (ii)    • •     
20. PDDP (iii)     •     
21. Lumle Project 
(iv)    
•      
22. Small Farmers’ 
Association   
•       
Sources: Key Informants’ Survey (n=14); Institutional Trajectory Survey (n=16); and Livelihood Trajectory Survey 
(n=18).  
Notes: (i) Annapurna Area Conservation Project; (ii) Nepal Water for Health; (iii) Participatory District Development 
Project; (iv) Project from Lumle Regional Agricultural Research Centre. 
Table 33 
Socio-Cultural Institutions at Community Level 
Institution Amalachaur Arjewa Kurgha Pakuwa Lampata Pipalbot Thini Tiri Khinga 
1. Youth Clubs     • •    
2. Gompa (i)       •  • • 
3. Temple Group   •       
4. School 
Committee 
•  •  • • • • •    
Sources: Key Informants’ Survey (n=14); Institutional Trajectory Survey (n=16); and Livelihood Trajectory Survey 
(n=18).  
Note: (i) Buddhist monastery. 
The division of these institutions into socio-economic and socio-cultural categories does not mean 
that they are mutually exclusive in terms of pursuing livelihoods; youth clubs, for instance, often 
constitute entry points for the mobilization of young people by Non-government Organisations and 
therefore may serve as institutions that attract external resources; and mothers’ groups, as suggested 
in the next section, serve both important cultural and economic functions. As social capital—
defined as networks of social relations—all the listed institutions would appear to constitute assets 
that may affect bargaining and other forms of power, and probably levels of shared norms and 
identity among entire communities or among those affiliated with specific institutions. With respect 
to norms and identity, it would also appear that the gompa or Buddhist monasteries of Thini, Tiri 
and Khinga are particularly bonding socio-cultural institutions. 
Avoiding dichotomizations does not mean that the historical context of these institutions should be 
disregarded, as the age of institutions usually relates to the degree to which they are rooted in a 
community. However, rather than referring to deeply embedded institutions as ‘traditional’ (which 
may be taken to connote something old and static) and more recent institutions as ‘modern’ (which 
may be taken to connote upgraded versions of the traditional), it makes more sense to refer to these 
institutions in more neutral terms as ‘customary’ and ‘non-customary’, respectively. The customary 
institutions featuring among those listed in table 32 above, include, in addition to the irrigation 
management institutions described in chapter 7 (the customary mukhya system of Mustang District 
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and the adhyakshya system of the hills), dhikur (credit groups) and parma (exchange labour). In the 
literature, parma is considered a central institution in the context of irrigated agriculture. Miller, in 
a study of decision-making in the Jhadewa Valley of Palpa District immediately south of the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, describes its basic functions and significance: 
“This system, called parima in Jhadewa and parma elsewhere in Nepal, is of special 
importance at the time of rice planting. A family asks its relatives and friends to send 
workers to its fields on a fixed day. It is possible to refuse, but one must have a very 
plausible excuse in order to avoid bad feelings… Parima workers receive no payment in 
cash but are repaid in labour when it is time for their own rice planting. Even though twenty 
to thirty workers may be involved in the exchange-labour process, and no written records 
are kept, the families experience no difficulty in recalling the names of the people to whom 
they are now indebted for repayment of labour… Though it is physically exhausting for the 
ploughmen and the other men and women to repay all their parima debts during the planting 
season of about six weeks, they value the system because it makes possible for each family 
to get all its rice transplanted in one day without a large outlay of scarce cash for hired 
labourers” (2000:112). 
As Miller further explains, the parma system is also in place with other work that is desirable to 
have completed within a short time, such as harvesting and threshing. Such reciprocal arrangements 
are found throughout Nepal (but are not at all unique to Nepal34), but performed, according to 
Messerschmidt, most elaborately among the Gurung ethnic group, where, organized around cultural 
institutions35 this “form of cooperation plays an important role in village and intra-ethnic unity, 
reciprocity, stability and communality” (1995:8). In both the hills and the mountains, parma should 
be understood as a predominantly risk-spreading arrangement closely associated with the 
agricultural cycle of irrigated grain production regimes, usually performed—as also observed by 
Bishop (1990) in the Karnali area—in combination with other labour mobilization arrangements. 
The fact that this institution only features in three of the communities should be considered 
indicative of recent changes related to non-grain crops as discussed earlier (see also next section). 
Other labour mobilization arrangements have not been investigated in detail in the present study. 
However, ‘vertical’ institutions based on access to and control of productive means and, 
subsequently, caste and class, would—as in other rural areas of Nepal—range from the hiring of 
labour on market terms to semi-feudalistic36 arrangements as well as sharecropping and other land-
renting arrangements. Class and caste relationships in the Kali Gandaki corridor and elsewhere in 
Nepal that, as Seddon and Adhikhari put it, “provide the basis and the ideological justification for 
exploitation and oppression, for social discrimination and exclusion, for degradation and 
deprivation as well as for employment and patronage” (2003:55), are indeed important determinants 
                                                 
34 Messerschmidt (1995) reports that they are found in North India, China and Tibet. I would suggest that they exist, or 
have existed, in most agricultural societies in some form. 
35 It “typically involves young men and women in agricultural field work and is organized around an age-graded female 
dormitory association called rodi” (Messerschmidt 1995:7). 
36 While payment in kind for labour probably occurs frequently, actual jajmani systems of caste-specific task 
specializations in hill agriculture (see Bishop 1990) or anything resembling the kamaiya bonded-labour system of the 
terai do not appear to be particularly prominent in the communities studied. First of all, demand for such labour 
outstrips supply and Brahmin who are not supposed to plough often have to do so anyway, faced with the requirement 
for a wage premium. Secondly, the presence of Maoists in the area appears to subdue outright exploitative practices. 
With respect to backward linkages to agriculture (implements), however, production is still organized along distinctly 
caste-specific tasks.  
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of the livelihood conditions of the poor. However, the scope of this study, with its focus on socio-
economic change among landed, irrigated farm households, means there is less emphasis on 
‘vertical’ institutional relationships between richer and poorer as well as kinship-based institutions 
that—similar to “money, markets, marriage and the law” (Leach et al. 1997:237)—have no direct 
organizational manifestations (Meynen and Doornbus 2004). 
Staying within the realm of customary institutions, and directly related to financial resources 
mobilization, dhikur, or rotating credit associations, are particularly important in Thini, Tiri, Khinga 
and Pipalbot. Dhikur tend to operate at disaggregated levels, made up of members who contribute to 
a fund at predetermined rates and frequencies, in order to raise capital for individual investment. 
Messerschmidt explains that 
“… each dhikur rotates annually or biannually for as many rounds as there are members. At 
each turn, every member contributes a prescribed amount of cash plus 10 per cent interest 
compounded incrementally. The member who takes the lump sum in his turn pays it back 
with interest which grows incrementally. Thus the overall fund grows turn by turn and those 
who take the sum at or near the end receive proportionately more than those near the start. In 
essence, those at the end are proffering a loan to the others; as lenders they accept deferred 
payment but receive a larger profit” (1995:6). 
While the dhikur principles that, as suggested above, “tend to distinguish early borrowers from late 
lenders” (Seddon et al. 1979:210) are related to roughly similar principles around the globe 
(Messerschmidt 1995), their significance in the context of this study relates chiefly to the origin and 
concentration of dhikur in the northern part of the Dhaulagiri Zone. From there, the practice has 
been spread to many locations, particularly the towns and bazaars along the trade route to the south 
(see Seddon et al. 1979 as well as chapter 5), by migrating Thakali from Mustang District and other 
northern peoples who do business along the trade route and beyond. While predominantly an 
entrenched resource-mobilizing practice of ‘northerners’, other groups, including Parbatiya, 
increasingly make use of it. Even if not listed in figure 32 as a community-level institution in all 
communities, dhikur exist at disaggregated levels in all communities, in some form and scale, 
reflecting a pattern throughout Nepal where everyone from business people to professional groups37 
engage in it. Though largely speculative, it does not seem unlikely that migration endeavours may 
benefit from dhikur.  
Geertz (1962) (quoted in Bingen 2000:18) saw such rotating credit associations as ‘intermediate’ 
institutions that were “essentially a device by means of which traditionalistic forms of social 
relationships are mobilized so as to fulfil non-traditionalistic forms of economic functions”, i.e., as 
vehicles for capital formation for farmers. Dhikur, in the context of the Kali Gandaki corridor, it 
may therefore be argued, contribute a great deal to the historical regional economic dynamics 
outlined in chapter 5. Additionally, as institutional fabric in the specific regional context, based on 
the dynamics associated with ‘communities of trust’ and shared interests upon which they depend 
for existence and successful operation (Seddon et al. 1970), dhikur should not be underestimated.  
Except for post offices, health centres and schools the bulk of the non-customary institutions are 
either direct products of, or spin-offs from, projects implemented by the government or Non-
government Organisations, usually with the assistance of international donors in the period from 
1990 onwards. Depending on the project, but in line with the emphasis on participation and the 
                                                 
37 A lecturer from the university campus in Pokhara once told me that it was common for university staff, including 
those in his own department, to engage in dhikur. 
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‘local’ in the dominant discourse of the time, these institutions featured as community-based 
organizations or users’ groups in most project and policy documents, as well as in Nepalese 
legislation. Some, such as the savings and credit groups and the vegetable cooperatives, stem (as 
elaborated on in the following section) from the tripartite collaboration between the Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project, the District Irrigation Office line agency and local Non-government 
Organisations. Others, such as the seed production and goat farmers’ associations, are among a 
plethora of groups initiated as part of the Participatory District Development Programme (PDDP) of 
the United Nations Development Programme which, as the name suggests, aimed to promote 
decentralization through District Development Committees. Yet other ‘institutions’ such as Nepal 
Water for Health (NEWAH) and the Annapurna Area Conservation Project (ACAP) are projects 
that, because of their recent nature, are still referred to by the name of the external agent and not yet 
to the name of the Community-based Organisation or Non-government Organisation offspring.  
These non-customary institutions differ substantially from customary institutions by virtue of their 
origin and internal architecture. Their structural-political origin in a liberal environment, 
emphasizing incentives, choice and (designed) decentralized collective action in the context of the 
decentralization policies of Nepal in the 1990s, was mentioned in chapters 2 and 4. In its practical 
local manifestation, the democratic basis has typically been a so-called mass meeting organized and 
conducted by a project ‘mobilizer’, who would in many cases, have identified potential stakeholders 
as part of a rapid rural appraisal exercise. The mass meeting serves as a general assembly where 
principles and objectives are discussed and a constitution-cum-bye-laws agreed upon. In line with 
democratic principles, a committee made up of both (pre-nominated) women and men, with as a 
minimum a treasurer, a secretary and a president, would be elected; every ‘association’ listed in 
figure 32 has a committee that is often, by many nominal members of the association, seen as the 
actual institution.  
The standard formula involved formal, recorded membership and enabled registration with and 
incorporation into the legal framework of local levels of government, the currently suspended 
Village Development Committees (see chapter 4). Partly because, at the time of writing, these 
committees were not in formal existence, and partly because they cover several villages, these 
formal, elected bodies are notably absent from the list. This does not, however, as shown in the next 
section, mean that they are not important to people. Registration as a legal Community-based 
Organisation or Non-government Organisation entity in theory created eligibility (what many 
respondents refer to as ‘recognition’) with respect to access to resources (projects, funds, etc.) 
through local line agencies, as well as District and Village Development Committees. In practice, in 
the context of irrigation and other infrastructure projects the awarding of legal status to these 
community-based institutions marked a departure from previous centralized (small) project 
implementation practice that involved only line agencies and a hierarchy of contractors, and was 
made possible as a result of amendments to the government’s Financial Rules that assigned 
“priority to users’ committees formed by local users for the construction of projects to be 
implemented in rural areas up to a cost ceiling of Nepali Rupees 10 lakh (one million)” (Nepal 
Gazette, 1 March 1993, ch. 42, no. 46, p. 9). These amendments followed wording in the Eighth 
Plan (1992–1997) emphasizing that: 
“… rural communities will be encouraged to organize user groups for building community 
infrastructure and to organize beneficiary groups in order to strengthen receiving 
mechanisms at the grassroots level. All projects within the technical and managerial 
competence of the local people will be implemented by local user groups with assistance 
from local and district committees” (National Planning Commission 1992: 41). 
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9.7.2  Institutional Priorities in a Changing Institutional Landscape 
Compared with the monolithic Panchayat institutions (SAPPROS 2001), the post-1990 democratic 
era in Nepal witnessed increasing institutional dynamics and access to opportunities for certain 
groups such as irrigated farmers in privileged locations. As argued in chapter 4, this should be 
understood in the context of the conducive political space provided by democratic policies in 
general, along with agricultural policies and dominant discourses of decentralization and poverty 
reduction that provided a central place to local, natural resource management institutions.  
The Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project was a key player in engineering new institutions in 
the Dhaulagiri Zone in the political-economic moment; its 66 irrigation projects involved a 
substantial amount of institutional engineering during the 1990s. In addition to the 66 Farmers’ 
Irrigation Associations and Water Users’ Management Committees, the period between 1992 and 
1996 saw the formation of some 43 functional literacy groups and 90 women’s savings 
groups/mothers’ groups (under the heading of ‘irrigation-related income-generation’). The 
trajectory of the latter form of group is particularly illustrative of the dominant approach of the 
time: savings were seen as an entry point for other income-generating activities and the groups 
received training on everything from environmental awareness creation and vegetable nurseries to 
smokeless stove construction and financial management. While a pioneering player that may be 
seen to have created a critical mass of activities, the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project was 
not the only one; national and international Non-government Organisations, bilateral and 
multilateral donors worked on related themes, with forestry users’ groups as the most prominent 
and widespread activity in natural resources management. Upon the departure of the Dhaulagiri 
Irrigation Development Project, local Non-government Organisations, some of them erstwhile 
partners of the project, created new alliances with new donors, and continued what they were by 
then good at, often in the communities where they were good at it, with ‘beneficiaries’ who were 
equally good at it. The effects of this intensive, often complementing, input of a battery of ‘soft’ 
resources is illustrated by one farmer: 
“As individuals we are not recognized, so we need to establish relations. Our vegetable-
growing cooperative is most important because we share ideas and get information from 
outside. It has been possible to change our living standard this way” (woman farmer, 
Lampata). 
These comments on the role of institutions in relation to ‘recognition’ (vis-à-vis authorities, those 
with information, those who monopolize trade in commodities, etc.), the breaking of information 
asymmetries (through the sharing of experiences on, for example, the cultivation of new crops), and 
the linkage with livelihoods are fairly representative of the meanings that farmers attach to their 
institutions. 
This particular farmer’s statement, expressed in 2005, as she pointed towards her dense, well-
maintained vegetable plots which her son was busy weeding, would please any promoter of local 
groups for poverty alleviation. The vegetable cooperative that she refers to has 75 member 
households in a locality of 122 households (70 of which are irrigated, communally or individually). 
Two other groups in the area have nine and 14 members, respectively. Many farmers, like her, earn 
Nepali Rupees 60,000 (approximately US$ 1000) per annum from the sale of vegetables in nearby 
Kusma and beyond. In line with what was the original Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project 
‘entry point’ philosophy, this farmer’s involvement started in 1992 when project resident social 
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mobilizers, as they were known, encouraged the formation of a mothers’ group (Ama Samuha)38, of 
which she was elected treasurer. Based on that group, a women’s savings group was formed and 
registered with the authorities in 1993 and she continued as treasurer, in close interaction with the 
social mobilizer.  
Members of the ‘entry point group’, while benefiting from interaction with the social mobilizer, 
received (among a number of training activities) formal ‘skills development training’, ‘off-season 
vegetable production training’, and the farmer herself, together with the chairperson of the savings 
group, received financial management training together with other leaders in Kusma, the district 
headquarters of Parbat. When the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project mobilizer left in 1996, 
a local Non-government Organisation39 assisted a number of women from the savings group to set 
up a livestock group, and when the same Non-government Organisation, in 1997, received a grant 
from a bilateral donor, it also assisted in creating the present vegetable cooperative. Most of the 
members are also members of the savings group (which continues to exist), except for a number of 
households who, in the face of labour shortages and sources of irrigation, find themselves unable to 
adopt the rather labour- and water-intensive vegetable cultivation. Similar institutional trajectories 
are found in most of the irrigated communities; the mothers’ group in particular appears to have 
been a successful entry point for credit provision.  
These examples illustrate that irrigation institutions are just one among a number of interacting 
institutions that shape people’s resource access and control in the institutional landscape. In the 
following that landscape will be further mapped by means of an exploration of institutional 
priorities and meanings among farmers, based on the understanding that “different institutions may 
carry different meanings for different social actors” (Leach et al. 1997: 10). Table 34 shows a 
summary of replies to the question, “Which is the most important institution for farmers in your 
community?”, in the livelihood trajectory survey as well as relevant responses in the key informants 
survey. The respondents were representatives of Farmers’ Irrigation Associations (six, all male), 
persons otherwise ‘active’ in the community (five, of which four are female), and ordinary farmers 
(eight, of which two are low caste, one male and one female, and one other is female).  
The focus is on ‘tangible’ associational activities (sangh in Nepali), and for that reason customary 
institutions mentioned earlier are conspicuously absent from the list, except in the case of the 
mountains. It should be noted though, in this context, that farmers consider parma activities, whose 
functions were described in the previous section, to have been reduced significantly in all 
communities, but mainly so in communities with good market access and subsequent diversification 
into crops with less uniform labour requirements. This would confirm that parma is primarily a 
function of the rice–wheat–maize cropping regime, with its relatively fixed and uniform periods of 
peak labour requirement. 
                                                 
38 Eligibility for membership is not necessarily motherhood but marriage. 
39 The Baglung-based Dhaulagiri Community Resource Development Centre (DCRDC). 
 200
Table 34 
Institutional Priorities, All Communities, (n=19) 
Rank Institution Reason Assigned 
 1 
  
Farmers’ Irrigation Association/ 
Village Irrigation Governance40 
Vegetable Cooperative 
Farmers’ Association 
Survival, livelihood, dispute resolution, water and natural 
resource management 
Livelihood 
Power (political) 
2 Village Development Committee 
 
Mothers’ Groups 
 
 
Drinking Water Committee 
School 
Gompa41  
Protection of water rights, conduit to access resources, 
registration, link to resources and formal recognition 
Role in solving social problems, checks social vices, savings 
and income-generation, encourages women’s participation, 
credit 
Safe drinking water 
Access to education 
Guidance (spiritual, astrological) 
3 Health Post 
District Agriculture Office 
District Development Committee 
Post Office 
Forest Users’ Group 
District Irrigation Office 
District Administration Office/ 
Magistrate 
Access to medical services 
Canal maintenance assistance 
Assist in resolution of water rights disputes 
Convenience 
Livelihood 
Occasional advice 
Not specified 
Sources: Key Informants’ Survey, Livelihood Trajectory Survey. 
Institutions that are directly associated with livelihoods, such as the vegetable cooperatives 
mentioned above, are the most highly prioritized. Within this category, Farmers’ Irrigation 
Associations/village irrigation governance institutions are considered to be of utmost importance. 
There is a tendency for male respondents, particularly those who represent irrigation institutions to 
singularly focus on this institution; however, female respondents, including those active in other 
institutions, also consider irrigation institutions the most important in overall terms. The functioning 
of the irrigation system is strongly associated with its governance in all responses. As the 
representative of a mothers’ group in Kurgha states:  
                                                 
40 It needs to be noted that for the purpose of illustrating an aggregate picture of institutional priorities, distinctions 
between the governance systems of hills and mountains are not made, even if differences are substantial. However, in 
the present context, it is worth noting that villagers in the mountain communities saw the customary village institution 
for managing natural resources as the most important. 
41 In the mountain communities. 
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“If there is no irrigation, my family cannot grow enough food. If we cannot grow enough 
food, my family gets in trouble… The irrigation cannot work without the Water Users’ 
Management Committee. They make rules and regulations and users have to follow them.” 
A low-caste woman farmer in the same locality, when asked if she thought the irrigation system 
could work without a committee, adds an equity perspective: 
“Well-managed irrigation is important for our livelihoods. Without irrigation we cannot 
produce crops, and without rules we cannot run the system: we get disputes among 
ourselves. If the system is managed well, we can irrigate even with little water. The 
committee is important for equal distribution, and without it the people who are strong and 
clever are able to benefit more than others.” 
This assignment of importance to a regulatory body and the relationship with livelihoods is even 
more pronounced in the communities in Mustang District where the mukhya institution covers all 
aspects of natural resource management, with irrigation as an important element. As the local 
blacksmith in Thini, with a small parcel of land, emphasizes: 
“We need the mukhya for settling disputes… we need him for managing the irrigation 
system.” 
The Village Development Committee ranks among the second most important institutions in the 
hills. This came as a surprise, considering that both Village Development Committees and District 
Development Committees were suspended in 2002. It appears, however, that despite its temporary 
burial, the memory of the 10-year life of particularly the Village Development Committees, the 
smallest units of administration in the democratic sense, is very much alive on the institutional map, 
and that people expect it to be restored to full life in the coming future. The high prioritization is 
associated mainly with what the representative of the vegetable cooperative in Lampata called 
‘recognition’. The following exchange, with the same woman farmer, illustrates this: 
Respondent:  Before, nobody liked to establish relations. It was difficult to mobilize even 200 
rupees. Now that we have the vegetable group we have more recognition, also the 
Village Development Committee and the District Development Committee 
recognize us. People also recognize our group. 
Interviewer:  Why is it important to get recognition from the Village Development Committee? 
Respondent:  Because a group can be registered and we received a grant. 
Interviewer:  A grant from where? 
Respondent:  From the organizations down there [points downhill, in the direction of Kusma]. 
When we formed the group, we received a grant; it came through the Village 
Development Committee. It is an important institution because we get legal 
recognition from it. 
Interviewer:  So the Village Development Committee is important because of the legal 
recognition? 
Respondent:  Yes, there is the legal status; that is why it is important, it has authority and can give 
us legal status. 
Interviewer:  I still do not quite understand why legal status is important. 
Respondent:  Legal means that if we want to work as a group and get benefits, we have to get a 
recommendation from the Village Development Committee, we have to register. We 
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cannot coordinate work with the Village Development Committee or other 
organizations if we are not registered. 
Interviewer:  Okay, I understand. Then what is the relationship with the District Development 
Committee? 
Respondent:  Village Development Committee does not have sufficient budget for doing much 
work at village level, so they bring plans to the District Development Committee. 
For example, for the grant and also our drinking water project, we went to the 
District Development Committee through the Village Development Committee. 
This tendency to assign importance to the role of the Village Development Committees for 
obtaining legal status, and for receiving approval for projects is echoed in all hill communities. 
While people also complain about political conflicts associated with the Village Development 
Committees, its suspension is generally seen as a major problem. As another woman farmer, this 
time from Pipalbot, says: 
“When we had a problem the Water Users’ Management Committee went many times to 
knock on the door of the Village Development Committee office, which was located in our 
village. Three years ago they provided funds for repairing damage to the irrigation system. 
We influenced the use of funds and their planning, and had dialogues with the chairman on 
how to spend Village Development Committee funds. Now that both the chairman and the 
vice-chairman are absent, it is no longer possible to do this. Because of the Maoist 
insurgency the office has also shifted to the district headquarters. Still, the Village 
Development Committee supports us for solving some problems, particularly the issuing of 
recommendation letters for line agencies”  
As this farmer says, the Village Development Committee may have been officially suspended in 
2002, but it continued to operate at a limited level in the hill communities for quite some time after 
its cessation, end even after seeking refuge in the district headquarters from Maoists it continued to 
perform minimum functions. There is no escaping the impression given by respondents that 
stripping the Village Development Committee and District Development Committee administrative 
layers from the local administrative maps left a vacuum with respect to any sense of connection that 
people had between the micro-setting and the state. At district level, the latter is now represented by 
the Chief District Officer (the Magistrate), the Local Development Officer (of the same office), the 
police and army, as well as the traditional line agencies, all of which are accountable, as in the pre-
democracy days, only to the central level. 
Institutions, as suggested in the introduction to this section, hold different meanings to different 
social actors, and while ‘simple’ livelihood concerns predominate, power, acquired through local 
institutions as platforms for gaining influence in the wider institutional landscape, hold meaning in 
a number of communities. Particularly in the hills, the emerging connection between the village and 
district levels through users’ groups such as the Farmers’ Irrigation Associations, the Village 
Development Committees and the District Development Committees held opportunities for power 
for some groups, typically male, Brahmin farmers often with sizeable landholdings. These farmers, 
some of whom had held political office during the Panchayat era, were quick to realize the 
advantages offered by the formal Water Users’ Management Committees introduced as part of the 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project intervention, and used these as platforms for gaining 
political influence. These power relations have not been investigated in much detail. It is, however, 
my clear impression that the ability to establish links between community organizations and local 
authorities (the ‘recognition’ mentioned above), and thus access to external resources, to a large 
 203
extent depended on the presence of politician farmers, along the lines of Seddon and Adhikari’s 
observation on the effect of democracy at local level: 
“….at the local level at least the shape of political competition had important implications 
for the deployment of social capital, and ultimately, for the distribution of economic and 
other resources. Increasingly, one’s political alignment affected one’s access to resources 
and the dominance or otherwise of a particular political tendency at the national, regional 
and local level determined the volume and direction of benefits” (2003:58). 
The suspension of the Village Development Committee/District Development Committee 
administrative layers severed the opportunity structures that were on offer during the democratic 
period. 
In the three mountain communities, government institutions never held the same meaning as the 
mukhya customary governance institutions (listed as ‘village irrigation governance’ in figure 6). 
The role of the Village Development Committee is generally seen as subordinate to that of the 
mukhya, and acknowledged mainly for the annual grant allocation, the use of which (generally for 
road building) was decided upon by the mukhya. Hence the absence of these administrative layers is 
not felt to be as great a loss in the mountains as it is in the hills, apart from the grant element. The 
democratic era nevertheless made its mark. As an ex-member of parliament and farmer from Thini 
explains: 
“During the Panchayat regime and even before, during the Ranas, the central authority 
would designate the mukhya. The villagers did not have the right to choose their mukhya at 
that time. During the democratic period, the villagers could choose their mukhya, but often 
there would be some political interference. It was like: his father was the mukhya, the son 
also became the mukhya and the grandson also. It got better under democracy. Now there is 
a good relationship between the mukhya and the villagers because the District Development 
Committees and the Village Development Committees are vacant. Now it is much better, 
and the present system where mukhya are elected is no doubt democratic. We no longer 
make a person mukhya on the grounds of his wealth or influence in politics; our experience 
with elected VDCs has made us more democratic.” 
Symptomatic of the limited importance of the formal administrative structures of the state, most 
mountain respondents—not just the women, but also the men—assign the second highest priority to 
the mothers’ groups (Ama Samuha) and see them as a powerful institution. Biswa Thakali, one of 
the (male) Thini mukhya, expresses this somewhat laconically: 
“The mothers’ group is powerful. They handle garbage and we have to pay them, even if we 
do not throw any garbage. But they keep the trails clean.” 
A woman farmer and former executive member of the mothers’ group in Thini goes beyond the 
practical meaning, and throws light on why the men also sees the mothers’ group as something to 
be reckoned with: 
“Whenever we have a practical problem with our land, we go to the mukhya. And whenever 
we have a personal problem, we call the mothers’ group. They persuade husbands to give up 
gambling and drinking alcohol.” 
The previously quoted ex-Member of Parliament from Thini further explains about this institution 
that gained strength in the 1990s. 
Respondent:   The mothers’ group was set up with the goal that women could do something to 
wipe out social evils and malpractices. At first they had a lot of problems but now 
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they have shown what they can do and people give them much importance. They 
have opened libraries and information centres, and in most villages in Mustang they 
are playing vital roles in the communities. Now they are invited to participate in 
most activities. We have problems in the villages, you know, with violence against 
women and other kinds of victimization. But these disputes, between husbands and 
wives, parents and children and so on, are settled in the village, not taken to court. 
Not after the mothers’ group became strong. 
Interviewer:  What happens? What are the sanctions? 
Respondent:  There are different types. Warnings are given if it is a first offence, and the 
perpetrators are told to apologize. The women come along in a group. If the 
perpetrators do to again, they are fined. 
The role of mothers’ groups as a form of social reform movement is known from other parts of 
Nepal, particularly with respect to the question of alcohol; throughout the past decades, women 
have successfully campaigned for the banning of the sale of alcohol in a number of districts42. 
However, in the hill communities of this study, meaning is attributed less to the social justice 
functions of these groups, than to their economic function, particularly the savings and credit 
functions already narrated from Lampata. It is quite evident that the latter functions have made the 
potentially controversial (from a gender power perspective) activities associated with women’s 
rights, awareness creation, safe motherhood, etc., palatable to men in conservative Hindu society. 
The secretary of the mothers’ group in Lampata gives a fairly representative account of the origin 
and meaning of these groups in the hills context: 
“After the change in 1990, different Non-government Organisations came here. Then the 
Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project came to the village and formed women’s groups. 
We got a feeling of unity. Before, women were only doing household activities and did not 
have permission to go out alone. If a woman had to [go out], she had to take a man for 
security. During the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project, women got the opportunity 
to go and observe things outside and learn new things. Those who quarrelled were 
persuaded to unite in the groups. The sanitation situation improved. After observation and 
visits to different places, a number of income-generation activities started. Vegetable seed 
production has been important for our livelihoods.” 
Health post and school feature lower down the list of important institutions in both the hills and the 
mountains. The reason for including them as relative priorities is fairly obvious, namely, as access 
to medical treatment and education. The latter in particular is generally highly prioritized in 
Brahmin society, where educational attainment carries a great deal of status. As in many other parts 
of the world, the ambition in these irrigated communities is to have at least one child (often a son) 
completing higher education, and preferably becoming a doctor, an engineer or—a relatively new 
ambition—“someone who knows about computers” and who, as mentioned earlier, will become an 
“earner, not just an eater”. That earning, a number of farmers express, should—as made clear earlier 
in this chapter—preferably take place abroad. It needs to be noted that schools seen as important 
institutions include first and foremost government schools—the last remaining public entity in 
                                                 
42 The Maoists, through their ‘women’s wing’, have capitalized on the anti-alcohol sentiments of women who, 
particularly in the poverty- and alcohol-stricken Far West of Nepal, had been successful in banning sales of alcohol. A 
campaign, taken to national levels in 2001, threatened to close down any establishment selling alcohol and promoting 
other ‘social vices’ even in Kathmandu. While bans apparently remain in place in many rural districts, cities have, 
however, not been affected to any significant extent (see Nepali Times, Vol. 55, 2001). 
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many villages—whose importance has increased in recent years, concurrent with Maoist drives 
against the proliferation of private schools run by, among others, government school teachers on the 
side. Other relatively less prioritized institutions include the gompa (monasteries in the mountains), 
drinking water committees and forest users’ groups, as well as government offices such as the 
District Agricultural Office, the Post Office, the District Irrigation Office, and the District 
Administrative Office.  
This overall picture of the priorities suggests that—with the notable exception of the ‘justice and 
morals’ meaning of the mothers’ groups—the economic, livelihood and resource access functions 
of institutions are central to the attribution of meaning to institutions in these irrigated communities.  
9.7.3  The Role of the Maoists and the Insurgency 
I mention in chapter 5 that at the time of fieldwork for this thesis (2004–06) the Maoists arguably 
constituted the single most important institutional presence in the Dhaulagiri Zone, measured in 
terms of ability and ambition with respect to the exercise of power and control over institutional, 
social, economic and political life. In light of this, it is somewhat conspicuous, that the Maoist 
movement is absent from the list of (and priority) attached to institutions in the communities. The 
effects of the Maoist presence and the insurgency have been touched upon in a couple of the 
statements in the previous section; in this section I will elaborate on this in more detail.  
I discuss, in chapter 4, the position of donors with respect to the Maoists, as well as the ambiguity 
surrounding the effects of the crisis. Keeping in mind these perspectives, investigation into the 
effects of the crisis on institutional life for a relatively better-off segment of rural society in a 
relatively well-endowed area of Nepal, is particularly interesting. Much more so than more remote 
and unirrigated communities, they may be seen as a segment that managed to reap certain benefits 
associated with the agricultural and democratic policies of the democratic era of the 1990s, as 
witnessed in the previous sections of this chapter. On a methodological note, it needs to be 
mentioned that direct questions regarding the effect of the crisis were not included in the 
questionnaires; the issue, however, usually appeared in connection with more general discussions 
on livelihood conditions. 
The direct effects of the crisis are mainly felt in the hills. Mustang District never saw a noticeable 
Maoist presence. In this arid, sparsely populated district with few places to hide from a 
disproportionately large military presence, “there are no Maoists, they only begin at Ghasa” (a one-
day walk to the south) was the uniform answer to any query on Maoist activity. People’s responses 
with respect to how the crisis had affected life (in the context of livelihoods, institutions, threats, the 
community) tended to be framed in terms of how their own livelihoods had been affected directly, 
rather than wider contexts. Here is a typical response: 
“It is difficult to travel at night; the security people stop us on the way and do not allow us to 
continue home. We waste money.” 
These are the words of a blacksmith in Thini. Travel (by foot or horse) at night along the trails 
beside the Kali Gandaki River was affected by an 8-p.m. curfew, and this was considered a serious 
problem for people who, like the blacksmith and most others men in the area, migrate seasonally to 
southern districts during the winter period. The problem apparently also affected the mobility of 
labourers originating in the south, who have traditionally come to Mustang District for the 
buckwheat harvest. 
The curfew also, as mentioned in chapter 6, affected irrigation where, following centuries of 
tradition, water allocations follow strict turns around the clock. “We have to catch our turns to 
irrigate our land and the curfew has become a nuisance. Even in times of drought we cannot irrigate 
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at night,” said one of the caretakers of Thini’s irrigation system who, like his neighbours, had been 
scared off by warning shots from the army camp across the valley. Both the travel restrictions and 
the inability to work in the fields at night, however, were considered mere nuisances rather than 
severe threats to livelihoods. Further north in the district, in the tiny hamlet of Tiri, the crisis was, 
however, perceived as a major threat to livelihoods. Traditionally, as mentioned earlier, the 
economy is heavily based on winter trade in sweaters in India, but increasingly that trade meets 
competition from lowlanders who—so the theory goes in Tiri—seek alternative sources of income 
through migration to India, in the face of the problems imposed by the Maoists. 
Unlike Mustang District, respondents in the hills, particularly the key informants, tended to place 
their evaluations of the crisis in a wider, community context. Their ability to do so possibly reflects 
their roles as leaders in communities under influence of formal administrative systems and policies. 
Additionally, a number of the informants had been—as also mentioned earlier—able to utilize the 
opportunity structures of the democratic era, with user groups often being used as platforms for 
gaining influence within local government. Both the suspension of local government and the 
suppression of politics at the village level other than those promoted by the Maoists are outcomes of 
the crisis. 
A woman farmer, active in the mothers’ group of Pipalbot, exemplifies this ability to articulate 
effects in a broad context: 
“No institution functions freely in our community because of the Maoist insurgency. We 
only have the health post, the post office and the school left. We are instructed by the 
Maoists not to work for the community without their approval. Maoist leaders do not like 
local institutions, NGOs and government agencies. They have closed the suspension bridge 
project, and they have declared that all women’s groups, forestry groups and other activities 
be registered with them, otherwise they will not allow them to run. But we cannot run 
meetings, pay visits, or invite outsiders such as NGO representatives. The Maoists have 
already kidnapped two District Development Committee staff and kept them for a long time 
in their so-called labour camp.” 
The same woman farmer goes on to lament that the Village Development Committee is inactive and 
that representatives of government line agencies are unable to visit the community: 
“We had good relations with the agriculture office, and the livestock office for providing 
seeds and technical support. Now their staff cannot come because of the Maoist threat.” 
This lamenting of the loss of contact with government offices is echoed in a number of interviews, 
and reflects the fact that farmers have increasingly diversified their cropping portfolios away from 
grains to also include cash crops. Government extension, however rudimentary, plays a pivotal role 
in sustaining production, particularly with respect to the provision of seeds. Village Development 
Committees were, as established in the previous section, the key facilitators of contact with line 
agencies. Their inability to operate is considered particularly problematic, as two male farmers from 
Amalachaur explain: 
“After the political change [in the early 1990s], we got a right to speak and the 
decentralization process gave power to the Village Development Committee. The 
government allocated Nepali Rupees 500,000 per Village Development Committee for 
development activities. The motor road was constructed. Various organizations were 
established, and there were women’s groups. This contributed to our livelihoods. But the 
present conflict situation means that Village Development Committee activities are not 
functioning at the village level. It has become very hard to run activities without elected 
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representatives. The Village Development Committee Secretary now only carries out legal 
work and stays in the district headquarters.” 
A wealthy farmer in Pipalbot, an ex-serviceman, provides a more personal account of events: 
“We are punished from two sides. Since 2002, the government has not been able to 
implement any programmes in our village. But these days we suffer more at the hands of the 
Maoists. I have to pay 12 days pension per month to the Maoists. From time to time, I have 
to donate additional funds. People who come back from abroad on leave have to pay a 
special tax, ranging from Nepali Rupees 10,000 up to Nepali Rupees 150,000 (US$ 142–
2150). We have to provide food and grains for free. Parents send their children to town for 
schooling because the local boarding schools have been closed. Our agricultural production 
and sales have gone down because the Maoists call us for frequent meetings and 
programmes of up to seven days. But if we do not participate, we are called anti-
revolutionary and maybe killed or expelled from the village.” 
The problem of being squeezed between the demands of the Maoists and for being suspected as a 
Maoist by the army is heard in virtually all communities. As a woman in Pipalbot says on the role 
of the army: 
“They misbehave with us. They have also arrested the forestry users’ committee chairperson 
and keep him in Baglung jail, charging him with meeting with the Maoists. He met them 
with a view to having two of his staff released from their custody.” 
In addition, the more active the Maoists are in an area, the more vulnerable the area is to open 
fighting. People in a number of communities in Myagdi District had for quite some time when I 
visited in 2004 only gathered for meetings inside houses, following an incident where an income-
generating group, gathered in a courtyard, were shot at from an army helicopter. Babiachaur, a 
community near Pipalbot, has been particularly affected. A woman farmer from the area, 
encountered at a government office in the district headquarters, was visible traumatized by a recent 
shoot-out between the army and the Maoists where she and her family were caught in the crossfire. 
Unable to talk about the event itself, she simply mentioned that: 
“The problems have seriously affected our lives, because we cannot do what we wish to do. 
We are unable to sell our products in the market and the Maoists have chased away the 
agriculture office.” 
What is it exactly that this farmer and others like her actually wish to do? Most farmers who have 
experienced progressively rising incomes throughout the past decade obviously wish to continue 
along what was, until quite recently, an advancing livelihood trajectory, fuelled, for most people, by 
a combination of cash crop sales and remittances from abroad. Even in the face of the current crisis, 
the vast majority finds that lives and livelihoods have improved compared to their childhoods and 
conditions before democracy.  
Most of the upwardly mobile have invested heavily in their children’s education, as witnessed by 
the number of private schools that shot up in rural (and indeed urban) areas in the 1990s (and were 
closed by the Maoists in the 2000s). I mentioned earlier that, like parents everywhere, the dream is 
for the children to become doctors or engineers, and many parents were, in 2004 and 2005, in the 
face of the crisis ready to sell land in order to reach this goal. Hardly anyone imagined a future for 
their children in the village “because of the lack of opportunities” was the common refrain. These 
ambitions—that may be further illustrated by statements along the lines of “life is easier in the 
city”, “the children do not want to work as we do” and “they have already passed their exams”—
obviously go beyond the present insurgency situation. However, the determination behind giving up 
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rural life is no doubt exacerbated by the present crisis which, as one farmer puts it, “has increased 
fear, worry, misery and expenditure”.  
9.7.4 Concluding Remarks: Institutional Plurality and Democratic Regression as Factors 
that Influence the Common Property Regime Irrigation 
The last sections have revealed that the institutional landscape in the communities is much more 
diverse than a singular focus on irrigation institutions would warrant. Multiple livelihood interests 
are accompanied by expanded matrices of institutions. The trends and shocks of the past decade 
have severely influenced farmers’ abilities to pursue livelihoods and livelihood strategies through 
institutions. On the one hand, the diversification of livelihoods, both ‘within’ agriculture (with 
subsequent legal pluralism) and outside of agriculture, has been accompanied by an institutional 
landscape that expanded within the ‘trend’ of the democratic policies of the politico-economic 
moment between in the 1990s and early 2000s. On the other hand, that landscape, and the space that 
it provided for progressive livelihood trajectories, has been curtailed in recent years by the ‘shock’ 
of armed conflict, particularly by Maoist attempts at controlling institutional life. 
How does this relate to irrigation and its institutions? If we accept, in the face of the data on 
lowered performance, dissatisfaction with institutional arrangements, reduced labour contributions, 
within-agriculture diversification, etc., that cooperation in irrigation is on the wane, the following 
question emerges: Does an expanded institutional landscape contribute to the relative institutional 
erosion of irrigation institutions? Mosse (2006) argues, using examples from south India, that the 
growth of associational life does tend to erode collective action in irrigation management. In the 
south Indian case, collective action was never, he argues, a matter of trust and reciprocity; rather it 
was embedded in social relations of rank, power and control. Therefore, the rise in associationalism, 
i.e., in caste associations, NGOs, user groups and other more or less horizontal expressions of 
struggles for autonomy, can be directly linked to the decline of coordinated control of commons 
resources, mainly because these associations (emerging in much the same way as in the Dhaulagiri 
Zone as an outcome of democratic policies) undermined the “hierarchical orders of community 
collective action” (2006:716).  
While relations of rank, power and control most certainly matter in the irrigated communities in the 
Dhaulagiri Zone, I will argue that because of the much more homogenous social context (in terms 
of caste and access to land, etc.), the rise in associational life should not to any great extent be 
associated with intra-community struggles for autonomy on the part of specific subordinate groups. 
For the same reasons, it would be incorrect to dismiss trust and reciprocity as elements in collective 
action. It seems more plausible to argue, as has been shown empirically in this thesis, that the rise in 
associational and other forms of institutional and organizational life—in addition to being related to 
enhanced democratic space and interventions by external agents—mainly reflects a wider diversity 
of livelihood interests, and that multiple livelihood interests and institutional plurality go hand-in-
hand. Collective action in the irrigation commons declines, in relative terms, because of shifts in 
livelihood interests; thus the extent to which other institutions are strengthened vis-à-vis irrigation 
institutions reflects changed interests.  
It is important to note, however, that amid growing institutional plurality, irrigation institutions are 
still considered among the most important institutions in livelihood terms. This, no doubt, reflects 
the continued importance of irrigated agriculture, based on conventional cropping regimes that 
depend on collective action cooperative elements, as a source of livelihoods, despite both ‘within- 
and without-agriculture’ diversification. However, the decrease in importance of other cooperative 
arrangements such as parma seems symptomatic of a relative reduction in the importance of the 
cooperative arrangements that surround irrigated agriculture and conventional cropping regimes. 
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The aging of irrigation association representatives and the apparent inability to attract younger 
farmers seems equally symptomatic of the growing institutional problems that have been discussed 
in earlier chapters, relating to hill farmers’ dissatisfaction with water distribution, among other 
issues. 
While collective action and cooperation over water may decline, it seems improbable to assume that 
cooperation in agriculture and in communal life in general declines; rather, the data examined in the 
previous sections imply, as already suggested, that cooperation merely takes on other forms. 
Vegetable farmers, owing to the more individualized water requirements of their crops, may reduce 
their involvement in collective action in the irrigated commons, but at the same time they form 
marketing cooperatives and farmers associations that help in linking them to markets and the 
surrounding government institutions. Likewise, the rise in importance of mothers’ groups, although 
not directly related to productive activities, certainly represents increased levels of engagement in 
civil society and cooperation with respect to social matters at the community level. 
This leaves us with the role of the Maoists and the army. The effects of the attempts on the part of 
the Maoists to control institutional life may—even if it was not reported to be the case by farmers—
affect the operation of these irrigation institutions in both the short and the long term. In the short 
term because irrigation leaders with non-Maoist political affiliations are likely to keep low profiles, 
and because Maoist ambitions with respect to co-opting institutional life has the general effect of 
discouraging public positions. It is my impression that this has already created leadership voids in 
irrigation committees. In the longer term, in a more indirect sense, it is the continued stifling of 
institutional and economic life combined with an atmosphere of fear that is of concern. Disruption 
of the progressing livelihood trajectories of these middle farmers is likely to have a considerable 
impact with respect to accelerating a tendency to abandon the pursuit of agriculture-based 
livelihoods and hence the institutions on which they are based. 
Chapter 10: Conclusion and Perspectives 
10.1 General Conclusion 
It was proposed at the beginning of this thesis that the central role provided to community-based 
resource management institutions in rural development policy and planning requires re-thinking. 
Such re-thinking is, I suggested, needed because dominant thinking on community-based irrigation 
institutions as effective ways of organizing agricultural production fails to capture current contexts 
of rapid and heterogeneously changing roles of agriculture in rural economies and livelihoods. It 
has been the ambition of this thesis to contribute to the re-thinking by exploring the extent to which 
common property regimes in irrigation are affected by changes, and by identifying the specific 
factors that may be affecting the performance of irrigation institutions and the cooperative 
arrangements that are associated with the management of common property regime-based 
irrigation. 
Underlying this ambition to re-think the situation was growing evidence from Nepal (and indeed 
elsewhere) that livelihood diversification and changing forms of agriculture have become major 
elements in rural socio-economic change. I suggested that, if the role of agriculture as a central 
livelihood has been reduced, then incentives for investing time and labour in collective operation 
and maintenance of irrigation systems were also likely to be affected, and that this, in turn, was 
likely to have negative implications on the performance of common property regime-based 
irrigation. I also pointed out that assumptions about the centrality of agriculture and rural 
institutions as stable entities and a subsequent tendency to understand irrigation institutions at 
internal levels restricted the ability of collective action thinking to capture dynamic ‘ground-level 
reality’. Therefore, that ‘reality’, I proposed, warranted the re-thinking of irrigation institutions and 
their responses to change in terms of broader empirical and theoretical contexts.  
The broad empirical circumstances that I have analysed have involved repeat-study data on 
irrigation system performance, institutions and socio-economic conditions in nine irrigated 
communities; and contextualization of irrigated agriculture and its institutions in Nepal in a 
‘political economic’ period, in political economy, and in a regional framework. It has also involved 
the generation of livelihood and institutional trajectories, based on the notion that livelihoods are 
formed within the context of various matrices of institutions. The theoretical and analytical 
approach has been somewhat pragmatic: for performance analysis I applied a framework that is 
central to collective action thinking, but in overall terms the investigation has been informed by 
theoretical and analytical elements that moved beyond the relatively narrow rational choice and 
methodological individualism realms of collective action.  
This entailed the integration of concepts associated with property, entitlements and particularly 
access into a livelihood framework. This not only served to balance the rational choice and agency 
elements of livelihood approaches with the more structural concerns associated with diversification, 
but it also provided scope for analysis of the dynamic relationship between livelihood trajectories in 
relation to irrigation institutions, and the consequences of changing economic, social and political 
contexts on these institutions and the institutional landscape in general. 
So to what extent and how is irrigated agriculture affected by changes in economic, social and 
political contexts? 
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It has been established that irrigation system performance, measured in terms of key indicators, has 
been reduced during the political-economic period under examination, particularly in the hills. The 
reasons for this include ‘within-agriculture diversification’ which has emerged as an important 
determinant of changes in the way irrigation is organized. Cropping patterns characterized by more 
vegetables, potatoes and to some extent fruits in the dry season have increased at the expense of 
grain crops such as wheat and maize (in the hills) and buckwheat (in parts of the mountains). 
Vegetable production is relatively water intensive, and depends on individual, rather than collective 
water-use regimes associated with staple crops. The collectively managed irrigation systems are 
unable to meet many farmers’ demands for water; this seems to explain why farmers increasingly 
find water insufficient and even unfairly distributed in the dry season. The fact that staple crops 
compete with vegetables and other ‘cash’ crops during the dry season for labour, water and 
fertilizer explain, to some extent, the falling yield levels of maize and wheat. Within-agriculture 
diversification and subsequent reduced incentives to ‘invest’ in the common property regime also 
contribute to explaining lowered institutional performance, characterized by reduced labour 
contributions and system maintenance. 
However, the impinging role of within-agriculture diversification on the performance of common 
property regimes in irrigation does not extend to rice production, which continues to display stable 
levels of productivity. This is largely owing to climatic conditions (e.g., a defined and prolonged 
monsoon) that render wet rice production the main, if not only, cropping option during the rainy 
season. Hence, the collective action on which wet rice production depends is likely to continue in a 
situation of legal pluralism, i.e., in co-existence with different tenure systems and legal orders in the 
social field of irrigation organization. 
‘Outside-agriculture diversification’, another potentially impinging factor in the management of 
irrigation as common property regimes, has increased quite dramatically in the irrigated 
communities. While this form of diversification that is chiefly manifested in male labour migration 
should be understood in the context of wider structural changes in the economy, its direct effects—
contrary to speculation on the subject—on cooperation in, and performance of, the irrigation 
systems are not great, at least not in the short term. Farmers do not see labour shortages resulting 
from migration as the problem with respect to the performance of maintenance tasks; this seems to 
be because (female-headed) households attach priority to such tasks, because more labour is hired, 
and because, at the level of the community, it would appear that those who migrate would not have 
participated in agriculture in the first place.  
The feminization of agriculture that results from migration, however, may be leading to institutional 
memory loss in the longer run, as women farmers do not replace ageing men in irrigation 
committees. However, while migration is likely to lead to the existence of a number of vulnerable 
de facto female-headed households whose status leaves them disadvantaged in respect to access to 
common property, these households are also likely, in the absence of other income opportunities, to 
pursue strategies that secure group membership and conditions for irrigated agriculture.  
The limited, direct effects of outside-agriculture diversification are related to one of the most 
important findings of this study, namely that the role of agriculture has not decreased over the years 
in the vast majority of the irrigated communities. This finding is important because it runs counter 
to what it is implicitly assumed in the study’s problematic, as indeed in much of the literature, i.e., 
that as rural households construct increasingly diverse portfolios of economic activities, the role of 
agriculture will decrease. The collective livelihood trajectories reveal that households in this study 
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have experienced changes in the composition of their income over the years, and that remittances 
appear to have played a major role in changing this composition. Remittances, however, it should 
be recalled, are far from important to all households and, overall, the situation is one of augmented 
incomes with agricultural sources of livelihoods constituting very important elements.  
The finding strongly suggests that any reduced incentives for investing time and labour in collective 
operation and maintenance of irrigation systems are not necessarily the result of a demise of 
agriculture, let alone migration and remittances. This prompts a focus on the more indirect effects 
associated with economic change on irrigation management. The finding thus brings us back to how 
both outside-agriculture diversification and within-agriculture diversification are linked to dynamics 
of urbanization and urban demand: with respect to urbanization we know from the literature that 
remittances tend not to be reinvested in agriculture and agriculture-based livelihoods, but rather 
stimulate urban-based investment and urbanization. The net household emigration figures from the 
hills suggest that this may also be the case as regards to the studied communities. With respect to 
urban demand, we know that the vegetable production that takes place in the irrigated communities 
is in response to growing urban markets where demand is, at least partly, fuelled by remittances.  
The finding therefore compels a focus on the effects of economic dynamics of within-agriculture 
diversification and the legal pluralism that such diversification implies, if a better understanding of 
the future of community-based irrigation and its role in rural development is to be arrived at. In 
other words, it appears that the focus could be less singularly on the demise of agriculture and its 
institutions and more on agriculture’s changed dynamics. 
The first part of the political-economic moment witnessed a proliferation of economic and social 
institutions, propelled by external agents and a democratic environment. The second part of the 
politico-economic moment saw a stifled institutional landscape, as a result of the civil war, 
particularly the Maoist’s attempts at controlling institutional life. Concluding remarks on the effects 
of these opposing directions on irrigation management are put forward in section 9.7.4. 
Suffice it to say here that agriculture’s continued importance as a source of livelihoods is reflected 
in the importance that farmers attach to institutions that are directly associated with agriculture, 
such as Farmers’ Irrigation Associations and vegetable cooperatives, and the wider institutional 
landscape that these institutions are part of. 
10.2  Perspectives: The Emerging Conundrum 
In the final section of this thesis, I will draw attention to the conundrum that has gradually emerged 
from the analysis of the last two chapters. The conundrum is as follows: diversification of 
livelihoods and integration with market forces in the mountains, so much more pronounced there 
than in the hill communities, does not appear to have had markedly negative effects on cooperation 
on the commons. In the mountain communities, shares of non-agricultural incomes have been 
continuously higher over the years than agricultural incomes and migration levels are generally 
higher than in the hills. ‘Exit options’ from agriculture have been available to the mountain farmers 
for centuries and the mountain communities, by any standard, are much more integrated into the 
regional and global economy than the hill communities. Yet the indicators on performance and 
other institutional health in general, from yield levels to labour contributions and to satisfaction 
with water distribution and other arrangements, do not seem seriously affected.  
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In the context of this thesis, this conundrum is an outcome of the grounded research methodology 
that has characterized the investigation. It raises a host of new questions and problematics that go 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It also confirms earlier assertions regarding the complexity 
associated with capturing, theoretically and empirically, the directions of rural change in general, 
and common property regimes in particular. Thus, in my drawing attention to this question, I will 
not address it in analytical detail, but rather offer pointers and perspectives as regards the direction 
that additional research on factors that influence common property regime irrigation could take. As 
the mountain cases suggest, the negative effects of external factors on common property regime 
irrigation experienced in the hills, whether directly or indirectly, are not universal. Revisiting figure 
1 of section 2.6.4, which presents three possible paths in the face of increased exit options, the 
situation in the mountains resembles path A, where wealth is seen to lead to incentives to 
contribute, to investments in resources and to resource maintenance. 
‘Within-agriculture diversification’ has emerged as one determinant of reduced performance in the 
common property regimes of the hills. Hence, less of such ‘within-agriculture diversification’ in the 
mountains compared to the hills could, to some extent, be considered one explanatory factor in 
remote Khinga and Tiri where conventional cereal crops prevail. However, this is not the case in 
Thini, which is a major supplier of vegetables to the district headquarters. In any case, even if less 
crop diversification were a major factor, it would not fully explain the differences between 
mountains and hills, as the more remote hill systems with limited vegetable production also display 
comparative lower performance trajectories than the mountains. 
I suggest that attempts at explaining the different paths that common property regimes may take, as 
illustrated by the mountains versus hills cases, should firstly focus on the historical and political 
context of the irrigation institutions. Secondly, it should engage with the debate on democratization 
and (‘good’) governance in natural resource management that, as I mention in chapter 2, has 
emerged in recent years. This debate focuses on the public and private spheres of institutions, and 
includes equity aspects (Meynen and Doornbus 2004), democratic versus ‘privatization’ 
decentralization (Ribot 2005), as well as the effectiveness of single-purpose institutions versus 
multipurpose institutions (Manor 2004) in addressing livelihoods concerns and wider development 
issues that require democratic engagement with the wider political system.  
It is pointed out in that debate, that single-purpose (‘private club’) institutions are characterized by 
‘exclusive’ membership (such as irrigated farmers), that committees are not always elected, and that 
their functions typically relate to singular concerns such as irrigation. Multipurpose councils, or 
local government, on the other hand, tend to belong within the public sphere, have more democratic 
structures and to concern themselves with a multitude of interests. The debate questions the wisdom 
of donor-driven proliferation of single-purpose institutions, such as the irrigation institutions that, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, have gained central places in rural development policy over the past 
decade or so.  
It would appear that the hill irrigation institutions possess characteristics of single-purpose 
institutions, while their mountain counterparts possess characteristics of multipurpose institutions. 
These characteristics appear to have been influenced by events during the political-economic 
moment. Most markedly in the hills, where privatization and decentralization as two major themes 
of the1990s helped to transform what had hitherto been informal irrigation institutions (in a 
government–administrative sense) into formal, legally recognized institutions. This occurred in the 
context of the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project’s irrigation rehabilitation interventions, in 
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line with collective action design principles and government efforts to promote local natural 
resource management. The standard formula involved recorded membership, (s)elected committees, 
bye-laws, and registration with local authorities.  
These committees have disappeared in two of the six hill communities that have been investigated. 
Existing committees show signs of coping problems and members point to the severance of links 
with local authorities, along with the civil war, as a couple of the reasons. As a sign of both, 
renewal of registration with Village Development Committees ceased in the early 2000s, as 
political life became increasingly problematic, not least for elite village politicians, some of whom 
had used committees as platforms for advancement. Additionally, local authorities had become 
increasingly unresponsive to local institutions in the face of the growing political crisis that 
culminated in the suspension of local authorities in 2002. This left the hill communities with an 
institutional landscape made up of the army, the local magistrate and the Maoists, the occasionally 
active line agency, and irrigation systems that appear to be managed increasingly informally. 
Moreover, the irrigation institutions are faced with challenges of increasing livelihood 
diversification, away from crops that require common property regime irrigation and away from 
agriculture as the central livelihood in general. 
In the mountains, some degree of integration between what have historically been village councils, 
that dealt with a wide range of natural resource concerns, and government administrative systems 
was a feature of both the (pre-1990) Panchayat structures (when mukhya where appointed by the 
central authority) and the post-1990 democratic decentralization structures. Farmers generally 
recollect the interfaces with both pre-democratic and democratic structures as negative (except for 
the annual grant allocation) because nepotism and co-option/corruption of traditional leadership was 
seen to divert attention away from local concerns. Efforts at institutional crafting in the 1990s by 
the Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project were based on a standard formula, similarly applied 
as in the hills, that completely ignored the existence of traditional governance structures. Hardly 
any trace of these devised institutional structures remains today; the committees that were set up 
were abolished once construction had been completed. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
democratic period did leave its mark; unlike the Panchayat times, mukhya are now elected. Farmers 
generally perceive the current village councils, based on accountability and self-reliance, as more 
effective than those of the past. 
This movement in opposing directions of hill and mountain institutional trajectories is interesting. It 
is particularly interesting to note that the multipurpose institutions of the mountains appear better 
suited to dealing with broad livelihood portfolios than their single-purpose counterpart institutions 
in the hills. Could this be because multipurpose institutions are better able to accommodate multiple 
livelihood interests that require expanded institutional matrices than are single-purpose institutions? 
Does the wider remit of multipurpose institutions provide more room for crafting and playing out 
diversified livelihood interests within natural resources and beyond? Are single-purpose 
institutions, equipped as they are to handle singular interests only, more vulnerable in a rapidly 
changing livelihood context? It appears that the institutional vulnerability of the hill institutions 
extends to the political context. While the partly ‘crafted’, single-purpose, user-group institutions of 
the hills did enjoy some success within the democratically decentralized landscape of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the severing of links to that landscape also exposed dependency on a wider portfolio of 
institutional concerns beyond the capacity of the single-purpose institution. During the same period, 
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the mountain institutions re-invented themselves and became not only more effective than before 
but also more democratic.  
Obviously, conditions for these institutions have been very different, particularly with respect to the 
very limited effects of the insurgency on institutional life in the mountains. Likewise, it may not be 
sensible to compare the deeply entrenched village councils of the mountains that have evolved over 
centuries under specific social, cultural and ecological circumstances with the irrigation institutions 
of the hills that have evolved under totally different circumstances. However, notwithstanding these 
factors, the cases illustrate the relevance of questioning rural development strategies that promote 
the exclusive logic of single-purpose institutions, as opposed to the more inclusive logic of 
multipurpose institutions and democratic decentralization in general. In the present case of the 
mountains, such inclusion certainly appears to be a supportive factor for continued community-
based collective action under changing social, political and economic conditions. 
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Annex 2 
IRRIGATION SURVEY 2004 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND CHECKLIST 
 
Key: Characters written in bold types inside brackets (…..) are directions to the interviewer.  
The questionnaire must be completed in English. 
 
 
1. Basic Information 
 
1.Subproject Name:_____________________2. Size of Command Area (Ropanies):________ 
 
3 No HHs with (tick)  Land in the CA_________ No HHs in the Village1_________ 
 
4. Date of Interview:___________________ 5. Interviewer’s Name__________________________
  
6. Farmer’s Name   :___________________ 7. Male_____ 8. Female_____9. Family Size_______ 
 
10. Total Operational (Ropanies) Holding in CA_____________ 
 
11. Location of land in CA:  Head_________  Middle________  Tail_______ 
 
2. Agricultural Indicators 
 
1.How many ropanies of all your crops did you cultivate in the CA last year2  
 
S.N  Crop Name  Ropanies Cultivated   Area Cultivated Last Year 
Last Year   Compared to Ten Year Ago 
 
1  ________________ __________________ Less Same More 
 
2  ________________ __________________ Less Same More 
 
3  ________________ __________________ Less Same  More 
 
4  ________________ __________________ Less Same  More 
 
(In case of a change in cultivation pattern over the years please explain):________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In the actual physical unit. 
2 I.e. from Baisakh 2060 – Chaitra 2061 
 1
3. What was the yield for your 3 main crops grown in the CA in the last harvest? 
 
s.n.  Crop    Yield  (unit:_____) 
 
1 _____________________  _________________________ 
 
2 _____________________  _________________________ 
 
3 _____________________  _________________________ 
 
 
3. Labour Inputs 
 
Please specify the use of labour (no.of people) for your last crops for the following crops: 
 
 
Crop  Family (own) Labour Hired Labour Parma Labour Total 
 
Buckwheat _______________  ________________ _________________ _____ 
 
N. Barley  _______________  ________________ _________________  _____ 
 
Barley  _______________  ________________ _________________  _____ 
 
Maize  _______________  ________________ _________________  _____ 
 
(In case of hired labour where did it come from) (tick)?  VDC____  Outside _____ Why do you  
 
hire labour (explain)?______________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4. Income and Livelihoods 
 
1. What was approximately your household cash income last year (NRs)?_________ 
 
2. Approximately, how much of this income came directly from agriculture (sale of grains, 
vegetables, fruits, livestock etc) (circle)?:  < 1/4 1/4 1/3 1/2 2/3 1/1 
 
3. What was the source of the non agricultural income (circle)?: 
a. Hotel/Tourism  b. Remittances c. Govt. Service or Army d. Shop 
 
e. Agricultural Labour f. Trade  g. Portering h. Other (explain): _________  
 
4. (Apart for remittances) Did you work (tick) Outside_________ or Inside________ this 
District? 
 
 2
4. Has the proportion of your household income that comes from outside/inside agriculture changed 
over the last ten years 
(explain)_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  
5 Migration and Employment: 
 
1. Household Data: 
 
Relation Place of Work Main 
Occupation 
Secondary 
Occupation 
Age 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
COLUMN ONE   COLUMN TWO  COLUMNS THREE AND FOUR 
1.Head of HH 1. District    1. Farming 
2.Wife  2. Nepal    2. Agricultural Labour 
3. Son  3. Abroad (India)   3. Govt. Service  
4.Daughter 4. Abroad (mention country)  4. Army 
5. Daughter-in-Law     5. Shop 
6. Son-in-Law     
      7. Portering 
6. Trade 
 
2. Do any members of your household live away from home more than 6 months of the year (tick)?: 
 
Yes_____No_____ (If yes) Who?_____________________________________________________ 
 
3. Do you get any financial support from relatives living outside (tick?) Yes____No____ 
 
 
5. Operation and Maintenance of the Irrigation System 
 
1. Does your household contribute labour to the maintenance of the irrigation system (tick)? 
 
Yes____ No_____ 
 
2. (If Yes), approximately how many days per year?____________ 
 
3. (If Yes) on which basis is the labour organised (tick?): 
 
A. Size of Landholding in CA _______ B. Size of your HH _________ C. Other_______________ 
 
4.( If Yes) Are you fined if you do not contribute labour (tick)?  Yes____ No____ How Much____ 
 
5. Do you Pay an Annual Water Fee (tick)?   Yes_____No_____ (If Yes) How Much___________ 
 3
 4
 
 
6. (If yes) Are you fined if you do not pay your water fee?  Yes____No____ How Much_________ 
 
Who Collects the fines?_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. (If No Labour is Contributed) How is the maintenance organised (describe)? ______________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. In case of an emergency (eg flood, landslide) how are cash/labour resources mobilised 
(describe)? 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Are you satisfied with the way in which the irrigation system is maintained (tick)? Yes___ No__ 
 
10. (If No) What is the problem (describe)_____________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Do you get sufficient water for your crops (Tick)? Yes_____ No______ 
 
(If No) Explain:___________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12. In your opinion, do farmers along the Head, Middle and Tail Reaches of the canal get their fair 
share of water (tick)? 
 
Yes_____  No________ 
 
(If No explain problem):__________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3 
IRRIGATION SURVEY 2004 
 
Questionnaire for Key Informants 
 
 
1. Basic Information: 
 
1. No. of Households in the Village_____2. No. of Women (+18)_____  3. No. of Men (+18)_____  
 
4. Total Village Population (incl. children)  (tick):   Permanent (>6 month a year)_____ 
 
  Temporary (< 6 month a year) ______  
 
5. What is the proportion of children who attend school outside the district? (circle): 
 
 < 1/4 1/4 1/3 1/2 2/3 1/1 
 
 
 
2. Institutional Information  
 
1.How old is the irrigation system?:_________ 
 
2.How is the irrigation system governed (describe)?______________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. How long has the committee existed?________________ 4. How many members does it  
 
have?_______  
 
4. What are the designations of the committee (chairman, treasurer, secretary etc): 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Are members (tick) Elected? ______Selected?______ (Describe system):_________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. What is the local name for the chairman?________ Is he (tick) Elected? _____ Selected? ______ 
 
How long is his term in office (years)_______________ 
 
 1
Is he also a member of other committees?  Yes_____ No_____ (If yes, mention which 
ones)___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Does the committee keep written records?  Yes_____ No______ 
 
8. Do by-laws exist (tick)?   Yes_____ No______ 
 
 
9. How often does the committee meet?_________ What typically has to be decided on?_________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
10. How is the irrigation system operated and maintained ? (labour contribution, chowkidars etc) 
(describe)?______________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(If Chowkidars) How are they paid (kind,cash) (describe)?______ How much are they  
 
paid?___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Is the committee  (tick) stronger _______or weaker________ now than it was 10 years ago? 
 
(Explain) _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Are there any women on the committee (tick)  Yes_____ No ______ (If yes) How many______ 
 
13. What is the average age of committee members? _____________________________________ 
 
14. Is the average age (tick)   Higher _______ Lower than 10 year ago 
 
12. Is or was the committee represented in other assemblies (VDC, DDC etc) 
(describe)?:______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Which other agricultural institutions exist in the community (“village council” parma, 
cooperatives etc) (describe)? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 2
 3
3. Migration: 
 
In how many households does the husband live away from home for more than six months of the  
 
year?___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Is this more than 10 years ago (tick) ?  Yes______ No _______ 
 
Are there any households where the wife lives away from home for more than six months a year  
 
(tick)? Yes_____ No_______ (If yes, how many)?:_____________________________________ 
 
 
How many households have migrated to (name of subproject) over the past 10 years?__________ 
 
How many HHs have migrated out of the subproject over the past 10 years?___________________ 
 
What happens to their agriculture when HHs move away (explain) __________________________ 
 
4. Livelihoods: 
 
1. What are the main sources of income for people in (name of village) (rank):  
 
A.________________________________________ B ___________________________________ 
 
C_________________________________________D___________________________________ 
 
E _________________________________________ F___________________________________ 
 
 
2. Has life in (name of village) become (tick): Better______ (or) Worse_______ over the  
 
past ten years? (explain)____________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4 
CHECKLIST: FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS. 
LIVELIHOOD TRAJECTORIES: 
 
 
1. Basic Information: 
 
Name____________________ Male________Female________ 
 
Family Size_________ Size of Holding in CA (Ropanies)___________  
 
Location of Land in CA: Head_______Middle_______Tail______ 
 
 
2. Land and Agriculture:   
 
2.1 Has the size of land has increased or decreased over the years?: 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Has the cropping pattern changed over the last ten years?: 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Agricultural work: have you been using more or less hired labour over the last ten years? 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Is there more or less parma now compared to ten years ago? 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Who from this household contributes labour to irrigation canal maintenance? 
 
 
 
 
3. Irrigation and Institutions 
 
3.1 Which institutions/organisations in this area are important for you and your family? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 How important is irrigation to your livelihood? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 The households here need to do quite a lot of maintenance of the irrigation system. Is it worth 
doing it? Do you benefit? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Is the irrigation system well managed? What are the problems, if any? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 How important is it that the irrigation system is managed well? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Has the irrigation system always been managed in the same way? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 Could the irrigation system work without a WUA? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 In some parts of Nepal the Government manages the irrigation systems. Would that be a good 
idea? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9. Do the DDC or VDC matter to your livelihood? 
 
 
 
 
3.9.1 How are VDC funds spent? 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9.2 How about other government institutions? Have they assisted the community? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Income and Income Sources 
 
 
4.1 Proportion of income from agriculture: 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Source of Non-agricultural income: 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Has the proportion of income (agriculture/non-agriculture) changed over the years (explain? 
 
 
 
 
4.4  - and compared with his/her parents days? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Education 
 
 
5.1 Interviewee’s level of education: 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Husband/wife’s level of education: 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Parents level of education: 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Is education is important for you and your family? 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Strategy for children’s education 
 
 
 
 
5.6 Strategy/expectation for children’s work 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Quality of Life 
 
 
6.1 Are you and your family better off these days than when you were a child (explain what has  
changed)? 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Have the political changes in 1990 affected you family’s livelihood?  
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Have they affected the community in general? 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Does the present insurgency affect your livelihood? 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 What are the reasons for change? 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Future income generating strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Will your children live in the community when they grow up? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5 
CHECKLIST: FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS1 
INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 
 
1. Basic Information 
 
Name__________________ Male_____ Female______ 
 
Designation_____________________________________________ 
 
Size of Landholding in CA_________________________________ 
 
 
 
2. History 
 
 
History of Involvement in Public Affairs 
 
 
 
Why is he/she active in Public Affairs? 
 
 
3. Institutional Relationships 
 
 
To what extent are those people who are active in WUC’s also active in local politics? 
 
 
 
 
Which is the most important local institution (local govnt, organisation, association etc) ? Rank and 
explain: 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
                                                 
1 For farmers active in WUA’s etc 
 
 
Which is the most important local institution for the farmers in Thini-Jomsom? Rank and explain: 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
Explain the relationship between WUC and VDC 
 
  
 
 
Explain the relationship between WUC and DDC 
 
 
 
 
Explain the relationship between WUC and HMG line agencies 
 
 
 
 
Does the community have a traditional government system? 
 
 
 
 
4. Various 
 
 
 
What are the threats to community strength? 
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